A New Direction For Japan’s Space Program?

Here is the longer version of the previous article:

Aviation Week & Space Technology   May 06, 2013 , p. 36

Paul Kallender-Umezu
Tokyo

Japanese space programs face strict new reality

Et Tu, Tokyo?

The first order of business for new Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) leader Naoki Okumura will be to reorient his nation’s space program from advanced development to activities that may produce some commercial return on investment.

EpsilonBased on the latest five-year “Basic Plan” for space promulgated by the Office of National Space Policy (ONSP), the new direction is putting pressure on JAXA to cut, postpone or reduce to research and development some or most of the agency’s flagship science, technology and manned spaceflight programs.

Some or all of the satellites planned for the Global Earth Observation System of Systems, the HTV-R pressurized sample-and-crew-return mini-shuttle and the H-X/H-3 launcher programs could face cancellation, concedes JAXA’s Hiroshi Sasaki, senior advisor in the strategic planning and management department.

“For 20 years, so much money has been spent by JAXA [and its predecessor, Nasda] on R&D, but there has been very little commercial return,” says Hirotoshi Kunitomo, ONSP director.

Under legislation passed last year, JAXA policy is now controlled by the 23-member ONSP, which was created at the end of a process begun in the middle of the past decade to wrest control of space planning from the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), which controlled 60% of Japan’s roughly 350 billion yen ($3.75 billion) annual government space budget through its oversight of JAXA.

With a charter for change, ONSP reports directly to Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who has final say over which of JAXA’s programs are funded. In turn, ONSP’s Basic Plan resets Japan’s space policy to three mutually reinforcing goals: promoting national security; boosting industry; and securing the country’s technological independence for all major space applications from reliance on foreign agencies—providing this supports the first two goals.

Kunitomo asserts that ONSP will continue to support frontier science as a lower priority, as long as it is based on the sort of low-cost, high-impact space science designed by JAXA’s Institute of Space and Astronautical Science , embodied by the Hayabusa asteroid sample-return mission. But former high-priority goals to promote environmental monitoring and human space activities and put robots on the Moon now have been moved down the list and must fight for funding, Kunitomo says.

Instead, only one of the three ONSP core programs—Japan’s launch vehicles—is run by JAXA.

The top-priority program, run by the ONSP, is to build out the Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS), Japan’s regional GPS overlay, with a budget approved for maintaining a constellation of four QZSS satellites by around 2018. A post-2020 build-out to a seven-satellite constellation will then give Japan its own independent regional positioning, navigation and timing capability.

The second is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (Asean) newly sanctioned disaster management network run by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). This requires a constellation of Earth-observing satellites equipped with X- and L-band radar and hyperspectral sensors to monitor Southeast Asia. Japan will provide at least the first three satellites, with more funding through foreign aid packages. Vietnam has signed up for two X-band satellites. The system’s once-daily global-revisit policy requires a minimum constellation of four satellites that will need to be replenished every five years or so.

The third priority has JAXA focusing on improving the current H-2A launch vehicle in partnership with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) while continuing improvement of its new low-cost, launch-on-demand Epsilon solid-fuel rocket for smaller payloads. A variant of the Epsilon will be uprated to around 1,800 kg (3,970 lb.) from 1,200 kg to low Earth orbit, matching that of its predecessor M-V launch vehicle.

JAXA projects that fall outside the Basic Plan’s goals but already were funded for development will continue if it would be counter-productive to stop them, says Kunitomo. These include launching the upcoming ALOS-2 land-observing system and the Global Precipitation Measurement/Dual-frequency Precipitation Radar satellites. The Greenhouse Gases-Observing Satellite-2 (Gosat-2) will also continue, as it is funded by the Environment Ministry, not MEXT/JAXA.

But under a Feb. 25 budget plan drawn up by Kunitomo, several programs face close scrutiny, including the HTV-R sample-return mission, any future launches of the HTV-R transfer vehicle beyond the current seven planned to 2016, lunar exploration and all of JAXA’s follow-on environmental missions.

The ONSP’s logic for reauditing the HTV-R is harsh. As it is too expensive to commercialize, the H-2B will be ditched as dead once its HTV duties are finished. The HTV’s only purpose is to service the International Space Station, and Japan must minimize its costs, so logically the HTV, HTV-R and H-2B have no future beyond 2016 and the HTV’s seventh flight. Indeed, one industry official tells Aviation Week that Japan may launch at most two post-2016 missions.

The Basic Plan mandates that the agency’s already-low-priority environmental-monitoring programs undergo a “focus and reselection process.” This means the proposed GCOM-C, EarthCARE cloud radar mission and ALOS-3 electro-optical missions , the second main plank of Japan’s flagship international cooperation programs with NASA and the European Space Agency , will struggle for funding, and not all will make it, says Kunitomo. But a reconfigured ALOS-3 that can adapt to the Asean disaster management network at a fraction of its projected price would be more acceptable, he concedes.

As for the putative H-X, Kunitomo says ONSP questions the need to spend $2 billion and 8-10 years to develop it. JAXA and MHI say the program requires a launch system that no one can guarantee will be commercially competitive.

Industry’s reaction to all of this appears to range from stress to relief to anxiety. Masaru Uji, a general manager at the Society of Japanese Aerospace Companies, says QZSS and Asean network programs will provide steady, long-term business for Japan’s two satellite integrators: Mitsubishi Electric, which is supplying its DS2000 bus for the QZSS; and NEC Corp. , with its METI-funded 300-kg-class multipurpose Asnaro bus for the network.

The aerospace trade association figures show that for 2011, Japan’s total space sales—both overseas and domestic, and including all subcontractor revenues—amounted to only ¥265 billion ($2.7 billion). That is down from a peak of ¥379 billion in 1998, with overseas commercial sales accounting for only the low teens in revenue and JAXA programs taking the lion’s share of domestic business.

The Basic Plan “is moving in the right direction. You can’t build a business without infrastructure,” says Satoshi Tsuzukibashi, director of the Industrial Technology Bureau at Keidanren, Japan’s most powerful business lobby.

Uji is particularly pleased for NEC, which has been awarded a so-called private finance initiative to develop the QZSS ground segment, spreading steady payments to the company for at least the next 15 years. Anticipating the Basic Plan this January, NEC announced a ¥9.9 billion investment in a new 9,000-sq.-meter (97,000-sq.-ft.) satellite facility in Fuchu, west of Tokyo, to build a fleet of Asnaro satellites, which it also hopes to market commercially under the Nextar brand, says Yasuo Horiuchi, senior manager of NEC’s satellite business development office.

Similarly, Mitsubishi Electric said in March that it completed a doubling of its satellite production capacity to eight buses annually at its Kamakura Works. Having already sold four of the 13 DS2000-based satellites to commercial satellite services customers, increased volume spurred by the QZSS program will create further efficiencies and cost competitiveness, says Executive Director Eiichi Hikima.

MHI may face a different challenge, however. Ryo Nakamura, director of H-2A-2B launch services in the company’s Space Systems Div., says an improved H-IIA may gain one commercial contract in 2015-16. This may convince ONSP to fund the H-X (or H-3), whose first stage was supposed to use an LE-X engine with a high-thrust expander bleed cycle. Before the Basic Plan , the rocket was slated in JAXA’s road map to undergo the first of its three test launches around 2018. Hidemasa Nakanishi, manager of strategy and planning at the Space Systems Div., thinks it is Japan ‘s duty as an advanced spacefaring nation to complete its participation in the International Space Station, thus learning pressurized return technologies through the HTV-R .

JAXA’s Sasaki points out that nothing has been cut yet, and JAXA is going to battle to preserve as much of its “traditional” programs as it can in the relevant subcommittees though the spring. Key decisions will come in June.

JSP Catchup #8: Japan To Boost Missile Warning, Other Surveillance Efforts

Here is a story that Space News asked me to write for their Military Space Quarterly, so it gave me a chance to write a little bit about the militarization of Japan’s space development, which is apparently not occurring.

The intriguing thing for me as a media participant and, more recently, as an observer, is why Japan’s development of a UAV program for early warning should suddenly become news.

And news. And news.

And, ahem…news.

Well, it’s because the Yomuiri decided it was news, even though the information has been out there since August, when the request for the budget was put out.

This led to the story being printed in the English and then suddenly the WSJ even has an angle.

Perhaps the journalist has figured out that maritime observation was somehow important to the U.S.-Japan Alliance, perhaps as it has been written in as one of the fours priority areas of cooperation. in the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (2+2) (June 2011).

The funniest story of them all was an AFP hack job on the Yomiuri story which was itself re-sluiced round media  slop sites, including a website called Inquirer.net, which quoted the AFP quoting the Yomiuri as saying “The defense ministry has demanded 3 billion yen ($372 million) over the next four years to develop the aircraft, which would come into operation in 2020, the Yomiuri Shimbun reported without citing sources.”

The Yomiuri Shimbun’s source was, as I mentioned, the publicly available MOD budget request, released months before, in color:

The fact that Japan is developing UAVs is old, old news; the fact that it is developing them as an alternative to satellite- based EW was big news- back in August. I wonder why the Yomiuri decided to notice the story months later?

In any case, for space watchers, the interesting point about this why is Japan researching twin  Early Warning programs simultaneously?

If you believe in the cock-up theory of history and recognize the stovepiping inherent in any large bureaucracy, then you might call it one hand not knowing what the other is doing.

In this case however, it is  more probably the extreme anxiety that the MOD feels about buying Japanese, which is probably based on the fact that the IGS has proved so problematical for Japan. There is a strong sense in the MoD that it can buy better gear, cheaper, with guaranteed compatibility and interoperability in terms of space based EW, so why risk buying from Melco?

Also there are tricky decisions whether to mount EW sensors on the geo-based satellites of QZSS, or develop standalone satellites, or put capability on a future Himawari, among other options on the table. In the meantime, cheap and cheerful UAV-mounted sensors are an option.

I’ll talk about SSA in a later submission, perhaps at the end of the month. If EW looks complicated for Japan, wait till you see what is happening with SSA! Anyway, here is a recent article from Space News.

Japan Passes Overhaul of Space Management Structure

Here is the Space News version of the Defense News story I put out earlier: it’s a case of better late than never, and I will be trying to cover developments in various media as well as for my academic and policy paper requirements. “Please watch this space!”

I had a long talk with Saadia Pekkanen, my coauthor of In Defense of Japan and everything we predicted is coming on slowly and surely. How things will pan out immediately will quickly be seen in the upcoming budget request. However, a massive revision of the Basic Plan of 2009 is also a top priority of the new Uchusenryaku Shitsu (Space Strategy Office) and we will have concrete evidence of the next 5-year plan then. The timetable for the revised Basic Plan could be as early as within this year. This and a Space Activities Act are the top priorities, according to Takafumi Matsui, who one of the core group behind the changes.

Space News version of my earlier Defense News story

Taepodon Trigger #3: DPRK to attempt 3rd Satellite Shot- Third Time Lucky?

You couldn’t make it up. You just couldn’t. I just asked the MOD about this very likelihood this week!

The announcement that the DPRK is attempting a third satellite launch in mid-April is just the sort of development that will help propel Japan’s basic BMD and nascent military space deployment.

The fact that so the Eunha-3 (Galaxy) rocket will fly over the Yellow Sea and not Japan doesn’t mean the news hasn’t already caused a huge stir in Japan, with the story being the top news on most TV.

Regardless of the flightpath, the launch will constitute another violation of June 2009’s UNSC Resolution 1874 that was passed the last time DPRK tried to launch a satellite (see below).

“We urge North Korea to exercise restraint and refrain from the launch,” said Chief Cabinet Secretary Osamu Fujimura, echoing statements from ROK.

What timing!

On Tuesday I was talking to Masayuki Iwaike, Director of Missile Defense and Space Policy at MOD about Japan’s approach to SSA and likely speed of moves by Japan on Early Warning, following last June’s 2+2, when Japan and the U.S. basically agreed that Japan will add some form of EW capability to its BMD systems, either through adding IR sensors on QZSS/Michibiki  or through several different satellite bus plans (candidates include

SERVIS-3 by USEF and ASNARO, among others) with the CISC probably jealously guarding its independence with the IGS program, keeping it from the Space Strategy Office to be formed in April.

The key point about next week’s Defense News article, will be that Japan has more or less completed its basic two-tier BMD system, with its radar and sensor structure also on the verge of completion with the fourth and final FPS-5 S-band phased array ground based early warning radar nearly finished, joining the upgraded FPS-3 3-D phased-array radars, and JADGE up and running. Meanwhile PAC-3 is being boosted and the MSDF is adding two more SM3-Block 1A capable cruisers.

So the big question was to Iwaike, will you accelerate plans or add capability if the recent U.S.-DPRK agreement turns out to be not worth the paper its written on?

– Remember last month North Korea supposedly agreed to suspend uranium enrichment, halt nuclear and long-range missile tests, and to allow back U.N. weapons inspectors in exchange for a quarter of a million tons of “food aid.”

So what happens if they start firing off their nasty fireworks demonstrating significant new capabilities, or creditable information comes out about successful miniaturization of their Pakistani/stolen bargain-basement fission bomb technology (actually, then consequently making it a creditable threat)?

Will Japan build out BMD?

Of course, I didn’t put the it that way, but the message was an unequivocal yes. Because all the key systems are in place. But that’s for next week’s article.

Please read Defense News on Monday.

The beauty of the SM3-/PAC-3 two-tier system is that it works (with caveats, see Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress) and it’s only going to get better. And when the Chinese decided to create chaos in orbit  with its 2007 ASAT test leading to what is rapidly going to become a crisis if nothing is done over the next decade, the U.S. was able to remind the Chinese just whom they are dealing with if they are serious.

And then, just on time, news comes out that North Korea is attempting its third satellite launch (Kwangmyŏngsŏng-3) around April 12-16 to celebrate the 100th anniversary of the birth Kim Il Sung, on April 15.

The Taepodon Trigger

One of the key stories in In Defense of Japan is the story of the Taepodon Trigger, which is more commonly called the Taepodon Shock.

Whatever else it doesn’t have going for it, the DPRK is a master of timing. It’s almost as if it wants Japan to further rearm to create a foreign bugbear to rail against and rally the (starving) masses. The history of DPRK missile launches is quite intriguing. In 1998, the attempted launch of Kwangmyongsong-1 aboard a re-gigged Taepodon gave Japan the decisive inflection point it needed to launching military space development, instead of developing dual-use technology research and development programs that could be converted to military use if and when needed. This is essentially the story behind Japan’s IGS, which is a regigged Melco USERS bus with not very good radar and optical sensors (which are getting better, nearing half-meter now for Gen-2 optical at least).

At the time, I can vividly remember the shock and outrage behind the missile overfly, which was largely stage-managed by media and politicians, since (a) Japan and the U.S. knew about the launch a month in advance, having been informed by the DPRK about it, and had an Aegis missile cruiser tracking the thing (b) the satellite launch didn’t actually violate Japan’s airspace at all and (c) as was actually an attempted satellite launch, not a missile test, as made out by the Japanese media.

Now while I am a strong supporter of Japan and no fan of the DPRK, the facts are the facts. Within 10 days of the “shocking missile test,” Ichiro Taniguchi, the Lion of Melco, was briefing the Cabinet on what was to become IGS. For more on this, please read In Defense of Japan.

But it was more of the same in 2009 when the nation in April attempted the launch of Kwangmyŏngsŏng-2 aboard an Unha-2 rocket carrying the satellite, following this with two rounds of missile tests in July 2009 and then a probably partially successful nuclear test in October. A busy year for everyone, and provocation that has helped Japan to bolster its SM-3 fleet to six ships.

In a perverse sense, the latest launch looks right on schedule. In order to prop up the 3rd incarnation of the Kim Dynasty, the DPRK needed a quick win in its poker strategy diplomacy of threat, bluff, and (insincere) concession cycle. On what levels the events of the last two months are wins for the regime vary; if they get the food and launch the satellite, it will buy the new regime a lot of time perhaps. If the perfidious Yankie and, etc., imperialists “renegade”  on the deal, and the satellite is triumphantly launched (whether it will or not, it will still triumphantly succeed in glorious honor of what not, of course, right) then it still provides glue to hang the new regime together on. Oh the poor suffering people.

All this of course is grist for the mill for Japan and is, ahem, unlikely to disincentivize Japan from pushing forward with EW and better BMD.

Update: This is from Reuters: Launch called a ‘deal-breaker

US: NKorea planned rocket launch a ‘deal-breaker’

The U.S. State Department issued the following statement, March 16:

“North Korea’s announcement that it plans to conduct a missile launch in direct violation of its international obligations is highly provocative. UN Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874 clearly and unequivocally prohibit North Korea from conducting launches that use ballistic missile technology. Such a missile launch would pose a threat to regional security and would also be inconsistent with North Korea’s recent undertaking to refrain from long-range missile launches. We call on North Korea to adhere to its international obligations, including all relevant UN Security Council Resolutions. We are consulting closely with our international partners on next steps. U.S. now says it will not  send food aid to North Korea if it goes ahead with the long-range rocket launch, and U.N. Security Council members said it may violate sanctions.”

The DPRK argues that satellite launches are part of a peaceful space program that is exempt from international disarmament obligations, but according to Reuters, State Department spokesman Victoria Nuland said the U.S. now had “grave concerns” about the Feb. 29 agreement under which the North agreed with the U.S. to nuclear concessions and a moratorium on long-range missile tests in return for 240,000 tons of food aid.

Nuland said a rocket launch would call into question North Korea’s good faith. She said that during the negotiations for the U.S.-North Korea agreement, “we made clear unequivocally that we considered that any satellite launch would be a deal-breaker.

Expect a third nuclear test!

Japan, Vietnam Sign Deal for Two Radar Imaging Satellites

The Basic Law of 2008 scores its first success! This is an old story but with a deal impeding in Thailand I thought I’d put it up.

It’s hard to overestimate the impact of this deal to Japan’s space diplomacy and the ripple effects for pan-Asian security. Not only was this the first time space diplomacy was used as an ODA tool, actually a strategic diplomatic coup with a key SE Asian emerging economy, Vietnam, but also for a LEO “EO” satellite.  The Japan-Vietnam deal represents the first real fruits of the Basic Law of 2008. NEC, which has developed excellent small-bus, communications and EO technologies was squashed out by Melco (which promoted and succeeded with both its IGS and QZSS plans, to turn from the Market to the Military, the key point of In Defense of Japan), has now been able to secure its own market and strategy.

Further the ASNARO project could well turn out to be a stroke of genius. NEC, USEF, METI, and others are streaming all over the southern hemisphere to “sell” various stripes of ASNARO, including upcoming hyperspectral sensor models. USEF figure they need a constellation of six (eight would be better) for an ASNARO constellation to fulfill its purpose. So only another emerging economy (probably Thailand) needs to sign up and things are looking very useful. Remember, ASNARO is built to dump data as it flies over various ground stations, which are truck-mounted and highly mobile.

What is Japan doing selling spy satellites (GSD of better than 50cm) via a highly-advanced 73 cm silicon mirror (that beat out a tried and tested Melco optical design hands down) capable of advanced point-and-click, back scanning and data dumping? The ASNARO is a significant leap forward for Japan’s spy satellite fleet, with ASNARO optical and SAR already sharper that IGS-Optical/Radar Gen-2, on a tiny bus, with far, far better pointing and delivery times.

Outline of ASNARO key capabilities and features*:

Basic acquisition mode is Snap Shot mode (10km x 10km). However, depending on the largeness or shape of the area of interest, it is more efficient to use Strip Map mode or Skew mode. In the ground segment, based on the area of interest (AOI) requested from the end-user, optimum acquisition mode is automatically selected and most efficient acquisition plan is programmed. In the planning, satellite resources (storage and power) are considered to optimize the acquisition planning in mid to long term.
– Snap Shot mode:
10km x 10km area parallel to the satellite orbit is acquired.
-Wide View shot mode:
Several snap shot acquisitions are combined in cross track direction, providing wider area image data than single snap shot acquisition.
– Multi Angle Shot mode:
Within single pass, one identical target area is acquired several times from different incidence angle.
– Strip Map mode:
Long strip area parallel to the satellite orbit is acquired.
– Skew Shot mode:
Long strip area in any direction can be acquired in Skew shot node.
– High S/N Shot mode:
10km x 10km area parallel to the satellite orbit is acquired taking longer time than Snap shot mode to increase S/N of the image

What on earth would Vietnam want all that for? Crop monitoring? Disaster prevention?Here is the SN story:

*Data taken from SSC11-IV-4 Advanced EO system for the Japanese Small Satellite ASNARO
25th Annual AIAA/USU Conference on Small Satellites

Space Quarterly 2: A Battle Looms for Japan’s Space Program

Ironically, just as my second piece in Space Quarterly came out on December 1, the SHSP’s Expert Committee (宇宙開発戦略専門調査会) chaired by MHI Chairman Kazuo Tsukuda had just (November 30) come out with a pre-final version of the compromises reached between the Cabinet and MEXT over the makeup and powers of the 宇宙戦略室 (Space Strategy Office) to be set up in the Cabinet Office!

Japan Edges Toward New Space Agency

The long struggles of the Mk.2 SHSP reached a critical period over the summer and fall of 2011. After having seen SHSP fundamentally unplugged following the DPJ election of Summer 2009, the SHPS effectively fell fallow through 2011 while it reabsorbed the DPJ’s new way of doing things. During the interregnum between May 2009, when it discussed the Basic Plan, the crucial Experts Committee did not start forging ahead until December 2010 under a group DPJ appointees.

In the meantime activist DPJ Minister for Space Development Seiji Maehara had convened an independent expert panel under Takafumi Matsui, Director of Chiba Institute of Technology’s Planetary Exploration Research Center, to come up with a fresh approach. And it did not disappoint: the  “Matsui Plan” released 20 April 2010 recommended the setting up of a “Space Agency” within the Cabinet Office and the partial breakup of JAXA.

Subsequently the 14-member “Mk.2” Experts Committee, chaired by Yoshiyuki Kasai, former chairman of Central Japan Railway Company set to re-tackle implementation of the Basic Law, constituting the QZSS Utilization Investigation Working Group (QZSS WG), which was to to be used to set a precedent for allowing the Cabinet Office to establish control of a major space development program, with a target to finish by August 2011. In April the QZSS WG recommended that Japan go ahead with a robust QZSS system, leading to a series of steps toward the Cabinet Office taking control of Japan’s space program from MEXT and JAXA.

Michibiki: Finally Licence to Guide

2011年6月15日

After 15 years and twists and turns that made IHI/Nissan’s bid for the J-1A->J-2->GX look like a skip around the block, Michibiki will finally become an openly accepted part of Japan’s emergent space-based national security structure.

There has always been a strong element of “aw-shucks, you don’t say” about the real purpose of the QZSS system, which is to provide a highly advanced (15cm to 1m positioning accuracy) sovereign (encrypted = military signal) positioning (read targeting) local (read regional) GPS system, that’s useful for…the same uses as the original GPS and GLONASS systems.

Although the what become the present system originated out of Melco and the old CRL (Communications Research Laboratory, now NICT) in 1996/7. I can still remember the pitch, and then the huge wrangle between the STA and MOFA with the U.S. over it. I covered this for Space News what, 14 and 13 years ago now.

In a recent conversation I had with a former GSDF general who is now a consultant for a major Japanese IT firm consulting the MOD to fight Japan’s cyberwars against 30,000 state-funded Chinese hackers, making sure QZSS has targeting capability has been formally on the table in inter-ministerial meetings (well at that time the MOD was the JDA) since at least 2005. In fact, retired general “X,” as we’ll call him, brought QZSS up unilaterally. The topic we were discussing was  the utility of UAVs and network-centric warfare and the limits of interoperability. The main issue for X was concern that Japan be capable of building a “rec’n’rocket” Global Hawk capability as well as a tactical capability so that battlefield, operations and strategic roles can be fulfilled. And then, as he put it, “there is the space element” of which QZSS or its successor will no doublt play a role…

2005. 2005. Well, well, well. Wasn’t that  time when the now-defunct ASBC (Advanced Satellite Business Corporation), who were responsible for window-dressing QZSS as an orbital Wall-Mart communications and broadcasting and “man nabi” system, gave me a very 玉虫色 (tamamushiiro) response about if they were talking to the JDA about the QZSS’s dual-uses.

The business model for QZSS as pounded out by ASBC didn’t make sense. Why would we need man-nabi from a keitai with an expensive chip plugged into a space-based system when nabi functions were already commonplace. Why would we need broadcasting when we already had BS* by NHK, and SKY PerfecTV washing our brains out with hundreds of channels of digital junk. SkyPerfect being the consolidated rump of what had been  DirecTV, PerfecTV and JSky B competing in Japan’s limited market, and JSAT competing with Mitsubishi’s SCC as a platform service providers. (SCC lost and was merged into JSAT). So there goes your business model.

As we make clear in In Defense of Japan, “..although the QZSS/Michibiki itself is a product of the 2000s, the system as a whole represents the culmination of eff orts to develop a regional GPS system dating back to the late 1980s.  Like a lot of the other space- based technologies discussed in this book, this one has had a long trajectory…”

More precisely, like everyone else, Japan realized that the space-based force muliplier technology and infrastruture, with gave birth to RMA, completely outdated militaries not similarly equipped in practically anything other than low-intensity conflicts. Thus the gearing up by Europe (Galileo), China (Beidou) (not exactly friends those two with the snooty French keeping the receipe for roast canard separate while the Chinese attempt to spice the whole affair up with illiberal doses of General Tao’s Sauce)  and and Japan (Michibiki) to develop its own PNT capability in case it was denied access or remained dependent on U.S. technology.

In the 1990s, the STA, METI, and the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT), looked to develop a positioning system that would cover a large swathe of Asia, from the Kurile Islands to the north, China to the east, and Guam in the south. In March 1997 the then STA asked what was then NASDA (now JAXA) to move ahead with research into the highly accurate, satellite-mounted atomic clocks needed for a high-precision GPS. This was billed at the time as a matter of “economic security.” As anyone who understands Japan’s nomenclature, “economic security” is a fine bedfellow of “security” and his old chum “national security.”  The facinating story of how Michibiki got developed is summarized in In Defense of Japan. Meanwhile, as my recent story in Space News below tries to make clear, the curtains have been drawn open, and people in Japan are starting to talk about Michibiki’s national security role more openly.

*BS means Broadcasting Satellite in Japan, not “the other” meaning.

Japanese GPS: Next Milspace Step becomes “Official Reality”

The AFP this week has followed up  the Yomiuri story about Japan building its own GPS system, quoting an anonymous official in the SHSP.  What’s actually interesting about the story however is:

a) There is significant language drift and change in the the presentation of the information. It’s interesting to see that mainstream media is stressing the independence of the Michibiki. But ever since I was briefed on in in CRL labs in the mid 1990s, I’ve always understood it as a separate  or independent GPS system. At least the Yomiuri is acknowledging its real strategic purpose as a regional GPS system.

The launch of the fleet is the critical technological building block for when and when Japan does decide to deploy a regional GPS system. Of course, then missile guidance is a matter of course. Remember this  in addition to the already announced shopping list to develop independent Early Warning, military communications, signit and SSA capabilities by the MOD (which will remain a shopping list for at least the time being, for reasons I’ll explain in a later post), and plans to build a supplemental dual-use spy satellite constellation test bed (ASNARO) by METI, along with ORS capabilities led by Epsilon and attempts later to develop air-launch and SLBM technology by METI via its military space technology implementing agency USEF  (see Quis custodiet ipsos database administrators? ).

It was quite gratifying for the Yomiuri to be quite open about this fundamental step. Remember back in the mid-90s then then STA and JAXA, supported by Melco and CRL were strongly pushing independent GPS, but were leaned on by the U.S. and then hauled in to make sure the system was properly consulted. The QZSS saga is one of the more eventful and interesting stories of Japan’s space development where strategic technology development interests that I don’t have time to go into here, but is outlined in In Defense of Japan. For more details, I have articles in Space News going back to 1996. I recall meetings of meeting grumpy STA official grumbling about the frequency with which the U.S. was jamming things up: clipped wings? Golden cage? Background noise?

But remember, the key point is that originally what is now Michibiki was always seen as an independent Japanese GPS system even it was not characterized as such in the media or Japan’s space literature, for various purposes. In fact I remember attending SAC committee reviews of the  (now defunct) ASBC consortium’s attempts to sell the QZSS system for its business and broadcasting functionality  back in the early 2000s and noting how obviously facile and see-through they were. The purpose of Japan’s GPS is security first, security second, and security third.

b) The second suprise was the numbers. We have the Yomiuri quoting as many as six or seven satellites, whereas only four are needed to get the 15 cm to 1 meter accuracy needed. In fact the Basic Law is pretty vague on the number. There was a tremendous battle fought in 2008 by Meclo and Keidanren to get the projected numbers up to over five and it’s interesting to see that the government is quoting that Melco can build DS2000 buses tweaked for Michibiki off the Kamakura production line for 35 billion yen each. The concern is if Melco has rectified its power systems troubles that have affected several satellites downt the years including 2 IGS radar spysats and Midori-2. Let’s hope those junctions and batteries are double checked.

c) In a comcomitant article by the Yomiuri the talk of Michibiki being an Asian Standard when China has already launched its own 8-constellation military system. I attribute the Yomiuri’s rhetoric on this as a combination of window dressing and wishful thinking. The wounded national psyche so gently portrayed by Prof. Kenneth B.  Pyle in Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose appears to be coming into play here with the idea of a competition to be an Asian standard. There are a lot of things I could say, but in line with the main arguments of In Defense of Japan, it does not really matter because the strategic Michibiki technology development program will go ahead anyway.

d) Finally, finally, it appears that after two years of solid stalling by MEXT, things are finally moving.