Defense News has just published a story that I did last week on the post F-35 choices Japan faces for its F-XX procurement. This was very interesting to write and research, as so much is “up in the air” and there are so many unknowns.

Unusually, Lockheed Martin refused to comment (Steve O’Bryan has been on the offensive recently emphasizing the positives with the F-35 program) while BAE’s Tony Ennis was happy to comment.

Questions include:

– Could there be some work for the Eurofighter after all? Will Japan feel bruised and abused if the F-35 turns out to be a poisoned chalice. (History of course is not on the Eurofighter’s side. The F-2, which became the thin edge of the wedge for the FSX procurement as the F-2 weighs in about 4X cost of a Block 50/52 F-16).

– What of the Mitsubishi ATD-X Shinshin? Is this as many believe a hedge or is it a complete waste of time and money. Is Japan really up for, and up to using this program as a hedge? Can MHI and TRDI really bring anything to the table.

Talking to analysts, the story would seem to be no. According to the excellent Prof. Narushige Michishita for one, the fact that Japan’s DBI is now non-competitive and falling away in technological ability (with analysts such as Kiyotani more or less calling the F-35 purchase an act of suicide), after failing to secure the F-22, Japan used the international RPF for the F-X in order to squeeze a better deal out of the U.S.

…and failed, or so it would seem to critics.

This question about the ATD-X revolves around the point that Japan seems to have felt compelled to buy the F-35 for fear of falling so far behind U.S. technology that it was prepared to swallow an industrial participation deal that many doubt will help Japanese industry to a 5th-generation fighter design and build capacity. Of course the U.S. probably doesn’t feel it wants Japan to have a 5th-generation fighter design and build capacity. But the days when Japan could bring technology, muscle, will and money to the table a la FSX seem to have long vanished. Meanwhile a recent internal report by MOD itself (see Japan’s Defense Industrial Base Nearing Crisis) has underscored just how much Japan is waking up to fundamental problems with its defense industrial base.

Interestingly for me,  Dr. Patrick Cronin at theCenter for a New American Security believes that that  F-15SE or the F-18 Super Hornet would still be great buys for Japan for the present, but should really go for it for a sixth-generation fighter.

“Either the F-15SE or the F-18 Super Hornet would be value added without breaking the bank.  Meanwhile, Japan needs to develop an F-XX future fighter that can defeat world-class defenses and aircraft out to the middle of this century and perhaps beyond.  That means Japan should be seeking to develop, possibly with an American partner, a sixth-generation aircraft with advanced stealth characteristics, directed energy weapons, and an unmanned option.  Thus, by the middle of next decade, JASDF would have two fighters (F-35s and either F-15SEs or F-18 Super Hornets).  It would then be preparing to field a sixth-generation F-XX.”

In addition to the Defense News version, here is the full interview with the  wonderful Paul Giarra at Global Strategies & Transformation whom along with Dr. Cronin, I would like to thank deeply for sharing some of their considerable insight and knowledge.

“JASDF fighter aircraft procurement beyond the 42 F-35s planned is a vital strategic issue for Japan.  In my view, Japan needs the best air force it can possibly get, for the defense of Japan as well as for alliance operations.  Unfortunately, even though Japan is normalizing militarily and responding to the emergence of China by revising its entire defense strategy, there is no aerospace strategy rationale in place to shape a positive outcome.

When Japan wanted to procure the F-22, there was no argument available to overcome legitimate export restrictions imposed by the U.S. Congress.  No one — whether Japanese or American airman or air power proponents — could argue that the Obey Amendment should be overturned, because there was no strategic rationale in hand for doing so.  That’s not to say that there could not be a compelling rationale for the F-22 or another equally good aircraft (Japanese or American), but there is no developed and deployable strategy, no vision, no operational basis for planning or procurement.

As for the F-35, I would say that 420 aircraft is as good a number as 42, because it is as arbitrary as 42, but at least with ten times the aircraft Japan would have a strong and credible air force.

As for particular aircraft, responsible airmen should have a vision of future air combat — we’re talking much more than a decade before any substantial number of new aircraft are available to JASDF.  Does an aircraft have to be a fifth generation, stealthy, and capable of super-cruise performance in order to meet the needs of JASDF?  What are those needs in the first place?  Will JASDF be flying directly overhead, defending Japanese airspace? Against what threats?  Will the JASDF be patrolling and fighting at the far periphery of Japan’s islands?  Will the JASDF be drastically outnumbered? What is the worst case?  The most likely case?  Will superb BVR missiles and air warfare command and control be sufficient, enabling a less capable aircraft?  What will be the operational relationship between JASDF and the U.S. Air Force?  Will alliance roles and missions influence, or even dictate, aircraft choice?  In this context, the Air Sea Battle concept looms large as a significant consideration going forward for JASDF and USAF planners.

How much time does JASDF have to make a choice and bring its new fleet of aircraft on line?  Is there a virtue to procuring relatively readily available F/A-18 Super Hornets or substantially re-designed F-15s?  Can Japan afford to wait?  Should JASDF skip ahead to some new combination of armed UAVs, or instead depend much more on very long range SAMs for territorial IAMD?  Are there new technologies or concepts on the horizon that are worth waiting for?

These are the sorts of questions that have answers if the JASDF and alliance aerospace strategy and air combat vision are in place.  There always will be tradeoffs between aircraft, but technical judgments and an informed choice can be made on the basis of a strategy, vision, and substantial and well developed roles and missions.

In the meantime, there are real industrial considerations on the table that never before have been factors.  With the relaxation of the three arms export control principles, it is possible for the first time for Japan’s aerospace industry to approach its American counterparts in a fundamentally different way that was never before possible:  as partners rather than consumers.  This adds a new dimension to JASDF’s procurement challenge.  In the long run, understanding and optimizing these new defense industry circumstances probably is as important as the aerospace strategy and vision.

It is natural that aircraft manufacturers paying suit to JASDF want to sell the aircraft they have developed.  Nevertheless, the most competitive will develop the aerospace rationale for JASDF’s new air fleet, and offer a strategic partnership that provides the air defense that Japan needs.“