Towards the H-3: Update

H-2A successor

Space News kindly published a version of my story on the H-3 last week. I’ve done the usual and pasted a version into this blog.

There is also a story by the ever excellent Warren Ferster on the Epsilon based on a JAXA presser. Please see this blog for more background on the Epsilon, or go to the new, vastly improved Space News website.

We can expect more light to be shone on this during June when the ONSP subcommittee makes its final recommendations. Meanwhile the Yomiuri and Asahi have some more information and perspective on the issue.

Our view in In Defense of Japan is that the H-series is a technology development program and while it may arouse screams of indignation and anger to say it, to put it bluntly, money will always be found to develop technologies that give Japan options. As, fundamentally, Saadia and I argue that Japan’s space program has always been basically, when you remove all the dressing, a dual-use strategic technology development program, then reasons to develop the H-3 will always be found.

As made plain by Dick Samuels and Mike Green, under nationalists such as Tomifumi Godai and in an era of rampant technonationalism and kokusanka, there were compelling reasons to develop the H-2. Japan wanted and needed to build a sophisticated, liquid fueled, highly efficient two-stage medium launch vehicle to cement its international reputation as part of the advanced spacefaring club. Remember, when the H-2 was envisaged over 20 years ago, few saw the impending “lost decade.”

Japan’s space program under NASDA was relatively awash with money, with investments made or planned  into all sorts of challenging dual-use precursor technologies including ETS-7 (on orbit ASAT demonstration) OICETS/ Kirari (laser communications), reconnaissance/ spy  satellites ICBM prototypes (M-V, J-1), reentry (OREX, USERS SEM) SIGINT (ETS-8), global strike (HYFLEX, HOPE) etc. Some highly ambitious programs that emerged last decade, have disappeared, for example HiMEOS and Smartsat-1.

On the other hand, ALSET looks as if it could make it.

これまでの基幹ロケットの評価と今後の在り方について 2013 年 4 月 24 日 宇宙輸送システム部会 委員 三菱重工業株式会社 代表取締役常務執行役員 航空宇宙事業本部長 鯨井 洋

これまでの基幹ロケットの評価と今後の在り方について
2013 年 4 月 24 日
宇宙輸送システム部会 委員
三菱重工業株式会社 代表取締役常務執行役員
航空宇宙事業本部長
鯨井 洋

Let’s not forget the H-2 very nearly made it to commercial viability but was fatally holed by the surging yen as well as dodgy turbopumps. So then money was found for the H-2A to solve the problem (half the costs, boost the payload) …but as we argue in In Defense of Japan, whether or not the H-2A really made it was not the issue. Could the program be justified in terms of a technology development program to the MoF. The peanuts in terms of cost involved in developing the H-2A compared to the cost of major launch vehicle systems by other advanced democracies (lets just name the Ariane 5) meant yes.

And now the cycle starts again. So how will the H-3 be sold to the MoF under the rubric of Japan’s latest stated space policy?

Sure, as something that will be commercially viable. Whether or not MHI and JAXA can actually achieve this is, we contend, strategically, a mute question. If and when the H-3 doesn’t make it commercially, MHI and Japan will have at least invested in developing a new level of excellent technologies that will secure Japan’s independent launch vehicle capabilities and provide jobs, technology and investment in its aerospace sector. Incidentally, the H-3 is now being sold by MHI as “catchup” again, as the slide above shows.

Sure, the same old cycle of vituperation and lashing will follow in the Japanese media if or when the H-3 fails to make the grade commercially, but the more strategic goals of “keeping/ catching up” will have been met.

JSP Catchup #6: Probe Uncovers 40-year Japanese Contractor Fraud

This story was NOT a surprise; the fuller story is at Japan Still Calculating Cost of Defense Firm’s Padded Bills, but ever since NEC Corp. in 1998 was found with its hands in the till, I have been wondering who would be fingered next, and when, and why when, and why.

I say this because when I chatted to people back in 1998, the practice of padding contracts with surplus labor costs was widespread in the space and defense sectors and this was commonly known. At the time the questions were Why NEC? And Why Now? Below my initial October story is NEC SCANDAL SHEDS LIGHT ON JAPANESE PROCUREMENTS, a more fruity web version of a story that I originally wrote for Space News back in the day.

The timing for the original NEC story was also interesting as NEC was strongly pushing for its version of what was to become Japan’s IGS spy satellite system that was provoked by the Teapodon Triggeran analysis that Saadia and I wrote about in In Defense of Japan (thank you Google Books!)

At the time NEC’s version of what was to become the IGS would have featured smaller satellites and cost less than Melco’s system. But with NEC suddenly out of the picture, Melco, with Ichiro Taniguchi at the helm, managed to personally lobby Japan’s Cabinet in the weeks after the Taepondon launch, and Japan’ got the IGS.

Here is a nice picture from Space Safety Magazine of Japan’s 1,200-Kilogram IGS 1B Satellite re-entered Earth’s Atmosphere on Thursday, July 26, 2012 after spending nearly 9.5 years in space.  Another more detailed article about this can be found at Spaceflight.101.com.

Eventually, NEC’s small-bus and higher resolution system has  been re-emerging in the ASNARO system, which is now being pushed as an alternative and complementary system to the expensive and relatively lower performance IGS, and also as the linchpin of a satellite-based, pan-Asian disaster monitoring network that is now a major part of Japan’s emerging regional space diplomacy and security strategy.  At least the Vietnamese have bought into it, and while customers don’t seem to be forming a line yet, there is still a lot of hope out there.

Here is the initial story for Defense News:

NEC SCANDAL SHEDS LIGHT ON

JAPANESE PROCUREMENTS.

By Paul Kallender in Tokyo

When, in September 1998, an investigation into the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) discovered that Japanese technology giant NEC Corp had systematically defrauded the taxpayer on 33 space contracts over the course of five years, it looked as though Japan’s obviously abused government procurement system was about to get a major overhaul.

The investigation began promisingly enough. On September 3, Tokyo prosecutors raided the JDA and arrested Kenichi Ueno, deputy head of the Procurement Office, and a clutch of executives from NEC subsidiary Toyo Communications.

This followed discoveries that not only had Toyo overcharged the JDA some $21m over dozens of equipment contracts, but that Ueno and others had conspired to prevent Toyo, NEC and other subsidiaries from repaying the money. NEC was raided the next day and by September 10, nine senior NEC and JDA executives were in jail.

It came to light that Ueno and others had lifted incriminating paperwork out of the Agency’s filing cabinets and put them into incinerators and even the homes of friends. NEC’s SuperTower headquarters was soon besieged by the Japanese phenomenon of ‘sound trucks,’ driven by right-wing extremists screaming abuse and demanding mass resignations.

But instead of resulting in the punishment of protagonists and the start of reforms, the scandal collapsed into a desultory cover-up. NEC’s initial response was to deny everything, with a bemused VP Masakatsu Miwa telling the media on September 10 that he did not expect top NEC executives to resign because of the scandal, going on to explain that he “wondered why” NEC officials were being implicated. Unfortunately for Miwa, on September 29, NEC’s overcharging was upscaled to $2.5bn, while, on the same day, a Parliamentary committee reported that the JDA had hired no less than 44 NEC executives in senior positions in just two years. By October 10, former NEC VP Hiroaki Shimayama and Takenori Yanase, VP of NEC’s Space Systems Division, had both been arrested.

Thieves charter

The National Space Development Agency (NASDA) launched an inquiry and on November 9, NEC admitted overcharging by at least $19m. Meanwhile on October 14, the JDA revealed that 225 of its officials had been hired by 20 suppliers in the past five years, shedding some dim light on a corner of Japan’s Amadudari (Descent from Heaven) career kickback system.

At the heart of the issue, according to NASDA’s former executive director Akira Kubozono, is the flawed government contract system which encourages corruption through a combination of legendary meanness and bureaucratic incompetence.

“There are two points about this affair,” he said. “One is that NEC is just a scapegoat. The second is that the governmental contract system is the cause of this scandal. When the defense contract revelations began, I thought it was only a matter of time before it spread into NEC’s space systems division as both defense and space procurement are conducted under similar systems.”

Under the Japanese government contract system, the co ntractor is obliged to repay any unused budget if the delivery price falls below the contract amount, and the contractor must also incur any costs if the project overshoots the agreed estimate — a thieves charter if ever there was one.

Furthermore NASDA, the Science and Technology Agency and the Ministry of Finance lack the technical expertise to evaluate bids and tend to just accept company estimates, says Kubozono. “The system needs to be reformed but I doubt this is possible as long as NASDA and the corporations are controlled by STA administrators (who also often retire to executive positions in NASDA) and not by engineers,” he says.

No mettle Kubozono, it seems, was right.

By November 12, the space scandal seemed to have been wrapped up, with NASDA saying it was satisfied that only NEC had abused the system. “The system has worked well for 30 years. We believe that a little devil whispered into NEC’s ear. We do not think it will happen again,” said Yasuyuki Fukumuro, NASDA PR deputy director. Fukumuro quickly admitted that NEC would be allowed to bid for Japan’s new spy satellite system, after a token contract moratorium.

Back at the JDA, a grand total of six senior officials will take up to 10% pay cuts for one to three months plus one official will receive a 10-day suspension, JDA chief Fukushiro Nukuga told the media at his November 20 resignation press conference.

The speech followed a report, which admitted that there had been “some incidents that could be regarded as a systematic cover-up,” perhaps referring to the 31 officials suspected of Berlin-bunker style burning of documentation that might have provided evidence.

But the worst thing about the affair, according to observers, has been the brazen arrogance of NEC. In his October 23 resignation speech, NEC Chairman Tadahiro Sekimoto, now under personal investigation for his role in the affair, denied any involvement but resigned out of “social responsibility” for the affair, astonishing Kubozono in particular.

“Sekimoto’s act was spineless. If he had honor he would have resigned to take responsibility, not quibbled. He showed no mettle and is a very poor example for younger business leaders. I fear for Japan’s future.”

An even poorer analysis comes from Youichi Teraishi, Editor of Japan’s ‘scandaru’ [scandal] daily, the Nikkan Gendai. He says that Sekimoto’s act compared unfavorably with Yakuza (the Japanese Mafia) standards of conduct. “This Oyabun [Japanese gang boss] showed a lack of chivalry. Captains of industry are supposed to be able to demonstrate this, but Sekimoto lacked the class,” he says.

Lastly, the scandal has left NEC seething that it was singled out for a brutal slap on the wrist. “Everyone is doing it, why should we be the scapegoat?” admitted one NEC official. “Our top management just stuck their heads in the sand and got shafted,” complained another.

This article first appeared in Global Technology News.

JSP Catchup #3: Japan’s Budget Request Targets Capabilities To Defend Sea Lanes

Here is a follow-up from the previous story with a little more analysis, which was published by Defense News on September 14.

FINALLY! Japan Passes Law Permitting Military Space Development

Here is the text of the quick story I put up last Friday for Defense News. For background on this story Japan Space Law: Now Mid-May, or When?

I’ll have a more more commentary on this later in the week. Well it’s three years late, but finally it’s gone through after considerable struggles. I’ll have something of a more detailed picture on the whole thing out later this year for Space Policy.

However talking to Kazuto Suzuki and Norihio Sakamoto over the past few weeks I have been struck by the differences of opinion on the upcoming speed with which the 宇宙戦略室 (Space Strategy Office) is going to be able to act. Sakamoto believes that the much-needed Space Activities Act, which is much needed to promote commercialization in J-space could come even within this year. Suzuki believes the law isn’t really a priority and not needed. Listening to an SHSP presentaiton on the issue earlier this year at a conference to establish the Keio Advanced Research Center for Space Law, the message seems mixed.

It has been pointed out that essentially the three-year battle to wrest control of space policy and execution from MEXT was de facto won last year when the SHSP under Katase effectively grabbed the budget negotiations with the MOF away from MEXT. You can see the effect immediately in that the much prized JAXA-MEXT flagship Hayabusa-2 program got its huge budget request stomped.

But the new law is far more than window dressing, as I will go on to explain in subsequent posts.

Tokyo — The Upper House of Japan’s Diet June 20 passed legislation that shifts control of the nation’s space policy and budget, and opens the door to military space development programs with an emphasis on space-based missile early warning.

The raft of legislation, based on the Bill to Amend the Law of Establishment of the Cabinet Office that was sent to the Diet on Feb. 14, enables the Prime Minister’s Cabinet Office to take control of the planning and budgeting of Japan’s government space program. It also removes an article in a prior law governing the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA), the nation’s equivalent to NASA, which had restricted JAXA’s ability to pursue military space programs.

Prior to the legislation, JAXA had been de facto controlled by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), and was overseen by a MEXT committee called the Space Activities Commission (SAC), leading to criticisms of regulatory capture.

At the same time, JAXA’s space development has been restricted to an extremely narrow “peaceful purposes only” policy, which meant the agency was unable to develop specifically military space programs.

The new legislation enables the Cabinet Office to set up a Space Strategy Office, headed by the prime minister, which will have the ultimate say on all policy and budget decisions. It will be supported by a consultative Space Policy Commission of five to seven academics and independent observers.

The legislation also scraps MEXT’s control of JAXA and abolishes SAC, said Kazuto Suzuki, associate professor of international political economy at the Public Policy School of Hokkaido University.

Japan’s space development has been hampered by the peaceful-purposes-only restriction, and by what many outside MEXT see as programs focused too much on technological development for its own sake, leading to expensive launch systems and satellites that serve little practical purpose for the nation, Suzuki said.

The passing of the law ends a process that began nearly a decade ago by politicians looking for ways to leverage Japan’s space development programs and technologies for security purposes, to bolster the nation’s defenses in the face of increased tensions in East Asia.

On top of an increasingly confident China, Japan faces a potentially belligerent and unstable North Korea just across the Sea of Japan. Since 1998, North Korea has consistently flouted and broken promises, norms and international laws in developing and testing nuclear weapons and missiles.

JAXA will now be permitted to develop space programs in line with international norms, which are governed by the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. The treaty allows military space development, but not the deployment of weapons of mass destruction in orbit.

As the Cabinet Office, the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) will all have a form of “joint control” over JAXA, the space agency will gradually move away from its purely scientific, non-military role, said analysts and experts involved with drawing up the legislation. Under the new arrangement, each ministry will be able to propose its own space programs.

METI, for example, is interested in promoting dual-use Earth observation and reconnaissance satellites and an air-launch space access system, according to the ministry.

Suzuki said there also is strong bipartisan political support for Japan to develop and launch its own missile early-warning system to support the nation’s small fleet of Aegis destroyers for upper-tier defense, and its PAC-3 systems for lower-tier defense.

The Cabinet Office also will take direct control of the budget and program development of Japan’s regional GPS system, called the Quasi-Zenith Satellite System.

More immediately, the Cabinet Office is likely to set up the Space Strategy Office and Space Policy Commission as early as July 1, said Norihiro Sakamoto, a research fellow at The Tokyo Foundation, a think tank based here.

The Space Strategy Office will quickly move to draft new laws and policies to shift Japan’s space focus away from purely research and development programs to a more national, security-orientated approach that encourages the industrialization and commercialization of Japan’s space industry.

In particular, Japan needs to draw up a comprehensive space law, a “Space Activities Act,” which will provide a legal framework for privately funded space initiatives, and a five-year space plan to run through the second half of the decade.

Taepodon Trigger #3: Update

Here’s a twist. Our nice neighbors from the north are inviting us to go watch their new toy blast off.

As I predicted on Friday’s piece, meanwhile the Japanese are talking about blasting the thing out of space. Take a look at (JFTM-1) Stellar Kiji! Pretty cool!

Right on cue the Taepodon Trigger #3 is already working, with the J-media queuing to bait  pols with patriot tests (pun intended, sorry)  while cooking up a fair bit of hysteria over a minor satellite launch. Albeit one clearly and very properly in violation of UN Security Council resolution 1874

Here from Kyodo:
Japan Starts Mulling Plan On Intercepting N Korean Rocket

OMITAMA (Kyodo)–Defense Minister Naoki Tanaka said Saturday that his ministry has started considering whether to take preparatory measures to destroy the rocket-mounted satellite North Korea is preparing to launch next month.

You have to laugh at Kyodo. “Rocket mounted satellite.” You don’t say!

The ministry is considering whether to deploy ground-based Patriot Advanced Capability-3 interceptors and Aegis-equipped destroyers carrying Standard Missile-3 ballistic missile interceptors, Tanaka told reporters at the Air Self-Defense Force’s Hyakuri air base in Omitama, Ibaraki Prefecture.

‘We are currently doing a mental exercise to prepare (for the planned rocket launch), using the previous incident as our guide,” Tanaka said, referring to the government’s decision at the time of the launch of long-range ballistic missile by Pyongyang in April 2009.

In March 2009, Yasukazu Hamada, defense minister at the time, issued an order for the Self-Defense Forces to destroy a North Korean rocket or its debris in the event that it fell onto Japanese territory.

With the issuance of the order, the ASDF dispatched units capable of launching PAC-3 missiles to Iwate and Akita prefectures in northeastern Japan as well as the Tokyo metropolitan area, while the Maritime Self-Defense Force deployed three Aegis guided-missile destroyers in the Sea of Japan and the Pacific.

Then right on cue, here are both Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda (not Yoshiko Noda) on the telly on Asahi News doing the very normal thing of telling future MOD leaders graduating from the 防衛大学 (where I have some Karate mates-  tough geezers!) that AP defense situation is opaque and Defense Minister Naoki Tanaka telling them they’d better have their smarts on.

Expect next month’s launch to (a) be a prelude to a possible nuke test and (b) for Japan to go for strenghtened and semi-independent space-based EW at the end of the decade.

Japan, Vietnam Sign Deal for Two Radar Imaging Satellites

The Basic Law of 2008 scores its first success! This is an old story but with a deal impeding in Thailand I thought I’d put it up.

It’s hard to overestimate the impact of this deal to Japan’s space diplomacy and the ripple effects for pan-Asian security. Not only was this the first time space diplomacy was used as an ODA tool, actually a strategic diplomatic coup with a key SE Asian emerging economy, Vietnam, but also for a LEO “EO” satellite.  The Japan-Vietnam deal represents the first real fruits of the Basic Law of 2008. NEC, which has developed excellent small-bus, communications and EO technologies was squashed out by Melco (which promoted and succeeded with both its IGS and QZSS plans, to turn from the Market to the Military, the key point of In Defense of Japan), has now been able to secure its own market and strategy.

Further the ASNARO project could well turn out to be a stroke of genius. NEC, USEF, METI, and others are streaming all over the southern hemisphere to “sell” various stripes of ASNARO, including upcoming hyperspectral sensor models. USEF figure they need a constellation of six (eight would be better) for an ASNARO constellation to fulfill its purpose. So only another emerging economy (probably Thailand) needs to sign up and things are looking very useful. Remember, ASNARO is built to dump data as it flies over various ground stations, which are truck-mounted and highly mobile.

What is Japan doing selling spy satellites (GSD of better than 50cm) via a highly-advanced 73 cm silicon mirror (that beat out a tried and tested Melco optical design hands down) capable of advanced point-and-click, back scanning and data dumping? The ASNARO is a significant leap forward for Japan’s spy satellite fleet, with ASNARO optical and SAR already sharper that IGS-Optical/Radar Gen-2, on a tiny bus, with far, far better pointing and delivery times.

Outline of ASNARO key capabilities and features*:

Basic acquisition mode is Snap Shot mode (10km x 10km). However, depending on the largeness or shape of the area of interest, it is more efficient to use Strip Map mode or Skew mode. In the ground segment, based on the area of interest (AOI) requested from the end-user, optimum acquisition mode is automatically selected and most efficient acquisition plan is programmed. In the planning, satellite resources (storage and power) are considered to optimize the acquisition planning in mid to long term.
– Snap Shot mode:
10km x 10km area parallel to the satellite orbit is acquired.
-Wide View shot mode:
Several snap shot acquisitions are combined in cross track direction, providing wider area image data than single snap shot acquisition.
– Multi Angle Shot mode:
Within single pass, one identical target area is acquired several times from different incidence angle.
– Strip Map mode:
Long strip area parallel to the satellite orbit is acquired.
– Skew Shot mode:
Long strip area in any direction can be acquired in Skew shot node.
– High S/N Shot mode:
10km x 10km area parallel to the satellite orbit is acquired taking longer time than Snap shot mode to increase S/N of the image

What on earth would Vietnam want all that for? Crop monitoring? Disaster prevention?Here is the SN story:

*Data taken from SSC11-IV-4 Advanced EO system for the Japanese Small Satellite ASNARO
25th Annual AIAA/USU Conference on Small Satellites

[Old] Update on ASNARO

This is part II of work that I was doing last year on ASNARO/NEXTAR that I forgot to upload. It’s relevant because of the big breakthrough in space ODA to Vietnam. Soon to be repeated in Thailand, if reports are true!

2011年6月30日

USERS SEM Deorbiting Pod

I was lucky enough recently to spend a day interviewing great people at METI, USEF, Pasco and NEC a little while back and managed to nail down many more details about what is happening with the ASNARO (Advanced Satellite with New system Architecture for Observation) project. For some Space News background on ASNARO, please see my original story. This time, specifically METI asked me to write about it for them, and gave tremendous help getting NEC and Pasco on board. It was just wonderful meeting people with ideas and strategies that are obviously well thought out.

Let’s get the disclaimer out of the way first.

From where we are standing, from the point of view of national security space, at the end of the day, it doesn’t matter if NEC succeeds in its strategy to turn the ASNARO/Nextar branded modular satellite platform into a commercial success in/for ASEAN countries. Of course it matters to NEC, because they are a private company and want to make more profit.

And of course it matters to me, because for the health of NEC and Japan’s military industrial base, it’s better that they sell or get more SE Asian nations to “buy” them through ODA and I wish them every luck.

But, at the end of the day, IF ASNARO/Sasuke/ Nextar never makes a successful commercial go of it, the Japanese government is still going to make sure the platform is built. And we predict that ASNARO will play its role in Japan’s emerging national space security infrastructure.

ASNARO is crucial to a number of players in a number of ways. After years of false starts and what may have been blind alleys — MDS-1 Tsubasa or OICETS Kirari spring to mind ;-)

-Nextar represents what NEC has been trying to build since the late 90s (1998 if my memory serves me right, see NEC unveils prototype bus, aims for Teledesic, this being the non-Space News version) and the era of Hiroaki Shimayama and Takenori Yanase. Nextar, which looks suspiciously like a reworked OICETS/ MDS bus to me, and it’s the keystone of their pan-Asian commercial turnkey systems strategy.

We’ll go into this in Part II.  In Part III, we’ll look at the military angle, but only when the official article is published in Defense News.

So what is ASNARO?

ASNARO is a USEF powerplay to develop a bus system that on one hand will give NEC a chance to compeat in the ASEAN market for EO sats, and whether or not that succeeds, gives Japan the option to build a constellation of spysatellites, all kicked of with a tiny down-payment of 6 billion yen.

Therefore ASNARO is important to METI to show that its decades-long investment in creating standardized satelite bus systems and plug and play and COTs parts at USEF is finally paying off. Those of you  who have read In Defense of Japan know that we more or less regard USEF as METI’s DARPA, or military space arm, although USEF wouldn’t be comfortable with this description. Afterall, the technologies they develop are for peaceful purposes only. Right?

(I still vividly remember the change in body language when discussing with USEF how accurate USERS’s SEM -see image above- could be made).

Leaving aside the dual-use nature of many USEF projects, ANSARO is a vital component in what METI had been calling its Space on Demand (SOD) program, which, while it doesn’t actually use military language, leves very little to the imagination. Submarine launch, air launch (and with Epsilon) mobile launch! Reprogrammable satellites…”flexible” ground systems (we’ll get to that one in Part III).


Incidentally, the other main submarine space launch vehicle I know of  is the R-29R Vysota “Stingray” SLBM rebranded Volna and its peaceful brotherhood for lobbing payloads into LEO instead of  3x 300 kiloton-yield warheads at…wherever.

Behind this, ASNARO is a platform technology that also enables NEC to supply ISAS with SPRINT-series satellites, and could become a key part of Japan’s ODA strategy to counter China’s building influence in ASEAN. Hitherto, APRSAF has been a bit of a highly amicable talking shop. More about that in Part II.

Anyway, here is the Space News article with some of the bear-bones details. More to follow in Parts II and III.

Space News article by Paul Kallender-Umezu

ASNARO Delayed but far from Doomed!

Japan Moves To Relax Restrictions on Military Space Development

Here is a story that I did just before the law was sent to the Diet on Feb 14 (see later article) about (finally, after three years!) the Cabinet Office moving to enact the Basic Law of 2008 and move to take (partial- just how this may spin out, see later article!) control of Japan’s space development, specifically with controlling Japan’s regional GPS system, the QZSS…

Like most media, I had to follow the headline, but have reserved deeper analysis for my research, to be published later this year…of course none of this is a surprise to readers of “In Defense of Japan“….

ASNARO Project Upate: Part II- A New Pathway for NEC

2011年7月13日

Following on from an afternoon at NEC a while back, I was also fortunate enough to spend more or less a day at USEF catching up on METI’s space programs. What an eye-opening event that was, which will also mean that an entire chapter in an upcoming book and old friend and I are planning is now almost entirely focused on USEF. Space Environment Reliability Verification Integrated System SERVIS-2 for example yielded at least one internationally competitive technology that has become a major global success story, as well as building significant leaps forward in satellite design with the improved CFRP core and 3D heat pipes…on Melco’s COTs-testbed the SERVIS-1.

Anyway, back to the matter in hand: in promoting the ASNARO/Nextar project, USEF took a break from Melco, which has been the main beneficiary of spin on/off with USEF over the last 15 years, to switch to NEC, which had traditionally been- and still is- Japan’s master of smaller bus systems, communications and sensors. I have to qualify this statement by saying that when I mean small, I don’t mean the micro- nano- and picosatellites now being churned out by UNISEC members and others.

What I mean is NEC’s excellence in satellites such as Oicets/Kirari and work done for ISAS over the decasdes. Allied with the engineering tradition of Toshiba (in particular ETS-7 here is an old story and another here I did for Spacer and ETS-6), NEC should have by all accounts bounced back earlier from last decade’s scandal.

But they are back, big time with the small-medium ASNARO bus (see below graphic):

Back in the late 90s, as I mentioned in Part-I, NEC’s main challenge for the then-commercial constellation communications market was the Oicets bus for Teledesic.

Remember Skybridge, Celestri, Spaceway, Astrolink, and the rest of them?…how could we ever forget the time when it appeared the earth was about to be circled by hundreds of satellites dedicated to making our brick cellphones work so expensively…

That all went kaput, along with NEC’s credibility when the procurement scandal broke in 1998, all to conveniently sabotaging NEC’s bid for the IGS constellation. And it seemed for years that NEC had been cast adrift like Comets/ Kakehashi or Kiku-6 slowly frazzling in the radiation of bad publicity while sinking into a black hole of no major Engineering Test Satellite contracts for JAXA.

In many ways, with the seizure of the IGS contracts by Melco in 1998, the company surged ahead of NEC, which was left without heavy bus technology. With Melco also closely aligned to USEF, things were looking pretty grim for NEC which seemed to have been left behind from securing major contracts for NASDA/JAXA for the best part of a decade.

NEC’s position has turned the corner and improved by several developments, however.

First miniturization and continual technical improvement mean that relatively small buses such as ASNARO’s can do a lot more than they could 20 years ago. These days, a middleweight can pack the punch of a heavyweight of yesteryear in some respects.  Related to this, there is swing back to the need for smaller, more flexible satellites as payloads and technology has advanced and ASNARO’s modular, plug and play capabilities could work just fine.

Second, more and differnet satellites are needed from multiple sources to build more solutions for Japan’s emerging national security space infrastructure.  Even with Melco recently announcing it planned to redouble its output at its Kamakura Works, Japan needs NEC.

Last but most importantly in some respects is the need for different solutions to promote Japanese space diplomacy in Asia, and South East Asia through APRSAF and ODA and against the rival Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization and CGWIC . Exploring this and related issues will be a key theme for my Ph.D. research at 慶應義塾大学 政策・メディア研究科 (Keio University’s Graduate School of Media and Governance).

In the coming decade, Southeast Asia needs to take decisions about developing its space infrastructure for human security and disaster and environmental warning/monitoring/relief and it’s vital that these are done with Japanese technologies, moving on from the Sentinel, SAFE, STAR and Micro-Star and UNIFORM  programs.

Space Quarterly

SpaceRef Kindly asked me to do some articles for them catching up on recent developments in Japan’s Space Program, and it was a great chance to be able to write a little bit longer for once, but for the media, not for academia. The inaugural issue was published September 1, 2011. Many thanks to Mark and Andy!

On the left is the inaugural issue of Space Quarterly

In the first issue I concentrated on the aftermath of 3/11, the Great East Japan Earthquake and tsunami. I haven’t been frightened by an earthquake in 20 years- you get used them after living here for a while. What happened on March 11, 2011 frightened all of us as far away as Tokyo. I couldn’t imagine a building as substantial (and retrofitted) as METI would start “swimming.” And I have never felt the need to evacuate under a desk before. As I describe in the beginning of the article, that first megaquake just kept coming…and of course, as we were to find out pretty quickly, that those first horrible hours were to be just the beginning….our hearts (and nappies, baby clothes, sterilized tissue, towels, wipes, baby blankets etc.) went and go out to the people in Tokyo (and all over Japan) who suffered (and continue to suffer) so terribly.