Space and Cyber…

I’ve been working on space and cyber issues over the last year, mainly focused on research, some of which has been translated through the media. I am always grateful to Defense News in particular, which allows me to write about things that interest me, and which adheres to some basic journalism tenets as taught to me by the wonderful  Carole Agus and Marguerite Holloway, who are my wellsprings for media writing.

Those values mean:

a) No such thing as a one-source story

b) Talk to multiple parties

c) The headline fits the story

d) A dog and pony show is a press conference not a news conference

e) An interview with a PR person is not a source and only filler

f) Don’t follow the pack.

Salute to my good friend Dan!

After all that venting, here is a sneak preview of what I have been doing over the past year.

But most of all, I am really looking forward to presenting at next year’s ISTS where I will get a chance to really get to grips with the issues in hand, or up there, so-to-speak!

自衛隊も宇宙利用へ: Japanese Journalism on EW

Here is an insight into how Japanese journalists (with many honorable exceptions) over the issues.  You can get an idea of piece just from the title: “New Satellite Race.” What on earth (or in orbit) that is supposed to mean, is beyond me.

The point is that the article raises legitimate concerns in its conclusion:

「政府の担当者の間では、発射のタイミングを正確にとらえるためにも、DSPなど「宇宙の目」の役割は重要と考えられている。このため、日本でも自前のDSP導入に向けた研究が始まった。
しかし課題は山積している。DSPにはミサイルの熱源をもとに瞬時に種類や能力を割り出し、弾道を緻密に解析できるソフトウエア開発が欠かせない。しかし日本にはそうしたデータの蓄積がない。しかも早期警戒システムには衛星だけでなく、集めた情報を部隊間で共有する巨大なネットワークの構築も必要になる。
03年から打ち上げが始まった政府の情報収集衛星に投じられた経費は現在、7000億円近い。開発費を含めればDSPも数千億円かかると推定されており、国民の納得が得られるかどうかという新たな問題に直面する。」

Which boils down to legitimate doubts and questions about Japan’s EW program. But the point is without context/ contextual/ relevant contextual presentation by the journalist, the Japanese public is left thinking that the Asahi’s question raising motivated by its political stance; even a few more cursory levels of analysis of facts and background would have made this more helpful…but at least it isn’t at the pizza on the moon level of rubbish that we sometimes see in the foreign press.

So I figure, anything that gets Japanese space development issues into the media by a reasonable  journalist has to be something…

日本の宇宙利用は変わるのか: An interesting interview with Norihiro Sakamoto

Here is an interesting article by my good friend and space expert Norihiro Sakamoto at The Tokyo Foundation. I have known Mr. Sakamoto ever since he worked at the Society of Japan Aerospace Companies (SJAC) and whose predictions and interpretations about Japan’s evolving space policy have proved the most accurate in the business. Here is a screenshot of the article, but you can find the full text at: http://www.tkfd.or.jp/files/doc/nikkeiplus.pdf

The MoD’s PFI for communication satellites was largely Mr. Sakamoto’s idea and he has lots more great ideas!

Mr. Sakamoto has some very interesting opinions about what exactly Japan should do with EW and marine observation and if I get a chance I will be talking about his ideas more on this blog later. Chance would be a fine thing. If I get a chance to put 10% of what I am looking at on this blog or in the media I will be lucky!

JSP Catchup #9: In Asia, C4ISR Market Is Growing

Ahem, just after writing JSP Catchup #8, I have to issue a mea culpa as colleague Wendell Minnick asked me to contribute from Japan, resulting in us looking at the UAV issue in In Asia, C4ISR Market Is Growing, which is easier to link to without copy and pasting the Defense News version in the paper. But, here is how it looks on the web!

JSP Catchup #8: Japan To Boost Missile Warning, Other Surveillance Efforts

Here is a story that Space News asked me to write for their Military Space Quarterly, so it gave me a chance to write a little bit about the militarization of Japan’s space development, which is apparently not occurring.

The intriguing thing for me as a media participant and, more recently, as an observer, is why Japan’s development of a UAV program for early warning should suddenly become news.

And news. And news.

And, ahem…news.

Well, it’s because the Yomuiri decided it was news, even though the information has been out there since August, when the request for the budget was put out.

This led to the story being printed in the English and then suddenly the WSJ even has an angle.

Perhaps the journalist has figured out that maritime observation was somehow important to the U.S.-Japan Alliance, perhaps as it has been written in as one of the fours priority areas of cooperation. in the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (2+2) (June 2011).

The funniest story of them all was an AFP hack job on the Yomiuri story which was itself re-sluiced round media  slop sites, including a website called Inquirer.net, which quoted the AFP quoting the Yomiuri as saying “The defense ministry has demanded 3 billion yen ($372 million) over the next four years to develop the aircraft, which would come into operation in 2020, the Yomiuri Shimbun reported without citing sources.”

The Yomiuri Shimbun’s source was, as I mentioned, the publicly available MOD budget request, released months before, in color:

The fact that Japan is developing UAVs is old, old news; the fact that it is developing them as an alternative to satellite- based EW was big news- back in August. I wonder why the Yomiuri decided to notice the story months later?

In any case, for space watchers, the interesting point about this why is Japan researching twin  Early Warning programs simultaneously?

If you believe in the cock-up theory of history and recognize the stovepiping inherent in any large bureaucracy, then you might call it one hand not knowing what the other is doing.

In this case however, it is  more probably the extreme anxiety that the MOD feels about buying Japanese, which is probably based on the fact that the IGS has proved so problematical for Japan. There is a strong sense in the MoD that it can buy better gear, cheaper, with guaranteed compatibility and interoperability in terms of space based EW, so why risk buying from Melco?

Also there are tricky decisions whether to mount EW sensors on the geo-based satellites of QZSS, or develop standalone satellites, or put capability on a future Himawari, among other options on the table. In the meantime, cheap and cheerful UAV-mounted sensors are an option.

I’ll talk about SSA in a later submission, perhaps at the end of the month. If EW looks complicated for Japan, wait till you see what is happening with SSA! Anyway, here is a recent article from Space News.

JSP Catchup #7: Japan Still Calculating Cost of Defense Firm’s Padded Bills

Here is the follow-up to JSP Catchup #6: Probe Uncovers 40-year Japanese Contractor Fraud and a fuller story for Defense News published the following week. I am still intrigued on who blew the whistle and why, but hopefully this will clean out a very mucky stable. Again there are so many unanswered questions, but perhaps it was felt that Melco had gotten too big for its boots.

This was certainly the message I got around Kasumigaseki in the mid-noughties when it became increasingly apparent that, at least in space, the IGS was overpriced and not very functional. But it seemed that Japan was stuck with it until better alternatives came up.

Meanwhile, Melco’s answer was, of course, to ask for more money to improve (repair) the IGS. The numbers of contracts and amounts are quite staggering, because the practice of overcharging was built into the very fabric of Melco’s system, and reading between the lines, it seems that the NEC scandal of 1998, instead of provoking a response to clean up, it did the reverse- Melco adopted increasingly sophisticated systems of cover-up and concealment. Not good.

A basic fact is that Melco produces a lot of excellent technology and systems and is a corner stone of Japan’s defense and space industries. While it really should have cleaned its stable out in 1998, as no doubt many others did, to the degree of information that is available, it seems that justice is being done. Perhaps at last, some real “Changes for the Better” ?

JSP Catchup #6: Probe Uncovers 40-year Japanese Contractor Fraud

This story was NOT a surprise; the fuller story is at Japan Still Calculating Cost of Defense Firm’s Padded Bills, but ever since NEC Corp. in 1998 was found with its hands in the till, I have been wondering who would be fingered next, and when, and why when, and why.

I say this because when I chatted to people back in 1998, the practice of padding contracts with surplus labor costs was widespread in the space and defense sectors and this was commonly known. At the time the questions were Why NEC? And Why Now? Below my initial October story is NEC SCANDAL SHEDS LIGHT ON JAPANESE PROCUREMENTS, a more fruity web version of a story that I originally wrote for Space News back in the day.

The timing for the original NEC story was also interesting as NEC was strongly pushing for its version of what was to become Japan’s IGS spy satellite system that was provoked by the Teapodon Triggeran analysis that Saadia and I wrote about in In Defense of Japan (thank you Google Books!)

At the time NEC’s version of what was to become the IGS would have featured smaller satellites and cost less than Melco’s system. But with NEC suddenly out of the picture, Melco, with Ichiro Taniguchi at the helm, managed to personally lobby Japan’s Cabinet in the weeks after the Taepondon launch, and Japan’ got the IGS.

Here is a nice picture from Space Safety Magazine of Japan’s 1,200-Kilogram IGS 1B Satellite re-entered Earth’s Atmosphere on Thursday, July 26, 2012 after spending nearly 9.5 years in space.  Another more detailed article about this can be found at Spaceflight.101.com.

Eventually, NEC’s small-bus and higher resolution system has  been re-emerging in the ASNARO system, which is now being pushed as an alternative and complementary system to the expensive and relatively lower performance IGS, and also as the linchpin of a satellite-based, pan-Asian disaster monitoring network that is now a major part of Japan’s emerging regional space diplomacy and security strategy.  At least the Vietnamese have bought into it, and while customers don’t seem to be forming a line yet, there is still a lot of hope out there.

Here is the initial story for Defense News:

NEC SCANDAL SHEDS LIGHT ON

JAPANESE PROCUREMENTS.

By Paul Kallender in Tokyo

When, in September 1998, an investigation into the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) discovered that Japanese technology giant NEC Corp had systematically defrauded the taxpayer on 33 space contracts over the course of five years, it looked as though Japan’s obviously abused government procurement system was about to get a major overhaul.

The investigation began promisingly enough. On September 3, Tokyo prosecutors raided the JDA and arrested Kenichi Ueno, deputy head of the Procurement Office, and a clutch of executives from NEC subsidiary Toyo Communications.

This followed discoveries that not only had Toyo overcharged the JDA some $21m over dozens of equipment contracts, but that Ueno and others had conspired to prevent Toyo, NEC and other subsidiaries from repaying the money. NEC was raided the next day and by September 10, nine senior NEC and JDA executives were in jail.

It came to light that Ueno and others had lifted incriminating paperwork out of the Agency’s filing cabinets and put them into incinerators and even the homes of friends. NEC’s SuperTower headquarters was soon besieged by the Japanese phenomenon of ‘sound trucks,’ driven by right-wing extremists screaming abuse and demanding mass resignations.

But instead of resulting in the punishment of protagonists and the start of reforms, the scandal collapsed into a desultory cover-up. NEC’s initial response was to deny everything, with a bemused VP Masakatsu Miwa telling the media on September 10 that he did not expect top NEC executives to resign because of the scandal, going on to explain that he “wondered why” NEC officials were being implicated. Unfortunately for Miwa, on September 29, NEC’s overcharging was upscaled to $2.5bn, while, on the same day, a Parliamentary committee reported that the JDA had hired no less than 44 NEC executives in senior positions in just two years. By October 10, former NEC VP Hiroaki Shimayama and Takenori Yanase, VP of NEC’s Space Systems Division, had both been arrested.

Thieves charter

The National Space Development Agency (NASDA) launched an inquiry and on November 9, NEC admitted overcharging by at least $19m. Meanwhile on October 14, the JDA revealed that 225 of its officials had been hired by 20 suppliers in the past five years, shedding some dim light on a corner of Japan’s Amadudari (Descent from Heaven) career kickback system.

At the heart of the issue, according to NASDA’s former executive director Akira Kubozono, is the flawed government contract system which encourages corruption through a combination of legendary meanness and bureaucratic incompetence.

“There are two points about this affair,” he said. “One is that NEC is just a scapegoat. The second is that the governmental contract system is the cause of this scandal. When the defense contract revelations began, I thought it was only a matter of time before it spread into NEC’s space systems division as both defense and space procurement are conducted under similar systems.”

Under the Japanese government contract system, the co ntractor is obliged to repay any unused budget if the delivery price falls below the contract amount, and the contractor must also incur any costs if the project overshoots the agreed estimate — a thieves charter if ever there was one.

Furthermore NASDA, the Science and Technology Agency and the Ministry of Finance lack the technical expertise to evaluate bids and tend to just accept company estimates, says Kubozono. “The system needs to be reformed but I doubt this is possible as long as NASDA and the corporations are controlled by STA administrators (who also often retire to executive positions in NASDA) and not by engineers,” he says.

No mettle Kubozono, it seems, was right.

By November 12, the space scandal seemed to have been wrapped up, with NASDA saying it was satisfied that only NEC had abused the system. “The system has worked well for 30 years. We believe that a little devil whispered into NEC’s ear. We do not think it will happen again,” said Yasuyuki Fukumuro, NASDA PR deputy director. Fukumuro quickly admitted that NEC would be allowed to bid for Japan’s new spy satellite system, after a token contract moratorium.

Back at the JDA, a grand total of six senior officials will take up to 10% pay cuts for one to three months plus one official will receive a 10-day suspension, JDA chief Fukushiro Nukuga told the media at his November 20 resignation press conference.

The speech followed a report, which admitted that there had been “some incidents that could be regarded as a systematic cover-up,” perhaps referring to the 31 officials suspected of Berlin-bunker style burning of documentation that might have provided evidence.

But the worst thing about the affair, according to observers, has been the brazen arrogance of NEC. In his October 23 resignation speech, NEC Chairman Tadahiro Sekimoto, now under personal investigation for his role in the affair, denied any involvement but resigned out of “social responsibility” for the affair, astonishing Kubozono in particular.

“Sekimoto’s act was spineless. If he had honor he would have resigned to take responsibility, not quibbled. He showed no mettle and is a very poor example for younger business leaders. I fear for Japan’s future.”

An even poorer analysis comes from Youichi Teraishi, Editor of Japan’s ‘scandaru’ [scandal] daily, the Nikkan Gendai. He says that Sekimoto’s act compared unfavorably with Yakuza (the Japanese Mafia) standards of conduct. “This Oyabun [Japanese gang boss] showed a lack of chivalry. Captains of industry are supposed to be able to demonstrate this, but Sekimoto lacked the class,” he says.

Lastly, the scandal has left NEC seething that it was singled out for a brutal slap on the wrist. “Everyone is doing it, why should we be the scapegoat?” admitted one NEC official. “Our top management just stuck their heads in the sand and got shafted,” complained another.

This article first appeared in Global Technology News.

JSP Catchup #5: Japan Takes Action Against Complex Cyber Threats

Here is a feature article I did for C4ISR Journal that Defense News put on the web and seems to have been picked up widely (see below), including even NewsOnJapan.com! It’s nice to be able to monetize my research and it was published just as the MOD decided to release some details on its cyberwarfare strategy.

In the year since a sophisticated cyber attack on Japan’s largest military contractor unleashed a flood of revelations about the vulnerability of the country’s most sensitive technical data, cybersecurity has vaulted onto the country’s national security agenda.

In August 2011, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries discovered viruses on its systems in 11 locations across Japan, including in plants that build many of the nation’s missiles, military helicopters, fighter jets, rockets, submarines and nuclear power reactors. Some 45 servers and 38 PCs were infected by at least eight types of viruses when employees unwittingly opened emails containing malware. The company, also Japan’s lead contractor for the SM-3 Block IIA missile being built with the U.S. and for 38 of Japan’s F-35s, sat on the news. When local media brought the attacks to light the following month, the Ministry of Defense rebuked Mitsubishi for failing to immediately inform the ministry of any security breach.

Yet the Mitsubishi stories were just the start of a stunning wave of revelations about similar attacks on other leading companies and institutions. IHI Corp. and Kawasaki Heavy Industries, both major space and military contractors, soon confirmed they had been targeted. In late October, Chief Cabinet Secretary Osamu Fujimura admitted the foreign ministry and several Japanese embassies had been under attack since June. Just after that, it was revealed that computers and servers used by three members of Japan’s Lower House had been hacked.

The bad news has continued into 2012. In April, Nissan reported malware and data breaches in its global network; in June, the group known as Anonymous hacked the finance and transport ministries’ Web pages, forcing the finance ministry to reveal that 123 of its desktop computers had been infected with a remote-access Trojan in 2010 and 2011.

The attacks have been getting more sophisticated, said Motohiro Tsuchiya, a professor at Keio University and member of the Information Security Policy Council, Japan’s top-level government cybersecurity advisory body.

“The recent tactic has been attacking peripheral institutions with lower security and then getting in behind the lower barriers — for example, by attacking think tanks. When this … started, everyone knew something was wrong,” Tsuchiya said.

Instead of brute-force denial-of-service and similar techniques, attacks against the Japanese government and the defense industry increasingly take the form of sophisticated targeted email messages carrying malware.

“In 2010-11, we saw emails mimicking legitimate email addresses, and the attachment files are no longer just [executable] files but also PDFs,” said Masahiro Uemura, who directs the office of IT security policy at the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, known as METI.

In 2011, such attacks accounted for one-third of all recorded attacks, a record, Uemura said. Worse, he said, attackers appear to be focusing on Japan’s infrastructure, especially control systems such as those used in power plants and the manufacturing industry. He said nearly 37 percent of infrastructure-related control systems are connected to the outside, and the vast majority has only perimeter security measures, Uemura said.

The flood of attacks has galvanized government action on cybersecurity policy domestically and internationally.

In October 2011, METI set up the Initiative for Cyber Security Information Sharing Partnership of Japan, which brings the country’s strategic sectors together to share information on cyber attacks and policy. Nine of the country’s top defense companies are members.

“Our minister personally asked us last fall to set up this initiative to protect our most critical industries. The attack on Mitsubishi was the trigger,” Uemura said.

Tsuchiya said the attacks jolted the Information Security Policy Council, which had rarely met since the Democratic Party of Japan came to power in 2009 with little policy focus on cybersecurity. This summer, the senior advisory board released Information Security 2012, which describes how the government might work with the private sector to protect critical infrastructure. The report suggested setting up large-scale attack drills with operators from nuclear plants, the gas distribution network and telecommunications; urging defense contractors to better ward off attacks and share information with the government; and implement measures to protect smartphones from viruses.

Meanwhile, the prime minister’s Cabinet Secretariat is now coordinating government policy much more actively. After the Anonymous attacks, for example, the Cabinet Secretariat set up an emergency support team to make better preparations against cyber attacks on government organizations.

The attacks also jump-started Japanese efforts to reach out to the U.S. and other foreign partners. In February, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs replaced a lower-level body with a Cyber Task Force under the control of Ambassador Tamotsu Shinotsuka. Ministry documents show the new group has five policy units: international rule-making, cyber crime, system security and protection, economic issues and national cybersecurity.

Still, Tsuchiya said, “The foreign affairs ministry hadn’t really been focused on cybersecurity, but this changed this year when [Minister of Foreign Affairs Koichiro] Gemba showed up at the June ISPC meeting. It was the first time any foreign minister had attended.”

Now, he said, international cooperation, especially with the U.S., is high on the agenda. Cooperation is now written into the U.S.-Japan security alliance. In April, a joint statement by the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee announced Tokyo’s intention to join the Convention of Cybercrime and to strengthen bilateral cooperation, critical infrastructure, system-security control, incident management and operational cooperation.

Most importantly for Uemura, he said his department now meets regularly with counterparts in the U.S. Department of Homeland Security to discuss coordination and address U.S. concerns on defense product issues. The partners are working toward an information-sharing security framework that may be announced in the coming months.

The ministry’s main policy is to promote international rule-making and norms setting in line with U.S. and European policies, according to one ministry official. The official cited U.K. Foreign Secretary William Hague’s February 2011 “Seven Principles” speech at the Munich Security Conference as one of the key references for Japanese policy and said Japan supports the promotion of the Budapest Convention on Cyber Crime.

Tsuchiya said the foreign ministry is working to promote international rules in line with U.S. and European policy to form international norms of behavior at the International Conference on Cyberspace in Budapest in October.

Significantly, Gemba has laid out a tentative Japanese policy on the right of self-defense against cyber attacks, an interpretation that theoretically paves the way for Japan to take defensive action. While it does not go as far as the U.S. Defense Department’s 2011 announcement that the U.S. may treat cyber attacks as “acts of war,” the Japanese government for the first time has recognized cyberspace as a national security domain, just like land, sea, air and outer space.

Meanwhile, the Ministry of Defense is beefing up its capabilities. The ministry, which created its first cybersecurity unit in 2000 and added the C4 Systems Command to protect its Defense Information Infrastructure data network, has about 380 people devoted to cybersecurity, said Koji Yoshino, the principal deputy director of the ministry’s Defense Programming and Planning Division.

The ministry’s baseline for cybersecurity and information exchange with the U.S. is based on an April 2006 memorandum of understanding that asks both sides to increase their capability against cyber attacks. After a CD-ROM containing classified Aegis radar data went missing in 2007, a new agreement was made leading to a bilateral agreement requiring Japan to tighten its military information security policies.

The focus on information security has been deepened further by the two countries’ cooperation on ballistic missile defense, which requires sharing information from Aegis ships, Patriot missile batteries and other sensors.

In the past two years, Yoshino said, the ministry has added a cyber planning coordinator to the Joint Staff Office, worked to drill people on responding to attacks, and begun developing tools to gather and analyze information about the latest attacks. It has also improved cyber analysis at Japan’s signals intelligence agency, called Defense Intelligence Headquarters and modeled after the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, he said.

This year, the C4SC added tools to improve information collection and dynamic and static analysis, particularly of malware, said Keiichi Sakashita, who directs the Information Assurance Office.

In September, the ministry’s cyber defense strategy took two steps forward. First, the ministry requested 21.2 billion yen ($270 million) to set up a new cyber defense force with about 100 people, which will combine the ministry’s previous efforts to create its own version of a Japanese Cyber Command, along with 13.3 billion yen to reinforce cyber defense of the ministry’s core Defense Information Infrastructure.

Tsuchiya applauded the move.

“The MoD has been trying for two years to set up the unit, but the attempts were refused by the finance ministry,” he said.

Second, the ministry is now writing doctrine on responding to a cyber attack, said Tetsuya Ito, who directs the strategic planning office of the ministry’s Defense Policy Division.

In September, a ministry panel released new guidelines for dealing with cyber attacks and affirming Japan’s right to respond.

“If a cyber attack takes place as part of a military attack, this can be considered to fulfill the first condition for invoking the right of self-defense,” said a report issued by the panel.

Here is some of the media the story attracted:

JSP Catchup #4: U.S., Japan Strengthen Ties Through Panetta Visit

After a long talk with an old SAIS buddy of mine, we came to the conclusion that China has blown it; Japan will now, following up on its more general security strategy, look to disinvest and take its business away and put it with the growing string of Asian nations who are also pissed at and increasingly concerned with China’s belligerence. Can China control the genie of nationalism it has unleashed?  I can see whiplash ahead.

The U.S. will find more common ground with Russia, if it has any sense at all. In any case, in answer to the old fear of abandonment that seems to resurface regularly, the U.S. in no certain terms seems to be showing more of its cards. Thank you, Mr. P!

JSP Catchup #3: Japan’s Budget Request Targets Capabilities To Defend Sea Lanes

Here is a follow-up from the previous story with a little more analysis, which was published by Defense News on September 14.