Towards the H-3: Update

H-2A successor

Space News kindly published a version of my story on the H-3 last week. I’ve done the usual and pasted a version into this blog.

There is also a story by the ever excellent Warren Ferster on the Epsilon based on a JAXA presser. Please see this blog for more background on the Epsilon, or go to the new, vastly improved Space News website.

We can expect more light to be shone on this during June when the ONSP subcommittee makes its final recommendations. Meanwhile the Yomiuri and Asahi have some more information and perspective on the issue.

Our view in In Defense of Japan is that the H-series is a technology development program and while it may arouse screams of indignation and anger to say it, to put it bluntly, money will always be found to develop technologies that give Japan options. As, fundamentally, Saadia and I argue that Japan’s space program has always been basically, when you remove all the dressing, a dual-use strategic technology development program, then reasons to develop the H-3 will always be found.

As made plain by Dick Samuels and Mike Green, under nationalists such as Tomifumi Godai and in an era of rampant technonationalism and kokusanka, there were compelling reasons to develop the H-2. Japan wanted and needed to build a sophisticated, liquid fueled, highly efficient two-stage medium launch vehicle to cement its international reputation as part of the advanced spacefaring club. Remember, when the H-2 was envisaged over 20 years ago, few saw the impending “lost decade.”

Japan’s space program under NASDA was relatively awash with money, with investments made or planned  into all sorts of challenging dual-use precursor technologies including ETS-7 (on orbit ASAT demonstration) OICETS/ Kirari (laser communications), reconnaissance/ spy  satellites ICBM prototypes (M-V, J-1), reentry (OREX, USERS SEM) SIGINT (ETS-8), global strike (HYFLEX, HOPE) etc. Some highly ambitious programs that emerged last decade, have disappeared, for example HiMEOS and Smartsat-1.

On the other hand, ALSET looks as if it could make it.

これまでの基幹ロケットの評価と今後の在り方について 2013 年 4 月 24 日 宇宙輸送システム部会 委員 三菱重工業株式会社 代表取締役常務執行役員 航空宇宙事業本部長 鯨井 洋

これまでの基幹ロケットの評価と今後の在り方について
2013 年 4 月 24 日
宇宙輸送システム部会 委員
三菱重工業株式会社 代表取締役常務執行役員
航空宇宙事業本部長
鯨井 洋

Let’s not forget the H-2 very nearly made it to commercial viability but was fatally holed by the surging yen as well as dodgy turbopumps. So then money was found for the H-2A to solve the problem (half the costs, boost the payload) …but as we argue in In Defense of Japan, whether or not the H-2A really made it was not the issue. Could the program be justified in terms of a technology development program to the MoF. The peanuts in terms of cost involved in developing the H-2A compared to the cost of major launch vehicle systems by other advanced democracies (lets just name the Ariane 5) meant yes.

And now the cycle starts again. So how will the H-3 be sold to the MoF under the rubric of Japan’s latest stated space policy?

Sure, as something that will be commercially viable. Whether or not MHI and JAXA can actually achieve this is, we contend, strategically, a mute question. If and when the H-3 doesn’t make it commercially, MHI and Japan will have at least invested in developing a new level of excellent technologies that will secure Japan’s independent launch vehicle capabilities and provide jobs, technology and investment in its aerospace sector. Incidentally, the H-3 is now being sold by MHI as “catchup” again, as the slide above shows.

Sure, the same old cycle of vituperation and lashing will follow in the Japanese media if or when the H-3 fails to make the grade commercially, but the more strategic goals of “keeping/ catching up” will have been met.

FINALLY! Japan Passes Law Permitting Military Space Development

Here is the text of the quick story I put up last Friday for Defense News. For background on this story Japan Space Law: Now Mid-May, or When?

I’ll have a more more commentary on this later in the week. Well it’s three years late, but finally it’s gone through after considerable struggles. I’ll have something of a more detailed picture on the whole thing out later this year for Space Policy.

However talking to Kazuto Suzuki and Norihio Sakamoto over the past few weeks I have been struck by the differences of opinion on the upcoming speed with which the 宇宙戦略室 (Space Strategy Office) is going to be able to act. Sakamoto believes that the much-needed Space Activities Act, which is much needed to promote commercialization in J-space could come even within this year. Suzuki believes the law isn’t really a priority and not needed. Listening to an SHSP presentaiton on the issue earlier this year at a conference to establish the Keio Advanced Research Center for Space Law, the message seems mixed.

It has been pointed out that essentially the three-year battle to wrest control of space policy and execution from MEXT was de facto won last year when the SHSP under Katase effectively grabbed the budget negotiations with the MOF away from MEXT. You can see the effect immediately in that the much prized JAXA-MEXT flagship Hayabusa-2 program got its huge budget request stomped.

But the new law is far more than window dressing, as I will go on to explain in subsequent posts.

Tokyo — The Upper House of Japan’s Diet June 20 passed legislation that shifts control of the nation’s space policy and budget, and opens the door to military space development programs with an emphasis on space-based missile early warning.

The raft of legislation, based on the Bill to Amend the Law of Establishment of the Cabinet Office that was sent to the Diet on Feb. 14, enables the Prime Minister’s Cabinet Office to take control of the planning and budgeting of Japan’s government space program. It also removes an article in a prior law governing the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA), the nation’s equivalent to NASA, which had restricted JAXA’s ability to pursue military space programs.

Prior to the legislation, JAXA had been de facto controlled by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), and was overseen by a MEXT committee called the Space Activities Commission (SAC), leading to criticisms of regulatory capture.

At the same time, JAXA’s space development has been restricted to an extremely narrow “peaceful purposes only” policy, which meant the agency was unable to develop specifically military space programs.

The new legislation enables the Cabinet Office to set up a Space Strategy Office, headed by the prime minister, which will have the ultimate say on all policy and budget decisions. It will be supported by a consultative Space Policy Commission of five to seven academics and independent observers.

The legislation also scraps MEXT’s control of JAXA and abolishes SAC, said Kazuto Suzuki, associate professor of international political economy at the Public Policy School of Hokkaido University.

Japan’s space development has been hampered by the peaceful-purposes-only restriction, and by what many outside MEXT see as programs focused too much on technological development for its own sake, leading to expensive launch systems and satellites that serve little practical purpose for the nation, Suzuki said.

The passing of the law ends a process that began nearly a decade ago by politicians looking for ways to leverage Japan’s space development programs and technologies for security purposes, to bolster the nation’s defenses in the face of increased tensions in East Asia.

On top of an increasingly confident China, Japan faces a potentially belligerent and unstable North Korea just across the Sea of Japan. Since 1998, North Korea has consistently flouted and broken promises, norms and international laws in developing and testing nuclear weapons and missiles.

JAXA will now be permitted to develop space programs in line with international norms, which are governed by the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. The treaty allows military space development, but not the deployment of weapons of mass destruction in orbit.

As the Cabinet Office, the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) will all have a form of “joint control” over JAXA, the space agency will gradually move away from its purely scientific, non-military role, said analysts and experts involved with drawing up the legislation. Under the new arrangement, each ministry will be able to propose its own space programs.

METI, for example, is interested in promoting dual-use Earth observation and reconnaissance satellites and an air-launch space access system, according to the ministry.

Suzuki said there also is strong bipartisan political support for Japan to develop and launch its own missile early-warning system to support the nation’s small fleet of Aegis destroyers for upper-tier defense, and its PAC-3 systems for lower-tier defense.

The Cabinet Office also will take direct control of the budget and program development of Japan’s regional GPS system, called the Quasi-Zenith Satellite System.

More immediately, the Cabinet Office is likely to set up the Space Strategy Office and Space Policy Commission as early as July 1, said Norihiro Sakamoto, a research fellow at The Tokyo Foundation, a think tank based here.

The Space Strategy Office will quickly move to draft new laws and policies to shift Japan’s space focus away from purely research and development programs to a more national, security-orientated approach that encourages the industrialization and commercialization of Japan’s space industry.

In particular, Japan needs to draw up a comprehensive space law, a “Space Activities Act,” which will provide a legal framework for privately funded space initiatives, and a five-year space plan to run through the second half of the decade.

Update: Some Interesting Media on Upcoming DPRK launch

Amongst the dross and hysteria about Japan “preparing to intercept” his month’s North Korean “missile” with PAC-3 or SM-3 the WSJ has just printed something sensible about the upcoming Eunha-3 launch of the DPRK’s third satellite, Kwangmyŏngsŏng-3.

(I particularly like the picture used in this AP picture, with the use of the green camouflage on the PAC-3 batteries to help protect them from the evil commies, while the batteries are surrounded the cherry blossom and slate gray blocks of flats they can’t protect against a “missile” that’s not going to come within a 1,000 kilometers of them.)

This follows another excellent piece in Businessweek, NKorea launch an intel opportunity for US, allies, which features the excellent Narushige Michishita and Hiroyasu Akutsu.

In Japan Readies Response to Pyongyang’s Launch the WSJ finally places at least one correct caveat in the story that anybody who has any basic understanding of the launch and Japan’s BMD technology would know instantly:

This time, North Korea says it will launch in a southerly, not an easterly, direction. That means the rocket is expected to pass high over Okinawan islands in the East China Sea, an area that has become a security concern for Tokyo amid disputes with China and worries over that country’s increasing military profile.

At last WSJ and BW are getting closer to the real story… Japan and the U.S. have known about this launch since December and the story is win-win-win for everyone, the DPRK, the media, who are getting a good story despite the fact that most hacks have just become (willing or unwitting) cyphers, politicians and Japan’s BMD spending. DPRK is good for one thing- stimulating Japan’s defense!

Remember that SM-3 is designed to shoot down an IRBM in orbit  (at the moment one might be about it, on a good day) in space and so far it has been achieving success in carefully coordinated and choreographed tests. PAC-3 is designed as a terminal phase descent against a high speed missile, not against tumbling slow moving small bit of rocket debris. In the billions-or trillions-to-one chances that a rocket casing or  chunk of something manages somehow to get on a trajectory to hit a tiny island such as Miyakojima, neither SM-3 or PAC-3 are going to be much use. But don’t let reality impinge on a  good story!

It’s a pity the WSJ befuddles the implications of their statement that the rocket is going to come nowhere near Japan, that somehow the Eunha-3, the DPRK by suggesting the  emerging naval arms race between China and Japan over the East China Sea has anything to do with our little North Korean rocket. That’s also besides the point that if something does go suddenly seriously wrong with the rocket, Japan’s two-tiered BMD system probably can’t do anything with it anyway.

But without the implication of threat and controversy, there isn’t much of a story  saying something like, erm, “Japan prepares training exercise for some Aegis cruisers to track North Korean satellite launch.”

The article then contains an interesting interpretation of facts and motives as told by Defense Minister Tanaka:

On Friday, Defense Minister Naoki Tanaka told reporters that nothing unusual should be read into the southern deployment. “It’s not related to a strengthening of our defense structure,” he said. “It’s just in case.”

That’s a new one!

PAC-3 has long been planned as part of the MOD’s latest Mid-Term Defense Plan precisely to send a message to China, as MOD told me March 13, well before before the “story broke” about the upcoming launch, that PAC-3 was  deployed to Okinawa anyway.

Then the article quotes a local analyst who has a take on things that is something nearer what all this is all about:

“The Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces must be thankful to Pyongyang for providing a chance for training under such real circumstances,” said Tetsuo Maeda, a Japanese military analyst.

Since Japan and the U.S. have known about the launch  since December, the “news” by the media which in the case of knowledgeable Japanese journalists amounts to a clear case of deliberately whipping up the froth to make it a good story, and for “foreign correspondents” based here to roll out a bunch of nonsense about the whole thing.

As I said in my original article, this latest Taepondon Trigger is an excellent chance for Japan to get training in and ramp the threat up so as to loosen up budget for more BMD after 2015.

In fact both North Korea and Japan and the U.S. have a lot to gain by the launch. As I originally wrote a month or so ago, succeed or fail, the launch will be a valuable propaganda victory for the military and political junta backing Kim Jong-il , and it will be both an intelligence bonanza and is already proving a valuable fear creation scenario to help Japan strengthen its defenses.

Taepodon Trigger#3: U.S. Knew of DPRK Plan Last Dec.

The plot thickens. As I pointed out in my original blog, all is not what it seems in the conventional media narrative about North Korean space launches and missile tests. The Yomiuri in “DPRK ‘told U.S. about plan on Dec. 15′” has just done some important work in revealing that it may well be that the United States knew as early as mid-December about this April’s North Korean satellite launch. The story reads as follows:

“WASHINGTON–A senior North Korean government official informed the United States before the death of Kim Jong Il was announced in December of its plan to launch a satellite, according to a former senior U.S. government official.
In an article for a U.S. research institute, Evans Revere, who served as acting assistant secretary of state under the administration of President George W. Bush, wrote that the decision to carry out the launch is highly likely to have been made by the late North Korean leader.
…Revere met with the North Korean official on Dec. 15 and was told about the planned launch of what some people believed to be a missile. The meeting is believed to have taken place in New York…”

This fits entirely in with standard practice by media, partly because it’s a great story, to hype the DPRK threat, (remember the original Taepodon incident of 1998 was not a shock at all, it was a trigger)  which is used by Japan’s political establishment (rightly, in my opinion) to promote further strategic investment and spending in Japan’s defense capabilities. Ultimately, and very indirectly of course, this is fed by nationalism and fear of abandonment. Those specters lurk very deep in the background. But they are there, nonetheless.

This whole prearranged dance is not what it seems at all…

….While a minor and enjoyable subroutine of my job as a researcher is to look at how politicians and the media work to manufacture opinion one of the hazards and joys is looking at the some of the dire rubbish that is fed to otherwise intelligent readers by the dregs of the media, I feel it’s important to keep some sort of sensible narrative up about important incidents such at the DPRK’s satellite launch. The whole idea about deploying PAC-3 to Okinawa to defend Japan is made-up media guff but the launch over the Yellow Sea will provide the MSDF with a valuable tracking and training opportunity, while there is no threat to Japan or its southernmost island chain at all.

For your amusement:

If you did read the CNN piece about those good ol’ Eagis ships protecting us from the commies, you would have also learned from CNN International that the North Koreans were planning “a rocket-powered satellite launch.” Or was that The Daily Telegraph?  Well hot dog!

It looks like the Taepodon Trigger #3 is fully in effect in both Japan and the ROK meanwhile.

Update 2: Taepodon Trigger #3

Update; some news has made it into some media that the Eunha-3 is going to come nowhere near Japan and it seems the press is gradually catching up to the news that the rocket’s path is due south as we see it “consistent with a satellite launch.” Of course it’s good PR to use the launch to focus attention on the need for Japan to bolster its BMD, but it seems people are slowly waking up to some basic facts about the launch.

The latest spin is “crash fears” about the “propulsion stage.” Put on your tin helmets!

The Taepodon Trigger (by which I mean magnifying external events to trigger changes in Japan’s national security stance)  is now fully in effect, with politicians and the media not wasting the opportunity drum up and repackage a good story about Japan preparing to shoot down the DPRK’s Eunha-3 (Galaxy) rocket next month to launch the Kwangmyŏngsŏng-3 if necessary.

The story, as repackaged from the Asahi in Time (Japan Threatens to Shoot Down NoKo Missile. Really) is a typical copying local reports “that Japanese Defense Minister Naoki Tanaka told Diet members Monday that “We will take the (necessary) procedures in the event of a contingency that threatens our country’s security,” and pointed out that Japan has Patriot PAC-3 and Aegis destroyers that could do the job. Japan’s Ground Self-Defense Forces began deploying Patriot batteries to Japan’s southern islands today.”

The article then goes on to copy the same old media rubric that I have to use in my media articles about the “Japanese” still being  “traumatized by a 1998 test in which nuclear-armed North Korea lobbed a ballistic missile directly over the home islands.”

“The incident prompted the Japanese to join the US in missile-defense R&D, and it remains a cornerstone of Japanese defense policy.”

This is lazy journalism, reinventing the past and not checking the facts and not knowing the basics about what is happening because:

1. The 1998 “missile test” was a space launch attempt and Japan and the U.S. were notified about it at least a month in advance and in fact an Aegis cruiser was put in the Sea of Japan to track the SLV’s flightpath

2. The original Taepodong 1 did not overfly or violate Japan’s territory.

3. Japan’s cooperation with MD did not directly result from this incident; in fact the IGS program was triggered.

Please see In Defense of Japan for more details and Taepodon Trigger #3: DPRK to attempt 3rd Satellite Shot- Third Time Lucky?

The SLV will fly over the Yellow Sea and not Japan. SM-3 is designed to intercept an IRBM in orbit. PAC-3 is not designed to shoot down IRBMs and even if the thing blew up on the way up, there is a vanishingly small chance of a hunk of metal landing on Naha. Could PAC-3 be of any use anyway? Perhaps a garbage-can chunk of debris containing a basket ball sized satellite might conceivably drop somewhere over the Yellow Sea somewhere but what has that got to do with PAC-3?

Finally all of the press (including the Yomiuri’s Govt may send PAC-3s to Okinawa / SDF readying for launch of DPRK rocket) is ignoring the fact that the movement of PAC-3 is ALREADY PLANNED.

But don’t let the facts get in the way of a good story.  Please see my Defense News article from this week below.

The point is that these and other “scares” will be used to help bolster Japan’s defense posture, which is an excellent thing overall.

Taepodon Trigger #3: Update

Here’s a twist. Our nice neighbors from the north are inviting us to go watch their new toy blast off.

As I predicted on Friday’s piece, meanwhile the Japanese are talking about blasting the thing out of space. Take a look at (JFTM-1) Stellar Kiji! Pretty cool!

Right on cue the Taepodon Trigger #3 is already working, with the J-media queuing to bait  pols with patriot tests (pun intended, sorry)  while cooking up a fair bit of hysteria over a minor satellite launch. Albeit one clearly and very properly in violation of UN Security Council resolution 1874

Here from Kyodo:
Japan Starts Mulling Plan On Intercepting N Korean Rocket

OMITAMA (Kyodo)–Defense Minister Naoki Tanaka said Saturday that his ministry has started considering whether to take preparatory measures to destroy the rocket-mounted satellite North Korea is preparing to launch next month.

You have to laugh at Kyodo. “Rocket mounted satellite.” You don’t say!

The ministry is considering whether to deploy ground-based Patriot Advanced Capability-3 interceptors and Aegis-equipped destroyers carrying Standard Missile-3 ballistic missile interceptors, Tanaka told reporters at the Air Self-Defense Force’s Hyakuri air base in Omitama, Ibaraki Prefecture.

‘We are currently doing a mental exercise to prepare (for the planned rocket launch), using the previous incident as our guide,” Tanaka said, referring to the government’s decision at the time of the launch of long-range ballistic missile by Pyongyang in April 2009.

In March 2009, Yasukazu Hamada, defense minister at the time, issued an order for the Self-Defense Forces to destroy a North Korean rocket or its debris in the event that it fell onto Japanese territory.

With the issuance of the order, the ASDF dispatched units capable of launching PAC-3 missiles to Iwate and Akita prefectures in northeastern Japan as well as the Tokyo metropolitan area, while the Maritime Self-Defense Force deployed three Aegis guided-missile destroyers in the Sea of Japan and the Pacific.

Then right on cue, here are both Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda (not Yoshiko Noda) on the telly on Asahi News doing the very normal thing of telling future MOD leaders graduating from the 防衛大学 (where I have some Karate mates-  tough geezers!) that AP defense situation is opaque and Defense Minister Naoki Tanaka telling them they’d better have their smarts on.

Expect next month’s launch to (a) be a prelude to a possible nuke test and (b) for Japan to go for strenghtened and semi-independent space-based EW at the end of the decade.

Taepodon Trigger #3: DPRK to attempt 3rd Satellite Shot- Third Time Lucky?

You couldn’t make it up. You just couldn’t. I just asked the MOD about this very likelihood this week!

The announcement that the DPRK is attempting a third satellite launch in mid-April is just the sort of development that will help propel Japan’s basic BMD and nascent military space deployment.

The fact that so the Eunha-3 (Galaxy) rocket will fly over the Yellow Sea and not Japan doesn’t mean the news hasn’t already caused a huge stir in Japan, with the story being the top news on most TV.

Regardless of the flightpath, the launch will constitute another violation of June 2009’s UNSC Resolution 1874 that was passed the last time DPRK tried to launch a satellite (see below).

“We urge North Korea to exercise restraint and refrain from the launch,” said Chief Cabinet Secretary Osamu Fujimura, echoing statements from ROK.

What timing!

On Tuesday I was talking to Masayuki Iwaike, Director of Missile Defense and Space Policy at MOD about Japan’s approach to SSA and likely speed of moves by Japan on Early Warning, following last June’s 2+2, when Japan and the U.S. basically agreed that Japan will add some form of EW capability to its BMD systems, either through adding IR sensors on QZSS/Michibiki  or through several different satellite bus plans (candidates include

SERVIS-3 by USEF and ASNARO, among others) with the CISC probably jealously guarding its independence with the IGS program, keeping it from the Space Strategy Office to be formed in April.

The key point about next week’s Defense News article, will be that Japan has more or less completed its basic two-tier BMD system, with its radar and sensor structure also on the verge of completion with the fourth and final FPS-5 S-band phased array ground based early warning radar nearly finished, joining the upgraded FPS-3 3-D phased-array radars, and JADGE up and running. Meanwhile PAC-3 is being boosted and the MSDF is adding two more SM3-Block 1A capable cruisers.

So the big question was to Iwaike, will you accelerate plans or add capability if the recent U.S.-DPRK agreement turns out to be not worth the paper its written on?

– Remember last month North Korea supposedly agreed to suspend uranium enrichment, halt nuclear and long-range missile tests, and to allow back U.N. weapons inspectors in exchange for a quarter of a million tons of “food aid.”

So what happens if they start firing off their nasty fireworks demonstrating significant new capabilities, or creditable information comes out about successful miniaturization of their Pakistani/stolen bargain-basement fission bomb technology (actually, then consequently making it a creditable threat)?

Will Japan build out BMD?

Of course, I didn’t put the it that way, but the message was an unequivocal yes. Because all the key systems are in place. But that’s for next week’s article.

Please read Defense News on Monday.

The beauty of the SM3-/PAC-3 two-tier system is that it works (with caveats, see Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress) and it’s only going to get better. And when the Chinese decided to create chaos in orbit  with its 2007 ASAT test leading to what is rapidly going to become a crisis if nothing is done over the next decade, the U.S. was able to remind the Chinese just whom they are dealing with if they are serious.

And then, just on time, news comes out that North Korea is attempting its third satellite launch (Kwangmyŏngsŏng-3) around April 12-16 to celebrate the 100th anniversary of the birth Kim Il Sung, on April 15.

The Taepodon Trigger

One of the key stories in In Defense of Japan is the story of the Taepodon Trigger, which is more commonly called the Taepodon Shock.

Whatever else it doesn’t have going for it, the DPRK is a master of timing. It’s almost as if it wants Japan to further rearm to create a foreign bugbear to rail against and rally the (starving) masses. The history of DPRK missile launches is quite intriguing. In 1998, the attempted launch of Kwangmyongsong-1 aboard a re-gigged Taepodon gave Japan the decisive inflection point it needed to launching military space development, instead of developing dual-use technology research and development programs that could be converted to military use if and when needed. This is essentially the story behind Japan’s IGS, which is a regigged Melco USERS bus with not very good radar and optical sensors (which are getting better, nearing half-meter now for Gen-2 optical at least).

At the time, I can vividly remember the shock and outrage behind the missile overfly, which was largely stage-managed by media and politicians, since (a) Japan and the U.S. knew about the launch a month in advance, having been informed by the DPRK about it, and had an Aegis missile cruiser tracking the thing (b) the satellite launch didn’t actually violate Japan’s airspace at all and (c) as was actually an attempted satellite launch, not a missile test, as made out by the Japanese media.

Now while I am a strong supporter of Japan and no fan of the DPRK, the facts are the facts. Within 10 days of the “shocking missile test,” Ichiro Taniguchi, the Lion of Melco, was briefing the Cabinet on what was to become IGS. For more on this, please read In Defense of Japan.

But it was more of the same in 2009 when the nation in April attempted the launch of Kwangmyŏngsŏng-2 aboard an Unha-2 rocket carrying the satellite, following this with two rounds of missile tests in July 2009 and then a probably partially successful nuclear test in October. A busy year for everyone, and provocation that has helped Japan to bolster its SM-3 fleet to six ships.

In a perverse sense, the latest launch looks right on schedule. In order to prop up the 3rd incarnation of the Kim Dynasty, the DPRK needed a quick win in its poker strategy diplomacy of threat, bluff, and (insincere) concession cycle. On what levels the events of the last two months are wins for the regime vary; if they get the food and launch the satellite, it will buy the new regime a lot of time perhaps. If the perfidious Yankie and, etc., imperialists “renegade”  on the deal, and the satellite is triumphantly launched (whether it will or not, it will still triumphantly succeed in glorious honor of what not, of course, right) then it still provides glue to hang the new regime together on. Oh the poor suffering people.

All this of course is grist for the mill for Japan and is, ahem, unlikely to disincentivize Japan from pushing forward with EW and better BMD.

Update: This is from Reuters: Launch called a ‘deal-breaker

US: NKorea planned rocket launch a ‘deal-breaker’

The U.S. State Department issued the following statement, March 16:

“North Korea’s announcement that it plans to conduct a missile launch in direct violation of its international obligations is highly provocative. UN Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874 clearly and unequivocally prohibit North Korea from conducting launches that use ballistic missile technology. Such a missile launch would pose a threat to regional security and would also be inconsistent with North Korea’s recent undertaking to refrain from long-range missile launches. We call on North Korea to adhere to its international obligations, including all relevant UN Security Council Resolutions. We are consulting closely with our international partners on next steps. U.S. now says it will not  send food aid to North Korea if it goes ahead with the long-range rocket launch, and U.N. Security Council members said it may violate sanctions.”

The DPRK argues that satellite launches are part of a peaceful space program that is exempt from international disarmament obligations, but according to Reuters, State Department spokesman Victoria Nuland said the U.S. now had “grave concerns” about the Feb. 29 agreement under which the North agreed with the U.S. to nuclear concessions and a moratorium on long-range missile tests in return for 240,000 tons of food aid.

Nuland said a rocket launch would call into question North Korea’s good faith. She said that during the negotiations for the U.S.-North Korea agreement, “we made clear unequivocally that we considered that any satellite launch would be a deal-breaker.

Expect a third nuclear test!

Japanese in Space: Hypersonic Flight: HYFLEX deserves a closer look

HerImage of Japan's Prototype Space Plane Hyflex (courtesy of JAXA)e I am going to put up some excellent work by fellow space journalist and Japan space watcher Peter J. Brown in his blog Japanese in Space.

Back in 2010, in In Defense of Japan, From the Market to the Military in Space Policy  Saadia and I pointed out some interesting context for Japan’s Hyflex program: You can read excerpts here on Google Books from our chapter on Launch Vehicles.

Wired Danger Room recently ran a piece on the USAF’s X-37B space plane (A Year Later, Mysterious Space Plane Is Still in Orbit), a program that is raising much attention in the military space community, for obvious reasons. But look at the picture; this is not a picture of the X-37B, though at a glance you might be forgiven for thinking it was…

As Peter points out, Japan actually had a robotic prototype space plane, Hyflex, that successfully demonstrated many of the precursor technologies of the X-37B all the way back in 1996, launched aboard the J-1 rocket. An interesting combination of technologies indeed.

If you want to find out more about the Hyflex program, please take a look at Peter’s article, which was also featured in another site I am a fan of, Japan Security Watch as USAF HTV-2 Recalls Japan’s HYFLEX Program. Please also note that Saadia and I were perhaps the first to point out the implications of the Hyflex program in In Defense of Japan, From the Market to the Military in Space Policy .

So what happened to Hyflex? Well, that’s a long story. I’ll see if I can dig out some of my old Space News articles from the 1990s!

Japan Moves To Relax Restrictions on Military Space Development

Here is a story that I did just before the law was sent to the Diet on Feb 14 (see later article) about (finally, after three years!) the Cabinet Office moving to enact the Basic Law of 2008 and move to take (partial- just how this may spin out, see later article!) control of Japan’s space development, specifically with controlling Japan’s regional GPS system, the QZSS…

Like most media, I had to follow the headline, but have reserved deeper analysis for my research, to be published later this year…of course none of this is a surprise to readers of “In Defense of Japan“….

The NHK’s “News” on Japan’s Not-So-Secret Nuclearization Plan 1968-70

I was both a little excited and very disappointed that the NHK decided to publicize something that’s been public knowledge for around a decade – that Japan looked into and decided not to produce nuclear weapons in the late 1960s.
The 日本の核に関する基礎的研究 conducted by the 内閣調査室 (Cabinet Information Research Office) for the then PM Eisaku Sato by Profs. Hidetake Kakibana, Michio Royama, Yonosuke Nagai and Hisashi Maeda distributed some 200 copies with the highest secrecy concluding that it was probably not in Japan’s best interests to develop an independent nuclear deterrent.
What was bold about NHK was to go an interview a protagonist who had decided to make a “confession” just about a month before he passed away. A very enlightened move by NHK. It is easy to portray Japan as “hiding something” when the mass-media tropes and memes are so misleading. The fact is that it’s well-known that Japan has the means, but has decided not to produce nuclear weapons, since the late 1960s, and the same goes with ICBMS.
(Characteristically, in 1970, a young firebrand called Ishihara Shintaro called for Japan to develop its own SLBM MIRVs. Interestingly enough, METI’s own bid to get budget for SLMB development was quashed last August by the DPJ’s rewriting of the general space activities budget request in August 2009.)
The fact is that Japan’s ability to produce nuclear weapons quickly is not controversial amongst the analyst community. In addition to a pluthermal/ fast breeder reactor program that will accelerate Japan’s production of supergrade plutonium (to an estimated 700 kg over ten years at Monju alone) via technology imported (according to Greenpeace) from the U.S. Savannah River Plant and Oak Ridge labs, Japan is known to have around plutonium available to construct warhead in about 9 months of a political decision for Japan to arm itself.
The major points I would like to discuss in relationship with this weekend’s news by the NHK is that serious discussion about developing an independent nuclear deterrent was launched in the wake of China’s rapid progression from fission to thermonuclear weapons capability in 1967 in a scant 22 months was not limited only to nukes. It also included space development.

In fact, the effect of China’s rapid progress on Japan cannot be understated in the post-war history of Japan developing its recessed deterrent strategy, of which Japan’s “peaceful purposes only” nuclear program and (until 1998) “peaceful purposes only” space program have been conjoined.
While Japan did not actually develop a nuclear deterrent, it did decide to develop and maintain all the technologies it needed to make sure that in an emergency Japan could rapidly go nuclear.
In Defense of Japan is a critical part of this story, because exactly the same strategy was employed for space development, to make sure Japan has a full spectrum of military space technologies ready to deliver weapons if or when they are made.
The exciting thing is that NHK is prepared to break one of the official mass media taboos, that Japan both can produce, and has strongly considered producing such weapons. But I feel it’s time for a more honest media discussion on the role of Japan’s space development program.
I’d like to think in some way that In Defense of Japan is also playing its part in lifting the almost willful non-discussion in the Japanese media, and the international media, of the meaning of Japan’s space program and the way policy is reported to the public.