Towards the H-3: Update

H-2A successor

Space News kindly published a version of my story on the H-3 last week. I’ve done the usual and pasted a version into this blog.

There is also a story by the ever excellent Warren Ferster on the Epsilon based on a JAXA presser. Please see this blog for more background on the Epsilon, or go to the new, vastly improved Space News website.

We can expect more light to be shone on this during June when the ONSP subcommittee makes its final recommendations. Meanwhile the Yomiuri and Asahi have some more information and perspective on the issue.

Our view in In Defense of Japan is that the H-series is a technology development program and while it may arouse screams of indignation and anger to say it, to put it bluntly, money will always be found to develop technologies that give Japan options. As, fundamentally, Saadia and I argue that Japan’s space program has always been basically, when you remove all the dressing, a dual-use strategic technology development program, then reasons to develop the H-3 will always be found.

As made plain by Dick Samuels and Mike Green, under nationalists such as Tomifumi Godai and in an era of rampant technonationalism and kokusanka, there were compelling reasons to develop the H-2. Japan wanted and needed to build a sophisticated, liquid fueled, highly efficient two-stage medium launch vehicle to cement its international reputation as part of the advanced spacefaring club. Remember, when the H-2 was envisaged over 20 years ago, few saw the impending “lost decade.”

Japan’s space program under NASDA was relatively awash with money, with investments made or planned  into all sorts of challenging dual-use precursor technologies including ETS-7 (on orbit ASAT demonstration) OICETS/ Kirari (laser communications), reconnaissance/ spy  satellites ICBM prototypes (M-V, J-1), reentry (OREX, USERS SEM) SIGINT (ETS-8), global strike (HYFLEX, HOPE) etc. Some highly ambitious programs that emerged last decade, have disappeared, for example HiMEOS and Smartsat-1.

On the other hand, ALSET looks as if it could make it.

これまでの基幹ロケットの評価と今後の在り方について 2013 年 4 月 24 日 宇宙輸送システム部会 委員 三菱重工業株式会社 代表取締役常務執行役員 航空宇宙事業本部長 鯨井 洋

これまでの基幹ロケットの評価と今後の在り方について
2013 年 4 月 24 日
宇宙輸送システム部会 委員
三菱重工業株式会社 代表取締役常務執行役員
航空宇宙事業本部長
鯨井 洋

Let’s not forget the H-2 very nearly made it to commercial viability but was fatally holed by the surging yen as well as dodgy turbopumps. So then money was found for the H-2A to solve the problem (half the costs, boost the payload) …but as we argue in In Defense of Japan, whether or not the H-2A really made it was not the issue. Could the program be justified in terms of a technology development program to the MoF. The peanuts in terms of cost involved in developing the H-2A compared to the cost of major launch vehicle systems by other advanced democracies (lets just name the Ariane 5) meant yes.

And now the cycle starts again. So how will the H-3 be sold to the MoF under the rubric of Japan’s latest stated space policy?

Sure, as something that will be commercially viable. Whether or not MHI and JAXA can actually achieve this is, we contend, strategically, a mute question. If and when the H-3 doesn’t make it commercially, MHI and Japan will have at least invested in developing a new level of excellent technologies that will secure Japan’s independent launch vehicle capabilities and provide jobs, technology and investment in its aerospace sector. Incidentally, the H-3 is now being sold by MHI as “catchup” again, as the slide above shows.

Sure, the same old cycle of vituperation and lashing will follow in the Japanese media if or when the H-3 fails to make the grade commercially, but the more strategic goals of “keeping/ catching up” will have been met.

Japanese in Space: Hypersonic Flight: HYFLEX deserves a closer look

HerImage of Japan's Prototype Space Plane Hyflex (courtesy of JAXA)e I am going to put up some excellent work by fellow space journalist and Japan space watcher Peter J. Brown in his blog Japanese in Space.

Back in 2010, in In Defense of Japan, From the Market to the Military in Space Policy  Saadia and I pointed out some interesting context for Japan’s Hyflex program: You can read excerpts here on Google Books from our chapter on Launch Vehicles.

Wired Danger Room recently ran a piece on the USAF’s X-37B space plane (A Year Later, Mysterious Space Plane Is Still in Orbit), a program that is raising much attention in the military space community, for obvious reasons. But look at the picture; this is not a picture of the X-37B, though at a glance you might be forgiven for thinking it was…

As Peter points out, Japan actually had a robotic prototype space plane, Hyflex, that successfully demonstrated many of the precursor technologies of the X-37B all the way back in 1996, launched aboard the J-1 rocket. An interesting combination of technologies indeed.

If you want to find out more about the Hyflex program, please take a look at Peter’s article, which was also featured in another site I am a fan of, Japan Security Watch as USAF HTV-2 Recalls Japan’s HYFLEX Program. Please also note that Saadia and I were perhaps the first to point out the implications of the Hyflex program in In Defense of Japan, From the Market to the Military in Space Policy .

So what happened to Hyflex? Well, that’s a long story. I’ll see if I can dig out some of my old Space News articles from the 1990s!

J-2/ Epsilon is Go!

2011年4月20日

The more I talk to Morita Sensei about the Epsilon, the more I am struck by how important it is to Japan’s strategic solid-fuel dual-use technology maintenance program. Those of you who know your rockets will know that the last two generations of ISAS sold LVs have been judged as readily convertible to ICBMS, and also the J-1, the last time Japan “mixed ‘n’ matched” technologies from its NASDA derived and ISAS derived programs.

But the Epsilon is very very different. Or is it? Where else other than in Japan could you develop a launch-on-demand rocket/ missile for $200 million? The Epsilon rocks! It is only an extreme budget squeeze that is stopping it from launching in its full configuration in 2013 right away. First of all, here is the article I recently wrote for Space News:

The technical changes being made to develop the Epsilon seem to have fully taken on board and learned from the mistakes made for the J-1 (featuring Tomifumi Godai, about whom I talk more about below), which, in one of my favorite articles for Space News in the 1990s, was “hammered” for its costs after a report by the Management and Coordination Agency showed that the J-1 development program cost more than similar projects in other countries. At the time I could see the mantra; Japan was trying to switch to genuinely be seen to cut costs from practically nothing to vapor, while underneath the J-1 was always mainly a technology development program to see if it could integrate an ICBM from its liquid and solid development programs. In terms of the cost per launch, the J-1 was really quite expensive. But in terms of technically showing how easy it is for Japan to produce ICBMs, the J-1 was quite a piece of work!

Here is the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States
Appendix III: Unclassified Working Papers
assessment of the J-1: 

To jog your memory: the J-1 was a three-stage solid fuel rocket able to place payloads of about 1,000 kg int low Earth orbit and the first NASDA rocket to be made from a  combination of existing indigenous rockets – the solid rocket booster of the H-2 and the upper stage of the M-3S II. In other words, after an awfully long, twisting and tortured route down the J-1U -> J-2 -> GX route, which was basically IHI’s bid to become a liquid engine technology integration company, the Epsilon is the direct successor of the J-1. The Epsilon is what the J-1 should have been.

Does any of this, taken from the Japan Echo of 15 years ago, sound at all similar?

Information Bulletin No.64
First Launch of Cost-Efficient J-1 Rocket Scheduled for February 1996

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January 8,1996

The National Space Development Agency of Japan (NASDA) is in the process of assembling a new domestically produced rocket, the J-1. Scheduled to be launched from the Tanegashima Space Center in February 1996, the J-1 features a cost-efficient design that incorporates parts of existing rockets. It will carry as its payload an experimental space vehicle that will gather data to be used in the development of a Japanese space shuttle, HOPE.
The mainstay of Japan’s space program is today the H-2, the first of which was successfully launched in 1994. The H-2, which can boost a two-ton satellite into geostationary orbit 36,000 kilometers above the equator, is a two-stage rocket fueled by liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen. The J-1, on the other hand, is a three-stage rocket designed to place a satellite of about one ton in low orbit. It was jointly developed by NASDA and the Ministry of Education’s Institute of Space and Aeronautical Science with an eye to a likely increase in the demand for rockets to put into low orbit small telecommunications and other satellites.
To save on development and production costs, current plans call for the first J-1 to incorporate the type of solid-fuel rocket now being used by NASDA as boosters for the H-2; the second and third will use a combination of the M23 and M3B sold-fuel rockets that constitute the tip of ISAS’s M-3SII. The J-1, which stands 33 meters tall, measures 1.8 meters in diameter, and weighs 87 tons is rather small compared to the H-2-50 meters tall, 4 meters in diameter, 264 tons-but was developed for only one-ninth of the cost, or 3.1 billion.
The first J-1, scheduled to be launched on February 1, 1996, will carry as its payload the 1,050-kilogram HYFLEX …” [X-37B space bomber test… no no, only joking. It’s nothing like the X-37B space bomber at all; here it is landing, right] “…a hypersonic flight experiment vehicle that will collect data for the development of a Japanese space shuttle, named HOPE. HYFLEX will separate from the J-1 at an altitude of 110 kilometers and glide back through the atmosphere. Scientists will be evaluating such points as HYFLEX’s heat-resistant properties as it reaches temperatures as high as 1500-1600 degrees Celsius and its stability and control systems as it hits speeds of up to Mach 15. After completing its glide, the HYFLEX will deploy a parachute and splash down in the ocean near the island of Ogasawara, where it will be retrieved by
waiting ships.

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The wonderful thing about this article is that it shows what they Japanese call the (Kyu) pichi (pitch) or the rapid assault on the higher strategic echelons of space development. It’s hard to believe going back to 1990s with the hubris and triumphalism;  with people like Tomifumi Godai, the godfather of the H-2, regaling Japan for its prowess in building better than the gaijin. The NYT article I linked to, unlike the screed put out these days, is actually worth reading! Godai’s pride in the H-2 was soon deflated though and his triumphalist series of articles in NASDA today in the 1990s has now disappeared from web and written out of history. But I remember.

It’s worth reminding people, I feel, that with a little bit more money, Japan would have had its own automated shuttle by now. It’s not doing too badly as it is with Kounotori, which is itself a technical triumph and a bargain- costing only $200 million or so to develop (officially).

But, literally, Japan lost Hope.  In caffeinated and wilder-eyed moments I often wonder how much pressure was put on Japan to sacrifice its space program on the altar of fiscal restraint when other much more wasteful spending programs survived. (I often marvel at how quickly SmartSat disappeared too…did someone in the U.S. embassy  gently whisper sweet somethings  in NICT’s ear so as not to show up the U.S. or frighten the Chinese too much?)

There is no question that the Epsilon is a highly aggressive dual-use ICBM program that actually will fulfill three functions;

a) It’s stated purpose- to provide a low-cost, highly flexible alternative to the H-2A/B for Japan’s microsatellite and science community and ASNARO/ ODA-programs

b) A fast-flexible mobile launcher for military micro/nano/pico satellites at times of increased tension or the buildup or waging of war. In fact the SPRINT series in itself does a nice job building up a standard bus system for modular payloads, which will make them highly versatile for applications starting with medium resolution/ tactical spy satellites aka ASNARO. The SPRINT-A flight is in fact a test launch for upcoming deals with Vietnam and Cambodia to supply satellites as ODA (and to keep them out of China’s orbit- again literally!)

c) A family of boosters for said purposes (a) and (b) and also as an ICBM design for if/when Japan decide to weaponsize its supergrade / plutonium stocks.

I have also put the first article I published on the Epsilon, which was originally called the ASR here, FYI:

Hayabusa-2 and Epsilon are Go

Monday, August 16, 2010

Technical Committee OKs Hayabusa-2 Development, Epsilon Launch in 2013
Very important strategic news for Japan’s space program as Japan’s Space Activities Commission (SAC) recommended the development of the Hayabusa-2 asteroid sample return mission after a key SAC evaluation committee approved of the technical development and mission goals of the project in a report published August 5.— The following is from something I filed at Space News a little while back. It’s highly significant because we are back where we started as SAC has returned as the de facto regulatory committee with the clout to justify MEXT’s spending programs.

In the 33-page report, the technical subcommittee, which has met three times since July 16, 2010, recommended that Hayabusa-2 be developed and launched before the end of March 2015 In outlining the mission’s goals, the draft report said Hayabusa-2 should visit, land on, deploy a miniature rover on and collect and return a sample of a C-class asteroid, which is considered to contain organic materials that can give clues to the formation of the solar system.

The report’s findings mean that SAC, which has oversight over the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA), will August 11 formally recommend development of the new probe as part of its review of JAXA’s space programs, according to Hiroko Takuma, deputy Director of the Space and Aeronautics Policy Division at the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, in an August 5 interview.

Japan’s space budget request is submitted to the Finance Ministry at the end of each August and ratified by Japan’s Diet each following March in time for the fiscal year starting April 1. The budget for Hayabusa-2 is projected to be about 16.4 billion yen (US$190 million), excluding the launch cost of the H-2A, Takuma said.

Hayabusa-2 will be the follow-on mission for the Hayabusa (Falcon) mission, which was the fist space probe to successfully complete a round-trip to an asteroid when it to Earth in June 2010 following an 85-month journey in which it visited and collected dust particles from the near-Earth object 25143 Itokawa.

In a separate report, the same technical subcommittee also recommended development of the next-generation Epsilon solid-rocket that is the successor to the M-V. The 24 meter tall Epsilon, which is being designed by JAXA, is based on the SRB-A solid augment booster used by the H-2A, and will be capable of lifting 1,200 kg into low-Earth orbit at a target cost of 3.8 billion yen per launch, about half the cost of the M-V, according to the subcommittee report.

Following the draft report, SAC will also approve development of the Epsilon rocket on August 11, said Takuma.

– Initial Commentary:
Japan space watchers will already know how critical Epsilon is to not only Japan’s critical need of a small launcher following the GX debacle, but also to MEXT’s SOD initiative (Japan’s ORS) and the ASNARO/ Sasuke programs for Japan’s dual use military space infrastructure.

Epsilon is basically an updated version of the original  development program of the early 90s, using exactly the same solid booster technology supplemented by M-V know-how. The irony about this ORS/dual-use technology demonstrator program is that it actually goes some way to hitting the original objectives as laid out by the STA for this program back in 1997!!