A Different Kind of Japanese Island Dispute…

Typhoon in a Teacup?

Not exactly.

This is interesting. As my esteemed friends at Japan Security Watch (“Mod Requests Funds for Yonaguni Base”) and Corey Wallace know all too well…just about a week after I wrote this story, China started laying claim to Okinawa- as was predicted in the article. Read on!

…Here is story that I recently wrote for Defense News that has been “under the radar” of the gaijin press here (not part of what’s officially what’s regarded as important “news” I suppose) but is important because everyone knows that in international law “boots on the rock,” so to speak, goes a “long way” in term of  territorial claims (see graphic in story below, as  DN helpfully added).

The most important part of the story for me was at the end, when Prof. Gabe kindly pointed out the most substantial strategic reason for putting a garrison on Yonaguni was to send a message to China, whose next step, he said, was to go lay claim to the Ryuku islands. Here is the  article I filed and then then the cut portion to follow, which also included comments by Corey:

     Yonaguni Story“Yonaguni citizens have bifurcated into two streams of opinion following the 2010 Senkakus incident,” said Corey Wallace, Lecturer at the University of Auckland, who provides analysis of Japanese security issues at the Japan Security Watch website.

 “Some see the increasing presence of Chinese ships and the potential for conflict as requiring some kind of presence. But the (GSDF) monitoring unit’s proximity to the Senkakus means it could become a target,” leading to the deepening split in islander opinion, Wallace said.

  That split has left Mayor Hokama in a difficult situation, according to McCormack, because while Hokama originally supported the GSDF deployment for its perceived economic boost, recent growing opposition may now affect his chances of reelection- suggesting more old-fashioned political motives for the sudden demand.

  At the same time, the deployment has increasingly garnished more national political significance for the conservative Abe administration, which is seeking to provide a more robust stance to counter what it sees as Chinese expansionism, said Masaaki Gabe, professor of International Relations and the director of the International Institute for Okinawan Studies at the University of the Ryukyus.

 At one level it’s all about the money, Gabe said. But the Yonaguni issue has become both symbolically and strategically important. The deployment has become a poster child of the Abe administration’s stronger stance against China, which is a combination of appealing to and building on popular patriotic sentiment while reinforcing Japan’s military both symbolically and in reality against what is now publicly acknowledged by Japanese political and defense elites as the growing threat of China.

  Since assuming power late last year, the Abe administration has been the first Japanese government in 11 years to raise defense spending, albeit only 0.8%. Beefing up Japan’s defense of its South East island chain and deterring potential Chinese aggression is now a strategic priority.

  First, while the deployment of troops and radar station is presently strategically not a major component of Japan’s Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance capabilities, which are now a strategic priority for the MoD, forward basing facilities provides options to build out capability later.

  But more importantly perhaps, boots on Yonaguni anticipate a future hand in China’s diplomatic poker game if and when it seeks to start pressing historical claims to sovereignty over the ancient Ryukyu Kingdom, which is present day Okinawa, of which Yonaguni is the most eastern island. 

 “This is part of Japan justifying its territorial sovereignty. In a future stage, China will assert its claims to Okinawa,” and the deployment to Yonaguni, which has never based Japanese troops before, is a step in forestalling this, Gabe said.

  In light of this, Gabe sees the current spat as sorting itself out in due course, mainly because too much is at stake for the MoD and the island, which will stand to loose out much more financially in the longer run should the deployment be abandoned.

Almost as soon as he said it to me, China, enter stage right (or from the left, if you will), went ahead the week after the article was published and staked its claim to the Ryukus.

Did the Foreign Ministry read my article and decide to give it the ol’ Communist try?

Well no, the  was this preplanned according to whatever schedule Beijing has in its largely successful media strategy (read psychological warfare) to make Japan out to be the bad guy (still now) in the hood.

First some think tank floats the idea publicly, then the Foreign Ministry does its thing, then Luo Yuan puts his own footprint into the issue.

Naval Gazing Japan’s MSDF

After a long talk with former Vice Admiral Yoji Koda in 2011, like most non-journalist analysts, I am struck with the continuity of MSDF plans, and always grateful for the accomplished insights and scholarship of Alessio Patalano James Manicom and last but foremost Paul Giarra. I always have to say a big “thank you” for having the ear of such accomplished sempai!

LWF1

LW2

Japanese in Space: Hypersonic Flight: HYFLEX deserves a closer look

HerImage of Japan's Prototype Space Plane Hyflex (courtesy of JAXA)e I am going to put up some excellent work by fellow space journalist and Japan space watcher Peter J. Brown in his blog Japanese in Space.

Back in 2010, in In Defense of Japan, From the Market to the Military in Space Policy  Saadia and I pointed out some interesting context for Japan’s Hyflex program: You can read excerpts here on Google Books from our chapter on Launch Vehicles.

Wired Danger Room recently ran a piece on the USAF’s X-37B space plane (A Year Later, Mysterious Space Plane Is Still in Orbit), a program that is raising much attention in the military space community, for obvious reasons. But look at the picture; this is not a picture of the X-37B, though at a glance you might be forgiven for thinking it was…

As Peter points out, Japan actually had a robotic prototype space plane, Hyflex, that successfully demonstrated many of the precursor technologies of the X-37B all the way back in 1996, launched aboard the J-1 rocket. An interesting combination of technologies indeed.

If you want to find out more about the Hyflex program, please take a look at Peter’s article, which was also featured in another site I am a fan of, Japan Security Watch as USAF HTV-2 Recalls Japan’s HYFLEX Program. Please also note that Saadia and I were perhaps the first to point out the implications of the Hyflex program in In Defense of Japan, From the Market to the Military in Space Policy .

So what happened to Hyflex? Well, that’s a long story. I’ll see if I can dig out some of my old Space News articles from the 1990s!