Japan’s Defense Plans: Into the Mass Media

Time

Nice to see the mass media outside Japan finally picking up on my “scoop” (which is journalist jargon for not attending a presser (now rebranded as “news conferences”) and actually talking to people.

Anyway, Time  (Japan Looks to Add Offensive Firepower) and The Diplomat ( Japan Mulls a Preemptive Strike Capability) picking up on my story about Japan’s plans for a new, more muscular defense strategy.

Which is great to see, because it’s actually really important, rather than a crisis or confrontation story on Japan manufactured by the local media.

Actually of course, the story itself is old, as this has been openly posited by Japan for at least a decade, and Japan’s ability to be a truly useful partner to the U.S. really started to come into focus as early as the late 1970s, which lead to the original “Three Arrows” Mitsuya policy. My favorite Three Arrows however comes from 乱.

Since then, in some ways, what is happening now to Japanese defense posture is catching up with the realities of the arc of insecurity that Japan faces, and its paramount need to service the Japan-U.S. Alliance, with the whole thing run through the post Cold War wormhole.

JSP Catchup #6: Probe Uncovers 40-year Japanese Contractor Fraud

This story was NOT a surprise; the fuller story is at Japan Still Calculating Cost of Defense Firm’s Padded Bills, but ever since NEC Corp. in 1998 was found with its hands in the till, I have been wondering who would be fingered next, and when, and why when, and why.

I say this because when I chatted to people back in 1998, the practice of padding contracts with surplus labor costs was widespread in the space and defense sectors and this was commonly known. At the time the questions were Why NEC? And Why Now? Below my initial October story is NEC SCANDAL SHEDS LIGHT ON JAPANESE PROCUREMENTS, a more fruity web version of a story that I originally wrote for Space News back in the day.

The timing for the original NEC story was also interesting as NEC was strongly pushing for its version of what was to become Japan’s IGS spy satellite system that was provoked by the Teapodon Triggeran analysis that Saadia and I wrote about in In Defense of Japan (thank you Google Books!)

At the time NEC’s version of what was to become the IGS would have featured smaller satellites and cost less than Melco’s system. But with NEC suddenly out of the picture, Melco, with Ichiro Taniguchi at the helm, managed to personally lobby Japan’s Cabinet in the weeks after the Taepondon launch, and Japan’ got the IGS.

Here is a nice picture from Space Safety Magazine of Japan’s 1,200-Kilogram IGS 1B Satellite re-entered Earth’s Atmosphere on Thursday, July 26, 2012 after spending nearly 9.5 years in space.  Another more detailed article about this can be found at Spaceflight.101.com.

Eventually, NEC’s small-bus and higher resolution system has  been re-emerging in the ASNARO system, which is now being pushed as an alternative and complementary system to the expensive and relatively lower performance IGS, and also as the linchpin of a satellite-based, pan-Asian disaster monitoring network that is now a major part of Japan’s emerging regional space diplomacy and security strategy.  At least the Vietnamese have bought into it, and while customers don’t seem to be forming a line yet, there is still a lot of hope out there.

Here is the initial story for Defense News:

NEC SCANDAL SHEDS LIGHT ON

JAPANESE PROCUREMENTS.

By Paul Kallender in Tokyo

When, in September 1998, an investigation into the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) discovered that Japanese technology giant NEC Corp had systematically defrauded the taxpayer on 33 space contracts over the course of five years, it looked as though Japan’s obviously abused government procurement system was about to get a major overhaul.

The investigation began promisingly enough. On September 3, Tokyo prosecutors raided the JDA and arrested Kenichi Ueno, deputy head of the Procurement Office, and a clutch of executives from NEC subsidiary Toyo Communications.

This followed discoveries that not only had Toyo overcharged the JDA some $21m over dozens of equipment contracts, but that Ueno and others had conspired to prevent Toyo, NEC and other subsidiaries from repaying the money. NEC was raided the next day and by September 10, nine senior NEC and JDA executives were in jail.

It came to light that Ueno and others had lifted incriminating paperwork out of the Agency’s filing cabinets and put them into incinerators and even the homes of friends. NEC’s SuperTower headquarters was soon besieged by the Japanese phenomenon of ‘sound trucks,’ driven by right-wing extremists screaming abuse and demanding mass resignations.

But instead of resulting in the punishment of protagonists and the start of reforms, the scandal collapsed into a desultory cover-up. NEC’s initial response was to deny everything, with a bemused VP Masakatsu Miwa telling the media on September 10 that he did not expect top NEC executives to resign because of the scandal, going on to explain that he “wondered why” NEC officials were being implicated. Unfortunately for Miwa, on September 29, NEC’s overcharging was upscaled to $2.5bn, while, on the same day, a Parliamentary committee reported that the JDA had hired no less than 44 NEC executives in senior positions in just two years. By October 10, former NEC VP Hiroaki Shimayama and Takenori Yanase, VP of NEC’s Space Systems Division, had both been arrested.

Thieves charter

The National Space Development Agency (NASDA) launched an inquiry and on November 9, NEC admitted overcharging by at least $19m. Meanwhile on October 14, the JDA revealed that 225 of its officials had been hired by 20 suppliers in the past five years, shedding some dim light on a corner of Japan’s Amadudari (Descent from Heaven) career kickback system.

At the heart of the issue, according to NASDA’s former executive director Akira Kubozono, is the flawed government contract system which encourages corruption through a combination of legendary meanness and bureaucratic incompetence.

“There are two points about this affair,” he said. “One is that NEC is just a scapegoat. The second is that the governmental contract system is the cause of this scandal. When the defense contract revelations began, I thought it was only a matter of time before it spread into NEC’s space systems division as both defense and space procurement are conducted under similar systems.”

Under the Japanese government contract system, the co ntractor is obliged to repay any unused budget if the delivery price falls below the contract amount, and the contractor must also incur any costs if the project overshoots the agreed estimate — a thieves charter if ever there was one.

Furthermore NASDA, the Science and Technology Agency and the Ministry of Finance lack the technical expertise to evaluate bids and tend to just accept company estimates, says Kubozono. “The system needs to be reformed but I doubt this is possible as long as NASDA and the corporations are controlled by STA administrators (who also often retire to executive positions in NASDA) and not by engineers,” he says.

No mettle Kubozono, it seems, was right.

By November 12, the space scandal seemed to have been wrapped up, with NASDA saying it was satisfied that only NEC had abused the system. “The system has worked well for 30 years. We believe that a little devil whispered into NEC’s ear. We do not think it will happen again,” said Yasuyuki Fukumuro, NASDA PR deputy director. Fukumuro quickly admitted that NEC would be allowed to bid for Japan’s new spy satellite system, after a token contract moratorium.

Back at the JDA, a grand total of six senior officials will take up to 10% pay cuts for one to three months plus one official will receive a 10-day suspension, JDA chief Fukushiro Nukuga told the media at his November 20 resignation press conference.

The speech followed a report, which admitted that there had been “some incidents that could be regarded as a systematic cover-up,” perhaps referring to the 31 officials suspected of Berlin-bunker style burning of documentation that might have provided evidence.

But the worst thing about the affair, according to observers, has been the brazen arrogance of NEC. In his October 23 resignation speech, NEC Chairman Tadahiro Sekimoto, now under personal investigation for his role in the affair, denied any involvement but resigned out of “social responsibility” for the affair, astonishing Kubozono in particular.

“Sekimoto’s act was spineless. If he had honor he would have resigned to take responsibility, not quibbled. He showed no mettle and is a very poor example for younger business leaders. I fear for Japan’s future.”

An even poorer analysis comes from Youichi Teraishi, Editor of Japan’s ‘scandaru’ [scandal] daily, the Nikkan Gendai. He says that Sekimoto’s act compared unfavorably with Yakuza (the Japanese Mafia) standards of conduct. “This Oyabun [Japanese gang boss] showed a lack of chivalry. Captains of industry are supposed to be able to demonstrate this, but Sekimoto lacked the class,” he says.

Lastly, the scandal has left NEC seething that it was singled out for a brutal slap on the wrist. “Everyone is doing it, why should we be the scapegoat?” admitted one NEC official. “Our top management just stuck their heads in the sand and got shafted,” complained another.

This article first appeared in Global Technology News.

Catchup #2 Japan’s Defense Budget Request Down 1.7 Percent

Here is a basic story on Japan’s defense budget request for next year for Defense News.  Of course the most interesting items for me are how the space and BMD budgets are working out, along with new investments in C4ISR. But this is more for a general audience.

The web story is here.

TOKYO — Japan’s Ministry of Defense on Sept. 10 requested 4.57 trillion yen ($58 billion) in budget appropriations for the next financial year, starting April 1, 2013, a figure that is 1.7 percent lower than the current budget. This represents the biggest one-year decline in half a century and the lowest total in two decades.

But the request also signals an ongoing restructuring and updating of Japan’s defense posture to counter China, and greatly upgrades command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; ballistic missile defense; and cyber defense capabilities.

Japan’s current five-year Mid-Term Defense Program of December 2010 has tasked the MoD with bolstering defense of the nation’s sea lanes and far-flung southeastern island chain, which extends from Okinawa to a few hundred kilometers from Taiwan. More recently, the MoD has begun to openly acknowledge China, which has an increasingly assertive Navy in the region, as a strategic concern.

In line with this, the ministry has been steadily reinforcing Japan’s marine, antisubmarine and surveillance capabilities. Consequently, the MoD for the next year has requested 72.3 billion yen for an advanced, 5,000-ton antisubmarine destroyer that features a new combined diesel-electric and gas propulsion system that will probably be developed in Japan.

The ministry has also asked for 10 billion yen to upgrade four E-767 airborne early warning and control aircraft, 19.2 billion yen for a 690-ton minesweeper featuring a fiber-reinforced plastic hull and 2.5 billion yen for four amphibious assault vehicles (AAVs).

The AAV request is viewed as the most important new item, said local military analyst Shinichi Kiyotani, who added the Ground Self-Defense Forces (GSDF) were looking to purchase four AAV-7 series vehicles after concluding that a vehicle developed in Japan could not meet cost and capability requirements.

“Japan has no marines or no Royal Marines for remote island protection,” Kiyotani said. “This was a significant purchase for the GSDF and a first for postwar Japan. It represents great progress in Japan’s efforts to deter threats against our islands.”

C4ISR and space systems also are more prominently featured, with the ministry requesting 100 million yen to convert its advanced FPS-5 phased array radar system so it can also conduct space situational awareness duties, in addition to funds for a research budget for a satellite-mounted ballistic missile early warning sensor, and 3 billion yen for an unmanned aerial vehicle-mounted ballistic missile early warning system.

And after several years of trying, the MoD has also requested 21.2 billion yen to set up a new cyber defense force with about 100 people, which will combine previous efforts to create a combined unit, along with 13.3 billion yen to reinforce cyber defense of the ministry’s core Defense Information Infrastructure.

Motohiro Tsuchiya, a professor at Keio University and member of the Information Security Policy Center, Japan’s top-level government cybersecurity advisory body, applauded the move to set up the unit as the MoD has previously been stymied by budgetary restraints in its attempts to set up the unit.

“The MoD has been trying for two years to set up the unit, but the attempts were refused by the Finance Ministry. It is said that the MoD will be finding about 100 staff to man the unit, but it is unclear if they will be 100 new staff, or seconded from other areas,” Tsuchiya said.

The Japanese budget year runs from April 1, with all of the nation’s government ministries putting in their requests to the powerful Ministry of Finance in late August or early September. The budget requests, already the result of haggling and negotiation, are then audited by the Finance Ministry, which generally makes small cuts, announcing the final figures at the end of December. The Japanese Diet then passes the ratified budget into law the following spring.

Tough Choices Ahead for Japan’s F-XX Procurement

Defense News has just published a story that I did last week on the post F-35 choices Japan faces for its F-XX procurement. This was very interesting to write and research, as so much is “up in the air” and there are so many unknowns.

Unusually, Lockheed Martin refused to comment (Steve O’Bryan has been on the offensive recently emphasizing the positives with the F-35 program) while BAE’s Tony Ennis was happy to comment.

Questions include:

– Could there be some work for the Eurofighter after all? Will Japan feel bruised and abused if the F-35 turns out to be a poisoned chalice. (History of course is not on the Eurofighter’s side. The F-2, which became the thin edge of the wedge for the FSX procurement as the F-2 weighs in about 4X cost of a Block 50/52 F-16).

– What of the Mitsubishi ATD-X Shinshin? Is this as many believe a hedge or is it a complete waste of time and money. Is Japan really up for, and up to using this program as a hedge? Can MHI and TRDI really bring anything to the table.

Talking to analysts, the story would seem to be no. According to the excellent Prof. Narushige Michishita for one, the fact that Japan’s DBI is now non-competitive and falling away in technological ability (with analysts such as Kiyotani more or less calling the F-35 purchase an act of suicide), after failing to secure the F-22, Japan used the international RPF for the F-X in order to squeeze a better deal out of the U.S.

…and failed, or so it would seem to critics.

This question about the ATD-X revolves around the point that Japan seems to have felt compelled to buy the F-35 for fear of falling so far behind U.S. technology that it was prepared to swallow an industrial participation deal that many doubt will help Japanese industry to a 5th-generation fighter design and build capacity. Of course the U.S. probably doesn’t feel it wants Japan to have a 5th-generation fighter design and build capacity. But the days when Japan could bring technology, muscle, will and money to the table a la FSX seem to have long vanished. Meanwhile a recent internal report by MOD itself (see Japan’s Defense Industrial Base Nearing Crisis) has underscored just how much Japan is waking up to fundamental problems with its defense industrial base.

Interestingly for me,  Dr. Patrick Cronin at theCenter for a New American Security believes that that  F-15SE or the F-18 Super Hornet would still be great buys for Japan for the present, but should really go for it for a sixth-generation fighter.

“Either the F-15SE or the F-18 Super Hornet would be value added without breaking the bank.  Meanwhile, Japan needs to develop an F-XX future fighter that can defeat world-class defenses and aircraft out to the middle of this century and perhaps beyond.  That means Japan should be seeking to develop, possibly with an American partner, a sixth-generation aircraft with advanced stealth characteristics, directed energy weapons, and an unmanned option.  Thus, by the middle of next decade, JASDF would have two fighters (F-35s and either F-15SEs or F-18 Super Hornets).  It would then be preparing to field a sixth-generation F-XX.”

In addition to the Defense News version, here is the full interview with the  wonderful Paul Giarra at Global Strategies & Transformation whom along with Dr. Cronin, I would like to thank deeply for sharing some of their considerable insight and knowledge.

“JASDF fighter aircraft procurement beyond the 42 F-35s planned is a vital strategic issue for Japan.  In my view, Japan needs the best air force it can possibly get, for the defense of Japan as well as for alliance operations.  Unfortunately, even though Japan is normalizing militarily and responding to the emergence of China by revising its entire defense strategy, there is no aerospace strategy rationale in place to shape a positive outcome.

When Japan wanted to procure the F-22, there was no argument available to overcome legitimate export restrictions imposed by the U.S. Congress.  No one — whether Japanese or American airman or air power proponents — could argue that the Obey Amendment should be overturned, because there was no strategic rationale in hand for doing so.  That’s not to say that there could not be a compelling rationale for the F-22 or another equally good aircraft (Japanese or American), but there is no developed and deployable strategy, no vision, no operational basis for planning or procurement.

As for the F-35, I would say that 420 aircraft is as good a number as 42, because it is as arbitrary as 42, but at least with ten times the aircraft Japan would have a strong and credible air force.

As for particular aircraft, responsible airmen should have a vision of future air combat — we’re talking much more than a decade before any substantial number of new aircraft are available to JASDF.  Does an aircraft have to be a fifth generation, stealthy, and capable of super-cruise performance in order to meet the needs of JASDF?  What are those needs in the first place?  Will JASDF be flying directly overhead, defending Japanese airspace? Against what threats?  Will the JASDF be patrolling and fighting at the far periphery of Japan’s islands?  Will the JASDF be drastically outnumbered? What is the worst case?  The most likely case?  Will superb BVR missiles and air warfare command and control be sufficient, enabling a less capable aircraft?  What will be the operational relationship between JASDF and the U.S. Air Force?  Will alliance roles and missions influence, or even dictate, aircraft choice?  In this context, the Air Sea Battle concept looms large as a significant consideration going forward for JASDF and USAF planners.

How much time does JASDF have to make a choice and bring its new fleet of aircraft on line?  Is there a virtue to procuring relatively readily available F/A-18 Super Hornets or substantially re-designed F-15s?  Can Japan afford to wait?  Should JASDF skip ahead to some new combination of armed UAVs, or instead depend much more on very long range SAMs for territorial IAMD?  Are there new technologies or concepts on the horizon that are worth waiting for?

These are the sorts of questions that have answers if the JASDF and alliance aerospace strategy and air combat vision are in place.  There always will be tradeoffs between aircraft, but technical judgments and an informed choice can be made on the basis of a strategy, vision, and substantial and well developed roles and missions.

In the meantime, there are real industrial considerations on the table that never before have been factors.  With the relaxation of the three arms export control principles, it is possible for the first time for Japan’s aerospace industry to approach its American counterparts in a fundamentally different way that was never before possible:  as partners rather than consumers.  This adds a new dimension to JASDF’s procurement challenge.  In the long run, understanding and optimizing these new defense industry circumstances probably is as important as the aerospace strategy and vision.

It is natural that aircraft manufacturers paying suit to JASDF want to sell the aircraft they have developed.  Nevertheless, the most competitive will develop the aerospace rationale for JASDF’s new air fleet, and offer a strategic partnership that provides the air defense that Japan needs.

Japan F-35 Update – First 4 ALREADY at a Premium!

F-35s in production (sort of). A sight we won’t be seeing in Japan.

Here’s Japan Accepts First F-35s Despite Cost Premium

Was actually stuck on a train midway between Tokyo and them mountains without my MacBook Air on Friday so filed this late, but it does feed into my take on the F-XX purchase coming later, which will be the ASDF’s and MOD’s most significant purchase of the next 20-30 years.

Things don’t look good if Japan is ALREADY paying more than was agreed on last year, see: Japan May Cancel F-35 Buy if Cost Rises.

All-in-all, with Japan being a complete novice at offset trade negotiations and with it’s defense industrial base severely weakened, it seems that the MOD might have gotten a little out of its depth!  The Pentagon is altering the deal, and let’s hope they don’t alter it any further.

Japan Accepts First F-35s Despite Cost

Premium

Jun. 29, 2012 – 12:36PM   |By PAUL KALLENDER-UMEZU   |   1  Comments

TOKYO — Japan’s Ministry of Defense (MoD) said June 29 it had agreed to purchase the first four of 42 Lockheed Martin F-35s and two simulators for 10.2 billion yen ($127.8 million) each, plus parts, for a total cost of 60 billion yen, according to a news release.

The price of the initial four jets in the Letter of Offer and Acceptance singed by the MoD is significantly above the 9.9 billion yen ($124.1 million) agreed to last December, when, in a contentious decision, the ministry selected the advanced but still developmental F-35 to replace its 1960s-era F-4EJs.

After a tough request for proposals review, the MoD opted for 42 of the stealthy F-35s over the flight-proven and less expensive Eurofighter Typhoon and Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet.

The price rise comes in spite of a threat, repeated publicly by then-MoD Minister Naoki Tanaka, that Japan would consider canceling the F-35 purchase if significant troubles and delays emerged. The Pentagon’s January decision to delay orders for 179 F-35s over the next five years as part of defense budget cuts, and an admission by Lockheed that this will boost prices, has caused international concern.

Underscoring Japanese alarm that it might have stuck itself with a steadily worsening deal, Tanaka said at a Feb. 24 news conference the MoD had asked the U.S. to “strictly adhere” to the terms of the agreement, including the original 9.9 billion yen price and 2016 delivery date.

That threat appears to have melted away. Despite the retreat, local defense analyst Shinichi Kiyotani said that because the cost did not rise even higher that might be interpreted as a partial victory for the MoD, which could face an even tougher job suppressing future price rises for the remaining 38 jets if the program suffers further glitches.

“The MoD has got a pretty good price and negotiated well compared to the price rises that might come later,” Kiyotani said.

The planned purchase of the other 38 jets has yet to be formally confirmed.

Details Scant on Anglo-Japan Defense Cooperation

Japan’s leading daily, the Yomiuri Shimbun, has a long editorial (see Japanese-British security ties must be strengthened) on UK PM David Cameron’s meeting with Japanese PM Yoshihiko Noda on Tuesday, but details of exactly what the potential partners are going to cooperate on remain scarce.

BAE M-777

BAE Systems M-777

My sources tell me that there is quite a bit of regret in some sections of Japan’s political and military establishment for choosing the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightening II multirole fighter over the Eurofighter Consortium’s Typhoon, whose development is being led by BAE Systems. Analysts not troubled by ties to the U.S. who seem pretty neutral, question last December’s decision to buy American after a long and lengthy RFP say that the Typhoon, which while expensive could work out considerably cheaper than the F-35, would have actually suited Japan’s needs more.

With the cost outlook for the F-35 seeming to worsen every time you care to look, (see  Japan F-35 deal unchanged, Japan May Cancel F-35 Buy if Cost Rises, or just Google search “F-35 Canada”!)  one senior source in the UK Defense establishment called Japan’s purchase of the F-35 not so much a license to assemble the vaunted but troubled 5th generation stealth fighter so much as “a license to write a blank check” to the Americans.

The article reaches the same sort of conclusions Andrew Chuter and I printed last week:

“Small equipment, such as chemical protective suits, is considered a strong candidate at the initial stage of the joint development between Japan and Britain. The British side suggested a helicopter as a candidate. We hope the two countries will study and select a program advantageous to both countries.”

The article also contains some disturbing information about those perpetually cast Japan as some sort of nationalist warmongering nation not weaned of/ harboring secret intentions to regain past imperial pretensions aided and abetted by the U.S.

“To the Defense Ministry’s knowledge, 35 tank-related companies, 26 vessel-related companies and 21 fighter-related firms have either withdrawn from the defense industry or gone bankrupt since 2003.”

UK-Japan Defense Deal Coming Soon!

This story was prompted by leaks in the UK  so I was drafted in to make comments in the middle of last week.

Working the phones and contacts reminded me of when I was a foreign correspondent stationed in Tokyo back more than a decade ago!

Michishita Sensei is much more interested in my research work on orbital debris ADR, and SSA but that’s for later….

Here is the second part:

Japan Begins Building Technology Demonstrator Fighter Shinshin

As one commentator on my story said, by the time the the F-35 is perfected and the Shinshin is flying, the U.S. will probably let Japan have the F-22 anyway, as it will be old hat by then. That’s a very cynical point of view as the F-35’s troubles continue, mainly in terms of cost growth.

 However, Japan is being sensible, at least on the surface of it. Whether or not TRDI and MHI can deliver on the Shinshin is an issue that is going to emerge over the next three or four years. The TRDI is often criticized for being too research orientated and not product driven. Questions about the Shinshin include just how much stealth technology will the DOD let Japan have. After the FSX debacle, Japan’s strategy has been to make sure it keeps at the edge of certain elemental technologies and subsystems while not remaining too far behind on systems technology just in case. So what sort of hedge is Shinshin? An interesting question. And what sort of leverage will it give Japan if any against the F-35?

Anyway, here is the brief story I put in for Defense News.

Chinese hackers stole U.S. F-35 stealth fighter jet details

Here is a report out of London (AGI) about what quite a few of us expected if true; F-35 data has been stolen by Chinese hackers. Here is the story and link.

(AGI) London – Chinese spies hacked into computers of British Aerospace (BAE) stealing details about the US F35 fighter jet.

When pictures of China’s first stealth fighter jet (the J-20) were circulated in late 2010, analysts all over the world were impressed with the progress made by Beijing in terms of aeronautical technology. Today, the Sunday Times reported that Chinese hackers managed to infiltrate computers of Britain’s biggest defence company, British Aerospace, to steal details about the Pentagon’s latest stealth fighter jet, the F35, which is still at the development stage. . .

Actually it is suspected by my Sensei at Keio University G-SEC, Motohiro Tsuchiya, that the partially successful cyberattack on MHI last summer may have also have yielded up some missile defense and nuclear power plant data. As most readers will know, MHI is a key contractor in the U.S.-Japan SM3-Block-IIA development program. Here is the draft of a story I wrote for Space News last November that was killed…

BEGIN TEXT

PAUL KALLENDER-UMEZU, TOKYO

Highly sensitive military data related to a number of space, aerospace and other programs may have been netted by hackers in a cyber-attack on Japan’s largest military contractor, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) this August, according to a senior cybersecurity expert here. The attack on MHI is just one part of a amid a wave of increasingly sophisticated assaults targeting top Japanese government institutions and corporations that is prompting a government effort to improve national security that have come to light in recent weeks.

MHI discovered viruses were at 11 locations across Japan, including plants that build missiles, jet fighters, the H-2A and H-2B launch vehicles, submarines and nuclear power reactors meaning that information stolen could include details of the SM-3 Block IIA advanced ballistic missile that is part of a joint research program between Japan and the U.S., according to Motohiro Tsuchiya, a professor at Keio University and member of the Information Security Policy Council, a top-level government cybersecurity advisory body here.

“Yes, it’s possible. The sponsors behind the attack will be trawling the data right now,” Tsuchiya said in a November 5 interview.

The attack came to light in September when it was revealed that 45 servers and 38 PCs had been infected by 8 or more types of viruses after employees had unwittingly opened e-mails containing malware. On October 25, in a statement, MHI conceded data had leaked out of the company’s network after a month saying there was no evidence of such a breach.

Hideo Ikuno, a spokesman for MHI declined, November 9, to comment on the issue, or local media reports that the company has up to 50 types of viruses in its systems.

The situation has angered Japan’s Ministry of Defense, which only found about the issue after the story was leaked to local media. Contractually the MOD should have been informed immediately of any security breach, said ministry spokesman Takaaki Ohno.

“It is very regrettable that MOD was not informed, and we lodged a protest to MHI. We reprimanded MHI severely over the cyber-attack incident, and MHI promised to promptly and steadily deal with an investigation and the prevention of recurrence,” Ohno said, November 9.

Over the past eight weeks Japan has been awash in revelations about cyber attacks on its leading companies and institutions.

IHI Corp. and Kawasaki Heavy Industries, both major space and military contractors here, have confirmed they had also been also been targeted in August in similar attacks to those on MHI. In late October, Chief Cabinet Secretary Osamu Fujimura revealed the Foreign Ministry and some Japanese embassies had been under attack since June. Local media also reported computers and a servers used by three members of Japan’s Lower House had been hacked and passwords and usernames of around 500 staff had been compromised.

Attacks on the MOD have been unsuccessful to date, Ohno said

Tsuchiya said the media reports only represent a tiny fraction of the waves of increasingly sophisticated and subtle attacks that began this January by suspected hackers in China when virus and Trojan laden e-mails sometimes revealing an astonishing ability to plausibly impersonate legitimate communications started hitting Japanese systems. The attacks on Japan followed earlier assaults on the U.S. Government on July 4, 2009 and then South Korea, with attacks on the Blue House and leading South Korea companies by mounted by suspected North Korean hackers, he said.

“The recent tactic has been attacking peripheral institutions with lower security and then getting in behind the lower barriers, for example by attacking think tanks. When this year started, everyone knew something was wrong,” Tsuchiya said.

Recent attacks are causing Japan to bolster its cybersecurity measures, not least the MOD. Ohno said at the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting on October 25, the ministers reaffirmed the significance of Japan-U.S. cyber strategy policy discussion, and decided to share information between defense authorities more closely.

“Information security is extremely important for the MOD that is in charge of this country’s security, and we intend to strengthen our response to cyber-attacks,” Ohno said.

The government will also launch framework that will share information on cyber attacks and discuss defenses among private and public sector participants, said Tsuchiya.

“MHI’s defenses should be very good but there are always holes and weaknesses and the real weakness with the targeted e-mail is the human link,” Tsuchiya said.

END TEXT

Japan F-35 deal unchanged…says David Venlet

Just seen an article from Reuters; Navy Vice Admiral David Venlet, who heads the Pentagon’s F-35 program office, has assured Japan, one of the first two foreign countries outside the eight original international partners to buy the stealth fighter, that the terms of its agreement in December to buy 42 F-35s would not change as a result of the Pentagon’s announcement that it would delay US orders for 179 of the fighters.

“Their deal is firm,” Venlet is reported to have told  a defense conference hosted by Credit Suisse and defense consultant Jim McAleese in Turkey.

At the same conference, Venlet is also reported to have admitted that per-unit costs of the F-35 will rise because of the delay, although he declined to quantify the changes. He also said the U.S. was still on course to order 2,443 fighters.

Background: earlier this year the Pentagon said it was postponing orders of  179 F-35s to save $15.1 billion through fiscal year 2017, and allow more time for development and testing, provoking international concern, not least from Japan. As I reported in Defense News a few weeks back (see Japan May Cancel F-35 Buy if Cost Rises), Japanese Defense Minister Naoki Tanaka said Japan could cancel orders for F-35 jets if the price rose. Japan is due to pay 9.9 billion yen ($121.62 million) per fighter for an initial four F-35s scheduled for delivery by March 2017. Japan had sent a senior defense official to the United States to demand that the US stick to the price and delivery date for F-35 fighter jets.

“We can look national leadership in the eye and say, ‘Your deal is good, with the (terms) that you were offered,'” Venlet is reported to have told reporters after his speech at the conference, referring to his conversations with Japanese leaders.