Japan Eyes More Muscular Defense

Here is this week’s front page news from Japan for Defense News based on the latest versions of the LDP’s 新「防衛計画の大綱」策定に係る提言.

Japan Plans More Aggressive DefenseThe key points for me were the mixed messages I picked up from both U.S. and Japanese interlocutors. Most see sense in Japan’s continued, measured buildup as part of a decades-long process together with constitutional revision to (a) shed Japan of the contradictions that have built up over Article 9 vs. the fact that Japan has built up, often, but not exclusively following U.S. requests, a highly capable but incomplete military and (b) recognize that there is nothing wrong with a carefully crafted constitutional right to collective defense (with an update badly needed now that Japan is building out its BMD, particularly, but not exclusively for SM3-Block IIA, cruise missile and UAV-killing SM-6, and when Japan acquires E-2D assets).

But on the other hand, there is a great deal of angst involved, particularly over the issue of preemptive strike capability. Actually this issue, as I try to point out, isn’t new. The idea that Japan should consider mid-air refueling first openly stated during the Koizumi administration and the grounds for Japan hitting North Korean missile sites as laid out by former defense minister Shigeru Ishiba, are a decade old.

There is a sense that the LDP assumes, and unthinkingly projects, that it, under Shinzo Abe, a grandson of Nobusuke Kishi, that is the natural party of leadership, and that now that the reigns of power are back where they should be, so the LDP has to contrast itself with the DPJ. This seems to have so many things wrong with it. The U.S. was not particularly unhappy with the previous administration, which, apart from the basing issue, was basically going the same direction as the LDP would have anyway. Second, the LDP at least says publicly that it realizes it was not elected to pursue Abe’s nationalist agenda, but given a (…it always seems a last chance saloon) opportunity by the electorate to try to do something, anything to get the economy going. Any attempt to cast its DPJ predecessor as weak on defense issues is ridiculous.  And the last time Abe tried to foist his political and constitutional agenda on Japan, he was more or less forced out, and his agenda quietly abandoned by his successors.

But the U.S. is alarmed, by what might be called the current administration’s handling of its public perception. Look below to the mealy mouthed  reaction by Ishiba, for example, to the recent comments by Toru Hashimoto on sex slaves, which may have become an albatross or an unintentional SIW that could make him irrelevant. More disturbing is the lack of gross emotional intelligence of it all. The idea that “everyone did it” isn’t really a move forward.

The bottom line is, as Japan assumes a more normal defense posture, does it want to create more stability or less stability in the region? Japan needs to recalibrate its constitution and military to support the U.S.-Japan alliance and this means proceeding with the requisite diplomatic and emotional intelligence.

Mr. Abe has been trying, one might say, very trying. Even pro-Japan, pro-Alliance interlocutors are saying they need Mr. Abe to wake up.

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Another gaffe by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe

And from what we see and we read, the Abe administration is making a pig’s ear out of it.

Anyway, here is the full article:

Japan Eyes More Muscular Defense

By PAUL KALLENDER-UMEZU
TOKYO After almost seven decades of maintaining a limited defense posture, Japan should develop its amphibious and pre-emptive strike capability while bolstering sea- and ground-based ballistic-missile defenses, according to policy proposals by the country’s ruling party.

The proposals, obtained by Defense News and released to a select group last week ahead of widespread distribution, were drawn up by the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). They also call for Japan to beef up its space-based early warning systems and invest in cyber defense.

The proposals were generated by several internal LDP committees led by former LDP Defense Ministers Shigeru Ishiba and Gen Nakatani, and therefore carry considerable weight, according to Narushige Michishita, director of the Security and International Studies Program at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies here.

“They’re important,” he said.

The recommendations will feed into policy, spending and acquisition priorities for Japan’s next five-year Mid-Term Defense Plan, which is being crafted by the Defense Ministry and will be published by December.

They also come as the LDP administration of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe seeks to revise Article 9 of Japan’s constitution to delete provisions that prohibit Japan from using “war as a sovereign right of the nation” and maintaining “war potential,” and replace them with the right to hold a “National Defense Force” under the prime minister as commander in chief.

The LDP’s policy proposals do not name weapon systems or suggest budgets, and are deliberately more vague than similar proposals drawn up by the LDP in 2009, just before the party suffered a disastrous electoral defeat to the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ).

“The LDP was not in power then [in 2009],” and so could be more direct, Michishita said.

The 2009 proposals openly discussed Japan acquiring, for example, the Boeing KC-46 tanker refueling plane as a step toward developing pre-emptive strike capability, such as knocking out fueled North Korean missiles. They also suggested adding the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system to Japan’s ship-based Aegis and ground-based Patriot systems.

Fast forward four years, and the proposals come from a resurrected LDP that delivered an even bigger electoral defeat to the DPJ last December. This time around, the language is more cautious because each word has more value.

While they carefully avoid all reference to Japan’s major sources of concern — China and North Korea — the proposals open intriguing possibilities over the extent to which Japan will strengthen its defense posture. In this context, Japanese defense planners are considering a number of options for each of the force enhancements, according to analysts and people familiar with the LDP’s discussions.

Most interesting and controversial is the proposed discussion of pre-emptive strike capability, which would require Japan to acquire Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs), long-range refueling capability for its nascent F-35 Joint Strike Fighters and/or a naval platform for the F-35B jump jet, should Japan opt to purchase that variant.

The proposals make no mention of the KC-46 this time around. The Air Self-Defense Force, meanwhile, has steadily equipped its fleet of Mitsubishi F-2 multirole fighters with JDAMS. It is thought that the two 19,500-ton 22DDH-class helicopter destroyers planned for the Maritime Self-Defense Force can be converted to carry the F-35B.

In 2003, before Japan had deployed its Aegis SM-3 and Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) ballistic-missile defense (BMD) systems, then-Defense Minister Ishiba made it clear that Japan could launch a strike against a missile base in North Korea in specific sets of circumstances.

For example, a strike could take place if there was evidence the missiles were fueled and aimed at Japan, and Japan had no other credible means of defense, Michishita said.

But now Japan is steadily building out its BMD systems to intercept North Korea’s longer-range Unha and Musudan mobile intermediate-range ballistic missiles, so such a strike would be potentially unconstitutional, he said.

Brad Glosserman, executive director of the Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), said he found recent talk of Japan bolstering its pre-emptive strike capability worrying.

“CSIS has been conducting discussions on the issue of pre-emptive strike for six years, and in recent months, we have seen resumption of calls to develop this capability resurface. I am concerned about the proliferation of these capabilities because of the potentially destabilizing consequences,” he said.

Japan probably won’t develop a separate marine corps, but it will more likely reinforce its amphibious capability, largely based on the Western Infantry Regiment of the Ground Self-Defense Forces (GSDF) that trained in amphibious warfare as part of the Iron Fist exercises with the US Marine Corps in California, analysts say.

Paul Giarra, president of US-based consulting firm Global Strategies & Transformation, said the language of the policy proposal opens the possibility of the GSDF equipping one or perhaps two regiments with advanced capabilities, including up to four dozen amphibious landing vehicles over the next five years, beyond the four AAV-7A1S vehicles already planned, and a suitable number of Bell-Boeing V-22 tilt-rotor Osprey aircraft.

“I read it more as the [Japan Self-Defense Forces] with some improved amphibious capabilities like vehicles and tilt-rotor aircraft. That is potentially a significant development, but the LDP does not look like it wants to go the whole hog on a marine corps,” said Christopher Hughes, professor of international politics and Japanese studies at Britain’s University of Warwick.

Japan is considering several options to boost its BMD portfolio, consisting of four Kongo-class destroyers and two larger Atago-class Aegis cruisers, and PAC-3 units. While the 2009 version of the proposals specifically mentions purchasing THAAD and an “advanced” version of the PAC-3, the new version recommends strengthening land-based BMD, leaving Japan a choice between purchasing either THAAD or the Aegis Ashore land-based version of the Aegis system, and the PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) system for last-ditch interdiction.

Giarra said deploying the PAC-3 MSE would complement Aegis Ashore, which Japan has shown an interest in purchasing to the tune of one or two 24-missile interceptor batteries, a number that could increase. In this case, purchasing THAAD systems might be too much of an overlap of similar capabilities, he suggested.

Japanese defense planners see cruise missiles in general and China’s DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile in particular as growing threats. This means that on top of the planned upgrades to employ the SM-3 Block IIA Aegis system when it becomes available, Japan also is considering purchasing the extended-range anti-air warfare RIM-174 missile.

“Cruise missile defense is becoming as important to Japan as ballistic-missile defense,” Michishita said.

Hughes said the proposals face many roadblocks, including opposition from more dovish LDP members and the MoD’s own panel scheduled to meet in January, which may have its own priorities. Last but not least is the Ministry of Finance, which will be unwilling to raise the defense budget under any circumstances.

“[But] if Abe/the LDP can pull all this off, then it will be very radical indeed,” Hughes said.

Regional Concerns

Japan’s moves will likely be welcomed across a region concerned about China’s aggressive territorial claims.

“Japan and the Philippines have a strained history, but the Filipinos are for a stronger Japan because Tokyo is helping train its Coast Guard,” Giarra said. “South Korea is less dependent on Japan and tensions run deeper, so it’s much less willing to go along with it.”

Tensions soared last week after Osaka’s mayor said forced prostitution in occupied nations was a military necessity for invading Japanese forces, prompting a South Korean newspaper to write that US atomic attacks on Japan were “divine punishment” for Tokyo’s brutality.

Some in Asia and Washington worry Japan’s nationalist leader believes Japanese forces did nothing wrong during World War II.

“Passive support for Japan will hold unless Japanese behavior changes,” Giarra added. “The question is whether Japanese officials can resist the temptation to undo what they believe were unnecessary apologies for wartime actions they don’t believe were wrong.

“The feeling of being wronged is as powerful in Japan as it is the other way around in Korea, Philippines, Indonesia . . . Germany dealt with its past and continues to do so, but Japan suppressed the issue, creating pent up pressure, and when it vents, it could change how this buildup is seen.”

Email: pkallender@defensenews.com.

JSP Catchup #6: Probe Uncovers 40-year Japanese Contractor Fraud

This story was NOT a surprise; the fuller story is at Japan Still Calculating Cost of Defense Firm’s Padded Bills, but ever since NEC Corp. in 1998 was found with its hands in the till, I have been wondering who would be fingered next, and when, and why when, and why.

I say this because when I chatted to people back in 1998, the practice of padding contracts with surplus labor costs was widespread in the space and defense sectors and this was commonly known. At the time the questions were Why NEC? And Why Now? Below my initial October story is NEC SCANDAL SHEDS LIGHT ON JAPANESE PROCUREMENTS, a more fruity web version of a story that I originally wrote for Space News back in the day.

The timing for the original NEC story was also interesting as NEC was strongly pushing for its version of what was to become Japan’s IGS spy satellite system that was provoked by the Teapodon Triggeran analysis that Saadia and I wrote about in In Defense of Japan (thank you Google Books!)

At the time NEC’s version of what was to become the IGS would have featured smaller satellites and cost less than Melco’s system. But with NEC suddenly out of the picture, Melco, with Ichiro Taniguchi at the helm, managed to personally lobby Japan’s Cabinet in the weeks after the Taepondon launch, and Japan’ got the IGS.

Here is a nice picture from Space Safety Magazine of Japan’s 1,200-Kilogram IGS 1B Satellite re-entered Earth’s Atmosphere on Thursday, July 26, 2012 after spending nearly 9.5 years in space.  Another more detailed article about this can be found at Spaceflight.101.com.

Eventually, NEC’s small-bus and higher resolution system has  been re-emerging in the ASNARO system, which is now being pushed as an alternative and complementary system to the expensive and relatively lower performance IGS, and also as the linchpin of a satellite-based, pan-Asian disaster monitoring network that is now a major part of Japan’s emerging regional space diplomacy and security strategy.  At least the Vietnamese have bought into it, and while customers don’t seem to be forming a line yet, there is still a lot of hope out there.

Here is the initial story for Defense News:

NEC SCANDAL SHEDS LIGHT ON

JAPANESE PROCUREMENTS.

By Paul Kallender in Tokyo

When, in September 1998, an investigation into the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) discovered that Japanese technology giant NEC Corp had systematically defrauded the taxpayer on 33 space contracts over the course of five years, it looked as though Japan’s obviously abused government procurement system was about to get a major overhaul.

The investigation began promisingly enough. On September 3, Tokyo prosecutors raided the JDA and arrested Kenichi Ueno, deputy head of the Procurement Office, and a clutch of executives from NEC subsidiary Toyo Communications.

This followed discoveries that not only had Toyo overcharged the JDA some $21m over dozens of equipment contracts, but that Ueno and others had conspired to prevent Toyo, NEC and other subsidiaries from repaying the money. NEC was raided the next day and by September 10, nine senior NEC and JDA executives were in jail.

It came to light that Ueno and others had lifted incriminating paperwork out of the Agency’s filing cabinets and put them into incinerators and even the homes of friends. NEC’s SuperTower headquarters was soon besieged by the Japanese phenomenon of ‘sound trucks,’ driven by right-wing extremists screaming abuse and demanding mass resignations.

But instead of resulting in the punishment of protagonists and the start of reforms, the scandal collapsed into a desultory cover-up. NEC’s initial response was to deny everything, with a bemused VP Masakatsu Miwa telling the media on September 10 that he did not expect top NEC executives to resign because of the scandal, going on to explain that he “wondered why” NEC officials were being implicated. Unfortunately for Miwa, on September 29, NEC’s overcharging was upscaled to $2.5bn, while, on the same day, a Parliamentary committee reported that the JDA had hired no less than 44 NEC executives in senior positions in just two years. By October 10, former NEC VP Hiroaki Shimayama and Takenori Yanase, VP of NEC’s Space Systems Division, had both been arrested.

Thieves charter

The National Space Development Agency (NASDA) launched an inquiry and on November 9, NEC admitted overcharging by at least $19m. Meanwhile on October 14, the JDA revealed that 225 of its officials had been hired by 20 suppliers in the past five years, shedding some dim light on a corner of Japan’s Amadudari (Descent from Heaven) career kickback system.

At the heart of the issue, according to NASDA’s former executive director Akira Kubozono, is the flawed government contract system which encourages corruption through a combination of legendary meanness and bureaucratic incompetence.

“There are two points about this affair,” he said. “One is that NEC is just a scapegoat. The second is that the governmental contract system is the cause of this scandal. When the defense contract revelations began, I thought it was only a matter of time before it spread into NEC’s space systems division as both defense and space procurement are conducted under similar systems.”

Under the Japanese government contract system, the co ntractor is obliged to repay any unused budget if the delivery price falls below the contract amount, and the contractor must also incur any costs if the project overshoots the agreed estimate — a thieves charter if ever there was one.

Furthermore NASDA, the Science and Technology Agency and the Ministry of Finance lack the technical expertise to evaluate bids and tend to just accept company estimates, says Kubozono. “The system needs to be reformed but I doubt this is possible as long as NASDA and the corporations are controlled by STA administrators (who also often retire to executive positions in NASDA) and not by engineers,” he says.

No mettle Kubozono, it seems, was right.

By November 12, the space scandal seemed to have been wrapped up, with NASDA saying it was satisfied that only NEC had abused the system. “The system has worked well for 30 years. We believe that a little devil whispered into NEC’s ear. We do not think it will happen again,” said Yasuyuki Fukumuro, NASDA PR deputy director. Fukumuro quickly admitted that NEC would be allowed to bid for Japan’s new spy satellite system, after a token contract moratorium.

Back at the JDA, a grand total of six senior officials will take up to 10% pay cuts for one to three months plus one official will receive a 10-day suspension, JDA chief Fukushiro Nukuga told the media at his November 20 resignation press conference.

The speech followed a report, which admitted that there had been “some incidents that could be regarded as a systematic cover-up,” perhaps referring to the 31 officials suspected of Berlin-bunker style burning of documentation that might have provided evidence.

But the worst thing about the affair, according to observers, has been the brazen arrogance of NEC. In his October 23 resignation speech, NEC Chairman Tadahiro Sekimoto, now under personal investigation for his role in the affair, denied any involvement but resigned out of “social responsibility” for the affair, astonishing Kubozono in particular.

“Sekimoto’s act was spineless. If he had honor he would have resigned to take responsibility, not quibbled. He showed no mettle and is a very poor example for younger business leaders. I fear for Japan’s future.”

An even poorer analysis comes from Youichi Teraishi, Editor of Japan’s ‘scandaru’ [scandal] daily, the Nikkan Gendai. He says that Sekimoto’s act compared unfavorably with Yakuza (the Japanese Mafia) standards of conduct. “This Oyabun [Japanese gang boss] showed a lack of chivalry. Captains of industry are supposed to be able to demonstrate this, but Sekimoto lacked the class,” he says.

Lastly, the scandal has left NEC seething that it was singled out for a brutal slap on the wrist. “Everyone is doing it, why should we be the scapegoat?” admitted one NEC official. “Our top management just stuck their heads in the sand and got shafted,” complained another.

This article first appeared in Global Technology News.

JSP Catchup #5: Japan Takes Action Against Complex Cyber Threats

Here is a feature article I did for C4ISR Journal that Defense News put on the web and seems to have been picked up widely (see below), including even NewsOnJapan.com! It’s nice to be able to monetize my research and it was published just as the MOD decided to release some details on its cyberwarfare strategy.

In the year since a sophisticated cyber attack on Japan’s largest military contractor unleashed a flood of revelations about the vulnerability of the country’s most sensitive technical data, cybersecurity has vaulted onto the country’s national security agenda.

In August 2011, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries discovered viruses on its systems in 11 locations across Japan, including in plants that build many of the nation’s missiles, military helicopters, fighter jets, rockets, submarines and nuclear power reactors. Some 45 servers and 38 PCs were infected by at least eight types of viruses when employees unwittingly opened emails containing malware. The company, also Japan’s lead contractor for the SM-3 Block IIA missile being built with the U.S. and for 38 of Japan’s F-35s, sat on the news. When local media brought the attacks to light the following month, the Ministry of Defense rebuked Mitsubishi for failing to immediately inform the ministry of any security breach.

Yet the Mitsubishi stories were just the start of a stunning wave of revelations about similar attacks on other leading companies and institutions. IHI Corp. and Kawasaki Heavy Industries, both major space and military contractors, soon confirmed they had been targeted. In late October, Chief Cabinet Secretary Osamu Fujimura admitted the foreign ministry and several Japanese embassies had been under attack since June. Just after that, it was revealed that computers and servers used by three members of Japan’s Lower House had been hacked.

The bad news has continued into 2012. In April, Nissan reported malware and data breaches in its global network; in June, the group known as Anonymous hacked the finance and transport ministries’ Web pages, forcing the finance ministry to reveal that 123 of its desktop computers had been infected with a remote-access Trojan in 2010 and 2011.

The attacks have been getting more sophisticated, said Motohiro Tsuchiya, a professor at Keio University and member of the Information Security Policy Council, Japan’s top-level government cybersecurity advisory body.

“The recent tactic has been attacking peripheral institutions with lower security and then getting in behind the lower barriers — for example, by attacking think tanks. When this … started, everyone knew something was wrong,” Tsuchiya said.

Instead of brute-force denial-of-service and similar techniques, attacks against the Japanese government and the defense industry increasingly take the form of sophisticated targeted email messages carrying malware.

“In 2010-11, we saw emails mimicking legitimate email addresses, and the attachment files are no longer just [executable] files but also PDFs,” said Masahiro Uemura, who directs the office of IT security policy at the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, known as METI.

In 2011, such attacks accounted for one-third of all recorded attacks, a record, Uemura said. Worse, he said, attackers appear to be focusing on Japan’s infrastructure, especially control systems such as those used in power plants and the manufacturing industry. He said nearly 37 percent of infrastructure-related control systems are connected to the outside, and the vast majority has only perimeter security measures, Uemura said.

The flood of attacks has galvanized government action on cybersecurity policy domestically and internationally.

In October 2011, METI set up the Initiative for Cyber Security Information Sharing Partnership of Japan, which brings the country’s strategic sectors together to share information on cyber attacks and policy. Nine of the country’s top defense companies are members.

“Our minister personally asked us last fall to set up this initiative to protect our most critical industries. The attack on Mitsubishi was the trigger,” Uemura said.

Tsuchiya said the attacks jolted the Information Security Policy Council, which had rarely met since the Democratic Party of Japan came to power in 2009 with little policy focus on cybersecurity. This summer, the senior advisory board released Information Security 2012, which describes how the government might work with the private sector to protect critical infrastructure. The report suggested setting up large-scale attack drills with operators from nuclear plants, the gas distribution network and telecommunications; urging defense contractors to better ward off attacks and share information with the government; and implement measures to protect smartphones from viruses.

Meanwhile, the prime minister’s Cabinet Secretariat is now coordinating government policy much more actively. After the Anonymous attacks, for example, the Cabinet Secretariat set up an emergency support team to make better preparations against cyber attacks on government organizations.

The attacks also jump-started Japanese efforts to reach out to the U.S. and other foreign partners. In February, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs replaced a lower-level body with a Cyber Task Force under the control of Ambassador Tamotsu Shinotsuka. Ministry documents show the new group has five policy units: international rule-making, cyber crime, system security and protection, economic issues and national cybersecurity.

Still, Tsuchiya said, “The foreign affairs ministry hadn’t really been focused on cybersecurity, but this changed this year when [Minister of Foreign Affairs Koichiro] Gemba showed up at the June ISPC meeting. It was the first time any foreign minister had attended.”

Now, he said, international cooperation, especially with the U.S., is high on the agenda. Cooperation is now written into the U.S.-Japan security alliance. In April, a joint statement by the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee announced Tokyo’s intention to join the Convention of Cybercrime and to strengthen bilateral cooperation, critical infrastructure, system-security control, incident management and operational cooperation.

Most importantly for Uemura, he said his department now meets regularly with counterparts in the U.S. Department of Homeland Security to discuss coordination and address U.S. concerns on defense product issues. The partners are working toward an information-sharing security framework that may be announced in the coming months.

The ministry’s main policy is to promote international rule-making and norms setting in line with U.S. and European policies, according to one ministry official. The official cited U.K. Foreign Secretary William Hague’s February 2011 “Seven Principles” speech at the Munich Security Conference as one of the key references for Japanese policy and said Japan supports the promotion of the Budapest Convention on Cyber Crime.

Tsuchiya said the foreign ministry is working to promote international rules in line with U.S. and European policy to form international norms of behavior at the International Conference on Cyberspace in Budapest in October.

Significantly, Gemba has laid out a tentative Japanese policy on the right of self-defense against cyber attacks, an interpretation that theoretically paves the way for Japan to take defensive action. While it does not go as far as the U.S. Defense Department’s 2011 announcement that the U.S. may treat cyber attacks as “acts of war,” the Japanese government for the first time has recognized cyberspace as a national security domain, just like land, sea, air and outer space.

Meanwhile, the Ministry of Defense is beefing up its capabilities. The ministry, which created its first cybersecurity unit in 2000 and added the C4 Systems Command to protect its Defense Information Infrastructure data network, has about 380 people devoted to cybersecurity, said Koji Yoshino, the principal deputy director of the ministry’s Defense Programming and Planning Division.

The ministry’s baseline for cybersecurity and information exchange with the U.S. is based on an April 2006 memorandum of understanding that asks both sides to increase their capability against cyber attacks. After a CD-ROM containing classified Aegis radar data went missing in 2007, a new agreement was made leading to a bilateral agreement requiring Japan to tighten its military information security policies.

The focus on information security has been deepened further by the two countries’ cooperation on ballistic missile defense, which requires sharing information from Aegis ships, Patriot missile batteries and other sensors.

In the past two years, Yoshino said, the ministry has added a cyber planning coordinator to the Joint Staff Office, worked to drill people on responding to attacks, and begun developing tools to gather and analyze information about the latest attacks. It has also improved cyber analysis at Japan’s signals intelligence agency, called Defense Intelligence Headquarters and modeled after the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, he said.

This year, the C4SC added tools to improve information collection and dynamic and static analysis, particularly of malware, said Keiichi Sakashita, who directs the Information Assurance Office.

In September, the ministry’s cyber defense strategy took two steps forward. First, the ministry requested 21.2 billion yen ($270 million) to set up a new cyber defense force with about 100 people, which will combine the ministry’s previous efforts to create its own version of a Japanese Cyber Command, along with 13.3 billion yen to reinforce cyber defense of the ministry’s core Defense Information Infrastructure.

Tsuchiya applauded the move.

“The MoD has been trying for two years to set up the unit, but the attempts were refused by the finance ministry,” he said.

Second, the ministry is now writing doctrine on responding to a cyber attack, said Tetsuya Ito, who directs the strategic planning office of the ministry’s Defense Policy Division.

In September, a ministry panel released new guidelines for dealing with cyber attacks and affirming Japan’s right to respond.

“If a cyber attack takes place as part of a military attack, this can be considered to fulfill the first condition for invoking the right of self-defense,” said a report issued by the panel.

Here is some of the media the story attracted: