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Towards the H-3: Update

Space News kindly published a version of my story on the H-3 last week. I’ve done the usual and pasted a version into this blog.

There is also a story by the ever e xcellent Warren Ferster on the Epsilon based on a JAXA presser. Please see this blog for more background on the Epsilon, or go to the new, vastly improved Space News website.

We can expect more light to be shone on this during June when the ONSP subcommittee makes its final recommendations. Meanwhile the Yomiuri and Asahi have some more information and perspective on the issue.

Our view in In Defense of Japan is that the H-series is a technology development program and while it may arouse screams of indignation and anger to say it, to put it bluntly, money will always be found to develop technologies that give Japan options. As, fundamentally, Saadia and I argue that Japan’s space program has always been basically, when you remove all the dressing, a dual-use strategic technology development program, then reasons to develop the H-3 will always be found.

As made plain by Dick Samuels and Mike Green, under nationalists such as Tomifumi Godai and in an era of rampant technonationalism and kokusanka, there were compelling reasons to develop the H-2. Japan wanted and needed to build a sophisticated, liquid fueled, highly efficient two-stage medium launch vehicle to cement its international reputation as part of the advanced spacefaring club. Remember, when the H-2 was envisaged over 20 years ago, few saw the impending “lost decade.”

Japan’s space program under NASDA was relatively awash with money, with investments made or planned into all sorts of challenging dual-use precursor technologies including ETS-7 (on orbit ASAT demonstration) OICETS/ Kirari (laser communications), reconnaissance/ spy satellites ICBM prototypes (M-V, J-1), reentry (OREX, USERS SEM) SIGINT (ETS-8), global strike (HYFLEX, HOPE) etc. Some highly ambitious programs that emerged last decade, have disappeared, for example HiMEOS and Smartsat-1.

On the other hand, ALSET looks as if it could make it.

これまでの基幹ロケットの評価と今後の在り方について
2013 年 4 月 24 日
宇宙輸送システム部会委員
三菱重工業株式会社代表取締役常務執行役員
航空宇宙事業本部長
鯨井洋

Let’s not forget the H-2 very nearly made it to commercial viability but was fatally holed by the surging yen as well as dodgy turbopumps. So then money was found for the H-2A to solve the problem (half the costs, boost the payload) …but as we argue in In Defense of Japan, whether or not the H-2A really made it was not the issue. Could the program be justified in terms of a technology development program to the MoF. The peanuts in terms of cost involved in developing the H-2A compared to the cost of major launch vehicle systems by other advanced democracies (lets just name the Ariane 5) meant yes.

And now the cycle starts again. So how will the H-3 be sold to the MoF under the rubric of Japan’s latest stated space policy?

Sure, as something that will be commercially viable. Whether or not MHI and JAXA can actually achieve this is, we contend, strategically, a mute question. If and when the H-3 doesn’t make it commercially, MHI and Japan will have at least invested in developing a new level of excellent technologies that will secure Japan’s independent launch vehicle capabilities and provide jobs, technology and investment in its aerospace sector. Incidentally, the H-3 is now being sold by MHI as “catchup” again, as the slide above shows.

Sure, the same old cycle of vituperation and lashing will follow in the Japanese media if or when the H-3 fails to make the grade commercially, but the more strategic goals of “keeping/ catching up” will have been met.

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by japanspace on May 30, 2013 • Permalink

Posted by japanspace on May 30, 2013

https://japanspace.wordpress.com/2013/05/30/towards-the-h-3-space-news-version/

A New Direction For Japan’s Space Program?

Here is the longer version of the previous article:

Aviation Week & Space Technology May 06, 2013 , p. 36

Paul Kallender-Umezu
Tokyo

Japanese space programs face strict new reality

Et Tu, Tokyo?

The first order of business for new Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) leader Naoki Okumura will be to reorient his nation’s space program from advanced development to activities that may produce some commercial return on investment.

Based on the latest five-year “Basic Plan” for space promulgated by the Office of National Space Policy (ONSP), the new direction is putting pressure on JAXA to cut, postpone or reduce to research and development some or most of the agency’s flagship science, technology and manned spaceflight programs.

Some or all of the satellites planned for the Global Earth Observation System of Systems, the HTV-R pressurized sample-and-crew-return mini-shuttle and the H-X/H-3 launcher programs could face cancellation, concedes JAXA’s Hiroshi Sasaki, senior advisor in the strategic planning and management department.

“For 20 years, so much money has been spent by JAXA [and its predecessor, Nasda] on R&D, but there has been very little commercial return,” says Hirotoshi Kunitomo, ONSP director.

Under legislation passed last year, JAXA policy is now controlled by the 23-member ONSP, which was created at the end of a process begun in the middle of the past decade to wrest control of space planning from the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), which controlled 60% of Japan’s roughly 350 billion yen ($3.75 billion) annual government space budget through its oversight of JAXA.

With a charter for change, ONSP reports directly to Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who has final say over which of JAXA’s programs are funded. In turn, ONSP’s Basic Plan resets Japan’s space policy to three mutually reinforcing goals: promoting national security; boosting industry; and securing the country’s technological independence for all major space applications from reliance on foreign agencies—providing this supports the first two goals.

Kunitomo asserts that ONSP will continue to support frontier science as a lower priority, as long as it is based on the sort of low-cost, high-impact space science designed by JAXA’s Institute of Space and Astronautical Science , embodied by the Hayabusa asteroid sample-return mission. But former high-priority goals to promote environmental monitoring and human space activities and put robots on the Moon now have been moved down the list and must fight for funding, Kunitomo says.

Instead, only one of the three ONSP core programs—Japan’s launch vehicles—is run by JAXA.

The top-priority program, run by the ONSP, is to build out the Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS), Japan’s regional GPS overlay, with a budget approved for maintaining a constellation of four QZSS satellites by around 2018. A post-2020 build-out to a seven-satellite constellation will then give Japan its own independent regional positioning, navigation and timing capability.

The second is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (Asean) newly sanctioned disaster management network run by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). This requires a constellation of Earth-observing satellites equipped with X- and L-band radar and hyperspectral sensors to monitor Southeast Asia. Japan will provide at least the first three satellites, with more funding through foreign aid packages. Vietnam has signed up for two X-band satellites. The system’s once-daily global-revisit policy requires a minimum constellation of four satellites that will need to be replenished every five years or so.

The third priority has JAXA focusing on improving the current H-2A launch vehicle in partnership with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) while continuing improvement of its new low-cost, launch-on-demand Epsilon solid-fuel rocket for smaller payloads. A variant of the Epsilon will be uprated to around 1,800 kg (3,970 lb.) from 1,200 kg to low Earth orbit, matching that of its predecessor M-V launch vehicle.

JAXA projects that fall outside the Basic Plan’s goals but already were funded for development will continue if it would be counter-productive to stop them, says Kunitomo. These include launching the upcoming ALOS-2 land-observing system and the Global Precipitation Measurement/Dual-frequency Precipitation Radar satellites. The Greenhouse Gases-Observing Satellite-2 (Gosat-2) will also continue, as it is funded by the Environment Ministry, not MEXT/JAXA.

But under a Feb. 25 budget plan drawn up by Kunitomo, several programs face close scrutiny, including the HTV-R sample-return mission, any future launches of the HTV-R transfer vehicle beyond the current seven planned to 2016, lunar exploration and all of JAXA’s follow-on environmental missions.

The ONSP’s logic for reauditing the HTV-R is harsh. As it is too expensive to commercialize, the H-2B will be ditched as dead once its HTV duties are finished. The HTV’s only purpose is to service the International Space Station, and Japan must minimize its costs, so logically the HTV, HTV-R and H-2B have no future beyond 2016 and the HTV’s seventh flight. Indeed, one industry official tells Aviation Week that Japan may launch at most two post-2016 missions.

The Basic Plan mandates that the agency’s already-low-priority environmental-monitoring programs undergo a “focus and reselection process.” This means the proposed GCOM-C, EarthCARE cloud radar mission and ALOS-3 electro-optical missions , the second main plank of Japan’s flagship international cooperation programs with NASA and the European Space Agency , will struggle for funding, and not all will make it, says Kunitomo. But a reconfigured ALOS-3 that can adapt to the Asean disaster management network at a fraction of its projected price would be more acceptable, he concedes.

As for the putative H-X, Kunitomo says ONSP questions the need to spend $2 billion and 8-10 years to develop it. JAXA and MHI say the program requires a launch system that no one can guarantee will be commercially competitive.

Industry’s reaction to all of this appears to range from stress to relief to anxiety. Masaru Uji, a general manager at the Society of Japanese Aerospace Companies, says QZSS and Asean network programs will provide steady, long-term business for Japan’s two satellite integrators: Mitsubishi Electric, which is supplying its DS2000 bus for the QZSS; and NEC Corp. , with its METI-funded 300-kg-class multipurpose Asnaro bus for the network.

The aerospace trade association figures show that for 2011, Japan’s total space sales—both overseas and domestic, and including all subcontractor revenues—amounted to only ¥265 billion ($2.7 billion). That is down from a peak of ¥379 billion in 1998, with overseas commercial sales accounting for only the low teens in revenue and JAXA programs taking the lion’s share of domestic business.

The Basic Plan “is moving in the right direction. You can’t build a business without infrastructure,” says Satoshi Tsuzukibashi, director of the Industrial Technology Bureau at Keidanren, Japan’s most powerful business lobby.

Uji is particularly pleased for NEC, which has been awarded a so-called private finance initiative to develop the QZSS ground segment, spreading steady payments to the company for at least the next 15 years. Anticipating the Basic Plan this January, NEC announced a ¥9.9 billion investment in a new 9,000-sq.-meter (97,000-sq.-ft.) satellite facility in Fuchu, west of Tokyo, to build a fleet of Asnaro satellites, which it also hopes to market commercially under the Nextar brand, says Yasuo Horiuchi, senior manager of NEC’s satellite business development office.

Similarly, Mitsubishi Electric said in March that it completed a doubling of its satellite production capacity to eight buses annually at its Kamakura Works. Having already sold four of the 13 DS2000-based satellites to commercial satellite services customers, increased volume spurred by the QZSS program will create further efficiencies and cost competitiveness, says Executive Director Eiichi Hikima.

MHI may face a different challenge, however. Ryo Nakamura, director of H-2A-2B launch services in the company’s Space Systems Div., says an improved H-IIA may gain one commercial contract in 2015-16. This may convince ONSP to fund the H-X (or H-3), whose first stage was supposed to use an LE-X engine with a high-thrust expander bleed cycle. Before the Basic Plan , the rocket was slated in JAXA’s road map to undergo the first of its three test launches around 2018. Hidemasa Nakanishi, manager of strategy and planning at the Space Systems Div., thinks it is Japan ‘s duty as an advanced spacefaring nation to complete its participation in the International Space Station, thus learning pressurized return technologies through the HTV-R .

JAXA’s Sasaki points out that nothing has been cut yet, and JAXA is going to battle to preserve as much of its “traditional” programs as it can in the relevant subcommittees though the spring. Key decisions will come in June.

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by japanspace on May 18, 2013 • Permalink

Posted in Adeos-2, Advanced Solid Rocket (ADR), ALOS-2, ASEAN Disaster Management Network, ASNARO, Daichi, GCOM-W1, H-2A, H-2B, H-3, H-X, Hayabusa, Hayabusa-2, Hiroshi Yamakawa, In Defense of Japan: From the Market to the Military in Space Policy, Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency, Japan Space Budget, Japan Space Development, Japanese GPS, Japanese Space Policy Basic Plan, JAXA, Keidanren, Kounotori (HTV), METI, MEXT, MHI, MHI Launch Services, Michibiki, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, NEXTAR, ODA Space Diplomacy, Office of National Space Policy, ONSP, QZSS, SHSP, Society Of Japanese Aerospace Companies, Space Activities Act, Space Activities Commission, Space ODA, Space PFI, Space Policy, Space Policy Commission, Space Strategy Office, Strategic Headquarters for Space Policy (, Strategic Headquarters for Space Policy (SHSP), Uchusenryaku Shitsu, UNISEC, USEF: ASNARO, 内閣衛星情報センター, 内閣府, 宇宙基本計画, 宇宙戦略室, 宇宙政策, 宇宙政策委員会, 情報収集衛星

Tagged ALOS-2, ALOS-3, ASNARO, Aviation Week and Space Technology, Basic Plan, Culture, DS2000, EarthCARE, Global Earth Observation System of Systems, Global Precipitation Measurement/Dual-frequency Precipitation Radar, GOSAT-2, Greenhouse Gases-Observing Satellite-2, H-2A, H-3, H-X, Hayabusa, HTV-R, International Space Station, Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency, JAXA, METI, MEXT, MHI, Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Education, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, NEC Space Systems, NEXTAR, Office of National Space Policy, ONSP, Quasi-Zenith Satellite System, QZSS, Science and Technology, Shinzo Abe, SJAC, Society Of Japanese Aerospace Companies, Space Strategy Office, Sports, Strategic Headquarters for Space Policy (SHSP), Trade and Industry, Uchusenryaku Shitsu, USEF: ASNARO, 内閣衛星情報センター, 内閣府, 宇宙基本計画, 宇宙戦略室, 宇宙政策, 宇宙政策委員会, 情報収集衛星

Posted by japanspace on May 18, 2013

https://japanspace.wordpress.com/2013/05/18/a-new-direction-for-japans-space-program/

Japanese Space Program Braces For Cuts

Here is a shorter version of the longer article that was published in Aviation Week last month. It was great to have the chance to write a little bit about what is going on in Japan. I’m posting this now, since Japan is nearing a decision on exactly what sort of H-3 launch vehicle it wants, for example, here, here, here and here, just to name a few. I’ll just post the longer form article and then my take on the H-3.

TOKYO — As Japan’s space policy plans shift away from research and development, the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) is finding its flagship science, technology and manned spaceflight programs in line for cuts and cancellations.

Some or all of Japan’s satellites planned for the Global Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS), the HTV-R pressurized sample-and-crew-return mini-shuttle, and the H-X/H-3 launcher programs could face cancellation, says JAXA’s Hiroshi Sasaki, senior advisor for the strategic planning and management department.

New laws have placed control of the Japanese space agency in the hands of the Office of National Space Policy. And ONSP director Hirotoshi Kunitomo seeks to reorient Japan’s space efforts from idealism to realism.

ONSP will continue to support frontier science as a lower priority, providing it is based on the sort of low-cost, high-impact space science designed by JAXA’s Institute of Space and Astronautical Science (ISAS), embodied by the Hayabusa asteroid sample return mission. But former high-priority goals to promote environmental monitoring, human space activities and putting robots on the Moon are now much lower priorities and will have to fight for funding, Kunitomo says.

Instead, ONSP is focusing on three core programs, and only one of them, Japan’s launch vehicles, is a JAXA program.

The highest priority effort, run by the ONSP, is to build out the Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS), Japan’s regional GPS overlay, with a budget approved for maintaining a constellation of four QZSS satellites by around 2018. A post-2020 build out to a seven-satellite constellation will then give Japan its own independent regional positioning, navigation and timing capability.

The second is the Association of Southeast Asian Nation’s (ASEAN) newly sanctioned Disaster Management Network run by the Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry (METI). This requires a constellation of Earth-observing optical, X- and L-band radar and hyperspectral sensor-equipped satellites monitoring Southeast Asia. Japan will provide at least the first three satellites, with more funding through foreign aid packages. Vietnam has already signed up for two X-band satellites. Stated policy requires a once-daily revisit over any part of the Earth, requiring a minimum constellation of four satellites that will need to be regularly replenished every five years or so.

The third priority focuses is on improving the current H-2A, which JAXA is working on with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI). It is also continuing improvement of JAXA’s new low-cost, launch-on-demand Epsilon solid launch rocket for smaller payloads. A variant will be uprated from 1,200 kg (2,650 lb.) to around 1,800 kg to low Earth orbit, matching that of its predecessor M-V launch vehicle.

JAXA projects that fall short of the Basic Plan’s goals but are already funded for development will continue if it is counterproductive to stop them, Kunitomo says. These include launching the upcoming ALOS-2 land-observing system and the Global Precipitation Measurement/Dual-frequency Precipitation Radar satellites. The greenhouse-gases-focused Observing Satellite-2 (GOSAT-2) is also safe, as it is funded by the Environment Ministry, not JAXA.

But under a Feb. 25 budget plan drawn up by Kunitomo, several programs face harsh scrutiny, including the HTV-R sample return mission, any future launches of the HTV-R transfer vehicle beyond the current seven planned through 2016, the H-3, Moon exploration and all of JAXA’s follow-on environmental missions.

Harsh logic

The ONSP’s logic for re-auditing the HTV-R is harsh. As it is too expensive to commercialize, the H-2B will be ditched as dead once its HTV duties are finished. As the HTV’s only purpose is to service the International Space Station, andImage Japan must minimize its costs, then logically the HTV, HTV-R and H-2B have no future beyond 2016 and the HTV’s seventh flight. Indeed, one industry source tells Aviation Week that Japan may launch perhaps two, at most, post-2016 missions.

For JAXA, things get tougher. ONSP plans mandate that the agency’s now-low priority environmental monitoring programs undergo a “focus and re-selection process.” This means the proposed GCOM-C, EarthCARE cloud radar mission and ALOS-3 electro-optical missions — the second main plank of Japan’s flagship international cooperation programs with NASA and the European Space Agency — will fight for funding, and not all will make it, Kunitomo says. But he concedes a reconfigured ALOS-3 that can adapt to the Disaster Management Network at a fraction of its projected price tag would become more acceptable.

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by japanspace on May 18, 2013 • Permalink

Posted by japanspace on May 18, 2013

https://japanspace.wordpress.com/2013/05/18/japanese-space-program-braces-for-cuts/

JSP Catchup #6: Probe Uncovers 40-year Japanese Contractor Fraud

This story was NOT a surprise; the fuller story is at Japan Still Calculating Cost of Defense Firm’s Padded Bills, but ever since NEC Corp. in 1998 was found with its hands in the till, I have been wondering who would be fingered next, and when, and why when, and why.

I say this because when I chatted to people back in 1998, the practice of padding contracts with surplus labor costs was widespread in the space and defense sectors and this was commonly known. At the time the questions were Why NEC? And Why Now? Below my initial October story is NEC SCANDAL SHEDS LIGHT ON JAPANESE PROCUREMENTS, a more fruity web version of a story that I originally wrote for Space News back in the day.

The timing for the original NEC story was also interesting as NEC was strongly pushing for its version of what was to become Japan’s IGS spy satellite system that was provoked by the Teapodon Trigger– an analysis that Saadia and I wrote about in In Defense of Japan (thank you Google Books!)

At the time NEC’s version of what was to become the IGS would have featured smaller satellites and cost less than Melco’s system. But with NEC suddenly out of the picture, Melco, with Ichiro Taniguchi at the helm, managed to personally lobby Japan’s Cabinet in the weeks after the Taepondon launch, and Japan’ got the IGS.

Here is a nice picture from Space Safety Magazine of Japan’s 1,200-Kilogram IGS 1B Satellite re-entered Earth’s Atmosphere on Thursday, July 26, 2012 after spending nearly 9.5 years in space. Another more detailed article about this can be found at Spaceflight.101.com.

Eventually, NEC’s small-bus and higher resolution system has been re-emerging in the ASNARO system, which is now being pushed as an alternative and complementary system to the expensive and relatively lower performance IGS, and also as the linchpin of a satellite-based, pan-Asian disaster monitoring network that is now a major part of Japan’s emerging regional space diplomacy and security strategy. At least the Vietnamese have bought into it, and while customers don’t seem to be forming a line yet, there is still a lot of hope out there.

Here is the initial story for Defense News:

NEC SCANDAL SHEDS LIGHT ON

JAPANESE PROCUREMENTS.

By Paul Kallender in Tokyo

When, in September 1998, an investigation into the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) discovered that Japanese technology giant NEC Corp had systematically defrauded the taxpayer on 33 space contracts over the course of five years, it looked as though Japan’s obviously abused government procurement system was about to get a major overhaul.

The investigation began promisingly enough. On September 3, Tokyo prosecutors raided the JDA and arrested Kenichi Ueno, deputy head of the Procurement Office, and a clutch of executives from NEC subsidiary Toyo Communications.

This followed discoveries that not only had Toyo overcharged the JDA some $21m over dozens of equipment contracts, but that Ueno and others had conspired to prevent Toyo, NEC and other subsidiaries from repaying the money. NEC was raided the next day and by September 10, nine senior NEC and JDA executives were in jail.

It came to light that Ueno and others had lifted incriminating paperwork out of the Agency’s filing cabinets and put them into incinerators and even the homes of friends. NEC’s SuperTower headquarters was soon besieged by the Japanese phenomenon of ‘sound trucks,’ driven by right-wing extremists screaming abuse and demanding mass resignations.

But instead of resulting in the punishment of protagonists and the start of reforms, the scandal collapsed into a desultory cover-up. NEC’s initial response was to deny everything, with a bemused VP Masakatsu Miwa telling the media on September 10 that he did not expect top NEC executives to resign because of the scandal, going on to explain that he “wondered why” NEC officials were being implicated. Unfortunately for Miwa, on September 29, NEC’s overcharging was upscaled to $2.5bn, while, on the same day, a Parliamentary committee reported that the JDA had hired no less than 44 NEC executives in senior positions in just two years. By October 10, former NEC VP Hiroaki Shimayama and Takenori Yanase, VP of NEC’s Space Systems Division, had both been arrested.

Thieves charter

The National Space Development Agency (NASDA) launched an inquiry and on November 9, NEC admitted overcharging by at least $19m. Meanwhile on October 14, the JDA revealed that 225 of its officials had been hired by 20 suppliers in the past five years, shedding some dim light on a corner of Japan’s Amadudari (Descent from Heaven) career kickback system.

At the heart of the issue, according to NASDA’s former executive director Akira Kubozono, is the flawed government contract system which encourages corruption through a combination of legendary meanness and bureaucratic incompetence.

“There are two points about this affair,” he said. “One is that NEC is just a scapegoat. The second is that the governmental contract system is the cause of this scandal. When the defense contract revelations began, I thought it was only a matter of time before it spread into NEC’s space systems division as both defense and space procurement are conducted under similar systems.”

Under the Japanese government contract system, the co ntractor is obliged to repay any unused budget if the delivery price falls below the contract amount, and the contractor must also incur any costs if the project overshoots the agreed estimate — a thieves charter if ever there was one.

Furthermore NASDA, the Science and Technology Agency and the Ministry of Finance lack the technical expertise to evaluate bids and tend to just accept company estimates, says Kubozono. “The system needs to be reformed but I doubt this is possible as long as NASDA and the corporations are controlled by STA administrators (who also often retire to executive positions in NASDA) and not by engineers,” he says.

No mettle Kubozono, it seems, was right.

By November 12, the space scandal seemed to have been wrapped up, with NASDA saying it was satisfied that only NEC had abused the system. “The system has worked well for 30 years. We believe that a little devil whispered into NEC’s ear. We do not think it will happen again,” said Yasuyuki Fukumuro, NASDA PR deputy director. Fukumuro quickly admitted that NEC would be allowed to bid for Japan’s new spy satellite system, after a token contract moratorium.

Back at the JDA, a grand total of six senior officials will take up to 10% pay cuts for one to three months plus one official will receive a 10-day suspension, JDA chief Fukushiro Nukuga told the media at his November 20 resignation press conference.

The speech followed a report, which admitted that there had been “some incidents that could be regarded as a systematic cover-up,” perhaps referring to the 31 officials suspected of Berlin-bunker style burning of documentation that might have provided evidence.

But the worst thing about the affair, according to observers, has been the brazen arrogance of NEC. In his October 23 resignation speech, NEC Chairman Tadahiro Sekimoto, now under personal investigation for his role in the affair, denied any involvement but resigned out of “social responsibility” for the affair, astonishing Kubozono in particular.

“Sekimoto’s act was spineless. If he had honor he would have resigned to take responsibility, not quibbled. He showed no mettle and is a very poor example for younger business leaders. I fear for Japan’s future.”

An even poorer analysis comes from Youichi Teraishi, Editor of Japan’s ‘scandaru’ [scandal] daily, the Nikkan Gendai. He says that Sekimoto’s act compared unfavorably with Yakuza (the Japanese Mafia) standards of conduct. “This Oyabun [Japanese gang boss] showed a lack of chivalry. Captains of industry are supposed to be able to demonstrate this, but Sekimoto lacked the class,” he says.

Lastly, the scandal has left NEC seething that it was singled out for a brutal slap on the wrist. “Everyone is doing it, why should we be the scapegoat?” admitted one NEC official. “Our top management just stuck their heads in the sand and got shafted,” complained another.

This article first appeared in Global Technology News.

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by japanspace on November 19, 2012 • Permalink

Posted by japanspace on November 19, 2012

https://japanspace.wordpress.com/2012/11/19/jsp-catchup-6-probe-uncovers-40-year-japanese-contractor-fraud/

Catchup #2 Japan’s Defense Budget Request Down 1.7 Percent

Here is a basic story on Japan’s defense budget request for next year for Defense News. Of course the most interesting items for me are how the space and BMD budgets are working out, along with new investments in C4ISR. But this is more for a general audience.

The web story is here.

TOKYO — Japan’s Ministry of Defense on Sept. 10 requested 4.57 trillion yen ($58 billion) in budget appropriations for the next financial year, starting April 1, 2013, a figure that is 1.7 percent lower than the current budget. This represents the biggest one-year decline in half a century and the lowest total in two decades.

But the request also signals an ongoing restructuring and updating of Japan’s defense posture to counter China, and greatly upgrades command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; ballistic missile defense; and cyber defense capabilities.

Japan’s current five-year Mid-Term Defense Program of December 2010 has tasked the MoD with bolstering defense of the nation’s sea lanes and far-flung southeastern island chain, which extends from Okinawa to a few hundred kilometers from Taiwan. More recently, the MoD has begun to openly acknowledge China, which has an increasingly assertive Navy in the region, as a strategic concern.

In line with this, the ministry has been steadily reinforcing Japan’s marine, antisubmarine and surveillance capabilities. Consequently, the MoD for the next year has requested 72.3 billion yen for an advanced, 5,000-ton antisubmarine destroyer that features a new combined diesel-electric and gas propulsion system that will probably be developed in Japan.

The ministry has also asked for 10 billion yen to upgrade four E-767 airborne early warning and control aircraft, 19.2 billion yen for a 690-ton minesweeper featuring a fiber-reinforced plastic hull and 2.5 billion yen for four amphibious assault vehicles (AAVs).

The AAV request is viewed as the most important new item, said local military analyst Shinichi Kiyotani, who added the Ground Self-Defense Forces (GSDF) were looking to purchase four AAV-7 series vehicles after concluding that a vehicle developed in Japan could not meet cost and capability requirements.

“Japan has no marines or no Royal Marines for remote island protection,” Kiyotani said. “This was a significant purchase for the GSDF and a first for postwar Japan. It represents great progress in Japan’s efforts to deter threats against our islands.”

C4ISR and space systems also are more prominently featured, with the ministry requesting 100 million yen to convert its advanced FPS-5 phased array radar system so it can also conduct space situational awareness duties, in addition to funds for a research budget for a satellite-mounted ballistic missile early warning sensor, and 3 billion yen for an unmanned aerial vehicle-mounted ballistic missile early warning system.

And after several years of trying, the MoD has also requested 21.2 billion yen to set up a new cyber defense force with about 100 people, which will combine previous efforts to create a combined unit, along with 13.3 billion yen to reinforce cyber defense of the ministry’s core Defense Information Infrastructure.

Motohiro Tsuchiya, a professor at Keio University and member of the Information Security Policy Center, Japan’s top-level government cybersecurity advisory body, applauded the move to set up the unit as the MoD has previously been stymied by budgetary restraints in its attempts to set up the unit.

“The MoD has been trying for two years to set up the unit, but the attempts were refused by the Finance Ministry. It is said that the MoD will be finding about 100 staff to man the unit, but it is unclear if they will be 100 new staff, or seconded from other areas,” Tsuchiya said.

The Japanese budget year runs from April 1, with all of the nation’s government ministries putting in their requests to the powerful Ministry of Finance in late August or early September. The budget requests, already the result of haggling and negotiation, are then audited by the Finance Ministry, which generally makes small cuts, announcing the final figures at the end of December. The Japanese Diet then passes the ratified budget into law the following spring.

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by japanspace on November 19, 2012 • Permalink

Posted in C4ISR, Defense News, F-35, Japan Cybersecurity, Japan early warning satellite, Japan early warning sensor, Japan Marine Self-Defense Force, Japan Marine Self-Defense Force (MSDF), Japan Space Budget, Japanese Anti Submarine Warefare, Japanese BMD, Japanese Defense Budget, JMOD, Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), Ministry of Defense, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, MOD Cybersecurity

Tagged AAV, C4ISR, Cybersecurity, E-767, FPS-5, J-MOD, Japan Cybersecurity, Japan Miltiary Space Policy, Japanese Ministry of Defense, MOD Cybersecurity, MOD Japan, space cybersecurity, UAV

Posted by japanspace on November 19, 2012

https://japanspace.wordpress.com/2012/11/19/catchup-2-japans-defense-budget-request-down-1-7-percent/

Tough Choices Ahead for Japan’s F-XX Procurement

Defense News has just published a story that I did last week on the post F-35 choices Japan faces for its F-XX procurement. This was very interesting to write and research, as so much is “up in the air” and there are so many unknowns.

Unusually, Lockheed Martin refused to comment (Steve O’Bryan has been on the offensive recently emphasizing the positives with the F-35 program) while BAE’s Tony Ennis was happy to comment.

Questions include:

– Could there be some work for the Eurofighter after all? Will Japan feel bruised and abused if the F-35 turns out to be a poisoned chalice. (History of course is not on the Eurofighter’s side. The F-2, which became the thin edge of the wedge for the FSX procurement as the F-2 weighs in about 4X cost of a Block 50/52 F-16).

– What of the Mitsubishi ATD-X Shinshin? Is this as many believe a hedge or is it a complete waste of time and money. Is Japan really up for, and up to using this program as a hedge? Can MHI and TRDI really bring anything to the table.

Talking to analysts, the story would seem to be no. According to the excellent Prof. Narushige Michishita for one, the fact that Japan’s DBI is now non-competitive and falling away in technological ability (with analysts such as Kiyotani more or less calling the F-35 purchase an act of suicide), after failing to secure the F-22, Japan used the international RPF for the F-X in order to squeeze a better deal out of the U.S.

…and failed, or so it would seem to critics.

This question about the ATD-X revolves around the point that Japan seems to have felt compelled to buy the F-35 for fear of falling so far behind U.S. technology that it was prepared to swallow an industrial participation deal that many doubt will help Japanese industry to a 5th-generation fighter design and build capacity. Of course the U.S. probably doesn’t feel it wants Japan to have a 5th-generation fighter design and build capacity. But the days when Japan could bring technology, muscle, will and money to the table a la FSX seem to have long vanished. Meanwhile a recent internal report by MOD itself (see Japan’s Defense Industrial Base Nearing Crisis) has underscored just how much Japan is waking up to fundamental problems with its defense industrial base.

Interestingly for me, Dr. Patrick Cronin at theCenter for a New American Security believes that that F-15SE or the F-18 Super Hornet would still be great buys for Japan for the present, but should really go for it for a sixth-generation fighter.

“Either the F-15SE or the F-18 Super Hornet would be value added without breaking the bank. Meanwhile, Japan needs to develop an F-XX future fighter that can defeat world-class defenses and aircraft out to the middle of this century and perhaps beyond. That means Japan should be seeking to develop, possibly with an American partner, a sixth-generation aircraft with advanced stealth characteristics, directed energy weapons, and an unmanned option. Thus, by the middle of next decade, JASDF would have two fighters (F-35s and either F-15SEs or F-18 Super Hornets). It would then be preparing to field a sixth-generation F-XX.”

In addition to the Defense News version, here is the full interview with the wonderful Paul Giarra at Global Strategies & Transformation whom along with Dr. Cronin, I would like to thank deeply for sharing some of their considerable insight and knowledge.

“JASDF fighter aircraft procurement beyond the 42 F-35s planned is a vital strategic issue for Japan. In my view, Japan needs the best air force it can possibly get, for the defense of Japan as well as for alliance operations. Unfortunately, even though Japan is normalizing militarily and responding to the emergence of China by revising its entire defense strategy, there is no aerospace strategy rationale in place to shape a positive outcome.

When Japan wanted to procure the F-22, there was no argument available to overcome legitimate export restrictions imposed by the U.S. Congress. No one — whether Japanese or American airman or air power proponents — could argue that the Obey Amendment should be overturned, because there was no strategic rationale in hand for doing so. That’s not to say that there could not be a compelling rationale for the F-22 or another equally good aircraft (Japanese or American), but there is no developed and deployable strategy, no vision, no operational basis for planning or procurement.

As for the F-35, I would say that 420 aircraft is as good a number as 42, because it is as arbitrary as 42, but at least with ten times the aircraft Japan would have a strong and credible air force.

As for particular aircraft, responsible airmen should have a vision of future air combat — we’re talking much more than a decade before any substantial number of new aircraft are available to JASDF. Does an aircraft have to be a fifth generation, stealthy, and capable of super-cruise performance in order to meet the needs of JASDF? What are those needs in the first place? Will JASDF be flying directly overhead, defending Japanese airspace? Against what threats? Will the JASDF be patrolling and fighting at the far periphery of Japan’s islands? Will the JASDF be drastically outnumbered? What is the worst case? The most likely case? Will superb BVR missiles and air warfare command and control be sufficient, enabling a less capable aircraft? What will be the operational relationship between JASDF and the U.S. Air Force? Will alliance roles and missions influence, or even dictate, aircraft choice? In this context, the Air Sea Battle concept looms large as a significant consideration going forward for JASDF and USAF planners.

How much time does JASDF have to make a choice and bring its new fleet of aircraft on line? Is there a virtue to procuring relatively readily available F/A-18 Super Hornets or substantially re-designed F-15s? Can Japan afford to wait? Should JASDF skip ahead to some new combination of armed UAVs, or instead depend much more on very long range SAMs for territorial IAMD? Are there new technologies or concepts on the horizon that are worth waiting for?

These are the sorts of questions that have answers if the JASDF and alliance aerospace strategy and air combat vision are in place. There always will be tradeoffs between aircraft, but technical judgments and an informed choice can be made on the basis of a strategy, vision, and substantial and well developed roles and missions.

In the meantime, there are real industrial considerations on the table that never before have been factors. With the relaxation of the three arms export control principles, it is possible for the first time for Japan’s aerospace industry to approach its American counterparts in a fundamentally different way that was never before possible: as partners rather than consumers. This adds a new dimension to JASDF’s procurement challenge. In the long run, understanding and optimizing these new defense industry circumstances probably is as important as the aerospace strategy and vision.

It is natural that aircraft manufacturers paying suit to JASDF want to sell the aircraft they have developed. Nevertheless, the most competitive will develop the aerospace rationale for JASDF’s new air fleet, and offer a strategic partnership that provides the air defense that Japan needs.“

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by japanspace on July 9, 2012 • Permalink

Posted by japanspace on July 9, 2012

https://japanspace.wordpress.com/2012/07/09/tough-choices-for-japans-post-f-35-f-xx-procurement/

Japan’s Defense Industrial Base Nearing Crisis

I haven’t been doing much work for the media recently as I focus on research but Defense News asked me to write on this subject for their Global Top 100 annual report, so it was my pleasure. Here is the short version of the work that I did for media purposes.

It’s grim. You get the picture, right. Actually I am following this up with another article soon. Apart from watching the Space Law saga (it might not pass Thursday, when the normal Diet session was due to have ended, but for the extension announced Monday) was happy to see that Mr. Tanaka, who is probably a very nice man, will be enjoying the rest of his career elsewhere and not in the MOD (c.f. my piece in Defense News: New Japanese DM Part of Move To Shake Up Leadership).

Anyway, here is the piece for Defense News: Japanese Defense Market Battles Flat Spending

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by japanspace on June 19, 2012 • Permalink

Posted in Aliance Issues, Alliance Issue, Arms Export Ban, F-35, F-X, In Defense of Japan: From the Market to the Military in Space Policy, infrastructure, Japanese Defense Budget, JMOD, JMOD White Paper, Ministry of Defense, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Space Activities Act, UK Japan Defense Cooperation, Uncategorized

Tagged Fujitsu, IHI, Japan MOD PFI, Japan Satellite PFI, Japan X-band communications, MHI, MOD Communications Satellite, NEC, Toshiba, X-band

Posted by japanspace on June 19, 2012

https://japanspace.wordpress.com/2012/06/19/japans-defense-industrial-base-nearing-crisis/

Japan Begins Building Technology Demonstrator Fighter Shinshin

As one commentator on my story said, by the time the the F-35 is perfected and the Shinshin is flying, the U.S. will probably let Japan have the F-22 anyway, as it will be old hat by then. That’s a very cynical point of view as the F-35’s troubles continue, mainly in terms of cost growth.

However, Japan is being sensible, at least on the surface of it. Whether or not TRDI and MHI can deliver on the Shinshin is an issue that is going to emerge over the next three or four years. The TRDI is often criticized for being too research orientated and not product driven. Questions about the Shinshin include just how much stealth technology will the DOD let Japan have. After the FSX debacle, Japan’s strategy has been to make sure it keeps at the edge of certain elemental technologies and subsystems while not remaining too far behind on systems technology just in case. So what sort of hedge is Shinshin? An interesting question. And what sort of leverage will it give Japan if any against the F-35?

Anyway, here is the brief story I put in for Defense News.

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by japanspace on April 2, 2012 • Permalink

Posted in Aliance Issues, Alliance Issue, ATD-X, Defense News, F-35, F-35 technical issues, F-X, Japanese Defense Budget, JMOD, Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), Lockheed Martin, Ministry of Defense, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Shinshin, TRDI, Uncategorized

Tagged ATD-X, F-35. Alliance Issues, JMOD, Joint, Joint Strike Fighter, Lockheed Martin, MHI, Ministry of Defense, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Shinshin

Posted by japanspace on April 2, 2012

https://japanspace.wordpress.com/2012/04/02/japan-begins-building-technology-demonstrator-fighter-shinshin/

Japan Sets Next H-2A and Kounotori-3 Launches

Jaxa and MHI have just announced that they have set the launch dates for the next H-2A and Kounotori-3 (HTV-3).

H-2A flight 21 is scheduled to launch JAXA’s Global Changing Observation Mission 1st – Water “SHIZUKU” (GCOM-W1) and the KOMPSAT-3 (Korean Multi-purpose Satellite 1) of the Korea Aerospace Research Institute (KARI) May 18 (Friday), 2012 (Japan Standard Time) at 1:39 a.m. thru 1:42 a.m. (Japan Standard Time).

To capitalize on the excess launch capability of the H-IIA F21, Japan is also provide launch and orbit injection opportunities for two small secondary payloads.

Also H-II Transfer Vehicle Kounotori-3 (HTV-3) aboard the H-2B Launch Vehicle No. 3 is scheduled for launch on July 21 (Saturday), 2012 (Japan Standard Time, JST) around 11:18 a.m. (JST). The launch window will run July 22 (Sunday) through August 31 (Friday), 2012 (JST) at the Yoshinobu Launch Complex at the Tanegashima Space Center.

It’s going to be a busy time for JAXA and MHI and a lot is riding on both missions.

First of all with the STS now retired, Japan is taking a vital role in resupplying ISS and both the HTV and the H-2B relatively new.

MHI and JAXA have been on a 12-year campaign to fully master the H-2 A/B technologies but the H-2B and HTV, a highly advanced automatic tug and the subject of more than 20 years of research by JAXA, are still very early into their launch careers. Experienced space watchers know that new technologies are still on probation until their launch rates reach double figures. Of course, failure of the mission to the ISS would not only be an international disaster for Japan, but cause the ISS program many issues.

There is also a lot riding on the KOMPSAT launch, as the H-2A is carrying a major Korean research satellite. While the ROK has found out that launch systems are extremely difficult to develop, having seen its first two efforts end unhappily, a failure of a launch of a prize Korean satellite aboard a Japanese rocket could deeply impact fractious Japan-ROK relations unless handled well by both sides. No doubt vituperation (from the ROK side) and conspiracy theories will abound.

The Kunotori mission is carrying several intriguing payloads, including two reentry accuracy and measurement experiments; the REBR (Reentry Breakup Recorder) manufactured by Aerospace Corporation, which will record data regarding the thermal, acceleration, rotational and other stresses that Kounotori will go through as it breaks up on reentry, and the much larger (22kg) i-Ball by IHI Aerospace which will do a similar job, but also has a camera.

JAXA is planning to release Cubesats from the International Space Station using the JEM’s robot hand, from Japan these will be RAIKO (Wakayama University) FITSAT-1 (Fukuoka Institute of Technology) and the WE WISH radio ham cubesats and TechEdSat built by San Jose State University and the F-1 cubesat by FPT University.

Good luck, chaps.

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by japanspace on March 21, 2012 • Permalink

Posted in GCOM-W1, H-2A, H-2B, KARI), KOMPSAT-3, Korea Aerospace Research Institute (KARI), Kounotori (HTV), MHI, MHI Launch Services, Microsatellites, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, SHIZUKU

Tagged GCOM-W1, H-2A, H-2B, JAXA, KARI, KOMPSAT-3, Korea Aerospace Research Institute (KARI), Kounotori (HTV)), MHI, MHI Launch Services, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, SHIZUKU

Posted by japanspace on March 21, 2012

https://japanspace.wordpress.com/2012/03/21/japan-sets-next-h-2a-and-kounotori-3-launches/

Chinese hackers stole U.S. F-35 stealth fighter jet details

Here is a report out of London (AGI) about what quite a few of us expected if true; F-35 data has been stolen by Chinese hackers. Here is the story and link.

(AGI) London – Chinese spies hacked into computers of British Aerospace (BAE) stealing details about the US F35 fighter jet.

When pictures of China’s first stealth fighter jet (the J-20) were circulated in late 2010, analysts all over the world were impressed with the progress made by Beijing in terms of aeronautical technology. Today, the Sunday Times reported that Chinese hackers managed to infiltrate computers of Britain’s biggest defence company, British Aerospace, to steal details about the Pentagon’s latest stealth fighter jet, the F35, which is still at the development stage. . .

Actually it is suspected by my Sensei at Keio University G-SEC, Motohiro Tsuchiya, that the partially successful cyberattack on MHI last summer may have also have yielded up some missile defense and nuclear power plant data. As most readers will know, MHI is a key contractor in the U.S.-Japan SM3-Block-IIA development program. Here is the draft of a story I wrote for Space News last November that was killed…

BEGIN TEXT

PAUL KALLENDER-UMEZU, TOKYO

Highly sensitive military data related to a number of space, aerospace and other programs may have been netted by hackers in a cyber-attack on Japan’s largest military contractor, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) this August, according to a senior cybersecurity expert here. The attack on MHI is just one part of a amid a wave of increasingly sophisticated assaults targeting top Japanese government institutions and corporations that is prompting a government effort to improve national security that have come to light in recent weeks.

MHI discovered viruses were at 11 locations across Japan, including plants that build missiles, jet fighters, the H-2A and H-2B launch vehicles, submarines and nuclear power reactors meaning that information stolen could include details of the SM-3 Block IIA advanced ballistic missile that is part of a joint research program between Japan and the U.S., according to Motohiro Tsuchiya, a professor at Keio University and member of the Information Security Policy Council, a top-level government cybersecurity advisory body here.

“Yes, it’s possible. The sponsors behind the attack will be trawling the data right now,” Tsuchiya said in a November 5 interview.

The attack came to light in September when it was revealed that 45 servers and 38 PCs had been infected by 8 or more types of viruses after employees had unwittingly opened e-mails containing malware. On October 25, in a statement, MHI conceded data had leaked out of the company’s network after a month saying there was no evidence of such a breach.

Hideo Ikuno, a spokesman for MHI declined, November 9, to comment on the issue, or local media reports that the company has up to 50 types of viruses in its systems.

The situation has angered Japan’s Ministry of Defense, which only found about the issue after the story was leaked to local media. Contractually the MOD should have been informed immediately of any security breach, said ministry spokesman Takaaki Ohno.

“It is very regrettable that MOD was not informed, and we lodged a protest to MHI. We reprimanded MHI severely over the cyber-attack incident, and MHI promised to promptly and steadily deal with an investigation and the prevention of recurrence,” Ohno said, November 9.

Over the past eight weeks Japan has been awash in revelations about cyber attacks on its leading companies and institutions.

IHI Corp. and Kawasaki Heavy Industries, both major space and military contractors here, have confirmed they had also been also been targeted in August in similar attacks to those on MHI. In late October, Chief Cabinet Secretary Osamu Fujimura revealed the Foreign Ministry and some Japanese embassies had been under attack since June. Local media also reported computers and a servers used by three members of Japan’s Lower House had been hacked and passwords and usernames of around 500 staff had been compromised.

Attacks on the MOD have been unsuccessful to date, Ohno said

Tsuchiya said the media reports only represent a tiny fraction of the waves of increasingly sophisticated and subtle attacks that began this January by suspected hackers in China when virus and Trojan laden e-mails sometimes revealing an astonishing ability to plausibly impersonate legitimate communications started hitting Japanese systems. The attacks on Japan followed earlier assaults on the U.S. Government on July 4, 2009 and then South Korea, with attacks on the Blue House and leading South Korea companies by mounted by suspected North Korean hackers, he said.

“The recent tactic has been attacking peripheral institutions with lower security and then getting in behind the lower barriers, for example by attacking think tanks. When this year started, everyone knew something was wrong,” Tsuchiya said.

Recent attacks are causing Japan to bolster its cybersecurity measures, not least the MOD. Ohno said at the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting on October 25, the ministers reaffirmed the significance of Japan-U.S. cyber strategy policy discussion, and decided to share information between defense authorities more closely.

“Information security is extremely important for the MOD that is in charge of this country’s security, and we intend to strengthen our response to cyber-attacks,” Ohno said.

The government will also launch framework that will share information on cyber attacks and discuss defenses among private and public sector participants, said Tsuchiya.

“MHI’s defenses should be very good but there are always holes and weaknesses and the real weakness with the targeted e-mail is the human link,” Tsuchiya said.

END TEXT

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by japanspace on March 12, 2012 • Permalink

Posted in cyberattacks, Cybersecurity, Defense News, F-35, F-X, G-SEC, JMOD, Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), MHI, Ministry of Defense, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Motohiro Tsuchiya

Tagged BAE, BAE Systems, cyberattacks, Cybersecurity, F-35, F-X, Lockheed Martin, MHI, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries

Posted by japanspace on March 12, 2012

https://japanspace.wordpress.com/2012/03/12/chinese-hackers-stole-u-s-f-35-stealth-fighter-jet-details/

Japan Space Policy

All posts in category Mitsubishi Heavy Industries

Towards the H-3: Update

A New Direction For Japan’s Space Program?

Japanese Space Program Braces For Cuts

JSP Catchup #6: Probe Uncovers 40-year Japanese Contractor Fraud

NEC SCANDAL SHEDS LIGHT ON

JAPANESE PROCUREMENTS.

Catchup #2 Japan’s Defense Budget Request Down 1.7 Percent

Tough Choices Ahead for Japan’s F-XX Procurement

Japan’s Defense Industrial Base Nearing Crisis

Japan Begins Building Technology Demonstrator Fighter Shinshin

Japan Sets Next H-2A and Kounotori-3 Launches

Chinese hackers stole U.S. F-35 stealth fighter jet details

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