Japan’s Defense Plans: Into the Mass Media

Time

Nice to see the mass media outside Japan finally picking up on my “scoop” (which is journalist jargon for not attending a presser (now rebranded as “news conferences”) and actually talking to people.

Anyway, Time  (Japan Looks to Add Offensive Firepower) and The Diplomat ( Japan Mulls a Preemptive Strike Capability) picking up on my story about Japan’s plans for a new, more muscular defense strategy.

Which is great to see, because it’s actually really important, rather than a crisis or confrontation story on Japan manufactured by the local media.

Actually of course, the story itself is old, as this has been openly posited by Japan for at least a decade, and Japan’s ability to be a truly useful partner to the U.S. really started to come into focus as early as the late 1970s, which lead to the original “Three Arrows” Mitsuya policy. My favorite Three Arrows however comes from 乱.

Since then, in some ways, what is happening now to Japanese defense posture is catching up with the realities of the arc of insecurity that Japan faces, and its paramount need to service the Japan-U.S. Alliance, with the whole thing run through the post Cold War wormhole.

Japan Eyes More Muscular Defense

Here is this week’s front page news from Japan for Defense News based on the latest versions of the LDP’s 新「防衛計画の大綱」策定に係る提言.

Japan Plans More Aggressive DefenseThe key points for me were the mixed messages I picked up from both U.S. and Japanese interlocutors. Most see sense in Japan’s continued, measured buildup as part of a decades-long process together with constitutional revision to (a) shed Japan of the contradictions that have built up over Article 9 vs. the fact that Japan has built up, often, but not exclusively following U.S. requests, a highly capable but incomplete military and (b) recognize that there is nothing wrong with a carefully crafted constitutional right to collective defense (with an update badly needed now that Japan is building out its BMD, particularly, but not exclusively for SM3-Block IIA, cruise missile and UAV-killing SM-6, and when Japan acquires E-2D assets).

But on the other hand, there is a great deal of angst involved, particularly over the issue of preemptive strike capability. Actually this issue, as I try to point out, isn’t new. The idea that Japan should consider mid-air refueling first openly stated during the Koizumi administration and the grounds for Japan hitting North Korean missile sites as laid out by former defense minister Shigeru Ishiba, are a decade old.

There is a sense that the LDP assumes, and unthinkingly projects, that it, under Shinzo Abe, a grandson of Nobusuke Kishi, that is the natural party of leadership, and that now that the reigns of power are back where they should be, so the LDP has to contrast itself with the DPJ. This seems to have so many things wrong with it. The U.S. was not particularly unhappy with the previous administration, which, apart from the basing issue, was basically going the same direction as the LDP would have anyway. Second, the LDP at least says publicly that it realizes it was not elected to pursue Abe’s nationalist agenda, but given a (…it always seems a last chance saloon) opportunity by the electorate to try to do something, anything to get the economy going. Any attempt to cast its DPJ predecessor as weak on defense issues is ridiculous.  And the last time Abe tried to foist his political and constitutional agenda on Japan, he was more or less forced out, and his agenda quietly abandoned by his successors.

But the U.S. is alarmed, by what might be called the current administration’s handling of its public perception. Look below to the mealy mouthed  reaction by Ishiba, for example, to the recent comments by Toru Hashimoto on sex slaves, which may have become an albatross or an unintentional SIW that could make him irrelevant. More disturbing is the lack of gross emotional intelligence of it all. The idea that “everyone did it” isn’t really a move forward.

The bottom line is, as Japan assumes a more normal defense posture, does it want to create more stability or less stability in the region? Japan needs to recalibrate its constitution and military to support the U.S.-Japan alliance and this means proceeding with the requisite diplomatic and emotional intelligence.

Mr. Abe has been trying, one might say, very trying. Even pro-Japan, pro-Alliance interlocutors are saying they need Mr. Abe to wake up.

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Another gaffe by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe

And from what we see and we read, the Abe administration is making a pig’s ear out of it.

Anyway, here is the full article:

Japan Eyes More Muscular Defense

By PAUL KALLENDER-UMEZU
TOKYO After almost seven decades of maintaining a limited defense posture, Japan should develop its amphibious and pre-emptive strike capability while bolstering sea- and ground-based ballistic-missile defenses, according to policy proposals by the country’s ruling party.

The proposals, obtained by Defense News and released to a select group last week ahead of widespread distribution, were drawn up by the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). They also call for Japan to beef up its space-based early warning systems and invest in cyber defense.

The proposals were generated by several internal LDP committees led by former LDP Defense Ministers Shigeru Ishiba and Gen Nakatani, and therefore carry considerable weight, according to Narushige Michishita, director of the Security and International Studies Program at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies here.

“They’re important,” he said.

The recommendations will feed into policy, spending and acquisition priorities for Japan’s next five-year Mid-Term Defense Plan, which is being crafted by the Defense Ministry and will be published by December.

They also come as the LDP administration of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe seeks to revise Article 9 of Japan’s constitution to delete provisions that prohibit Japan from using “war as a sovereign right of the nation” and maintaining “war potential,” and replace them with the right to hold a “National Defense Force” under the prime minister as commander in chief.

The LDP’s policy proposals do not name weapon systems or suggest budgets, and are deliberately more vague than similar proposals drawn up by the LDP in 2009, just before the party suffered a disastrous electoral defeat to the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ).

“The LDP was not in power then [in 2009],” and so could be more direct, Michishita said.

The 2009 proposals openly discussed Japan acquiring, for example, the Boeing KC-46 tanker refueling plane as a step toward developing pre-emptive strike capability, such as knocking out fueled North Korean missiles. They also suggested adding the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system to Japan’s ship-based Aegis and ground-based Patriot systems.

Fast forward four years, and the proposals come from a resurrected LDP that delivered an even bigger electoral defeat to the DPJ last December. This time around, the language is more cautious because each word has more value.

While they carefully avoid all reference to Japan’s major sources of concern — China and North Korea — the proposals open intriguing possibilities over the extent to which Japan will strengthen its defense posture. In this context, Japanese defense planners are considering a number of options for each of the force enhancements, according to analysts and people familiar with the LDP’s discussions.

Most interesting and controversial is the proposed discussion of pre-emptive strike capability, which would require Japan to acquire Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs), long-range refueling capability for its nascent F-35 Joint Strike Fighters and/or a naval platform for the F-35B jump jet, should Japan opt to purchase that variant.

The proposals make no mention of the KC-46 this time around. The Air Self-Defense Force, meanwhile, has steadily equipped its fleet of Mitsubishi F-2 multirole fighters with JDAMS. It is thought that the two 19,500-ton 22DDH-class helicopter destroyers planned for the Maritime Self-Defense Force can be converted to carry the F-35B.

In 2003, before Japan had deployed its Aegis SM-3 and Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) ballistic-missile defense (BMD) systems, then-Defense Minister Ishiba made it clear that Japan could launch a strike against a missile base in North Korea in specific sets of circumstances.

For example, a strike could take place if there was evidence the missiles were fueled and aimed at Japan, and Japan had no other credible means of defense, Michishita said.

But now Japan is steadily building out its BMD systems to intercept North Korea’s longer-range Unha and Musudan mobile intermediate-range ballistic missiles, so such a strike would be potentially unconstitutional, he said.

Brad Glosserman, executive director of the Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), said he found recent talk of Japan bolstering its pre-emptive strike capability worrying.

“CSIS has been conducting discussions on the issue of pre-emptive strike for six years, and in recent months, we have seen resumption of calls to develop this capability resurface. I am concerned about the proliferation of these capabilities because of the potentially destabilizing consequences,” he said.

Japan probably won’t develop a separate marine corps, but it will more likely reinforce its amphibious capability, largely based on the Western Infantry Regiment of the Ground Self-Defense Forces (GSDF) that trained in amphibious warfare as part of the Iron Fist exercises with the US Marine Corps in California, analysts say.

Paul Giarra, president of US-based consulting firm Global Strategies & Transformation, said the language of the policy proposal opens the possibility of the GSDF equipping one or perhaps two regiments with advanced capabilities, including up to four dozen amphibious landing vehicles over the next five years, beyond the four AAV-7A1S vehicles already planned, and a suitable number of Bell-Boeing V-22 tilt-rotor Osprey aircraft.

“I read it more as the [Japan Self-Defense Forces] with some improved amphibious capabilities like vehicles and tilt-rotor aircraft. That is potentially a significant development, but the LDP does not look like it wants to go the whole hog on a marine corps,” said Christopher Hughes, professor of international politics and Japanese studies at Britain’s University of Warwick.

Japan is considering several options to boost its BMD portfolio, consisting of four Kongo-class destroyers and two larger Atago-class Aegis cruisers, and PAC-3 units. While the 2009 version of the proposals specifically mentions purchasing THAAD and an “advanced” version of the PAC-3, the new version recommends strengthening land-based BMD, leaving Japan a choice between purchasing either THAAD or the Aegis Ashore land-based version of the Aegis system, and the PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) system for last-ditch interdiction.

Giarra said deploying the PAC-3 MSE would complement Aegis Ashore, which Japan has shown an interest in purchasing to the tune of one or two 24-missile interceptor batteries, a number that could increase. In this case, purchasing THAAD systems might be too much of an overlap of similar capabilities, he suggested.

Japanese defense planners see cruise missiles in general and China’s DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile in particular as growing threats. This means that on top of the planned upgrades to employ the SM-3 Block IIA Aegis system when it becomes available, Japan also is considering purchasing the extended-range anti-air warfare RIM-174 missile.

“Cruise missile defense is becoming as important to Japan as ballistic-missile defense,” Michishita said.

Hughes said the proposals face many roadblocks, including opposition from more dovish LDP members and the MoD’s own panel scheduled to meet in January, which may have its own priorities. Last but not least is the Ministry of Finance, which will be unwilling to raise the defense budget under any circumstances.

“[But] if Abe/the LDP can pull all this off, then it will be very radical indeed,” Hughes said.

Regional Concerns

Japan’s moves will likely be welcomed across a region concerned about China’s aggressive territorial claims.

“Japan and the Philippines have a strained history, but the Filipinos are for a stronger Japan because Tokyo is helping train its Coast Guard,” Giarra said. “South Korea is less dependent on Japan and tensions run deeper, so it’s much less willing to go along with it.”

Tensions soared last week after Osaka’s mayor said forced prostitution in occupied nations was a military necessity for invading Japanese forces, prompting a South Korean newspaper to write that US atomic attacks on Japan were “divine punishment” for Tokyo’s brutality.

Some in Asia and Washington worry Japan’s nationalist leader believes Japanese forces did nothing wrong during World War II.

“Passive support for Japan will hold unless Japanese behavior changes,” Giarra added. “The question is whether Japanese officials can resist the temptation to undo what they believe were unnecessary apologies for wartime actions they don’t believe were wrong.

“The feeling of being wronged is as powerful in Japan as it is the other way around in Korea, Philippines, Indonesia . . . Germany dealt with its past and continues to do so, but Japan suppressed the issue, creating pent up pressure, and when it vents, it could change how this buildup is seen.”

Email: pkallender@defensenews.com.

Naval Gazing Japan’s MSDF

After a long talk with former Vice Admiral Yoji Koda in 2011, like most non-journalist analysts, I am struck with the continuity of MSDF plans, and always grateful for the accomplished insights and scholarship of Alessio Patalano James Manicom and last but foremost Paul Giarra. I always have to say a big “thank you” for having the ear of such accomplished sempai!

LWF1

LW2

Tough Choices Ahead for Japan’s F-XX Procurement

Defense News has just published a story that I did last week on the post F-35 choices Japan faces for its F-XX procurement. This was very interesting to write and research, as so much is “up in the air” and there are so many unknowns.

Unusually, Lockheed Martin refused to comment (Steve O’Bryan has been on the offensive recently emphasizing the positives with the F-35 program) while BAE’s Tony Ennis was happy to comment.

Questions include:

– Could there be some work for the Eurofighter after all? Will Japan feel bruised and abused if the F-35 turns out to be a poisoned chalice. (History of course is not on the Eurofighter’s side. The F-2, which became the thin edge of the wedge for the FSX procurement as the F-2 weighs in about 4X cost of a Block 50/52 F-16).

– What of the Mitsubishi ATD-X Shinshin? Is this as many believe a hedge or is it a complete waste of time and money. Is Japan really up for, and up to using this program as a hedge? Can MHI and TRDI really bring anything to the table.

Talking to analysts, the story would seem to be no. According to the excellent Prof. Narushige Michishita for one, the fact that Japan’s DBI is now non-competitive and falling away in technological ability (with analysts such as Kiyotani more or less calling the F-35 purchase an act of suicide), after failing to secure the F-22, Japan used the international RPF for the F-X in order to squeeze a better deal out of the U.S.

…and failed, or so it would seem to critics.

This question about the ATD-X revolves around the point that Japan seems to have felt compelled to buy the F-35 for fear of falling so far behind U.S. technology that it was prepared to swallow an industrial participation deal that many doubt will help Japanese industry to a 5th-generation fighter design and build capacity. Of course the U.S. probably doesn’t feel it wants Japan to have a 5th-generation fighter design and build capacity. But the days when Japan could bring technology, muscle, will and money to the table a la FSX seem to have long vanished. Meanwhile a recent internal report by MOD itself (see Japan’s Defense Industrial Base Nearing Crisis) has underscored just how much Japan is waking up to fundamental problems with its defense industrial base.

Interestingly for me,  Dr. Patrick Cronin at theCenter for a New American Security believes that that  F-15SE or the F-18 Super Hornet would still be great buys for Japan for the present, but should really go for it for a sixth-generation fighter.

“Either the F-15SE or the F-18 Super Hornet would be value added without breaking the bank.  Meanwhile, Japan needs to develop an F-XX future fighter that can defeat world-class defenses and aircraft out to the middle of this century and perhaps beyond.  That means Japan should be seeking to develop, possibly with an American partner, a sixth-generation aircraft with advanced stealth characteristics, directed energy weapons, and an unmanned option.  Thus, by the middle of next decade, JASDF would have two fighters (F-35s and either F-15SEs or F-18 Super Hornets).  It would then be preparing to field a sixth-generation F-XX.”

In addition to the Defense News version, here is the full interview with the  wonderful Paul Giarra at Global Strategies & Transformation whom along with Dr. Cronin, I would like to thank deeply for sharing some of their considerable insight and knowledge.

“JASDF fighter aircraft procurement beyond the 42 F-35s planned is a vital strategic issue for Japan.  In my view, Japan needs the best air force it can possibly get, for the defense of Japan as well as for alliance operations.  Unfortunately, even though Japan is normalizing militarily and responding to the emergence of China by revising its entire defense strategy, there is no aerospace strategy rationale in place to shape a positive outcome.

When Japan wanted to procure the F-22, there was no argument available to overcome legitimate export restrictions imposed by the U.S. Congress.  No one — whether Japanese or American airman or air power proponents — could argue that the Obey Amendment should be overturned, because there was no strategic rationale in hand for doing so.  That’s not to say that there could not be a compelling rationale for the F-22 or another equally good aircraft (Japanese or American), but there is no developed and deployable strategy, no vision, no operational basis for planning or procurement.

As for the F-35, I would say that 420 aircraft is as good a number as 42, because it is as arbitrary as 42, but at least with ten times the aircraft Japan would have a strong and credible air force.

As for particular aircraft, responsible airmen should have a vision of future air combat — we’re talking much more than a decade before any substantial number of new aircraft are available to JASDF.  Does an aircraft have to be a fifth generation, stealthy, and capable of super-cruise performance in order to meet the needs of JASDF?  What are those needs in the first place?  Will JASDF be flying directly overhead, defending Japanese airspace? Against what threats?  Will the JASDF be patrolling and fighting at the far periphery of Japan’s islands?  Will the JASDF be drastically outnumbered? What is the worst case?  The most likely case?  Will superb BVR missiles and air warfare command and control be sufficient, enabling a less capable aircraft?  What will be the operational relationship between JASDF and the U.S. Air Force?  Will alliance roles and missions influence, or even dictate, aircraft choice?  In this context, the Air Sea Battle concept looms large as a significant consideration going forward for JASDF and USAF planners.

How much time does JASDF have to make a choice and bring its new fleet of aircraft on line?  Is there a virtue to procuring relatively readily available F/A-18 Super Hornets or substantially re-designed F-15s?  Can Japan afford to wait?  Should JASDF skip ahead to some new combination of armed UAVs, or instead depend much more on very long range SAMs for territorial IAMD?  Are there new technologies or concepts on the horizon that are worth waiting for?

These are the sorts of questions that have answers if the JASDF and alliance aerospace strategy and air combat vision are in place.  There always will be tradeoffs between aircraft, but technical judgments and an informed choice can be made on the basis of a strategy, vision, and substantial and well developed roles and missions.

In the meantime, there are real industrial considerations on the table that never before have been factors.  With the relaxation of the three arms export control principles, it is possible for the first time for Japan’s aerospace industry to approach its American counterparts in a fundamentally different way that was never before possible:  as partners rather than consumers.  This adds a new dimension to JASDF’s procurement challenge.  In the long run, understanding and optimizing these new defense industry circumstances probably is as important as the aerospace strategy and vision.

It is natural that aircraft manufacturers paying suit to JASDF want to sell the aircraft they have developed.  Nevertheless, the most competitive will develop the aerospace rationale for JASDF’s new air fleet, and offer a strategic partnership that provides the air defense that Japan needs.