A Different Kind of Japanese Island Dispute…

Typhoon in a Teacup?

Not exactly.

This is interesting. As my esteemed friends at Japan Security Watch (“Mod Requests Funds for Yonaguni Base”) and Corey Wallace know all too well…just about a week after I wrote this story, China started laying claim to Okinawa- as was predicted in the article. Read on!

…Here is story that I recently wrote for Defense News that has been “under the radar” of the gaijin press here (not part of what’s officially what’s regarded as important “news” I suppose) but is important because everyone knows that in international law “boots on the rock,” so to speak, goes a “long way” in term of  territorial claims (see graphic in story below, as  DN helpfully added).

The most important part of the story for me was at the end, when Prof. Gabe kindly pointed out the most substantial strategic reason for putting a garrison on Yonaguni was to send a message to China, whose next step, he said, was to go lay claim to the Ryuku islands. Here is the  article I filed and then then the cut portion to follow, which also included comments by Corey:

     Yonaguni Story“Yonaguni citizens have bifurcated into two streams of opinion following the 2010 Senkakus incident,” said Corey Wallace, Lecturer at the University of Auckland, who provides analysis of Japanese security issues at the Japan Security Watch website.

 “Some see the increasing presence of Chinese ships and the potential for conflict as requiring some kind of presence. But the (GSDF) monitoring unit’s proximity to the Senkakus means it could become a target,” leading to the deepening split in islander opinion, Wallace said.

  That split has left Mayor Hokama in a difficult situation, according to McCormack, because while Hokama originally supported the GSDF deployment for its perceived economic boost, recent growing opposition may now affect his chances of reelection- suggesting more old-fashioned political motives for the sudden demand.

  At the same time, the deployment has increasingly garnished more national political significance for the conservative Abe administration, which is seeking to provide a more robust stance to counter what it sees as Chinese expansionism, said Masaaki Gabe, professor of International Relations and the director of the International Institute for Okinawan Studies at the University of the Ryukyus.

 At one level it’s all about the money, Gabe said. But the Yonaguni issue has become both symbolically and strategically important. The deployment has become a poster child of the Abe administration’s stronger stance against China, which is a combination of appealing to and building on popular patriotic sentiment while reinforcing Japan’s military both symbolically and in reality against what is now publicly acknowledged by Japanese political and defense elites as the growing threat of China.

  Since assuming power late last year, the Abe administration has been the first Japanese government in 11 years to raise defense spending, albeit only 0.8%. Beefing up Japan’s defense of its South East island chain and deterring potential Chinese aggression is now a strategic priority.

  First, while the deployment of troops and radar station is presently strategically not a major component of Japan’s Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance capabilities, which are now a strategic priority for the MoD, forward basing facilities provides options to build out capability later.

  But more importantly perhaps, boots on Yonaguni anticipate a future hand in China’s diplomatic poker game if and when it seeks to start pressing historical claims to sovereignty over the ancient Ryukyu Kingdom, which is present day Okinawa, of which Yonaguni is the most eastern island. 

 “This is part of Japan justifying its territorial sovereignty. In a future stage, China will assert its claims to Okinawa,” and the deployment to Yonaguni, which has never based Japanese troops before, is a step in forestalling this, Gabe said.

  In light of this, Gabe sees the current spat as sorting itself out in due course, mainly because too much is at stake for the MoD and the island, which will stand to loose out much more financially in the longer run should the deployment be abandoned.

Almost as soon as he said it to me, China, enter stage right (or from the left, if you will), went ahead the week after the article was published and staked its claim to the Ryukus.

Did the Foreign Ministry read my article and decide to give it the ol’ Communist try?

Well no, the  was this preplanned according to whatever schedule Beijing has in its largely successful media strategy (read psychological warfare) to make Japan out to be the bad guy (still now) in the hood.

First some think tank floats the idea publicly, then the Foreign Ministry does its thing, then Luo Yuan puts his own footprint into the issue.