Towards the H-3: Update

H-2A successor

Space News kindly published a version of my story on the H-3 last week. I’ve done the usual and pasted a version into this blog.

There is also a story by the ever excellent Warren Ferster on the Epsilon based on a JAXA presser. Please see this blog for more background on the Epsilon, or go to the new, vastly improved Space News website.

We can expect more light to be shone on this during June when the ONSP subcommittee makes its final recommendations. Meanwhile the Yomiuri and Asahi have some more information and perspective on the issue.

Our view in In Defense of Japan is that the H-series is a technology development program and while it may arouse screams of indignation and anger to say it, to put it bluntly, money will always be found to develop technologies that give Japan options. As, fundamentally, Saadia and I argue that Japan’s space program has always been basically, when you remove all the dressing, a dual-use strategic technology development program, then reasons to develop the H-3 will always be found.

As made plain by Dick Samuels and Mike Green, under nationalists such as Tomifumi Godai and in an era of rampant technonationalism and kokusanka, there were compelling reasons to develop the H-2. Japan wanted and needed to build a sophisticated, liquid fueled, highly efficient two-stage medium launch vehicle to cement its international reputation as part of the advanced spacefaring club. Remember, when the H-2 was envisaged over 20 years ago, few saw the impending “lost decade.”

Japan’s space program under NASDA was relatively awash with money, with investments made or planned  into all sorts of challenging dual-use precursor technologies including ETS-7 (on orbit ASAT demonstration) OICETS/ Kirari (laser communications), reconnaissance/ spy  satellites ICBM prototypes (M-V, J-1), reentry (OREX, USERS SEM) SIGINT (ETS-8), global strike (HYFLEX, HOPE) etc. Some highly ambitious programs that emerged last decade, have disappeared, for example HiMEOS and Smartsat-1.

On the other hand, ALSET looks as if it could make it.

これまでの基幹ロケットの評価と今後の在り方について 2013 年 4 月 24 日 宇宙輸送システム部会 委員 三菱重工業株式会社 代表取締役常務執行役員 航空宇宙事業本部長 鯨井 洋

これまでの基幹ロケットの評価と今後の在り方について
2013 年 4 月 24 日
宇宙輸送システム部会 委員
三菱重工業株式会社 代表取締役常務執行役員
航空宇宙事業本部長
鯨井 洋

Let’s not forget the H-2 very nearly made it to commercial viability but was fatally holed by the surging yen as well as dodgy turbopumps. So then money was found for the H-2A to solve the problem (half the costs, boost the payload) …but as we argue in In Defense of Japan, whether or not the H-2A really made it was not the issue. Could the program be justified in terms of a technology development program to the MoF. The peanuts in terms of cost involved in developing the H-2A compared to the cost of major launch vehicle systems by other advanced democracies (lets just name the Ariane 5) meant yes.

And now the cycle starts again. So how will the H-3 be sold to the MoF under the rubric of Japan’s latest stated space policy?

Sure, as something that will be commercially viable. Whether or not MHI and JAXA can actually achieve this is, we contend, strategically, a mute question. If and when the H-3 doesn’t make it commercially, MHI and Japan will have at least invested in developing a new level of excellent technologies that will secure Japan’s independent launch vehicle capabilities and provide jobs, technology and investment in its aerospace sector. Incidentally, the H-3 is now being sold by MHI as “catchup” again, as the slide above shows.

Sure, the same old cycle of vituperation and lashing will follow in the Japanese media if or when the H-3 fails to make the grade commercially, but the more strategic goals of “keeping/ catching up” will have been met.

Naval Gazing Japan’s MSDF

After a long talk with former Vice Admiral Yoji Koda in 2011, like most non-journalist analysts, I am struck with the continuity of MSDF plans, and always grateful for the accomplished insights and scholarship of Alessio Patalano James Manicom and last but foremost Paul Giarra. I always have to say a big “thank you” for having the ear of such accomplished sempai!

LWF1

LW2

自衛隊も宇宙利用へ: Japanese Journalism on EW

Here is an insight into how Japanese journalists (with many honorable exceptions) over the issues.  You can get an idea of piece just from the title: “New Satellite Race.” What on earth (or in orbit) that is supposed to mean, is beyond me.

The point is that the article raises legitimate concerns in its conclusion:

「政府の担当者の間では、発射のタイミングを正確にとらえるためにも、DSPなど「宇宙の目」の役割は重要と考えられている。このため、日本でも自前のDSP導入に向けた研究が始まった。
しかし課題は山積している。DSPにはミサイルの熱源をもとに瞬時に種類や能力を割り出し、弾道を緻密に解析できるソフトウエア開発が欠かせない。しかし日本にはそうしたデータの蓄積がない。しかも早期警戒システムには衛星だけでなく、集めた情報を部隊間で共有する巨大なネットワークの構築も必要になる。
03年から打ち上げが始まった政府の情報収集衛星に投じられた経費は現在、7000億円近い。開発費を含めればDSPも数千億円かかると推定されており、国民の納得が得られるかどうかという新たな問題に直面する。」

Which boils down to legitimate doubts and questions about Japan’s EW program. But the point is without context/ contextual/ relevant contextual presentation by the journalist, the Japanese public is left thinking that the Asahi’s question raising motivated by its political stance; even a few more cursory levels of analysis of facts and background would have made this more helpful…but at least it isn’t at the pizza on the moon level of rubbish that we sometimes see in the foreign press.

So I figure, anything that gets Japanese space development issues into the media by a reasonable  journalist has to be something…

JSP Catchup #6: Probe Uncovers 40-year Japanese Contractor Fraud

This story was NOT a surprise; the fuller story is at Japan Still Calculating Cost of Defense Firm’s Padded Bills, but ever since NEC Corp. in 1998 was found with its hands in the till, I have been wondering who would be fingered next, and when, and why when, and why.

I say this because when I chatted to people back in 1998, the practice of padding contracts with surplus labor costs was widespread in the space and defense sectors and this was commonly known. At the time the questions were Why NEC? And Why Now? Below my initial October story is NEC SCANDAL SHEDS LIGHT ON JAPANESE PROCUREMENTS, a more fruity web version of a story that I originally wrote for Space News back in the day.

The timing for the original NEC story was also interesting as NEC was strongly pushing for its version of what was to become Japan’s IGS spy satellite system that was provoked by the Teapodon Triggeran analysis that Saadia and I wrote about in In Defense of Japan (thank you Google Books!)

At the time NEC’s version of what was to become the IGS would have featured smaller satellites and cost less than Melco’s system. But with NEC suddenly out of the picture, Melco, with Ichiro Taniguchi at the helm, managed to personally lobby Japan’s Cabinet in the weeks after the Taepondon launch, and Japan’ got the IGS.

Here is a nice picture from Space Safety Magazine of Japan’s 1,200-Kilogram IGS 1B Satellite re-entered Earth’s Atmosphere on Thursday, July 26, 2012 after spending nearly 9.5 years in space.  Another more detailed article about this can be found at Spaceflight.101.com.

Eventually, NEC’s small-bus and higher resolution system has  been re-emerging in the ASNARO system, which is now being pushed as an alternative and complementary system to the expensive and relatively lower performance IGS, and also as the linchpin of a satellite-based, pan-Asian disaster monitoring network that is now a major part of Japan’s emerging regional space diplomacy and security strategy.  At least the Vietnamese have bought into it, and while customers don’t seem to be forming a line yet, there is still a lot of hope out there.

Here is the initial story for Defense News:

NEC SCANDAL SHEDS LIGHT ON

JAPANESE PROCUREMENTS.

By Paul Kallender in Tokyo

When, in September 1998, an investigation into the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) discovered that Japanese technology giant NEC Corp had systematically defrauded the taxpayer on 33 space contracts over the course of five years, it looked as though Japan’s obviously abused government procurement system was about to get a major overhaul.

The investigation began promisingly enough. On September 3, Tokyo prosecutors raided the JDA and arrested Kenichi Ueno, deputy head of the Procurement Office, and a clutch of executives from NEC subsidiary Toyo Communications.

This followed discoveries that not only had Toyo overcharged the JDA some $21m over dozens of equipment contracts, but that Ueno and others had conspired to prevent Toyo, NEC and other subsidiaries from repaying the money. NEC was raided the next day and by September 10, nine senior NEC and JDA executives were in jail.

It came to light that Ueno and others had lifted incriminating paperwork out of the Agency’s filing cabinets and put them into incinerators and even the homes of friends. NEC’s SuperTower headquarters was soon besieged by the Japanese phenomenon of ‘sound trucks,’ driven by right-wing extremists screaming abuse and demanding mass resignations.

But instead of resulting in the punishment of protagonists and the start of reforms, the scandal collapsed into a desultory cover-up. NEC’s initial response was to deny everything, with a bemused VP Masakatsu Miwa telling the media on September 10 that he did not expect top NEC executives to resign because of the scandal, going on to explain that he “wondered why” NEC officials were being implicated. Unfortunately for Miwa, on September 29, NEC’s overcharging was upscaled to $2.5bn, while, on the same day, a Parliamentary committee reported that the JDA had hired no less than 44 NEC executives in senior positions in just two years. By October 10, former NEC VP Hiroaki Shimayama and Takenori Yanase, VP of NEC’s Space Systems Division, had both been arrested.

Thieves charter

The National Space Development Agency (NASDA) launched an inquiry and on November 9, NEC admitted overcharging by at least $19m. Meanwhile on October 14, the JDA revealed that 225 of its officials had been hired by 20 suppliers in the past five years, shedding some dim light on a corner of Japan’s Amadudari (Descent from Heaven) career kickback system.

At the heart of the issue, according to NASDA’s former executive director Akira Kubozono, is the flawed government contract system which encourages corruption through a combination of legendary meanness and bureaucratic incompetence.

“There are two points about this affair,” he said. “One is that NEC is just a scapegoat. The second is that the governmental contract system is the cause of this scandal. When the defense contract revelations began, I thought it was only a matter of time before it spread into NEC’s space systems division as both defense and space procurement are conducted under similar systems.”

Under the Japanese government contract system, the co ntractor is obliged to repay any unused budget if the delivery price falls below the contract amount, and the contractor must also incur any costs if the project overshoots the agreed estimate — a thieves charter if ever there was one.

Furthermore NASDA, the Science and Technology Agency and the Ministry of Finance lack the technical expertise to evaluate bids and tend to just accept company estimates, says Kubozono. “The system needs to be reformed but I doubt this is possible as long as NASDA and the corporations are controlled by STA administrators (who also often retire to executive positions in NASDA) and not by engineers,” he says.

No mettle Kubozono, it seems, was right.

By November 12, the space scandal seemed to have been wrapped up, with NASDA saying it was satisfied that only NEC had abused the system. “The system has worked well for 30 years. We believe that a little devil whispered into NEC’s ear. We do not think it will happen again,” said Yasuyuki Fukumuro, NASDA PR deputy director. Fukumuro quickly admitted that NEC would be allowed to bid for Japan’s new spy satellite system, after a token contract moratorium.

Back at the JDA, a grand total of six senior officials will take up to 10% pay cuts for one to three months plus one official will receive a 10-day suspension, JDA chief Fukushiro Nukuga told the media at his November 20 resignation press conference.

The speech followed a report, which admitted that there had been “some incidents that could be regarded as a systematic cover-up,” perhaps referring to the 31 officials suspected of Berlin-bunker style burning of documentation that might have provided evidence.

But the worst thing about the affair, according to observers, has been the brazen arrogance of NEC. In his October 23 resignation speech, NEC Chairman Tadahiro Sekimoto, now under personal investigation for his role in the affair, denied any involvement but resigned out of “social responsibility” for the affair, astonishing Kubozono in particular.

“Sekimoto’s act was spineless. If he had honor he would have resigned to take responsibility, not quibbled. He showed no mettle and is a very poor example for younger business leaders. I fear for Japan’s future.”

An even poorer analysis comes from Youichi Teraishi, Editor of Japan’s ‘scandaru’ [scandal] daily, the Nikkan Gendai. He says that Sekimoto’s act compared unfavorably with Yakuza (the Japanese Mafia) standards of conduct. “This Oyabun [Japanese gang boss] showed a lack of chivalry. Captains of industry are supposed to be able to demonstrate this, but Sekimoto lacked the class,” he says.

Lastly, the scandal has left NEC seething that it was singled out for a brutal slap on the wrist. “Everyone is doing it, why should we be the scapegoat?” admitted one NEC official. “Our top management just stuck their heads in the sand and got shafted,” complained another.

This article first appeared in Global Technology News.

Great New Review of In Defense of Japan- this time by the Military Review!

What a nice present for the 100th post of this blog, a review of In Defense of Japan by The Military Review. In Defense of Japan got top billing!

This follows on from great reviews by U.S. Space Command’s High Frontier Journal and Foreign Affairs. We were especially gratified by the U.S. Space Command’s review, which called IDOJ a “model analysis.”

Here are the highlights of the Military Review piece (with the caveats in the full text of course)

“So Japan’s defense policy, like perhaps most such policies, is a mixture of realistic pragmatism within norms-based constraints. Authors Saadia Pekkanen and Paul Kallender-Umezu have added nuance to this picture in their excellent case study on Japan’s space policy. The authors are especially effective in demonstrating the impact corporate interests have in shaping Japan’s defense policy. They trace what they describe as Japan’s “market to the military” trend in space policy…

…This book is a readable, cogent examination of the interaction of corporate interests with national security interests, and adds needed nuance to the emerging understanding of Japan as an important player in the field of international security.” COL David Hunter-Chester, USA, Retired,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Review of IDOJ by Colonel David Hunter-Chester in The Military Review, July-August 2012

Japan Passes Overhaul of Space Management Structure

Here is the Space News version of the Defense News story I put out earlier: it’s a case of better late than never, and I will be trying to cover developments in various media as well as for my academic and policy paper requirements. “Please watch this space!”

I had a long talk with Saadia Pekkanen, my coauthor of In Defense of Japan and everything we predicted is coming on slowly and surely. How things will pan out immediately will quickly be seen in the upcoming budget request. However, a massive revision of the Basic Plan of 2009 is also a top priority of the new Uchusenryaku Shitsu (Space Strategy Office) and we will have concrete evidence of the next 5-year plan then. The timetable for the revised Basic Plan could be as early as within this year. This and a Space Activities Act are the top priorities, according to Takafumi Matsui, who one of the core group behind the changes.

Space News version of my earlier Defense News story

Another Positive Review for In Defense of Japan

Nice bright shiny e-mail from SUP recently reading as follows:

In Defense of Japan (Saadia M. Pekkanen and Paul Kallender-Umezu) was reviewed in Social Science Japan Journal Vol. 15, No. 1 (Winter 2012) on 6/21/2012.

“[V]ery ambitious and admirable. The book is based on very extensive research and it provides a good record of the path of Japanese space policy development. It is a good book to use as a concise data book of Japanese space history.”—Kazuto Suzuki, Social Science Japan Journal.

This is nice to see, especially after Rick Sturdevant called it a “model analysis.” But, shucks, what does he know about space, eh?

In Defense of Japan draws substantively from an impressive number and variety of sources . . . [T]he authors siphon a wealth of factual detail to document the market-to-military trend . . . Anyone interested in reading a thoroughly researched, up-to-date, English-language treatise on the dual-use nature of Japan’s evolving space activities need look no further than this particular volume, which might serve as a model for historically grounded analyses of other national space policies and programs.”—Rick W. Sturdevant, High Frontier
_______________________________________________________________________

Japan Space Law: Now Mid-May, or When?

What is this man doing?

News from the Strategic Headquarters for Space Policy (SHSP, 内閣官房宇宙開発戦略本部事務局) just in is that the Law to establish Japan’s new space structure, in which the Prime Minister’s Cabinet Office will start to try to wrest control of Japan’s space programs from the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), will now be delayed until mid-May.

According to SHSP director Mikio Aoki, the bill, which was submitted to Japan’s lower house, the House of Representatives on Feb. 14 was originally to have been debated and passed by the end of March.  It was then rescheduled for April 20. However, the DPJ administration is bogged down in other issues, most notably Prime Minister’ Noda’s discussions with opposition leaders about the DPJ’s plans to raise the consumption tax from April 2014. on which Noda has said he has staked his political life.

Noda is widely suspected of planning to dissolve the Lower House for a snap election if the Diet rejects the taxation bill. If this happens, then Japan faces another long and frustrating wait to enact the Basic Space Law of 2008.

The space bill, Cabinet Office Restructuring and Reform Law (内閣府設置法等の一部を改正する法律(閣議決定)),  is designed to fundamentally restructure the control of Japan’s space program and remove the restriction on the nation’s main space agency, the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) from developing military space programs. It is designed to enable the Prime Minister’s Cabinet Office to set up a 30-member Space Strategy Office (宇宙戦略室) that is headed by the Japanese Prime Minister while scrapping the Space Activities Commission, which currently controls JAXA. The Strategy Office  will assume control of all of Japan’s space planning, program and budget control, including that of JAXA through a new Strategic Space Committee set up in the Office, also chaired by the Prime Minister, said Takafumi Matsui, Emeritus Professor of Tokyo University and chairman of the advisory committee that proposed the law. For more on this, please see: Bill to Establish the 内閣府宇宙戦略室 (Space Strategy Office) sent to the Diet.

The Bill should have been drawn up and enacted within two years of the original Basic Law but was stalled by the election of the DPJ in 2009 and the opposition of MEXT, with the SHSP only managing to find a workable compromise this February. For some details of this, please see How will the SHSP’s Next-Gen Space Plan Unfold? The architects of the Bill had tied it to the General Space Activities budget,  which should have been passed March 31; and if the delay stretches much beyond May, this could impact Japan’s space policy making for yet another year.

Update: Some Interesting Media on Upcoming DPRK launch

Amongst the dross and hysteria about Japan “preparing to intercept” his month’s North Korean “missile” with PAC-3 or SM-3 the WSJ has just printed something sensible about the upcoming Eunha-3 launch of the DPRK’s third satellite, Kwangmyŏngsŏng-3.

(I particularly like the picture used in this AP picture, with the use of the green camouflage on the PAC-3 batteries to help protect them from the evil commies, while the batteries are surrounded the cherry blossom and slate gray blocks of flats they can’t protect against a “missile” that’s not going to come within a 1,000 kilometers of them.)

This follows another excellent piece in Businessweek, NKorea launch an intel opportunity for US, allies, which features the excellent Narushige Michishita and Hiroyasu Akutsu.

In Japan Readies Response to Pyongyang’s Launch the WSJ finally places at least one correct caveat in the story that anybody who has any basic understanding of the launch and Japan’s BMD technology would know instantly:

This time, North Korea says it will launch in a southerly, not an easterly, direction. That means the rocket is expected to pass high over Okinawan islands in the East China Sea, an area that has become a security concern for Tokyo amid disputes with China and worries over that country’s increasing military profile.

At last WSJ and BW are getting closer to the real story… Japan and the U.S. have known about this launch since December and the story is win-win-win for everyone, the DPRK, the media, who are getting a good story despite the fact that most hacks have just become (willing or unwitting) cyphers, politicians and Japan’s BMD spending. DPRK is good for one thing- stimulating Japan’s defense!

Remember that SM-3 is designed to shoot down an IRBM in orbit  (at the moment one might be about it, on a good day) in space and so far it has been achieving success in carefully coordinated and choreographed tests. PAC-3 is designed as a terminal phase descent against a high speed missile, not against tumbling slow moving small bit of rocket debris. In the billions-or trillions-to-one chances that a rocket casing or  chunk of something manages somehow to get on a trajectory to hit a tiny island such as Miyakojima, neither SM-3 or PAC-3 are going to be much use. But don’t let reality impinge on a  good story!

It’s a pity the WSJ befuddles the implications of their statement that the rocket is going to come nowhere near Japan, that somehow the Eunha-3, the DPRK by suggesting the  emerging naval arms race between China and Japan over the East China Sea has anything to do with our little North Korean rocket. That’s also besides the point that if something does go suddenly seriously wrong with the rocket, Japan’s two-tiered BMD system probably can’t do anything with it anyway.

But without the implication of threat and controversy, there isn’t much of a story  saying something like, erm, “Japan prepares training exercise for some Aegis cruisers to track North Korean satellite launch.”

The article then contains an interesting interpretation of facts and motives as told by Defense Minister Tanaka:

On Friday, Defense Minister Naoki Tanaka told reporters that nothing unusual should be read into the southern deployment. “It’s not related to a strengthening of our defense structure,” he said. “It’s just in case.”

That’s a new one!

PAC-3 has long been planned as part of the MOD’s latest Mid-Term Defense Plan precisely to send a message to China, as MOD told me March 13, well before before the “story broke” about the upcoming launch, that PAC-3 was  deployed to Okinawa anyway.

Then the article quotes a local analyst who has a take on things that is something nearer what all this is all about:

“The Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces must be thankful to Pyongyang for providing a chance for training under such real circumstances,” said Tetsuo Maeda, a Japanese military analyst.

Since Japan and the U.S. have known about the launch  since December, the “news” by the media which in the case of knowledgeable Japanese journalists amounts to a clear case of deliberately whipping up the froth to make it a good story, and for “foreign correspondents” based here to roll out a bunch of nonsense about the whole thing.

As I said in my original article, this latest Taepondon Trigger is an excellent chance for Japan to get training in and ramp the threat up so as to loosen up budget for more BMD after 2015.

In fact both North Korea and Japan and the U.S. have a lot to gain by the launch. As I originally wrote a month or so ago, succeed or fail, the launch will be a valuable propaganda victory for the military and political junta backing Kim Jong-il , and it will be both an intelligence bonanza and is already proving a valuable fear creation scenario to help Japan strengthen its defenses.

Taepodon Trigger#3: U.S. Knew of DPRK Plan Last Dec.

The plot thickens. As I pointed out in my original blog, all is not what it seems in the conventional media narrative about North Korean space launches and missile tests. The Yomiuri in “DPRK ‘told U.S. about plan on Dec. 15′” has just done some important work in revealing that it may well be that the United States knew as early as mid-December about this April’s North Korean satellite launch. The story reads as follows:

“WASHINGTON–A senior North Korean government official informed the United States before the death of Kim Jong Il was announced in December of its plan to launch a satellite, according to a former senior U.S. government official.
In an article for a U.S. research institute, Evans Revere, who served as acting assistant secretary of state under the administration of President George W. Bush, wrote that the decision to carry out the launch is highly likely to have been made by the late North Korean leader.
…Revere met with the North Korean official on Dec. 15 and was told about the planned launch of what some people believed to be a missile. The meeting is believed to have taken place in New York…”

This fits entirely in with standard practice by media, partly because it’s a great story, to hype the DPRK threat, (remember the original Taepodon incident of 1998 was not a shock at all, it was a trigger)  which is used by Japan’s political establishment (rightly, in my opinion) to promote further strategic investment and spending in Japan’s defense capabilities. Ultimately, and very indirectly of course, this is fed by nationalism and fear of abandonment. Those specters lurk very deep in the background. But they are there, nonetheless.

This whole prearranged dance is not what it seems at all…

….While a minor and enjoyable subroutine of my job as a researcher is to look at how politicians and the media work to manufacture opinion one of the hazards and joys is looking at the some of the dire rubbish that is fed to otherwise intelligent readers by the dregs of the media, I feel it’s important to keep some sort of sensible narrative up about important incidents such at the DPRK’s satellite launch. The whole idea about deploying PAC-3 to Okinawa to defend Japan is made-up media guff but the launch over the Yellow Sea will provide the MSDF with a valuable tracking and training opportunity, while there is no threat to Japan or its southernmost island chain at all.

For your amusement:

If you did read the CNN piece about those good ol’ Eagis ships protecting us from the commies, you would have also learned from CNN International that the North Koreans were planning “a rocket-powered satellite launch.” Or was that The Daily Telegraph?  Well hot dog!

It looks like the Taepodon Trigger #3 is fully in effect in both Japan and the ROK meanwhile.