Japan Eyes More Muscular Defense

Here is this week’s front page news from Japan for Defense News based on the latest versions of the LDP’s 新「防衛計画の大綱」策定に係る提言.

Japan Plans More Aggressive DefenseThe key points for me were the mixed messages I picked up from both U.S. and Japanese interlocutors. Most see sense in Japan’s continued, measured buildup as part of a decades-long process together with constitutional revision to (a) shed Japan of the contradictions that have built up over Article 9 vs. the fact that Japan has built up, often, but not exclusively following U.S. requests, a highly capable but incomplete military and (b) recognize that there is nothing wrong with a carefully crafted constitutional right to collective defense (with an update badly needed now that Japan is building out its BMD, particularly, but not exclusively for SM3-Block IIA, cruise missile and UAV-killing SM-6, and when Japan acquires E-2D assets).

But on the other hand, there is a great deal of angst involved, particularly over the issue of preemptive strike capability. Actually this issue, as I try to point out, isn’t new. The idea that Japan should consider mid-air refueling first openly stated during the Koizumi administration and the grounds for Japan hitting North Korean missile sites as laid out by former defense minister Shigeru Ishiba, are a decade old.

There is a sense that the LDP assumes, and unthinkingly projects, that it, under Shinzo Abe, a grandson of Nobusuke Kishi, that is the natural party of leadership, and that now that the reigns of power are back where they should be, so the LDP has to contrast itself with the DPJ. This seems to have so many things wrong with it. The U.S. was not particularly unhappy with the previous administration, which, apart from the basing issue, was basically going the same direction as the LDP would have anyway. Second, the LDP at least says publicly that it realizes it was not elected to pursue Abe’s nationalist agenda, but given a (…it always seems a last chance saloon) opportunity by the electorate to try to do something, anything to get the economy going. Any attempt to cast its DPJ predecessor as weak on defense issues is ridiculous.  And the last time Abe tried to foist his political and constitutional agenda on Japan, he was more or less forced out, and his agenda quietly abandoned by his successors.

But the U.S. is alarmed, by what might be called the current administration’s handling of its public perception. Look below to the mealy mouthed  reaction by Ishiba, for example, to the recent comments by Toru Hashimoto on sex slaves, which may have become an albatross or an unintentional SIW that could make him irrelevant. More disturbing is the lack of gross emotional intelligence of it all. The idea that “everyone did it” isn’t really a move forward.

The bottom line is, as Japan assumes a more normal defense posture, does it want to create more stability or less stability in the region? Japan needs to recalibrate its constitution and military to support the U.S.-Japan alliance and this means proceeding with the requisite diplomatic and emotional intelligence.

Mr. Abe has been trying, one might say, very trying. Even pro-Japan, pro-Alliance interlocutors are saying they need Mr. Abe to wake up.

25iht-edtepperman25-articleLarge

Another gaffe by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe

And from what we see and we read, the Abe administration is making a pig’s ear out of it.

Anyway, here is the full article:

Japan Eyes More Muscular Defense

By PAUL KALLENDER-UMEZU
TOKYO After almost seven decades of maintaining a limited defense posture, Japan should develop its amphibious and pre-emptive strike capability while bolstering sea- and ground-based ballistic-missile defenses, according to policy proposals by the country’s ruling party.

The proposals, obtained by Defense News and released to a select group last week ahead of widespread distribution, were drawn up by the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). They also call for Japan to beef up its space-based early warning systems and invest in cyber defense.

The proposals were generated by several internal LDP committees led by former LDP Defense Ministers Shigeru Ishiba and Gen Nakatani, and therefore carry considerable weight, according to Narushige Michishita, director of the Security and International Studies Program at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies here.

“They’re important,” he said.

The recommendations will feed into policy, spending and acquisition priorities for Japan’s next five-year Mid-Term Defense Plan, which is being crafted by the Defense Ministry and will be published by December.

They also come as the LDP administration of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe seeks to revise Article 9 of Japan’s constitution to delete provisions that prohibit Japan from using “war as a sovereign right of the nation” and maintaining “war potential,” and replace them with the right to hold a “National Defense Force” under the prime minister as commander in chief.

The LDP’s policy proposals do not name weapon systems or suggest budgets, and are deliberately more vague than similar proposals drawn up by the LDP in 2009, just before the party suffered a disastrous electoral defeat to the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ).

“The LDP was not in power then [in 2009],” and so could be more direct, Michishita said.

The 2009 proposals openly discussed Japan acquiring, for example, the Boeing KC-46 tanker refueling plane as a step toward developing pre-emptive strike capability, such as knocking out fueled North Korean missiles. They also suggested adding the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system to Japan’s ship-based Aegis and ground-based Patriot systems.

Fast forward four years, and the proposals come from a resurrected LDP that delivered an even bigger electoral defeat to the DPJ last December. This time around, the language is more cautious because each word has more value.

While they carefully avoid all reference to Japan’s major sources of concern — China and North Korea — the proposals open intriguing possibilities over the extent to which Japan will strengthen its defense posture. In this context, Japanese defense planners are considering a number of options for each of the force enhancements, according to analysts and people familiar with the LDP’s discussions.

Most interesting and controversial is the proposed discussion of pre-emptive strike capability, which would require Japan to acquire Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs), long-range refueling capability for its nascent F-35 Joint Strike Fighters and/or a naval platform for the F-35B jump jet, should Japan opt to purchase that variant.

The proposals make no mention of the KC-46 this time around. The Air Self-Defense Force, meanwhile, has steadily equipped its fleet of Mitsubishi F-2 multirole fighters with JDAMS. It is thought that the two 19,500-ton 22DDH-class helicopter destroyers planned for the Maritime Self-Defense Force can be converted to carry the F-35B.

In 2003, before Japan had deployed its Aegis SM-3 and Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) ballistic-missile defense (BMD) systems, then-Defense Minister Ishiba made it clear that Japan could launch a strike against a missile base in North Korea in specific sets of circumstances.

For example, a strike could take place if there was evidence the missiles were fueled and aimed at Japan, and Japan had no other credible means of defense, Michishita said.

But now Japan is steadily building out its BMD systems to intercept North Korea’s longer-range Unha and Musudan mobile intermediate-range ballistic missiles, so such a strike would be potentially unconstitutional, he said.

Brad Glosserman, executive director of the Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), said he found recent talk of Japan bolstering its pre-emptive strike capability worrying.

“CSIS has been conducting discussions on the issue of pre-emptive strike for six years, and in recent months, we have seen resumption of calls to develop this capability resurface. I am concerned about the proliferation of these capabilities because of the potentially destabilizing consequences,” he said.

Japan probably won’t develop a separate marine corps, but it will more likely reinforce its amphibious capability, largely based on the Western Infantry Regiment of the Ground Self-Defense Forces (GSDF) that trained in amphibious warfare as part of the Iron Fist exercises with the US Marine Corps in California, analysts say.

Paul Giarra, president of US-based consulting firm Global Strategies & Transformation, said the language of the policy proposal opens the possibility of the GSDF equipping one or perhaps two regiments with advanced capabilities, including up to four dozen amphibious landing vehicles over the next five years, beyond the four AAV-7A1S vehicles already planned, and a suitable number of Bell-Boeing V-22 tilt-rotor Osprey aircraft.

“I read it more as the [Japan Self-Defense Forces] with some improved amphibious capabilities like vehicles and tilt-rotor aircraft. That is potentially a significant development, but the LDP does not look like it wants to go the whole hog on a marine corps,” said Christopher Hughes, professor of international politics and Japanese studies at Britain’s University of Warwick.

Japan is considering several options to boost its BMD portfolio, consisting of four Kongo-class destroyers and two larger Atago-class Aegis cruisers, and PAC-3 units. While the 2009 version of the proposals specifically mentions purchasing THAAD and an “advanced” version of the PAC-3, the new version recommends strengthening land-based BMD, leaving Japan a choice between purchasing either THAAD or the Aegis Ashore land-based version of the Aegis system, and the PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) system for last-ditch interdiction.

Giarra said deploying the PAC-3 MSE would complement Aegis Ashore, which Japan has shown an interest in purchasing to the tune of one or two 24-missile interceptor batteries, a number that could increase. In this case, purchasing THAAD systems might be too much of an overlap of similar capabilities, he suggested.

Japanese defense planners see cruise missiles in general and China’s DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile in particular as growing threats. This means that on top of the planned upgrades to employ the SM-3 Block IIA Aegis system when it becomes available, Japan also is considering purchasing the extended-range anti-air warfare RIM-174 missile.

“Cruise missile defense is becoming as important to Japan as ballistic-missile defense,” Michishita said.

Hughes said the proposals face many roadblocks, including opposition from more dovish LDP members and the MoD’s own panel scheduled to meet in January, which may have its own priorities. Last but not least is the Ministry of Finance, which will be unwilling to raise the defense budget under any circumstances.

“[But] if Abe/the LDP can pull all this off, then it will be very radical indeed,” Hughes said.

Regional Concerns

Japan’s moves will likely be welcomed across a region concerned about China’s aggressive territorial claims.

“Japan and the Philippines have a strained history, but the Filipinos are for a stronger Japan because Tokyo is helping train its Coast Guard,” Giarra said. “South Korea is less dependent on Japan and tensions run deeper, so it’s much less willing to go along with it.”

Tensions soared last week after Osaka’s mayor said forced prostitution in occupied nations was a military necessity for invading Japanese forces, prompting a South Korean newspaper to write that US atomic attacks on Japan were “divine punishment” for Tokyo’s brutality.

Some in Asia and Washington worry Japan’s nationalist leader believes Japanese forces did nothing wrong during World War II.

“Passive support for Japan will hold unless Japanese behavior changes,” Giarra added. “The question is whether Japanese officials can resist the temptation to undo what they believe were unnecessary apologies for wartime actions they don’t believe were wrong.

“The feeling of being wronged is as powerful in Japan as it is the other way around in Korea, Philippines, Indonesia . . . Germany dealt with its past and continues to do so, but Japan suppressed the issue, creating pent up pressure, and when it vents, it could change how this buildup is seen.”

Email: pkallender@defensenews.com.

Japan Rebuilding IGS Spy Satellite Network

Here is an older about the IGS spy satellite constellation for Space News which has been left “as is” by the Office of National Space Policy (ONSP) in its February 25 Mk. II Basic Plan. I have a lot to say about this for academia this year, but managed to get a story out for Aviation Week & Space Technology, which I’ll post a bit later.

Japan Rebuilding IGS Spy Satellite Network

自衛隊も宇宙利用へ: Japanese Journalism on EW

Here is an insight into how Japanese journalists (with many honorable exceptions) over the issues.  You can get an idea of piece just from the title: “New Satellite Race.” What on earth (or in orbit) that is supposed to mean, is beyond me.

The point is that the article raises legitimate concerns in its conclusion:

「政府の担当者の間では、発射のタイミングを正確にとらえるためにも、DSPなど「宇宙の目」の役割は重要と考えられている。このため、日本でも自前のDSP導入に向けた研究が始まった。
しかし課題は山積している。DSPにはミサイルの熱源をもとに瞬時に種類や能力を割り出し、弾道を緻密に解析できるソフトウエア開発が欠かせない。しかし日本にはそうしたデータの蓄積がない。しかも早期警戒システムには衛星だけでなく、集めた情報を部隊間で共有する巨大なネットワークの構築も必要になる。
03年から打ち上げが始まった政府の情報収集衛星に投じられた経費は現在、7000億円近い。開発費を含めればDSPも数千億円かかると推定されており、国民の納得が得られるかどうかという新たな問題に直面する。」

Which boils down to legitimate doubts and questions about Japan’s EW program. But the point is without context/ contextual/ relevant contextual presentation by the journalist, the Japanese public is left thinking that the Asahi’s question raising motivated by its political stance; even a few more cursory levels of analysis of facts and background would have made this more helpful…but at least it isn’t at the pizza on the moon level of rubbish that we sometimes see in the foreign press.

So I figure, anything that gets Japanese space development issues into the media by a reasonable  journalist has to be something…

JSP Catchup #9: In Asia, C4ISR Market Is Growing

Ahem, just after writing JSP Catchup #8, I have to issue a mea culpa as colleague Wendell Minnick asked me to contribute from Japan, resulting in us looking at the UAV issue in In Asia, C4ISR Market Is Growing, which is easier to link to without copy and pasting the Defense News version in the paper. But, here is how it looks on the web!

JSP Catchup #8: Japan To Boost Missile Warning, Other Surveillance Efforts

Here is a story that Space News asked me to write for their Military Space Quarterly, so it gave me a chance to write a little bit about the militarization of Japan’s space development, which is apparently not occurring.

The intriguing thing for me as a media participant and, more recently, as an observer, is why Japan’s development of a UAV program for early warning should suddenly become news.

And news. And news.

And, ahem…news.

Well, it’s because the Yomuiri decided it was news, even though the information has been out there since August, when the request for the budget was put out.

This led to the story being printed in the English and then suddenly the WSJ even has an angle.

Perhaps the journalist has figured out that maritime observation was somehow important to the U.S.-Japan Alliance, perhaps as it has been written in as one of the fours priority areas of cooperation. in the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (2+2) (June 2011).

The funniest story of them all was an AFP hack job on the Yomiuri story which was itself re-sluiced round media  slop sites, including a website called Inquirer.net, which quoted the AFP quoting the Yomiuri as saying “The defense ministry has demanded 3 billion yen ($372 million) over the next four years to develop the aircraft, which would come into operation in 2020, the Yomiuri Shimbun reported without citing sources.”

The Yomiuri Shimbun’s source was, as I mentioned, the publicly available MOD budget request, released months before, in color:

The fact that Japan is developing UAVs is old, old news; the fact that it is developing them as an alternative to satellite- based EW was big news- back in August. I wonder why the Yomiuri decided to notice the story months later?

In any case, for space watchers, the interesting point about this why is Japan researching twin  Early Warning programs simultaneously?

If you believe in the cock-up theory of history and recognize the stovepiping inherent in any large bureaucracy, then you might call it one hand not knowing what the other is doing.

In this case however, it is  more probably the extreme anxiety that the MOD feels about buying Japanese, which is probably based on the fact that the IGS has proved so problematical for Japan. There is a strong sense in the MoD that it can buy better gear, cheaper, with guaranteed compatibility and interoperability in terms of space based EW, so why risk buying from Melco?

Also there are tricky decisions whether to mount EW sensors on the geo-based satellites of QZSS, or develop standalone satellites, or put capability on a future Himawari, among other options on the table. In the meantime, cheap and cheerful UAV-mounted sensors are an option.

I’ll talk about SSA in a later submission, perhaps at the end of the month. If EW looks complicated for Japan, wait till you see what is happening with SSA! Anyway, here is a recent article from Space News.

JSP Catchup #6: Probe Uncovers 40-year Japanese Contractor Fraud

This story was NOT a surprise; the fuller story is at Japan Still Calculating Cost of Defense Firm’s Padded Bills, but ever since NEC Corp. in 1998 was found with its hands in the till, I have been wondering who would be fingered next, and when, and why when, and why.

I say this because when I chatted to people back in 1998, the practice of padding contracts with surplus labor costs was widespread in the space and defense sectors and this was commonly known. At the time the questions were Why NEC? And Why Now? Below my initial October story is NEC SCANDAL SHEDS LIGHT ON JAPANESE PROCUREMENTS, a more fruity web version of a story that I originally wrote for Space News back in the day.

The timing for the original NEC story was also interesting as NEC was strongly pushing for its version of what was to become Japan’s IGS spy satellite system that was provoked by the Teapodon Triggeran analysis that Saadia and I wrote about in In Defense of Japan (thank you Google Books!)

At the time NEC’s version of what was to become the IGS would have featured smaller satellites and cost less than Melco’s system. But with NEC suddenly out of the picture, Melco, with Ichiro Taniguchi at the helm, managed to personally lobby Japan’s Cabinet in the weeks after the Taepondon launch, and Japan’ got the IGS.

Here is a nice picture from Space Safety Magazine of Japan’s 1,200-Kilogram IGS 1B Satellite re-entered Earth’s Atmosphere on Thursday, July 26, 2012 after spending nearly 9.5 years in space.  Another more detailed article about this can be found at Spaceflight.101.com.

Eventually, NEC’s small-bus and higher resolution system has  been re-emerging in the ASNARO system, which is now being pushed as an alternative and complementary system to the expensive and relatively lower performance IGS, and also as the linchpin of a satellite-based, pan-Asian disaster monitoring network that is now a major part of Japan’s emerging regional space diplomacy and security strategy.  At least the Vietnamese have bought into it, and while customers don’t seem to be forming a line yet, there is still a lot of hope out there.

Here is the initial story for Defense News:

NEC SCANDAL SHEDS LIGHT ON

JAPANESE PROCUREMENTS.

By Paul Kallender in Tokyo

When, in September 1998, an investigation into the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) discovered that Japanese technology giant NEC Corp had systematically defrauded the taxpayer on 33 space contracts over the course of five years, it looked as though Japan’s obviously abused government procurement system was about to get a major overhaul.

The investigation began promisingly enough. On September 3, Tokyo prosecutors raided the JDA and arrested Kenichi Ueno, deputy head of the Procurement Office, and a clutch of executives from NEC subsidiary Toyo Communications.

This followed discoveries that not only had Toyo overcharged the JDA some $21m over dozens of equipment contracts, but that Ueno and others had conspired to prevent Toyo, NEC and other subsidiaries from repaying the money. NEC was raided the next day and by September 10, nine senior NEC and JDA executives were in jail.

It came to light that Ueno and others had lifted incriminating paperwork out of the Agency’s filing cabinets and put them into incinerators and even the homes of friends. NEC’s SuperTower headquarters was soon besieged by the Japanese phenomenon of ‘sound trucks,’ driven by right-wing extremists screaming abuse and demanding mass resignations.

But instead of resulting in the punishment of protagonists and the start of reforms, the scandal collapsed into a desultory cover-up. NEC’s initial response was to deny everything, with a bemused VP Masakatsu Miwa telling the media on September 10 that he did not expect top NEC executives to resign because of the scandal, going on to explain that he “wondered why” NEC officials were being implicated. Unfortunately for Miwa, on September 29, NEC’s overcharging was upscaled to $2.5bn, while, on the same day, a Parliamentary committee reported that the JDA had hired no less than 44 NEC executives in senior positions in just two years. By October 10, former NEC VP Hiroaki Shimayama and Takenori Yanase, VP of NEC’s Space Systems Division, had both been arrested.

Thieves charter

The National Space Development Agency (NASDA) launched an inquiry and on November 9, NEC admitted overcharging by at least $19m. Meanwhile on October 14, the JDA revealed that 225 of its officials had been hired by 20 suppliers in the past five years, shedding some dim light on a corner of Japan’s Amadudari (Descent from Heaven) career kickback system.

At the heart of the issue, according to NASDA’s former executive director Akira Kubozono, is the flawed government contract system which encourages corruption through a combination of legendary meanness and bureaucratic incompetence.

“There are two points about this affair,” he said. “One is that NEC is just a scapegoat. The second is that the governmental contract system is the cause of this scandal. When the defense contract revelations began, I thought it was only a matter of time before it spread into NEC’s space systems division as both defense and space procurement are conducted under similar systems.”

Under the Japanese government contract system, the co ntractor is obliged to repay any unused budget if the delivery price falls below the contract amount, and the contractor must also incur any costs if the project overshoots the agreed estimate — a thieves charter if ever there was one.

Furthermore NASDA, the Science and Technology Agency and the Ministry of Finance lack the technical expertise to evaluate bids and tend to just accept company estimates, says Kubozono. “The system needs to be reformed but I doubt this is possible as long as NASDA and the corporations are controlled by STA administrators (who also often retire to executive positions in NASDA) and not by engineers,” he says.

No mettle Kubozono, it seems, was right.

By November 12, the space scandal seemed to have been wrapped up, with NASDA saying it was satisfied that only NEC had abused the system. “The system has worked well for 30 years. We believe that a little devil whispered into NEC’s ear. We do not think it will happen again,” said Yasuyuki Fukumuro, NASDA PR deputy director. Fukumuro quickly admitted that NEC would be allowed to bid for Japan’s new spy satellite system, after a token contract moratorium.

Back at the JDA, a grand total of six senior officials will take up to 10% pay cuts for one to three months plus one official will receive a 10-day suspension, JDA chief Fukushiro Nukuga told the media at his November 20 resignation press conference.

The speech followed a report, which admitted that there had been “some incidents that could be regarded as a systematic cover-up,” perhaps referring to the 31 officials suspected of Berlin-bunker style burning of documentation that might have provided evidence.

But the worst thing about the affair, according to observers, has been the brazen arrogance of NEC. In his October 23 resignation speech, NEC Chairman Tadahiro Sekimoto, now under personal investigation for his role in the affair, denied any involvement but resigned out of “social responsibility” for the affair, astonishing Kubozono in particular.

“Sekimoto’s act was spineless. If he had honor he would have resigned to take responsibility, not quibbled. He showed no mettle and is a very poor example for younger business leaders. I fear for Japan’s future.”

An even poorer analysis comes from Youichi Teraishi, Editor of Japan’s ‘scandaru’ [scandal] daily, the Nikkan Gendai. He says that Sekimoto’s act compared unfavorably with Yakuza (the Japanese Mafia) standards of conduct. “This Oyabun [Japanese gang boss] showed a lack of chivalry. Captains of industry are supposed to be able to demonstrate this, but Sekimoto lacked the class,” he says.

Lastly, the scandal has left NEC seething that it was singled out for a brutal slap on the wrist. “Everyone is doing it, why should we be the scapegoat?” admitted one NEC official. “Our top management just stuck their heads in the sand and got shafted,” complained another.

This article first appeared in Global Technology News.

JSP Catchup #3: Japan’s Budget Request Targets Capabilities To Defend Sea Lanes

Here is a follow-up from the previous story with a little more analysis, which was published by Defense News on September 14.

Japan Passes Overhaul of Space Management Structure

Here is the Space News version of the Defense News story I put out earlier: it’s a case of better late than never, and I will be trying to cover developments in various media as well as for my academic and policy paper requirements. “Please watch this space!”

I had a long talk with Saadia Pekkanen, my coauthor of In Defense of Japan and everything we predicted is coming on slowly and surely. How things will pan out immediately will quickly be seen in the upcoming budget request. However, a massive revision of the Basic Plan of 2009 is also a top priority of the new Uchusenryaku Shitsu (Space Strategy Office) and we will have concrete evidence of the next 5-year plan then. The timetable for the revised Basic Plan could be as early as within this year. This and a Space Activities Act are the top priorities, according to Takafumi Matsui, who one of the core group behind the changes.

Space News version of my earlier Defense News story

FINALLY! Japan Passes Law Permitting Military Space Development

Here is the text of the quick story I put up last Friday for Defense News. For background on this story Japan Space Law: Now Mid-May, or When?

I’ll have a more more commentary on this later in the week. Well it’s three years late, but finally it’s gone through after considerable struggles. I’ll have something of a more detailed picture on the whole thing out later this year for Space Policy.

However talking to Kazuto Suzuki and Norihio Sakamoto over the past few weeks I have been struck by the differences of opinion on the upcoming speed with which the 宇宙戦略室 (Space Strategy Office) is going to be able to act. Sakamoto believes that the much-needed Space Activities Act, which is much needed to promote commercialization in J-space could come even within this year. Suzuki believes the law isn’t really a priority and not needed. Listening to an SHSP presentaiton on the issue earlier this year at a conference to establish the Keio Advanced Research Center for Space Law, the message seems mixed.

It has been pointed out that essentially the three-year battle to wrest control of space policy and execution from MEXT was de facto won last year when the SHSP under Katase effectively grabbed the budget negotiations with the MOF away from MEXT. You can see the effect immediately in that the much prized JAXA-MEXT flagship Hayabusa-2 program got its huge budget request stomped.

But the new law is far more than window dressing, as I will go on to explain in subsequent posts.

Tokyo — The Upper House of Japan’s Diet June 20 passed legislation that shifts control of the nation’s space policy and budget, and opens the door to military space development programs with an emphasis on space-based missile early warning.

The raft of legislation, based on the Bill to Amend the Law of Establishment of the Cabinet Office that was sent to the Diet on Feb. 14, enables the Prime Minister’s Cabinet Office to take control of the planning and budgeting of Japan’s government space program. It also removes an article in a prior law governing the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA), the nation’s equivalent to NASA, which had restricted JAXA’s ability to pursue military space programs.

Prior to the legislation, JAXA had been de facto controlled by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), and was overseen by a MEXT committee called the Space Activities Commission (SAC), leading to criticisms of regulatory capture.

At the same time, JAXA’s space development has been restricted to an extremely narrow “peaceful purposes only” policy, which meant the agency was unable to develop specifically military space programs.

The new legislation enables the Cabinet Office to set up a Space Strategy Office, headed by the prime minister, which will have the ultimate say on all policy and budget decisions. It will be supported by a consultative Space Policy Commission of five to seven academics and independent observers.

The legislation also scraps MEXT’s control of JAXA and abolishes SAC, said Kazuto Suzuki, associate professor of international political economy at the Public Policy School of Hokkaido University.

Japan’s space development has been hampered by the peaceful-purposes-only restriction, and by what many outside MEXT see as programs focused too much on technological development for its own sake, leading to expensive launch systems and satellites that serve little practical purpose for the nation, Suzuki said.

The passing of the law ends a process that began nearly a decade ago by politicians looking for ways to leverage Japan’s space development programs and technologies for security purposes, to bolster the nation’s defenses in the face of increased tensions in East Asia.

On top of an increasingly confident China, Japan faces a potentially belligerent and unstable North Korea just across the Sea of Japan. Since 1998, North Korea has consistently flouted and broken promises, norms and international laws in developing and testing nuclear weapons and missiles.

JAXA will now be permitted to develop space programs in line with international norms, which are governed by the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. The treaty allows military space development, but not the deployment of weapons of mass destruction in orbit.

As the Cabinet Office, the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) will all have a form of “joint control” over JAXA, the space agency will gradually move away from its purely scientific, non-military role, said analysts and experts involved with drawing up the legislation. Under the new arrangement, each ministry will be able to propose its own space programs.

METI, for example, is interested in promoting dual-use Earth observation and reconnaissance satellites and an air-launch space access system, according to the ministry.

Suzuki said there also is strong bipartisan political support for Japan to develop and launch its own missile early-warning system to support the nation’s small fleet of Aegis destroyers for upper-tier defense, and its PAC-3 systems for lower-tier defense.

The Cabinet Office also will take direct control of the budget and program development of Japan’s regional GPS system, called the Quasi-Zenith Satellite System.

More immediately, the Cabinet Office is likely to set up the Space Strategy Office and Space Policy Commission as early as July 1, said Norihiro Sakamoto, a research fellow at The Tokyo Foundation, a think tank based here.

The Space Strategy Office will quickly move to draft new laws and policies to shift Japan’s space focus away from purely research and development programs to a more national, security-orientated approach that encourages the industrialization and commercialization of Japan’s space industry.

In particular, Japan needs to draw up a comprehensive space law, a “Space Activities Act,” which will provide a legal framework for privately funded space initiatives, and a five-year space plan to run through the second half of the decade.

Taepodon Trigger#3: U.S. Knew of DPRK Plan Last Dec.

The plot thickens. As I pointed out in my original blog, all is not what it seems in the conventional media narrative about North Korean space launches and missile tests. The Yomiuri in “DPRK ‘told U.S. about plan on Dec. 15′” has just done some important work in revealing that it may well be that the United States knew as early as mid-December about this April’s North Korean satellite launch. The story reads as follows:

“WASHINGTON–A senior North Korean government official informed the United States before the death of Kim Jong Il was announced in December of its plan to launch a satellite, according to a former senior U.S. government official.
In an article for a U.S. research institute, Evans Revere, who served as acting assistant secretary of state under the administration of President George W. Bush, wrote that the decision to carry out the launch is highly likely to have been made by the late North Korean leader.
…Revere met with the North Korean official on Dec. 15 and was told about the planned launch of what some people believed to be a missile. The meeting is believed to have taken place in New York…”

This fits entirely in with standard practice by media, partly because it’s a great story, to hype the DPRK threat, (remember the original Taepodon incident of 1998 was not a shock at all, it was a trigger)  which is used by Japan’s political establishment (rightly, in my opinion) to promote further strategic investment and spending in Japan’s defense capabilities. Ultimately, and very indirectly of course, this is fed by nationalism and fear of abandonment. Those specters lurk very deep in the background. But they are there, nonetheless.

This whole prearranged dance is not what it seems at all…

….While a minor and enjoyable subroutine of my job as a researcher is to look at how politicians and the media work to manufacture opinion one of the hazards and joys is looking at the some of the dire rubbish that is fed to otherwise intelligent readers by the dregs of the media, I feel it’s important to keep some sort of sensible narrative up about important incidents such at the DPRK’s satellite launch. The whole idea about deploying PAC-3 to Okinawa to defend Japan is made-up media guff but the launch over the Yellow Sea will provide the MSDF with a valuable tracking and training opportunity, while there is no threat to Japan or its southernmost island chain at all.

For your amusement:

If you did read the CNN piece about those good ol’ Eagis ships protecting us from the commies, you would have also learned from CNN International that the North Koreans were planning “a rocket-powered satellite launch.” Or was that The Daily Telegraph?  Well hot dog!

It looks like the Taepodon Trigger #3 is fully in effect in both Japan and the ROK meanwhile.