As Predicted: N. Korea preparing for third nuclear test…

As I predicted on this blog back on March 16 (Taepodon Trigger #3: DPRK to attempt 3rd Satellite Shot- Third Time Lucky?) and March 18 (Taepodon Trigger #3: Update)  the DPRK is likely to follow up its satellite launch with a third nuclear test.

The test is a necessary part of the military circenses (sans the panem, pity the poor long-suffering Korean people) to usher in the Kim Jong-un fronted era with a celebartory big bang and fireworks, DPRK-style.
This according to Reuters:

North Korea, pressing ahead with a rocket launch in defiance of a UN resolution, is also preparing a third nuclear weapons test, South Korean news reports said on Sunday…

South Korea’s Yonhap news agency quoted an unidentified intelligence source as saying North Korea was “clandestinely preparing a nuclear test” at the same location as the first two.

The source added that workers in the destitute North had been seen in commercial satellite images digging a tunnel in the northeastern town of Punggye-ri, Kilju County, in addition to existing mines believed to have been used for tests in 2006 and 2009.

Here is an interesting take on the whole thing by none other than Henry Kissinger: North Korea’s Nuclear Challenge on ihavenet.com.

More News on Japan’s Strategic Nuclear / Space Hedge

Senior Vice Foreign Minister Takeaki Matsumoto admitted November 29 in not so many words that Japan in the late 1960s was considering developing nuclear weapons. The news followed an in-house MOFA probe on the recent NHK documentary on a senior MOFA official’s deathbed confessions that Japan in the late 1960s conducted under-the-table negotiations with West Germany that the two discuss the possibility of developing nuclear weapons. In the event, the Germans said no and the Japanese went ahead with advancing its nuclear and rocket systems capabilities, but strictly for peaceful purposes as technology programs.

Each time these revelations roll out, In Defense of Japan just looks more and more prescient.

In connection with this the Mainichi Shimbun has just released news that MOFA wavered over whether Japan should sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1970, thereby giving up the right to possess nuclear weapons. In fact, 15 documents reveal more formal data on how close Japan was in 1968-70 to arming itself with nuclear weapons as a response to China’s extraordinarily swift development of deployable thermonuclear weapons.

Two critical issues were 1. Could Japan rely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella and 2. would signing the NPT might impair Japan’s domestic nuclear energy program by making allies loathe to supply Japan with enriched uranium.

Most tellingly documents show that in September 1969 Japan was drawing up guidelines committed to the need to have the capability to convert its nuclear technology into nuclear weapons while promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

The critical points are here:

また、外交政策大綱では「当面核兵器は保有しない政策をとるが、核兵器製造の経済的・技術的ポテンシャルは常に保持するとともにこれに対する掣肘 (せいちゅう)(制約)をうけないよう配慮する」(69年9月)と核兵器製造の潜在力保持の必要性を指摘。原子力の平和利用を進めながらも核兵器に転用可 能な選択肢を残すよう求める意見が記されている」

“While Japan is adopting a policy of not possessing nuclear weapons for now, it should possess the economic and technological potential to produce nuclear weapons and there should be no limits to such potential,” the guidelines state.”

This confirms why Japan’s pluthermal program is designed, accidentally on purpose to produce plenty of supergrade plutonium in order to produce highly efficient nuclear weapons anyway.

This is highly significant because it confirms the premise of In Defense of Japan that Japan did not actually develop a nuclear deterrent, it did decide to develop and maintain all the technologies it needed to make sure that in an emergency Japan could rapidly go nuclear.

The NHK’s “News” on Japan’s Not-So-Secret Nuclearization Plan 1968-70

I was both a little excited and very disappointed that the NHK decided to publicize something that’s been public knowledge for around a decade – that Japan looked into and decided not to produce nuclear weapons in the late 1960s.
The 日本の核に関する基礎的研究 conducted by the 内閣調査室 (Cabinet Information Research Office) for the then PM Eisaku Sato by Profs. Hidetake Kakibana, Michio Royama, Yonosuke Nagai and Hisashi Maeda distributed some 200 copies with the highest secrecy concluding that it was probably not in Japan’s best interests to develop an independent nuclear deterrent.
What was bold about NHK was to go an interview a protagonist who had decided to make a “confession” just about a month before he passed away. A very enlightened move by NHK. It is easy to portray Japan as “hiding something” when the mass-media tropes and memes are so misleading. The fact is that it’s well-known that Japan has the means, but has decided not to produce nuclear weapons, since the late 1960s, and the same goes with ICBMS.
(Characteristically, in 1970, a young firebrand called Ishihara Shintaro called for Japan to develop its own SLBM MIRVs. Interestingly enough, METI’s own bid to get budget for SLMB development was quashed last August by the DPJ’s rewriting of the general space activities budget request in August 2009.)
The fact is that Japan’s ability to produce nuclear weapons quickly is not controversial amongst the analyst community. In addition to a pluthermal/ fast breeder reactor program that will accelerate Japan’s production of supergrade plutonium (to an estimated 700 kg over ten years at Monju alone) via technology imported (according to Greenpeace) from the U.S. Savannah River Plant and Oak Ridge labs, Japan is known to have around plutonium available to construct warhead in about 9 months of a political decision for Japan to arm itself.
The major points I would like to discuss in relationship with this weekend’s news by the NHK is that serious discussion about developing an independent nuclear deterrent was launched in the wake of China’s rapid progression from fission to thermonuclear weapons capability in 1967 in a scant 22 months was not limited only to nukes. It also included space development.

In fact, the effect of China’s rapid progress on Japan cannot be understated in the post-war history of Japan developing its recessed deterrent strategy, of which Japan’s “peaceful purposes only” nuclear program and (until 1998) “peaceful purposes only” space program have been conjoined.
While Japan did not actually develop a nuclear deterrent, it did decide to develop and maintain all the technologies it needed to make sure that in an emergency Japan could rapidly go nuclear.
In Defense of Japan is a critical part of this story, because exactly the same strategy was employed for space development, to make sure Japan has a full spectrum of military space technologies ready to deliver weapons if or when they are made.
The exciting thing is that NHK is prepared to break one of the official mass media taboos, that Japan both can produce, and has strongly considered producing such weapons. But I feel it’s time for a more honest media discussion on the role of Japan’s space development program.
I’d like to think in some way that In Defense of Japan is also playing its part in lifting the almost willful non-discussion in the Japanese media, and the international media, of the meaning of Japan’s space program and the way policy is reported to the public.