Japan Eyes More Muscular Defense

Here is this week’s front page news from Japan for Defense News based on the latest versions of the LDP’s 新「防衛計画の大綱」策定に係る提言.

Japan Plans More Aggressive DefenseThe key points for me were the mixed messages I picked up from both U.S. and Japanese interlocutors. Most see sense in Japan’s continued, measured buildup as part of a decades-long process together with constitutional revision to (a) shed Japan of the contradictions that have built up over Article 9 vs. the fact that Japan has built up, often, but not exclusively following U.S. requests, a highly capable but incomplete military and (b) recognize that there is nothing wrong with a carefully crafted constitutional right to collective defense (with an update badly needed now that Japan is building out its BMD, particularly, but not exclusively for SM3-Block IIA, cruise missile and UAV-killing SM-6, and when Japan acquires E-2D assets).

But on the other hand, there is a great deal of angst involved, particularly over the issue of preemptive strike capability. Actually this issue, as I try to point out, isn’t new. The idea that Japan should consider mid-air refueling first openly stated during the Koizumi administration and the grounds for Japan hitting North Korean missile sites as laid out by former defense minister Shigeru Ishiba, are a decade old.

There is a sense that the LDP assumes, and unthinkingly projects, that it, under Shinzo Abe, a grandson of Nobusuke Kishi, that is the natural party of leadership, and that now that the reigns of power are back where they should be, so the LDP has to contrast itself with the DPJ. This seems to have so many things wrong with it. The U.S. was not particularly unhappy with the previous administration, which, apart from the basing issue, was basically going the same direction as the LDP would have anyway. Second, the LDP at least says publicly that it realizes it was not elected to pursue Abe’s nationalist agenda, but given a (…it always seems a last chance saloon) opportunity by the electorate to try to do something, anything to get the economy going. Any attempt to cast its DPJ predecessor as weak on defense issues is ridiculous.  And the last time Abe tried to foist his political and constitutional agenda on Japan, he was more or less forced out, and his agenda quietly abandoned by his successors.

But the U.S. is alarmed, by what might be called the current administration’s handling of its public perception. Look below to the mealy mouthed  reaction by Ishiba, for example, to the recent comments by Toru Hashimoto on sex slaves, which may have become an albatross or an unintentional SIW that could make him irrelevant. More disturbing is the lack of gross emotional intelligence of it all. The idea that “everyone did it” isn’t really a move forward.

The bottom line is, as Japan assumes a more normal defense posture, does it want to create more stability or less stability in the region? Japan needs to recalibrate its constitution and military to support the U.S.-Japan alliance and this means proceeding with the requisite diplomatic and emotional intelligence.

Mr. Abe has been trying, one might say, very trying. Even pro-Japan, pro-Alliance interlocutors are saying they need Mr. Abe to wake up.

25iht-edtepperman25-articleLarge

Another gaffe by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe

And from what we see and we read, the Abe administration is making a pig’s ear out of it.

Anyway, here is the full article:

Japan Eyes More Muscular Defense

By PAUL KALLENDER-UMEZU
TOKYO After almost seven decades of maintaining a limited defense posture, Japan should develop its amphibious and pre-emptive strike capability while bolstering sea- and ground-based ballistic-missile defenses, according to policy proposals by the country’s ruling party.

The proposals, obtained by Defense News and released to a select group last week ahead of widespread distribution, were drawn up by the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). They also call for Japan to beef up its space-based early warning systems and invest in cyber defense.

The proposals were generated by several internal LDP committees led by former LDP Defense Ministers Shigeru Ishiba and Gen Nakatani, and therefore carry considerable weight, according to Narushige Michishita, director of the Security and International Studies Program at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies here.

“They’re important,” he said.

The recommendations will feed into policy, spending and acquisition priorities for Japan’s next five-year Mid-Term Defense Plan, which is being crafted by the Defense Ministry and will be published by December.

They also come as the LDP administration of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe seeks to revise Article 9 of Japan’s constitution to delete provisions that prohibit Japan from using “war as a sovereign right of the nation” and maintaining “war potential,” and replace them with the right to hold a “National Defense Force” under the prime minister as commander in chief.

The LDP’s policy proposals do not name weapon systems or suggest budgets, and are deliberately more vague than similar proposals drawn up by the LDP in 2009, just before the party suffered a disastrous electoral defeat to the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ).

“The LDP was not in power then [in 2009],” and so could be more direct, Michishita said.

The 2009 proposals openly discussed Japan acquiring, for example, the Boeing KC-46 tanker refueling plane as a step toward developing pre-emptive strike capability, such as knocking out fueled North Korean missiles. They also suggested adding the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system to Japan’s ship-based Aegis and ground-based Patriot systems.

Fast forward four years, and the proposals come from a resurrected LDP that delivered an even bigger electoral defeat to the DPJ last December. This time around, the language is more cautious because each word has more value.

While they carefully avoid all reference to Japan’s major sources of concern — China and North Korea — the proposals open intriguing possibilities over the extent to which Japan will strengthen its defense posture. In this context, Japanese defense planners are considering a number of options for each of the force enhancements, according to analysts and people familiar with the LDP’s discussions.

Most interesting and controversial is the proposed discussion of pre-emptive strike capability, which would require Japan to acquire Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs), long-range refueling capability for its nascent F-35 Joint Strike Fighters and/or a naval platform for the F-35B jump jet, should Japan opt to purchase that variant.

The proposals make no mention of the KC-46 this time around. The Air Self-Defense Force, meanwhile, has steadily equipped its fleet of Mitsubishi F-2 multirole fighters with JDAMS. It is thought that the two 19,500-ton 22DDH-class helicopter destroyers planned for the Maritime Self-Defense Force can be converted to carry the F-35B.

In 2003, before Japan had deployed its Aegis SM-3 and Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) ballistic-missile defense (BMD) systems, then-Defense Minister Ishiba made it clear that Japan could launch a strike against a missile base in North Korea in specific sets of circumstances.

For example, a strike could take place if there was evidence the missiles were fueled and aimed at Japan, and Japan had no other credible means of defense, Michishita said.

But now Japan is steadily building out its BMD systems to intercept North Korea’s longer-range Unha and Musudan mobile intermediate-range ballistic missiles, so such a strike would be potentially unconstitutional, he said.

Brad Glosserman, executive director of the Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), said he found recent talk of Japan bolstering its pre-emptive strike capability worrying.

“CSIS has been conducting discussions on the issue of pre-emptive strike for six years, and in recent months, we have seen resumption of calls to develop this capability resurface. I am concerned about the proliferation of these capabilities because of the potentially destabilizing consequences,” he said.

Japan probably won’t develop a separate marine corps, but it will more likely reinforce its amphibious capability, largely based on the Western Infantry Regiment of the Ground Self-Defense Forces (GSDF) that trained in amphibious warfare as part of the Iron Fist exercises with the US Marine Corps in California, analysts say.

Paul Giarra, president of US-based consulting firm Global Strategies & Transformation, said the language of the policy proposal opens the possibility of the GSDF equipping one or perhaps two regiments with advanced capabilities, including up to four dozen amphibious landing vehicles over the next five years, beyond the four AAV-7A1S vehicles already planned, and a suitable number of Bell-Boeing V-22 tilt-rotor Osprey aircraft.

“I read it more as the [Japan Self-Defense Forces] with some improved amphibious capabilities like vehicles and tilt-rotor aircraft. That is potentially a significant development, but the LDP does not look like it wants to go the whole hog on a marine corps,” said Christopher Hughes, professor of international politics and Japanese studies at Britain’s University of Warwick.

Japan is considering several options to boost its BMD portfolio, consisting of four Kongo-class destroyers and two larger Atago-class Aegis cruisers, and PAC-3 units. While the 2009 version of the proposals specifically mentions purchasing THAAD and an “advanced” version of the PAC-3, the new version recommends strengthening land-based BMD, leaving Japan a choice between purchasing either THAAD or the Aegis Ashore land-based version of the Aegis system, and the PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) system for last-ditch interdiction.

Giarra said deploying the PAC-3 MSE would complement Aegis Ashore, which Japan has shown an interest in purchasing to the tune of one or two 24-missile interceptor batteries, a number that could increase. In this case, purchasing THAAD systems might be too much of an overlap of similar capabilities, he suggested.

Japanese defense planners see cruise missiles in general and China’s DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile in particular as growing threats. This means that on top of the planned upgrades to employ the SM-3 Block IIA Aegis system when it becomes available, Japan also is considering purchasing the extended-range anti-air warfare RIM-174 missile.

“Cruise missile defense is becoming as important to Japan as ballistic-missile defense,” Michishita said.

Hughes said the proposals face many roadblocks, including opposition from more dovish LDP members and the MoD’s own panel scheduled to meet in January, which may have its own priorities. Last but not least is the Ministry of Finance, which will be unwilling to raise the defense budget under any circumstances.

“[But] if Abe/the LDP can pull all this off, then it will be very radical indeed,” Hughes said.

Regional Concerns

Japan’s moves will likely be welcomed across a region concerned about China’s aggressive territorial claims.

“Japan and the Philippines have a strained history, but the Filipinos are for a stronger Japan because Tokyo is helping train its Coast Guard,” Giarra said. “South Korea is less dependent on Japan and tensions run deeper, so it’s much less willing to go along with it.”

Tensions soared last week after Osaka’s mayor said forced prostitution in occupied nations was a military necessity for invading Japanese forces, prompting a South Korean newspaper to write that US atomic attacks on Japan were “divine punishment” for Tokyo’s brutality.

Some in Asia and Washington worry Japan’s nationalist leader believes Japanese forces did nothing wrong during World War II.

“Passive support for Japan will hold unless Japanese behavior changes,” Giarra added. “The question is whether Japanese officials can resist the temptation to undo what they believe were unnecessary apologies for wartime actions they don’t believe were wrong.

“The feeling of being wronged is as powerful in Japan as it is the other way around in Korea, Philippines, Indonesia . . . Germany dealt with its past and continues to do so, but Japan suppressed the issue, creating pent up pressure, and when it vents, it could change how this buildup is seen.”

Email: pkallender@defensenews.com.

A Different Kind of Japanese Island Dispute…

Typhoon in a Teacup?

Not exactly.

This is interesting. As my esteemed friends at Japan Security Watch (“Mod Requests Funds for Yonaguni Base”) and Corey Wallace know all too well…just about a week after I wrote this story, China started laying claim to Okinawa- as was predicted in the article. Read on!

…Here is story that I recently wrote for Defense News that has been “under the radar” of the gaijin press here (not part of what’s officially what’s regarded as important “news” I suppose) but is important because everyone knows that in international law “boots on the rock,” so to speak, goes a “long way” in term of  territorial claims (see graphic in story below, as  DN helpfully added).

The most important part of the story for me was at the end, when Prof. Gabe kindly pointed out the most substantial strategic reason for putting a garrison on Yonaguni was to send a message to China, whose next step, he said, was to go lay claim to the Ryuku islands. Here is the  article I filed and then then the cut portion to follow, which also included comments by Corey:

     Yonaguni Story“Yonaguni citizens have bifurcated into two streams of opinion following the 2010 Senkakus incident,” said Corey Wallace, Lecturer at the University of Auckland, who provides analysis of Japanese security issues at the Japan Security Watch website.

 “Some see the increasing presence of Chinese ships and the potential for conflict as requiring some kind of presence. But the (GSDF) monitoring unit’s proximity to the Senkakus means it could become a target,” leading to the deepening split in islander opinion, Wallace said.

  That split has left Mayor Hokama in a difficult situation, according to McCormack, because while Hokama originally supported the GSDF deployment for its perceived economic boost, recent growing opposition may now affect his chances of reelection- suggesting more old-fashioned political motives for the sudden demand.

  At the same time, the deployment has increasingly garnished more national political significance for the conservative Abe administration, which is seeking to provide a more robust stance to counter what it sees as Chinese expansionism, said Masaaki Gabe, professor of International Relations and the director of the International Institute for Okinawan Studies at the University of the Ryukyus.

 At one level it’s all about the money, Gabe said. But the Yonaguni issue has become both symbolically and strategically important. The deployment has become a poster child of the Abe administration’s stronger stance against China, which is a combination of appealing to and building on popular patriotic sentiment while reinforcing Japan’s military both symbolically and in reality against what is now publicly acknowledged by Japanese political and defense elites as the growing threat of China.

  Since assuming power late last year, the Abe administration has been the first Japanese government in 11 years to raise defense spending, albeit only 0.8%. Beefing up Japan’s defense of its South East island chain and deterring potential Chinese aggression is now a strategic priority.

  First, while the deployment of troops and radar station is presently strategically not a major component of Japan’s Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance capabilities, which are now a strategic priority for the MoD, forward basing facilities provides options to build out capability later.

  But more importantly perhaps, boots on Yonaguni anticipate a future hand in China’s diplomatic poker game if and when it seeks to start pressing historical claims to sovereignty over the ancient Ryukyu Kingdom, which is present day Okinawa, of which Yonaguni is the most eastern island. 

 “This is part of Japan justifying its territorial sovereignty. In a future stage, China will assert its claims to Okinawa,” and the deployment to Yonaguni, which has never based Japanese troops before, is a step in forestalling this, Gabe said.

  In light of this, Gabe sees the current spat as sorting itself out in due course, mainly because too much is at stake for the MoD and the island, which will stand to loose out much more financially in the longer run should the deployment be abandoned.

Almost as soon as he said it to me, China, enter stage right (or from the left, if you will), went ahead the week after the article was published and staked its claim to the Ryukus.

Did the Foreign Ministry read my article and decide to give it the ol’ Communist try?

Well no, the  was this preplanned according to whatever schedule Beijing has in its largely successful media strategy (read psychological warfare) to make Japan out to be the bad guy (still now) in the hood.

First some think tank floats the idea publicly, then the Foreign Ministry does its thing, then Luo Yuan puts his own footprint into the issue.

Helicopter Markets Steady in East Asia

Here’s another recent piece for Defense News, thanks again to Wendell Minnick

Rotary Combat

 

Catching up again

After a long discussion with Ito san recently, this is a priority for Japan.  Here is an ancient story by instant media standards on some issues that are strategically important.

Cyber

JSP Catchup #9: In Asia, C4ISR Market Is Growing

Ahem, just after writing JSP Catchup #8, I have to issue a mea culpa as colleague Wendell Minnick asked me to contribute from Japan, resulting in us looking at the UAV issue in In Asia, C4ISR Market Is Growing, which is easier to link to without copy and pasting the Defense News version in the paper. But, here is how it looks on the web!

JSP Catchup #4: U.S., Japan Strengthen Ties Through Panetta Visit

After a long talk with an old SAIS buddy of mine, we came to the conclusion that China has blown it; Japan will now, following up on its more general security strategy, look to disinvest and take its business away and put it with the growing string of Asian nations who are also pissed at and increasingly concerned with China’s belligerence. Can China control the genie of nationalism it has unleashed?  I can see whiplash ahead.

The U.S. will find more common ground with Russia, if it has any sense at all. In any case, in answer to the old fear of abandonment that seems to resurface regularly, the U.S. in no certain terms seems to be showing more of its cards. Thank you, Mr. P!

Catchup #2 Japan’s Defense Budget Request Down 1.7 Percent

Here is a basic story on Japan’s defense budget request for next year for Defense News.  Of course the most interesting items for me are how the space and BMD budgets are working out, along with new investments in C4ISR. But this is more for a general audience.

The web story is here.

TOKYO — Japan’s Ministry of Defense on Sept. 10 requested 4.57 trillion yen ($58 billion) in budget appropriations for the next financial year, starting April 1, 2013, a figure that is 1.7 percent lower than the current budget. This represents the biggest one-year decline in half a century and the lowest total in two decades.

But the request also signals an ongoing restructuring and updating of Japan’s defense posture to counter China, and greatly upgrades command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; ballistic missile defense; and cyber defense capabilities.

Japan’s current five-year Mid-Term Defense Program of December 2010 has tasked the MoD with bolstering defense of the nation’s sea lanes and far-flung southeastern island chain, which extends from Okinawa to a few hundred kilometers from Taiwan. More recently, the MoD has begun to openly acknowledge China, which has an increasingly assertive Navy in the region, as a strategic concern.

In line with this, the ministry has been steadily reinforcing Japan’s marine, antisubmarine and surveillance capabilities. Consequently, the MoD for the next year has requested 72.3 billion yen for an advanced, 5,000-ton antisubmarine destroyer that features a new combined diesel-electric and gas propulsion system that will probably be developed in Japan.

The ministry has also asked for 10 billion yen to upgrade four E-767 airborne early warning and control aircraft, 19.2 billion yen for a 690-ton minesweeper featuring a fiber-reinforced plastic hull and 2.5 billion yen for four amphibious assault vehicles (AAVs).

The AAV request is viewed as the most important new item, said local military analyst Shinichi Kiyotani, who added the Ground Self-Defense Forces (GSDF) were looking to purchase four AAV-7 series vehicles after concluding that a vehicle developed in Japan could not meet cost and capability requirements.

“Japan has no marines or no Royal Marines for remote island protection,” Kiyotani said. “This was a significant purchase for the GSDF and a first for postwar Japan. It represents great progress in Japan’s efforts to deter threats against our islands.”

C4ISR and space systems also are more prominently featured, with the ministry requesting 100 million yen to convert its advanced FPS-5 phased array radar system so it can also conduct space situational awareness duties, in addition to funds for a research budget for a satellite-mounted ballistic missile early warning sensor, and 3 billion yen for an unmanned aerial vehicle-mounted ballistic missile early warning system.

And after several years of trying, the MoD has also requested 21.2 billion yen to set up a new cyber defense force with about 100 people, which will combine previous efforts to create a combined unit, along with 13.3 billion yen to reinforce cyber defense of the ministry’s core Defense Information Infrastructure.

Motohiro Tsuchiya, a professor at Keio University and member of the Information Security Policy Center, Japan’s top-level government cybersecurity advisory body, applauded the move to set up the unit as the MoD has previously been stymied by budgetary restraints in its attempts to set up the unit.

“The MoD has been trying for two years to set up the unit, but the attempts were refused by the Finance Ministry. It is said that the MoD will be finding about 100 staff to man the unit, but it is unclear if they will be 100 new staff, or seconded from other areas,” Tsuchiya said.

The Japanese budget year runs from April 1, with all of the nation’s government ministries putting in their requests to the powerful Ministry of Finance in late August or early September. The budget requests, already the result of haggling and negotiation, are then audited by the Finance Ministry, which generally makes small cuts, announcing the final figures at the end of December. The Japanese Diet then passes the ratified budget into law the following spring.

MV-22 Osprey One Crash from U.S.-Japan Alliance Disaster?

Lots and lots have been written about the running sore on U.S.-Japan alliance issues that is Futenma, but I was struck by just how unhappy the Japanese people I talked to are, with much of  the conversations having to remain off record.

When the U.S. came over to Japan in the week up to the original June 29 news of the deployment, alliance managers here were struck by the perceived U.S. attitude to the issue, which was basically “deal with it.”

Actually the story runs a lot deeper than that. Alliance managers in Tokyo may feel that Nagatacho has been put in a no-win solution with the situation, the MOD feels that the MV-22 is a military issue (if you want the U.S. to defend Japan, you got to have the best gear) while local politicians in Yamaguchi and Okinawa are genuinely fearful that the Osprey is one crash away from causing a genuine eruption of a “bases out/ no Americans in my back yard” sentiment spreading away from Okinawa into mainstream discourse via the media.

Anyway, coincidentally, in a bout of grim international relations-esque black humor, I have been plowing through “offensive realism” theory a la John J. Mearsheimer! Here is the story from this week’s Defense News.

Many thanks to Kawakami Sensei and Brooks Sensei for their insights on this issue.

Tough Choices Ahead for Japan’s F-XX Procurement

Defense News has just published a story that I did last week on the post F-35 choices Japan faces for its F-XX procurement. This was very interesting to write and research, as so much is “up in the air” and there are so many unknowns.

Unusually, Lockheed Martin refused to comment (Steve O’Bryan has been on the offensive recently emphasizing the positives with the F-35 program) while BAE’s Tony Ennis was happy to comment.

Questions include:

– Could there be some work for the Eurofighter after all? Will Japan feel bruised and abused if the F-35 turns out to be a poisoned chalice. (History of course is not on the Eurofighter’s side. The F-2, which became the thin edge of the wedge for the FSX procurement as the F-2 weighs in about 4X cost of a Block 50/52 F-16).

– What of the Mitsubishi ATD-X Shinshin? Is this as many believe a hedge or is it a complete waste of time and money. Is Japan really up for, and up to using this program as a hedge? Can MHI and TRDI really bring anything to the table.

Talking to analysts, the story would seem to be no. According to the excellent Prof. Narushige Michishita for one, the fact that Japan’s DBI is now non-competitive and falling away in technological ability (with analysts such as Kiyotani more or less calling the F-35 purchase an act of suicide), after failing to secure the F-22, Japan used the international RPF for the F-X in order to squeeze a better deal out of the U.S.

…and failed, or so it would seem to critics.

This question about the ATD-X revolves around the point that Japan seems to have felt compelled to buy the F-35 for fear of falling so far behind U.S. technology that it was prepared to swallow an industrial participation deal that many doubt will help Japanese industry to a 5th-generation fighter design and build capacity. Of course the U.S. probably doesn’t feel it wants Japan to have a 5th-generation fighter design and build capacity. But the days when Japan could bring technology, muscle, will and money to the table a la FSX seem to have long vanished. Meanwhile a recent internal report by MOD itself (see Japan’s Defense Industrial Base Nearing Crisis) has underscored just how much Japan is waking up to fundamental problems with its defense industrial base.

Interestingly for me,  Dr. Patrick Cronin at theCenter for a New American Security believes that that  F-15SE or the F-18 Super Hornet would still be great buys for Japan for the present, but should really go for it for a sixth-generation fighter.

“Either the F-15SE or the F-18 Super Hornet would be value added without breaking the bank.  Meanwhile, Japan needs to develop an F-XX future fighter that can defeat world-class defenses and aircraft out to the middle of this century and perhaps beyond.  That means Japan should be seeking to develop, possibly with an American partner, a sixth-generation aircraft with advanced stealth characteristics, directed energy weapons, and an unmanned option.  Thus, by the middle of next decade, JASDF would have two fighters (F-35s and either F-15SEs or F-18 Super Hornets).  It would then be preparing to field a sixth-generation F-XX.”

In addition to the Defense News version, here is the full interview with the  wonderful Paul Giarra at Global Strategies & Transformation whom along with Dr. Cronin, I would like to thank deeply for sharing some of their considerable insight and knowledge.

“JASDF fighter aircraft procurement beyond the 42 F-35s planned is a vital strategic issue for Japan.  In my view, Japan needs the best air force it can possibly get, for the defense of Japan as well as for alliance operations.  Unfortunately, even though Japan is normalizing militarily and responding to the emergence of China by revising its entire defense strategy, there is no aerospace strategy rationale in place to shape a positive outcome.

When Japan wanted to procure the F-22, there was no argument available to overcome legitimate export restrictions imposed by the U.S. Congress.  No one — whether Japanese or American airman or air power proponents — could argue that the Obey Amendment should be overturned, because there was no strategic rationale in hand for doing so.  That’s not to say that there could not be a compelling rationale for the F-22 or another equally good aircraft (Japanese or American), but there is no developed and deployable strategy, no vision, no operational basis for planning or procurement.

As for the F-35, I would say that 420 aircraft is as good a number as 42, because it is as arbitrary as 42, but at least with ten times the aircraft Japan would have a strong and credible air force.

As for particular aircraft, responsible airmen should have a vision of future air combat — we’re talking much more than a decade before any substantial number of new aircraft are available to JASDF.  Does an aircraft have to be a fifth generation, stealthy, and capable of super-cruise performance in order to meet the needs of JASDF?  What are those needs in the first place?  Will JASDF be flying directly overhead, defending Japanese airspace? Against what threats?  Will the JASDF be patrolling and fighting at the far periphery of Japan’s islands?  Will the JASDF be drastically outnumbered? What is the worst case?  The most likely case?  Will superb BVR missiles and air warfare command and control be sufficient, enabling a less capable aircraft?  What will be the operational relationship between JASDF and the U.S. Air Force?  Will alliance roles and missions influence, or even dictate, aircraft choice?  In this context, the Air Sea Battle concept looms large as a significant consideration going forward for JASDF and USAF planners.

How much time does JASDF have to make a choice and bring its new fleet of aircraft on line?  Is there a virtue to procuring relatively readily available F/A-18 Super Hornets or substantially re-designed F-15s?  Can Japan afford to wait?  Should JASDF skip ahead to some new combination of armed UAVs, or instead depend much more on very long range SAMs for territorial IAMD?  Are there new technologies or concepts on the horizon that are worth waiting for?

These are the sorts of questions that have answers if the JASDF and alliance aerospace strategy and air combat vision are in place.  There always will be tradeoffs between aircraft, but technical judgments and an informed choice can be made on the basis of a strategy, vision, and substantial and well developed roles and missions.

In the meantime, there are real industrial considerations on the table that never before have been factors.  With the relaxation of the three arms export control principles, it is possible for the first time for Japan’s aerospace industry to approach its American counterparts in a fundamentally different way that was never before possible:  as partners rather than consumers.  This adds a new dimension to JASDF’s procurement challenge.  In the long run, understanding and optimizing these new defense industry circumstances probably is as important as the aerospace strategy and vision.

It is natural that aircraft manufacturers paying suit to JASDF want to sell the aircraft they have developed.  Nevertheless, the most competitive will develop the aerospace rationale for JASDF’s new air fleet, and offer a strategic partnership that provides the air defense that Japan needs.

Japan F-35 Update – First 4 ALREADY at a Premium!

F-35s in production (sort of). A sight we won’t be seeing in Japan.

Here’s Japan Accepts First F-35s Despite Cost Premium

Was actually stuck on a train midway between Tokyo and them mountains without my MacBook Air on Friday so filed this late, but it does feed into my take on the F-XX purchase coming later, which will be the ASDF’s and MOD’s most significant purchase of the next 20-30 years.

Things don’t look good if Japan is ALREADY paying more than was agreed on last year, see: Japan May Cancel F-35 Buy if Cost Rises.

All-in-all, with Japan being a complete novice at offset trade negotiations and with it’s defense industrial base severely weakened, it seems that the MOD might have gotten a little out of its depth!  The Pentagon is altering the deal, and let’s hope they don’t alter it any further.

Japan Accepts First F-35s Despite Cost

Premium

Jun. 29, 2012 – 12:36PM   |By PAUL KALLENDER-UMEZU   |   1  Comments

TOKYO — Japan’s Ministry of Defense (MoD) said June 29 it had agreed to purchase the first four of 42 Lockheed Martin F-35s and two simulators for 10.2 billion yen ($127.8 million) each, plus parts, for a total cost of 60 billion yen, according to a news release.

The price of the initial four jets in the Letter of Offer and Acceptance singed by the MoD is significantly above the 9.9 billion yen ($124.1 million) agreed to last December, when, in a contentious decision, the ministry selected the advanced but still developmental F-35 to replace its 1960s-era F-4EJs.

After a tough request for proposals review, the MoD opted for 42 of the stealthy F-35s over the flight-proven and less expensive Eurofighter Typhoon and Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet.

The price rise comes in spite of a threat, repeated publicly by then-MoD Minister Naoki Tanaka, that Japan would consider canceling the F-35 purchase if significant troubles and delays emerged. The Pentagon’s January decision to delay orders for 179 F-35s over the next five years as part of defense budget cuts, and an admission by Lockheed that this will boost prices, has caused international concern.

Underscoring Japanese alarm that it might have stuck itself with a steadily worsening deal, Tanaka said at a Feb. 24 news conference the MoD had asked the U.S. to “strictly adhere” to the terms of the agreement, including the original 9.9 billion yen price and 2016 delivery date.

That threat appears to have melted away. Despite the retreat, local defense analyst Shinichi Kiyotani said that because the cost did not rise even higher that might be interpreted as a partial victory for the MoD, which could face an even tougher job suppressing future price rises for the remaining 38 jets if the program suffers further glitches.

“The MoD has got a pretty good price and negotiated well compared to the price rises that might come later,” Kiyotani said.

The planned purchase of the other 38 jets has yet to be formally confirmed.