Towards the H-3: Update

H-2A successor

Space News kindly published a version of my story on the H-3 last week. I’ve done the usual and pasted a version into this blog.

There is also a story by the ever excellent Warren Ferster on the Epsilon based on a JAXA presser. Please see this blog for more background on the Epsilon, or go to the new, vastly improved Space News website.

We can expect more light to be shone on this during June when the ONSP subcommittee makes its final recommendations. Meanwhile the Yomiuri and Asahi have some more information and perspective on the issue.

Our view in In Defense of Japan is that the H-series is a technology development program and while it may arouse screams of indignation and anger to say it, to put it bluntly, money will always be found to develop technologies that give Japan options. As, fundamentally, Saadia and I argue that Japan’s space program has always been basically, when you remove all the dressing, a dual-use strategic technology development program, then reasons to develop the H-3 will always be found.

As made plain by Dick Samuels and Mike Green, under nationalists such as Tomifumi Godai and in an era of rampant technonationalism and kokusanka, there were compelling reasons to develop the H-2. Japan wanted and needed to build a sophisticated, liquid fueled, highly efficient two-stage medium launch vehicle to cement its international reputation as part of the advanced spacefaring club. Remember, when the H-2 was envisaged over 20 years ago, few saw the impending “lost decade.”

Japan’s space program under NASDA was relatively awash with money, with investments made or planned  into all sorts of challenging dual-use precursor technologies including ETS-7 (on orbit ASAT demonstration) OICETS/ Kirari (laser communications), reconnaissance/ spy  satellites ICBM prototypes (M-V, J-1), reentry (OREX, USERS SEM) SIGINT (ETS-8), global strike (HYFLEX, HOPE) etc. Some highly ambitious programs that emerged last decade, have disappeared, for example HiMEOS and Smartsat-1.

On the other hand, ALSET looks as if it could make it.

これまでの基幹ロケットの評価と今後の在り方について 2013 年 4 月 24 日 宇宙輸送システム部会 委員 三菱重工業株式会社 代表取締役常務執行役員 航空宇宙事業本部長 鯨井 洋

これまでの基幹ロケットの評価と今後の在り方について
2013 年 4 月 24 日
宇宙輸送システム部会 委員
三菱重工業株式会社 代表取締役常務執行役員
航空宇宙事業本部長
鯨井 洋

Let’s not forget the H-2 very nearly made it to commercial viability but was fatally holed by the surging yen as well as dodgy turbopumps. So then money was found for the H-2A to solve the problem (half the costs, boost the payload) …but as we argue in In Defense of Japan, whether or not the H-2A really made it was not the issue. Could the program be justified in terms of a technology development program to the MoF. The peanuts in terms of cost involved in developing the H-2A compared to the cost of major launch vehicle systems by other advanced democracies (lets just name the Ariane 5) meant yes.

And now the cycle starts again. So how will the H-3 be sold to the MoF under the rubric of Japan’s latest stated space policy?

Sure, as something that will be commercially viable. Whether or not MHI and JAXA can actually achieve this is, we contend, strategically, a mute question. If and when the H-3 doesn’t make it commercially, MHI and Japan will have at least invested in developing a new level of excellent technologies that will secure Japan’s independent launch vehicle capabilities and provide jobs, technology and investment in its aerospace sector. Incidentally, the H-3 is now being sold by MHI as “catchup” again, as the slide above shows.

Sure, the same old cycle of vituperation and lashing will follow in the Japanese media if or when the H-3 fails to make the grade commercially, but the more strategic goals of “keeping/ catching up” will have been met.

A New Direction For Japan’s Space Program?

Here is the longer version of the previous article:

Aviation Week & Space Technology   May 06, 2013 , p. 36

Paul Kallender-Umezu
Tokyo

Japanese space programs face strict new reality

Et Tu, Tokyo?

The first order of business for new Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) leader Naoki Okumura will be to reorient his nation’s space program from advanced development to activities that may produce some commercial return on investment.

EpsilonBased on the latest five-year “Basic Plan” for space promulgated by the Office of National Space Policy (ONSP), the new direction is putting pressure on JAXA to cut, postpone or reduce to research and development some or most of the agency’s flagship science, technology and manned spaceflight programs.

Some or all of the satellites planned for the Global Earth Observation System of Systems, the HTV-R pressurized sample-and-crew-return mini-shuttle and the H-X/H-3 launcher programs could face cancellation, concedes JAXA’s Hiroshi Sasaki, senior advisor in the strategic planning and management department.

“For 20 years, so much money has been spent by JAXA [and its predecessor, Nasda] on R&D, but there has been very little commercial return,” says Hirotoshi Kunitomo, ONSP director.

Under legislation passed last year, JAXA policy is now controlled by the 23-member ONSP, which was created at the end of a process begun in the middle of the past decade to wrest control of space planning from the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), which controlled 60% of Japan’s roughly 350 billion yen ($3.75 billion) annual government space budget through its oversight of JAXA.

With a charter for change, ONSP reports directly to Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who has final say over which of JAXA’s programs are funded. In turn, ONSP’s Basic Plan resets Japan’s space policy to three mutually reinforcing goals: promoting national security; boosting industry; and securing the country’s technological independence for all major space applications from reliance on foreign agencies—providing this supports the first two goals.

Kunitomo asserts that ONSP will continue to support frontier science as a lower priority, as long as it is based on the sort of low-cost, high-impact space science designed by JAXA’s Institute of Space and Astronautical Science , embodied by the Hayabusa asteroid sample-return mission. But former high-priority goals to promote environmental monitoring and human space activities and put robots on the Moon now have been moved down the list and must fight for funding, Kunitomo says.

Instead, only one of the three ONSP core programs—Japan’s launch vehicles—is run by JAXA.

The top-priority program, run by the ONSP, is to build out the Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS), Japan’s regional GPS overlay, with a budget approved for maintaining a constellation of four QZSS satellites by around 2018. A post-2020 build-out to a seven-satellite constellation will then give Japan its own independent regional positioning, navigation and timing capability.

The second is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (Asean) newly sanctioned disaster management network run by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). This requires a constellation of Earth-observing satellites equipped with X- and L-band radar and hyperspectral sensors to monitor Southeast Asia. Japan will provide at least the first three satellites, with more funding through foreign aid packages. Vietnam has signed up for two X-band satellites. The system’s once-daily global-revisit policy requires a minimum constellation of four satellites that will need to be replenished every five years or so.

The third priority has JAXA focusing on improving the current H-2A launch vehicle in partnership with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) while continuing improvement of its new low-cost, launch-on-demand Epsilon solid-fuel rocket for smaller payloads. A variant of the Epsilon will be uprated to around 1,800 kg (3,970 lb.) from 1,200 kg to low Earth orbit, matching that of its predecessor M-V launch vehicle.

JAXA projects that fall outside the Basic Plan’s goals but already were funded for development will continue if it would be counter-productive to stop them, says Kunitomo. These include launching the upcoming ALOS-2 land-observing system and the Global Precipitation Measurement/Dual-frequency Precipitation Radar satellites. The Greenhouse Gases-Observing Satellite-2 (Gosat-2) will also continue, as it is funded by the Environment Ministry, not MEXT/JAXA.

But under a Feb. 25 budget plan drawn up by Kunitomo, several programs face close scrutiny, including the HTV-R sample-return mission, any future launches of the HTV-R transfer vehicle beyond the current seven planned to 2016, lunar exploration and all of JAXA’s follow-on environmental missions.

The ONSP’s logic for reauditing the HTV-R is harsh. As it is too expensive to commercialize, the H-2B will be ditched as dead once its HTV duties are finished. The HTV’s only purpose is to service the International Space Station, and Japan must minimize its costs, so logically the HTV, HTV-R and H-2B have no future beyond 2016 and the HTV’s seventh flight. Indeed, one industry official tells Aviation Week that Japan may launch at most two post-2016 missions.

The Basic Plan mandates that the agency’s already-low-priority environmental-monitoring programs undergo a “focus and reselection process.” This means the proposed GCOM-C, EarthCARE cloud radar mission and ALOS-3 electro-optical missions , the second main plank of Japan’s flagship international cooperation programs with NASA and the European Space Agency , will struggle for funding, and not all will make it, says Kunitomo. But a reconfigured ALOS-3 that can adapt to the Asean disaster management network at a fraction of its projected price would be more acceptable, he concedes.

As for the putative H-X, Kunitomo says ONSP questions the need to spend $2 billion and 8-10 years to develop it. JAXA and MHI say the program requires a launch system that no one can guarantee will be commercially competitive.

Industry’s reaction to all of this appears to range from stress to relief to anxiety. Masaru Uji, a general manager at the Society of Japanese Aerospace Companies, says QZSS and Asean network programs will provide steady, long-term business for Japan’s two satellite integrators: Mitsubishi Electric, which is supplying its DS2000 bus for the QZSS; and NEC Corp. , with its METI-funded 300-kg-class multipurpose Asnaro bus for the network.

The aerospace trade association figures show that for 2011, Japan’s total space sales—both overseas and domestic, and including all subcontractor revenues—amounted to only ¥265 billion ($2.7 billion). That is down from a peak of ¥379 billion in 1998, with overseas commercial sales accounting for only the low teens in revenue and JAXA programs taking the lion’s share of domestic business.

The Basic Plan “is moving in the right direction. You can’t build a business without infrastructure,” says Satoshi Tsuzukibashi, director of the Industrial Technology Bureau at Keidanren, Japan’s most powerful business lobby.

Uji is particularly pleased for NEC, which has been awarded a so-called private finance initiative to develop the QZSS ground segment, spreading steady payments to the company for at least the next 15 years. Anticipating the Basic Plan this January, NEC announced a ¥9.9 billion investment in a new 9,000-sq.-meter (97,000-sq.-ft.) satellite facility in Fuchu, west of Tokyo, to build a fleet of Asnaro satellites, which it also hopes to market commercially under the Nextar brand, says Yasuo Horiuchi, senior manager of NEC’s satellite business development office.

Similarly, Mitsubishi Electric said in March that it completed a doubling of its satellite production capacity to eight buses annually at its Kamakura Works. Having already sold four of the 13 DS2000-based satellites to commercial satellite services customers, increased volume spurred by the QZSS program will create further efficiencies and cost competitiveness, says Executive Director Eiichi Hikima.

MHI may face a different challenge, however. Ryo Nakamura, director of H-2A-2B launch services in the company’s Space Systems Div., says an improved H-IIA may gain one commercial contract in 2015-16. This may convince ONSP to fund the H-X (or H-3), whose first stage was supposed to use an LE-X engine with a high-thrust expander bleed cycle. Before the Basic Plan , the rocket was slated in JAXA’s road map to undergo the first of its three test launches around 2018. Hidemasa Nakanishi, manager of strategy and planning at the Space Systems Div., thinks it is Japan ‘s duty as an advanced spacefaring nation to complete its participation in the International Space Station, thus learning pressurized return technologies through the HTV-R .

JAXA’s Sasaki points out that nothing has been cut yet, and JAXA is going to battle to preserve as much of its “traditional” programs as it can in the relevant subcommittees though the spring. Key decisions will come in June.

Japanese Space Program Braces For Cuts

Here is a shorter version of the longer article that was published in Aviation Week last month. It was great to have the chance to write a little bit about what is going on in Japan. I’m posting this now, since Japan is nearing a decision on exactly what sort of H-3 launch vehicle it wants, for example, here, here, here and here, just to name a few. I’ll just post the longer form article and then my take on the H-3.

TOKYO — As Japan’s space policy plans shift away from research and development, the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) is finding its flagship science, technology and manned spaceflight programs in line for cuts and cancellations.

Some or all of Japan’s satellites planned for the Global Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS), the HTV-R pressurized sample-and-crew-return mini-shuttle, and the H-X/H-3 launcher programs could face cancellation, says JAXA’s Hiroshi Sasaki, senior advisor for the strategic planning and management department.

Epsilon rocketNew laws have placed control of the Japanese space agency in the hands of the Office of National Space Policy. And ONSP director Hirotoshi Kunitomo seeks to reorient Japan’s space efforts from idealism to realism.

ONSP will continue to support frontier science as a lower priority, providing it is based on the sort of low-cost, high-impact space science designed by JAXA’s Institute of Space and Astronautical Science (ISAS), embodied by the Hayabusa asteroid sample return mission. But former high-priority goals to promote environmental monitoring, human space activities and putting robots on the Moon are now much lower priorities and will have to fight for funding, Kunitomo says.

Instead, ONSP is focusing on three core programs, and only one of them, Japan’s launch vehicles, is a JAXA program.

The highest priority effort, run by the ONSP, is to build out the Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS), Japan’s regional GPS overlay, with a budget approved for maintaining a constellation of four QZSS satellites by around 2018. A post-2020 build out to a seven-satellite constellation will then give Japan its own independent regional positioning, navigation and timing capability.

The second is the Association of Southeast Asian Nation’s (ASEAN) newly sanctioned Disaster Management Network run by the Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry (METI). This requires a constellation of Earth-observing optical, X- and L-band radar and hyperspectral sensor-equipped satellites monitoring Southeast Asia. Japan will provide at least the first three satellites, with more funding through foreign aid packages. Vietnam has already signed up for two X-band satellites. Stated policy requires a once-daily revisit over any part of the Earth, requiring a minimum constellation of four satellites that will need to be regularly replenished every five years or so.

The third priority focuses is on improving the current H-2A, which JAXA is working on with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI). It is also continuing improvement of JAXA’s new low-cost, launch-on-demand Epsilon solid launch rocket for smaller payloads. A variant will be uprated from 1,200 kg (2,650 lb.) to around 1,800 kg to low Earth orbit, matching that of its predecessor M-V launch vehicle.

JAXA projects that fall short of the Basic Plan’s goals but are already funded for development will continue if it is counterproductive to stop them, Kunitomo says. These include launching the upcoming ALOS-2 land-observing system and the Global Precipitation Measurement/Dual-frequency Precipitation Radar satellites. The greenhouse-gases-focused Observing Satellite-2 (GOSAT-2) is also safe, as it is funded by the Environment Ministry, not JAXA.

But under a Feb. 25 budget plan drawn up by Kunitomo, several programs face harsh scrutiny, including the HTV-R sample return mission, any future launches of the HTV-R transfer vehicle beyond the current seven planned through 2016, the H-3, Moon exploration and all of JAXA’s follow-on environmental missions.

Harsh logic

The ONSP’s logic for re-auditing the HTV-R is harsh. As it is too expensive to commercialize, the H-2B will be ditched as dead once its HTV duties are finished. As the HTV’s only purpose is to service the International Space Station, andImage Japan must minimize its costs, then logically the HTV, HTV-R and H-2B have no future beyond 2016 and the HTV’s seventh flight. Indeed, one industry source tells Aviation Week that Japan may launch perhaps two, at most, post-2016 missions.

For JAXA, things get tougher. ONSP plans mandate that the agency’s now-low priority environmental monitoring programs undergo a “focus and re-selection process.” This means the proposed GCOM-C, EarthCARE cloud radar mission and ALOS-3 electro-optical missions — the second main plank of Japan’s flagship international cooperation programs with NASA and the European Space Agency — will fight for funding, and not all will make it, Kunitomo says. But he concedes a reconfigured ALOS-3 that can adapt to the Disaster Management Network at a fraction of its projected price tag would become more acceptable.

Path to the H-X Part II

2011年5月9日

Earlier we took a look at the development of the improved H-2A/B rocket that is going to “lower costs” for commercial satellites to help the H-2A compete in the global market.

Well that may be true, but the key point about the improvements is that they follow Japan’s traditional approach to technology investment- kaizen. By continually learning and improving, the spin-on for Japan’s ability to put be able to put all sorts of payloads in all sorts of places is the necessary deeper function of the dual-use technonationalist development paradigm.

This article looks at the deeper story behind the improved H-2A. Like the Epsilon, development has been pushed out. Unlike the Epsilon, the future potential evolution of the H-series to human rating is quite clear.

The first thing to point out is that the upgrades I wrote about in Space News are a deal less ambitious than those originally planned last September. I the original plans for these through the spring, but they were embargoed. Now they’re to have as a reference.

LE-X and H-X

Anyway, lets step back and take a look at how Japan’s rocket program rose and fell and rose again, the inflection points being the February 21, 1998 (crack in LE-5A cooling chamber, dodgy brazing,) and November 15, 1999 (fatigue failure LE-7A inducer) back-to-back failures of the H-2 and then the November 29, 2003 failure (nozzle erosion, SRB-A) of the H-2A carrying two IGS spy satellites.

It was the failure of the H-2A’s Nissan/Thiokol technology SRB-A that particularly incensed then-SAC Commissioner Iguchi, who slammed his desk in frustration: “We forgot to check the SRB-A!” he exclaimed, and rankled Takeo Kawamura (then MEXT-minister and in-name-only responsible for the cursed booster’s non-separation from the core stage) enough to begin the process of reforming Japan’s space governance- reforms that are just now being resolved by Yamakawa sensei.

We shall overcome indeed.

But since then the H-2A/B have flown with a perfect record, with the H-2B representing a literally huge boost to Japan’s LV integration skills as well as its launch capacity all for a couple of hundred million bucks. Yes, THAT GOOD!

Apart from improvements in nozzles, cavitation, valves and vibration, JAXA and MHI’s continuous kaizen have led to a number of other improvements of other weaknesses, including separating redundancy lines to make them even more robust, and protecting the wire harness, lets never remember that these rockets work as designed and developed at a cost one order lower than their U.S. rivals.

Another one of those failures by Japan’s doomed and disaster-prone space program, right?

Now lets go to the H-X, which is scheduled for development in 2020; the key weapon for this is the LE-X engine, which will use a high-thrust expander bleed cycle engine, making it inherently more safe and robust.

Thrust will be 1450kN, Specific Impulse (vacuum)  432 seconds and the rotational speeds of the FTP and OTP will be 40,800 rpm and 16,100 rpm respectively.  The engine will feature a simplified manifold for the injector, a single-sage open impeller with a two-stage inducer for the fuel turbo pump, a spin-form single sheet metallic nozzle and the oxygen turbo pump will feature a single-stage impeller and a two-stage turbine. Component testing is due to start next year with prototype engine test firing in 2015 and qualification tests beginning in 2017. If everything goes according to plan -a big if of course- then a test flight might be feasible as early as 2018, according to internal JAXA documents.

Will Japan pull it off and be launching a manned H-X in 2020. I don’t think so- there isn’t the will nor the money. Can Japan do it?

You bet!

Japan Maps Pathway to H-X

….First steps halted by lack of budget…

I get sort of incredulous when folks talk about the various failures of Japan’s space development programs to do this and that. The only things Japan’s space development program is guilty of is being inexpensive and successful.  How much did Kounotori cost to develop then, and the H-2B?

Following the Asahi’s punt at describing JAXA’s H-3 rocket earlier this year, I decided to take look at Japan’s steps toward human spaceflight via upgrading the H-2 family. After talking to MHI back in 2005, I didn’t expect too many changes, with the primary new technology driver for the H-3 being the LE-X engine.

Five years later, and things seem to be on the same course, although JAXA is now openly offering its development schedules and plans to those interested and it makes for a great look into the future.

First of all, the fact that JAXA will be embarking on a “Phase I” upgrade this April spurred me to file an article for Space News, which is now below. Initially I’d like to make comments on the missing elements of this story and background that can’t be crammed in a 550-750 word article, and then I’ll move on to future plans in more detail in Part II, which will also show just how advanced thinking is on polishing the space silverware in Japan.

First of all, here is the story, then some follow-up below:

Comments:
Ever since I first started writing on the H-II, with a story on Nissan importing CFRP technology for the  H-2A’s initial SRB-As, what, back in 1997 as I remember, we have been “waiting” for the H-IIA  to fulfill its stated public goal of being “commercially” successful.

In many ways, one of the key points about In Defense of Japan is that it doesn’t really, really matter if the H-2A is commercially successful or not, because the money will always be found to keep on developing Japan’s liquid  and solid) propulsion and system integration technology, whether the rocket makes a profit in the commercial marketplace or not.

There are several parts to this argument: but my point is that that fundamentally, money will always be found because that’s been essential part of Japan’s technonationalist industrial policy since the Meij Ishin period (see Rich Nation, Strong Army, which forms an essential plank for the arguments in In Defense of Japan).

Beyond the spin-on, spin-off paradigm, and MHI’s long-standing interest in microsatellites, MHI is very keen to get the story about about these upgrades because they show the strong commitment to improving this wonderful system, showcase MHI’s and Japan’s technologies, and well, if the yen were even 120 to the dollar, how cheap would the H-2A be compared to the Atlas anyway?

That’s wishful thinking, but it is a fact that Tanegashima’s issues don’t begin and end with ralicraltant fishing unions who need regular dollops of fiscal and pools of alcoholic lubrication to open up the launch windows.

However the physics of getting a payload into orbit from Southern Japan don’t change no matter how much awamori is consumed. Firstly, the rocket has to take a bit of a long and winding ascent to avoid you name it South East Asian nations who don’t appreciate tons of flaming toxic space debris landing on them should the worst happen. Then, and here’s the spin, Tanegashima is quite a way off the equator meaning the H-2A is loosing out on arrival as well. So the top line is the bottom line and MHI are very keen to point out that the long-cruise capability saves (potential) customers money.

The second point I would like to make is that the upgrade I wrote about is actually a stripped down version. The Epsilon has also been hit. Despite both LVs being high priority, penny pinching means that the improvements to the H-2A and the Epsilon are actually strung out to a different timetable and diluted implementation compared to what even was the consensus for the development pathways as late as last September.