Here is an older about the IGS spy satellite constellation for Space News which has been left “as is” by the Office of National Space Policy (ONSP) in its February 25 Mk. II Basic Plan. I have a lot to say about this for academia this year, but managed to get a story out for Aviation Week & Space Technology, which I’ll post a bit later.
Posted by japanspace on May 9, 2013
https://japanspace.wordpress.com/2013/05/09/japan-rebuilding-igs-spy-satellite-network/
Here is a story that Space News asked me to write for their Military Space Quarterly, so it gave me a chance to write a little bit about the militarization of Japan’s space development, which is apparently not occurring.
The intriguing thing for me as a media participant and, more recently, as an observer, is why Japan’s development of a UAV program for early warning should suddenly become news.
And, ahem…news.
Well, it’s because the Yomuiri decided it was news, even though the information has been out there since August, when the request for the budget was put out.
This led to the story being printed in the English and then suddenly the WSJ even has an angle.
Perhaps the journalist has figured out that maritime observation was somehow important to the U.S.-Japan Alliance, perhaps as it has been written in as one of the fours priority areas of cooperation. in the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (2+2) (June 2011).
The funniest story of them all was an AFP hack job on the Yomiuri story which was itself re-sluiced round media slop sites, including a website called Inquirer.net, which quoted the AFP quoting the Yomiuri as saying “The defense ministry has demanded 3 billion yen ($372 million) over the next four years to develop the aircraft, which would come into operation in 2020, the Yomiuri Shimbun reported without citing sources.”
The Yomiuri Shimbun’s source was, as I mentioned, the publicly available MOD budget request, released months before, in color:
The fact that Japan is developing UAVs is old, old news; the fact that it is developing them as an alternative to satellite- based EW was big news- back in August. I wonder why the Yomiuri decided to notice the story months later?
In any case, for space watchers, the interesting point about this why is Japan researching twin Early Warning programs simultaneously?
If you believe in the cock-up theory of history and recognize the stovepiping inherent in any large bureaucracy, then you might call it one hand not knowing what the other is doing.
In this case however, it is more probably the extreme anxiety that the MOD feels about buying Japanese, which is probably based on the fact that the IGS has proved so problematical for Japan. There is a strong sense in the MoD that it can buy better gear, cheaper, with guaranteed compatibility and interoperability in terms of space based EW, so why risk buying from Melco?
Also there are tricky decisions whether to mount EW sensors on the geo-based satellites of QZSS, or develop standalone satellites, or put capability on a future Himawari, among other options on the table. In the meantime, cheap and cheerful UAV-mounted sensors are an option.
I’ll talk about SSA in a later submission, perhaps at the end of the month. If EW looks complicated for Japan, wait till you see what is happening with SSA! Anyway, here is a recent article from Space News.
Posted by japanspace on November 19, 2012
https://japanspace.wordpress.com/2012/11/19/jsp-catchup-8-japan-to-boost-missile-warning-other-surveillance-efforts-2/
Here is the follow-up to JSP Catchup #6: Probe Uncovers 40-year Japanese Contractor Fraud and a fuller story for Defense News published the following week. I am still intrigued on who blew the whistle and why, but hopefully this will clean out a very mucky stable. Again there are so many unanswered questions, but perhaps it was felt that Melco had gotten too big for its boots.
This was certainly the message I got around Kasumigaseki in the mid-noughties when it became increasingly apparent that, at least in space, the IGS was overpriced and not very functional. But it seemed that Japan was stuck with it until better alternatives came up.
Meanwhile, Melco’s answer was, of course, to ask for more money to improve (repair) the IGS. The numbers of contracts and amounts are quite staggering, because the practice of overcharging was built into the very fabric of Melco’s system, and reading between the lines, it seems that the NEC scandal of 1998, instead of provoking a response to clean up, it did the reverse- Melco adopted increasingly sophisticated systems of cover-up and concealment. Not good.
A basic fact is that Melco produces a lot of excellent technology and systems and is a corner stone of Japan’s defense and space industries. While it really should have cleaned its stable out in 1998, as no doubt many others did, to the degree of information that is available, it seems that justice is being done. Perhaps at last, some real “Changes for the Better” ?
Posted by japanspace on November 19, 2012
https://japanspace.wordpress.com/2012/11/19/jsp-catchup-7-japan-still-calculating-cost-of-defense-firms-padded-bills/
This story was NOT a surprise; the fuller story is at Japan Still Calculating Cost of Defense Firm’s Padded Bills, but ever since NEC Corp. in 1998 was found with its hands in the till, I have been wondering who would be fingered next, and when, and why when, and why.
I say this because when I chatted to people back in 1998, the practice of padding contracts with surplus labor costs was widespread in the space and defense sectors and this was commonly known. At the time the questions were Why NEC? And Why Now? Below my initial October story is NEC SCANDAL SHEDS LIGHT ON JAPANESE PROCUREMENTS, a more fruity web version of a story that I originally wrote for Space News back in the day.
The timing for the original NEC story was also interesting as NEC was strongly pushing for its version of what was to become Japan’s IGS spy satellite system that was provoked by the Teapodon Trigger– an analysis that Saadia and I wrote about in In Defense of Japan (thank you Google Books!)
At the time NEC’s version of what was to become the IGS would have featured smaller satellites and cost less than Melco’s system. But with NEC suddenly out of the picture, Melco, with Ichiro Taniguchi at the helm, managed to personally lobby Japan’s Cabinet in the weeks after the Taepondon launch, and Japan’ got the IGS.
Here is a nice picture from Space Safety Magazine of Japan’s 1,200-Kilogram IGS 1B Satellite re-entered Earth’s Atmosphere on Thursday, July 26, 2012 after spending nearly 9.5 years in space. Another more detailed article about this can be found at Spaceflight.101.com.
Eventually, NEC’s small-bus and higher resolution system has been re-emerging in the ASNARO system, which is now being pushed as an alternative and complementary system to the expensive and relatively lower performance IGS, and also as the linchpin of a satellite-based, pan-Asian disaster monitoring network that is now a major part of Japan’s emerging regional space diplomacy and security strategy. At least the Vietnamese have bought into it, and while customers don’t seem to be forming a line yet, there is still a lot of hope out there.
Here is the initial story for Defense News:
By Paul Kallender in Tokyo
When, in September 1998, an investigation into the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) discovered that Japanese technology giant NEC Corp had systematically defrauded the taxpayer on 33 space contracts over the course of five years, it looked as though Japan’s obviously abused government procurement system was about to get a major overhaul.
The investigation began promisingly enough. On September 3, Tokyo prosecutors raided the JDA and arrested Kenichi Ueno, deputy head of the Procurement Office, and a clutch of executives from NEC subsidiary Toyo Communications.
This followed discoveries that not only had Toyo overcharged the JDA some $21m over dozens of equipment contracts, but that Ueno and others had conspired to prevent Toyo, NEC and other subsidiaries from repaying the money. NEC was raided the next day and by September 10, nine senior NEC and JDA executives were in jail.
It came to light that Ueno and others had lifted incriminating paperwork out of the Agency’s filing cabinets and put them into incinerators and even the homes of friends. NEC’s SuperTower headquarters was soon besieged by the Japanese phenomenon of ‘sound trucks,’ driven by right-wing extremists screaming abuse and demanding mass resignations.
But instead of resulting in the punishment of protagonists and the start of reforms, the scandal collapsed into a desultory cover-up. NEC’s initial response was to deny everything, with a bemused VP Masakatsu Miwa telling the media on September 10 that he did not expect top NEC executives to resign because of the scandal, going on to explain that he “wondered why” NEC officials were being implicated. Unfortunately for Miwa, on September 29, NEC’s overcharging was upscaled to $2.5bn, while, on the same day, a Parliamentary committee reported that the JDA had hired no less than 44 NEC executives in senior positions in just two years. By October 10, former NEC VP Hiroaki Shimayama and Takenori Yanase, VP of NEC’s Space Systems Division, had both been arrested.
Thieves charter
The National Space Development Agency (NASDA) launched an inquiry and on November 9, NEC admitted overcharging by at least $19m. Meanwhile on October 14, the JDA revealed that 225 of its officials had been hired by 20 suppliers in the past five years, shedding some dim light on a corner of Japan’s Amadudari (Descent from Heaven) career kickback system.
At the heart of the issue, according to NASDA’s former executive director Akira Kubozono, is the flawed government contract system which encourages corruption through a combination of legendary meanness and bureaucratic incompetence.
“There are two points about this affair,” he said. “One is that NEC is just a scapegoat. The second is that the governmental contract system is the cause of this scandal. When the defense contract revelations began, I thought it was only a matter of time before it spread into NEC’s space systems division as both defense and space procurement are conducted under similar systems.”
Under the Japanese government contract system, the co ntractor is obliged to repay any unused budget if the delivery price falls below the contract amount, and the contractor must also incur any costs if the project overshoots the agreed estimate — a thieves charter if ever there was one.
Furthermore NASDA, the Science and Technology Agency and the Ministry of Finance lack the technical expertise to evaluate bids and tend to just accept company estimates, says Kubozono. “The system needs to be reformed but I doubt this is possible as long as NASDA and the corporations are controlled by STA administrators (who also often retire to executive positions in NASDA) and not by engineers,” he says.
No mettle Kubozono, it seems, was right.
By November 12, the space scandal seemed to have been wrapped up, with NASDA saying it was satisfied that only NEC had abused the system. “The system has worked well for 30 years. We believe that a little devil whispered into NEC’s ear. We do not think it will happen again,” said Yasuyuki Fukumuro, NASDA PR deputy director. Fukumuro quickly admitted that NEC would be allowed to bid for Japan’s new spy satellite system, after a token contract moratorium.
Back at the JDA, a grand total of six senior officials will take up to 10% pay cuts for one to three months plus one official will receive a 10-day suspension, JDA chief Fukushiro Nukuga told the media at his November 20 resignation press conference.
The speech followed a report, which admitted that there had been “some incidents that could be regarded as a systematic cover-up,” perhaps referring to the 31 officials suspected of Berlin-bunker style burning of documentation that might have provided evidence.
But the worst thing about the affair, according to observers, has been the brazen arrogance of NEC. In his October 23 resignation speech, NEC Chairman Tadahiro Sekimoto, now under personal investigation for his role in the affair, denied any involvement but resigned out of “social responsibility” for the affair, astonishing Kubozono in particular.
“Sekimoto’s act was spineless. If he had honor he would have resigned to take responsibility, not quibbled. He showed no mettle and is a very poor example for younger business leaders. I fear for Japan’s future.”
An even poorer analysis comes from Youichi Teraishi, Editor of Japan’s ‘scandaru’ [scandal] daily, the Nikkan Gendai. He says that Sekimoto’s act compared unfavorably with Yakuza (the Japanese Mafia) standards of conduct. “This Oyabun [Japanese gang boss] showed a lack of chivalry. Captains of industry are supposed to be able to demonstrate this, but Sekimoto lacked the class,” he says.
Lastly, the scandal has left NEC seething that it was singled out for a brutal slap on the wrist. “Everyone is doing it, why should we be the scapegoat?” admitted one NEC official. “Our top management just stuck their heads in the sand and got shafted,” complained another.
This article first appeared in Global Technology News.
Posted by japanspace on November 19, 2012
https://japanspace.wordpress.com/2012/11/19/jsp-catchup-6-probe-uncovers-40-year-japanese-contractor-fraud/
You couldn’t make it up. You just couldn’t. I just asked the MOD about this very likelihood this week!
The announcement that the DPRK is attempting a third satellite launch in mid-April is just the sort of development that will help propel Japan’s basic BMD and nascent military space deployment.
The fact that so the Eunha-3 (Galaxy) rocket will fly over the Yellow Sea and not Japan doesn’t mean the news hasn’t already caused a huge stir in Japan, with the story being the top news on most TV.
Regardless of the flightpath, the launch will constitute another violation of June 2009’s UNSC Resolution 1874 that was passed the last time DPRK tried to launch a satellite (see below).
“We urge North Korea to exercise restraint and refrain from the launch,” said Chief Cabinet Secretary Osamu Fujimura, echoing statements from ROK.
What timing!
On Tuesday I was talking to Masayuki Iwaike, Director of Missile Defense and Space Policy at MOD about Japan’s approach to SSA and likely speed of moves by Japan on Early Warning, following last June’s 2+2, when Japan and the U.S. basically agreed that Japan will add some form of EW capability to its BMD systems, either through adding IR sensors on QZSS/Michibiki or through several different satellite bus plans (candidates include
SERVIS-3 by USEF and ASNARO, among others) with the CISC probably jealously guarding its independence with the IGS program, keeping it from the Space Strategy Office to be formed in April.
The key point about next week’s Defense News article, will be that Japan has more or less completed its basic two-tier BMD system, with its radar and sensor structure also on the verge of completion with the fourth and final FPS-5 S-band phased array ground based early warning radar nearly finished, joining the upgraded FPS-3 3-D phased-array radars, and JADGE up and running. Meanwhile PAC-3 is being boosted and the MSDF is adding two more SM3-Block 1A capable cruisers.
So the big question was to Iwaike, will you accelerate plans or add capability if the recent U.S.-DPRK agreement turns out to be not worth the paper its written on?
– Remember last month North Korea supposedly agreed to suspend uranium enrichment, halt nuclear and long-range missile tests, and to allow back U.N. weapons inspectors in exchange for a quarter of a million tons of “food aid.”
So what happens if they start firing off their nasty fireworks demonstrating significant new capabilities, or creditable information comes out about successful miniaturization of their Pakistani/stolen bargain-basement fission bomb technology (actually, then consequently making it a creditable threat)?
Will Japan build out BMD?
Of course, I didn’t put the it that way, but the message was an unequivocal yes. Because all the key systems are in place. But that’s for next week’s article.
Please read Defense News on Monday.
The beauty of the SM3-/PAC-3 two-tier system is that it works (with caveats, see Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress) and it’s only going to get better. And when the Chinese decided to create chaos in orbit with its 2007 ASAT test leading to what is rapidly going to become a crisis if nothing is done over the next decade, the U.S. was able to remind the Chinese just whom they are dealing with if they are serious.
And then, just on time, news comes out that North Korea is attempting its third satellite launch (Kwangmyŏngsŏng-3) around April 12-16 to celebrate the 100th anniversary of the birth Kim Il Sung, on April 15.
The Taepodon Trigger
One of the key stories in In Defense of Japan is the story of the Taepodon Trigger, which is more commonly called the Taepodon Shock.
Whatever else it doesn’t have going for it, the DPRK is a master of timing. It’s almost as if it wants Japan to further rearm to create a foreign bugbear to rail against and rally the (starving) masses. The history of DPRK missile launches is quite intriguing. In 1998, the attempted launch of Kwangmyongsong-1 
aboard a re-gigged Taepodon gave Japan the decisive inflection point it needed to launching military space development, instead of developing dual-use technology research and development programs that could be converted to military use if and when needed. This is essentially the story behind Japan’s IGS, which is a regigged Melco USERS bus with not very good radar and optical sensors (which are getting better, nearing half-meter now for Gen-2 optical at least).
At the time, I can vividly remember the shock and outrage behind the missile overfly, which was largely stage-managed by media and politicians, since (a) Japan and the U.S. knew about the launch a month in advance, having been informed by the DPRK about it, and had an Aegis missile cruiser tracking the thing (b) the satellite launch didn’t actually violate Japan’s airspace at all and (c) as was actually an attempted satellite launch, not a missile test, as made out by the Japanese media.
Now while I am a strong supporter of Japan and no fan of the DPRK, the facts are the facts. Within 10 days of the “shocking missile test,” Ichiro Taniguchi, the Lion of Melco, was briefing the Cabinet on what was to become IGS. For more on this, please read In Defense of Japan.
But it was more of the same in 2009 when the nation in April attempted the 
launch of Kwangmyŏngsŏng-2 aboard an Unha-2 rocket carrying the satellite, following this with two rounds of missile tests in July 2009 and then a probably partially successful nuclear test in October. A busy year for everyone, and provocation that has helped Japan to bolster its SM-3 fleet to six ships.
In a perverse sense, the latest launch looks right on schedule. In order to prop up the 3rd incarnation of the Kim Dynasty, the DPRK needed a quick win in its poker strategy diplomacy of threat, bluff, and (insincere) concession cycle. On what levels the events of the last two months are wins for the regime vary; if they get the food and launch the satellite, it will buy the new regime a lot of time perhaps. If the perfidious Yankie and, etc., imperialists “renegade” on the deal, and the satellite is triumphantly launched (whether it will or not, it will still triumphantly succeed in glorious honor of what not, of course, right) then it still provides glue to hang the new regime together on. Oh the poor suffering people.
All this of course is grist for the mill for Japan and is, ahem, unlikely to disincentivize Japan from pushing forward with EW and better BMD.
Update: This is from Reuters: Launch called a ‘deal-breaker
The U.S. State Department issued the following statement, March 16:
“North Korea’s announcement that it plans to conduct a missile launch in direct violation of its international obligations is highly provocative. UN Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874 clearly and unequivocally prohibit North Korea from conducting launches that use ballistic missile technology. Such a missile launch would pose a threat to regional security and would also be inconsistent with North Korea’s recent undertaking to refrain from long-range missile launches. We call on North Korea to adhere to its international obligations, including all relevant UN Security Council Resolutions. We are consulting closely with our international partners on next steps. U.S. now says it will not send food aid to North Korea if it goes ahead with the long-range rocket launch, and U.N. Security Council members said it may violate sanctions.”
The DPRK argues that satellite launches are part of a peaceful space program that is exempt from international disarmament obligations, but according to Reuters, State Department spokesman Victoria Nuland said the U.S. now had “grave concerns” about the Feb. 29 agreement under which the North agreed with the U.S. to nuclear concessions and a moratorium on long-range missile tests in return for 240,000 tons of food aid.
Nuland said a rocket launch would call into question North Korea’s good faith. She said that during the negotiations for the U.S.-North Korea agreement, “we made clear unequivocally that we considered that any satellite launch would be a deal-breaker.
Expect a third nuclear test!
Posted by japanspace on March 16, 2012
https://japanspace.wordpress.com/2012/03/16/taepodon-trigger-3-dprk-to-attempt-3rd-satellite-shot-third-time-lucky/
The Basic Law of 2008 scores its first success! This is an old story but with a deal impeding in Thailand I thought I’d put it up.
It’s hard to overestimate the impact of this deal to Japan’s space diplomacy and the ripple effects for pan-Asian security. Not only was this the first time space diplomacy was used as an ODA tool, actually a strategic diplomatic coup with a key SE Asian emerging economy, Vietnam, but also for a LEO “EO” satellite. The Japan-Vietnam deal represents the first real fruits of the Basic Law of 2008. NEC, which has developed excellent small-bus, communications and EO technologies was squashed out by Melco (which promoted and succeeded with both its IGS and QZSS plans, to turn from the Market to the Military, the key point of In Defense of Japan), has now been able to secure its own market and strategy.
Further the ASNARO project could well turn out to be a stroke of genius. NEC, USEF, METI, and others are streaming all over the southern hemisphere to “sell” various stripes of ASNARO, including upcoming hyperspectral sensor models. USEF figure they need a constellation of six (eight would be better) for an ASNARO constellation to fulfill its purpose. So only another emerging economy (probably Thailand) needs to sign up and things are looking very useful. Remember, ASNARO is built to dump data as it flies over various ground stations, which are truck-mounted and highly mobile.
What is Japan doing selling spy satellites (GSD of better than 50cm) via a highly-advanced 73 cm silicon mirror (that beat out a tried and tested Melco optical design hands down) capable of advanced point-and-click, back scanning and data dumping? The ASNARO is a significant leap forward for Japan’s spy satellite fleet, with ASNARO optical and SAR already sharper that IGS-Optical/Radar Gen-2, on a tiny bus, with far, far better pointing and delivery times.
Outline of ASNARO key capabilities and features*:
Basic acquisition mode is Snap Shot mode (10km x 10km). However, depending on the largeness or shape of the area of interest, it is more efficient to use Strip Map mode or Skew mode. In the ground segment, based on the area of interest (AOI) requested from the end-user, optimum acquisition mode is automatically selected and most efficient acquisition plan is programmed. In the planning, satellite resources (storage and power) are considered to optimize the acquisition planning in mid to long term.
– Snap Shot mode:
10km x 10km area parallel to the satellite orbit is acquired.
-Wide View shot mode:
Several snap shot acquisitions are combined in cross track direction, providing wider area image data than single snap shot acquisition.
– Multi Angle Shot mode:
Within single pass, one identical target area is acquired several times from different incidence angle.
– Strip Map mode:
Long strip area parallel to the satellite orbit is acquired.
– Skew Shot mode:
Long strip area in any direction can be acquired in Skew shot node.
– High S/N Shot mode:
10km x 10km area parallel to the satellite orbit is acquired taking longer time than Snap shot mode to increase S/N of the image
What on earth would Vietnam want all that for? Crop monitoring? Disaster prevention?Here is the SN story:
*Data taken from SSC11-IV-4 Advanced EO system for the Japanese Small Satellite ASNARO
25th Annual AIAA/USU Conference on Small Satellites
Posted by japanspace on March 7, 2012
https://japanspace.wordpress.com/2012/03/07/japan-vietnam-sign-deal-for-two-radar-imaging-satellites/
Space News, 19 December 2011. The future of the IGS looks to be that the CSIC will retain its independence within the new 宇宙戦略室 (Space Strategy Office) within the Cabinet Office, however the details are still be worked out in favor of a final January decision. If all goes well, the proposed law will put to the Diet in January. The CISC will not allow interference in this program for a while it seems; however Melco has been steadily making profits from this program ever since NEC was destabilized by scandal back in 1998 (see NEC Scandal Sheds Light on Japanese Procurements). However the satellite bus is old (probably based on USERS) and there have been many issues with both the radar and optical satellites. This saga has been covered by me exhaustively since the late 1990s and several of the IGS have failed on orbit early. We hope Melco has sorted out the issues with the IGS design moving forward!
Posted by japanspace on March 6, 2012
https://japanspace.wordpress.com/2012/03/06/japan-launches-igs-radar-reconnaissance-satellite/
2011年4月19日
This was one of the more important interviews I had back in the day when I was working on getting Stanford University to try to understand the scale of the changes that were occurring in Japan’s strategic thinking in terms of beginning to show deployment of Japan’s dual-use technologies- when some of the recessed hedge thinking started edging toward…
…let’s put it a different way:- and the dual-use aspect of Japan’s space development strategy started becoming the subject of polite conversation.
Basically the story is that I’d realized it had been on the cards ever since the 1998 “Taepodon flyover,” which Saadia and I call the Taepondon Trigger, when Melco handed me the pre-prepared plans for what were going to become the IGS. Funny, that, wasn’t it?
However, when I pitched to Saadia back in 2003 back in the Okura Hotel’s breakfast bar that Japan was going to militarize its space development, there was concern from her that I was going to go too far too quickly. And our first version of the book in 2005 that predicted what was going to happen (I was about 95% right, if you could put a figure on it, as it turned out) was dismissed out of hand first time round because it didn’t fit the frame. But all I was doing was applying Dick Samuel’s scholarship from beyond the aerospace sector to the space…
First meeting Takeo Kawamura in 2006 was a vital step in plugging into the fundamental changes occurring with the Kawamura Initiative (IDOJ, pp.38) that we documented in In Defense of Japan. Basically I’d gotten a heads up from Kazuto Suzuki, who played a vital role in promoting and drafting one of the key strategic changes in Japan’s normalization, the Basic Law.
Takeo Kawamura is one of those great people that you get to meet in your life who care about what it means and will take the extra step to put it out. I was there to put the message out to an international audience that someone cared, and he did, and I did, and that was enough.
I remember back in Feb 2004 during one of my many private audiences with Mazakasu Iguchi when he’d told me…you know, they thought they’d checked everything, right down to the last bolt…they’d cleaned out MHI at Nagoya and they were now pristine clean and ready…but Nissan, they’d forgot Nissan. The bloody solid boosters. I can still remember Iguchi Sensei thumping his desk in exasperation.
It was about the same time that Takeo Kawamura, then MEXT Minister, realized he’d been dealt a dud hand. SAC was supposed to be in control of MEXT, or was it CSTP in control of everything? Nobody really knew. That was the point. Everybody got blamed, but nobody took the rap. Kawamura realized he was just a figurehead, and that space development was on bureaucratic autopilot. Whatever you felt about Ryutaro Hashimoto at the time, he did really have some sort of guts to try to change things. So Takeo Kawamura stepped up to the plate. The rest is, as you might say, recent history 
.
Kawamura under the Aso Premiership was one of the most important reasons why the SHSP was able to set up the 宇宙開発戦略専門調査会 (Experts Committee) and 宇宙開発利用体制検討ワーキンググループ (Reorganization Expert’s Committee) and 宇宙活動に関する法制検討ワーキンググループ (Legal Research Committee) quickly.
Posted by japanspace on March 5, 2012
https://japanspace.wordpress.com/2012/03/05/interview-with-former-chief-cabinet-secretary-takeo-kawamura/
2011年1月14日
Japan’s general activities space budget will see a 3.0% rise to 309.9 billion yen (US$3.75 billion) for the fiscal year starting April 1, 2011 over the prior year, according to figures released by the Strategic Headquarters for Space Policy (SHSP), January 14.
The Ministry of Education Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) is to receive a budget of 177 billion yen, up 18 billion yen for the current year, with substantial rises in budgets a number for the development of a number of high profile programs, said Keichi Tabuchi, Unit Chief, Office for Space Untilization Promotion, MEXT, January 14.
Main budget increases are for the the Hayabusa-2 asteroid sample return mission; the GCOM-W water circulation observation satellite; the ALOS-2 earth resources and disaster observation satellite; the Epsilon fast-launch solid-fueled medium launch vehicle; the ASTRO-H X-ray astronomical satellite; and the Bepi Colombo Mercury probe.
Other programs that will receive significant budget increases include the IGS fleet of reconnaissance satellites by the Prime Ministers Cabinet Office, the development of ballistic missile early warning sensor technology by the Ministry of Defense, and the ASNARO small-bus, high-resolution observation satellite development program that is being funded by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, according to SHSP figures below in the graphic:
Posted by japanspace on March 4, 2012
https://japanspace.wordpress.com/2012/03/04/japan-space-budget-up-3-focus-on-milspace-supported/
One of the most important strategic development technologies in space is to be able to swarm LEO, MEO and GEO with ASATs, spy, communications and defensive satellites.
Presently we are in the era of a slow-motion arms buildup with various nations including Japan flexing their muscles with cramming more capability into smaller and smaller satellites. In line with this last June’s Basic Plan for Space Policy focused Japan’s sites on microsatellite development by universities, and UNIFORM follows on from a 4.1 billion yen FIRST program investment by the Cabinet Office in university-based nanosatellite development, which ends in 2013.
The result is the UNIFORM (University International Formation Mission) program explained below.
It is a fact that the brilliant Shinchi Nakasuka (here is a nice article at JAXA), who is the man most behind Japan’s strategic microsatellite development at Tokyo at the ISSL and UNISEC already got most of that money for FIRST and now my best guess that it will get the lion’s share for UNIFORM.
But there are actually several things going on with UNIFORM, according to my knowledge
1. UNIFORM was needed because of the failure of MicroStar, the former version run by JAXA, which was not successful.
2) Any diplomatic offensive using the Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum (APRSAF) is welcome by Japan as a classic MOFA strategy- a regional “balancer” against and diluter growing Chinese soft space diplomacy. In particular the Japan-originated APRSAF got the reputation of being a bit of a talking shop compared with Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO) which has the reputation of getting things done.
As METI already secured a big tranche of yen for the ASNARO constellation, which is NEC’s answer to Melco’s IGS constellation, it would seem that Japan is going gangbusters to develop small-bus technology for intelligence gathering, observation, communication and other applications.
Posted by japanspace on March 4, 2012
https://japanspace.wordpress.com/2012/03/04/japan-pushes-forward-with-microsatellite-development/
Japan Space Policy 