Towards the H-3: Update

H-2A successor

Space News kindly published a version of my story on the H-3 last week. I’ve done the usual and pasted a version into this blog.

There is also a story by the ever excellent Warren Ferster on the Epsilon based on a JAXA presser. Please see this blog for more background on the Epsilon, or go to the new, vastly improved Space News website.

We can expect more light to be shone on this during June when the ONSP subcommittee makes its final recommendations. Meanwhile the Yomiuri and Asahi have some more information and perspective on the issue.

Our view in In Defense of Japan is that the H-series is a technology development program and while it may arouse screams of indignation and anger to say it, to put it bluntly, money will always be found to develop technologies that give Japan options. As, fundamentally, Saadia and I argue that Japan’s space program has always been basically, when you remove all the dressing, a dual-use strategic technology development program, then reasons to develop the H-3 will always be found.

As made plain by Dick Samuels and Mike Green, under nationalists such as Tomifumi Godai and in an era of rampant technonationalism and kokusanka, there were compelling reasons to develop the H-2. Japan wanted and needed to build a sophisticated, liquid fueled, highly efficient two-stage medium launch vehicle to cement its international reputation as part of the advanced spacefaring club. Remember, when the H-2 was envisaged over 20 years ago, few saw the impending “lost decade.”

Japan’s space program under NASDA was relatively awash with money, with investments made or planned  into all sorts of challenging dual-use precursor technologies including ETS-7 (on orbit ASAT demonstration) OICETS/ Kirari (laser communications), reconnaissance/ spy  satellites ICBM prototypes (M-V, J-1), reentry (OREX, USERS SEM) SIGINT (ETS-8), global strike (HYFLEX, HOPE) etc. Some highly ambitious programs that emerged last decade, have disappeared, for example HiMEOS and Smartsat-1.

On the other hand, ALSET looks as if it could make it.

これまでの基幹ロケットの評価と今後の在り方について 2013 年 4 月 24 日 宇宙輸送システム部会 委員 三菱重工業株式会社 代表取締役常務執行役員 航空宇宙事業本部長 鯨井 洋

これまでの基幹ロケットの評価と今後の在り方について
2013 年 4 月 24 日
宇宙輸送システム部会 委員
三菱重工業株式会社 代表取締役常務執行役員
航空宇宙事業本部長
鯨井 洋

Let’s not forget the H-2 very nearly made it to commercial viability but was fatally holed by the surging yen as well as dodgy turbopumps. So then money was found for the H-2A to solve the problem (half the costs, boost the payload) …but as we argue in In Defense of Japan, whether or not the H-2A really made it was not the issue. Could the program be justified in terms of a technology development program to the MoF. The peanuts in terms of cost involved in developing the H-2A compared to the cost of major launch vehicle systems by other advanced democracies (lets just name the Ariane 5) meant yes.

And now the cycle starts again. So how will the H-3 be sold to the MoF under the rubric of Japan’s latest stated space policy?

Sure, as something that will be commercially viable. Whether or not MHI and JAXA can actually achieve this is, we contend, strategically, a mute question. If and when the H-3 doesn’t make it commercially, MHI and Japan will have at least invested in developing a new level of excellent technologies that will secure Japan’s independent launch vehicle capabilities and provide jobs, technology and investment in its aerospace sector. Incidentally, the H-3 is now being sold by MHI as “catchup” again, as the slide above shows.

Sure, the same old cycle of vituperation and lashing will follow in the Japanese media if or when the H-3 fails to make the grade commercially, but the more strategic goals of “keeping/ catching up” will have been met.

Japan Inches Toward Arms Exports

Here’s a scoop I got last year, made front page. In In Defense of Japan we largely built on the excellent work of Michael W. Chinworth, in particular Inside Japan’s Defense,which seems to have been a primer for the work of so many others.

Japan Inches Toward Arms Exports

Arms 2

Naval Gazing Japan’s MSDF

After a long talk with former Vice Admiral Yoji Koda in 2011, like most non-journalist analysts, I am struck with the continuity of MSDF plans, and always grateful for the accomplished insights and scholarship of Alessio Patalano James Manicom and last but foremost Paul Giarra. I always have to say a big “thank you” for having the ear of such accomplished sempai!

LWF1

LW2

Great New Review of In Defense of Japan- this time by the Military Review!

What a nice present for the 100th post of this blog, a review of In Defense of Japan by The Military Review. In Defense of Japan got top billing!

This follows on from great reviews by U.S. Space Command’s High Frontier Journal and Foreign Affairs. We were especially gratified by the U.S. Space Command’s review, which called IDOJ a “model analysis.”

Here are the highlights of the Military Review piece (with the caveats in the full text of course)

“So Japan’s defense policy, like perhaps most such policies, is a mixture of realistic pragmatism within norms-based constraints. Authors Saadia Pekkanen and Paul Kallender-Umezu have added nuance to this picture in their excellent case study on Japan’s space policy. The authors are especially effective in demonstrating the impact corporate interests have in shaping Japan’s defense policy. They trace what they describe as Japan’s “market to the military” trend in space policy…

…This book is a readable, cogent examination of the interaction of corporate interests with national security interests, and adds needed nuance to the emerging understanding of Japan as an important player in the field of international security.” COL David Hunter-Chester, USA, Retired,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Review of IDOJ by Colonel David Hunter-Chester in The Military Review, July-August 2012

Japan Passes Overhaul of Space Management Structure

Here is the Space News version of the Defense News story I put out earlier: it’s a case of better late than never, and I will be trying to cover developments in various media as well as for my academic and policy paper requirements. “Please watch this space!”

I had a long talk with Saadia Pekkanen, my coauthor of In Defense of Japan and everything we predicted is coming on slowly and surely. How things will pan out immediately will quickly be seen in the upcoming budget request. However, a massive revision of the Basic Plan of 2009 is also a top priority of the new Uchusenryaku Shitsu (Space Strategy Office) and we will have concrete evidence of the next 5-year plan then. The timetable for the revised Basic Plan could be as early as within this year. This and a Space Activities Act are the top priorities, according to Takafumi Matsui, who one of the core group behind the changes.

Space News version of my earlier Defense News story

Taepodon Trigger#3: U.S. Knew of DPRK Plan Last Dec.

The plot thickens. As I pointed out in my original blog, all is not what it seems in the conventional media narrative about North Korean space launches and missile tests. The Yomiuri in “DPRK ‘told U.S. about plan on Dec. 15′” has just done some important work in revealing that it may well be that the United States knew as early as mid-December about this April’s North Korean satellite launch. The story reads as follows:

“WASHINGTON–A senior North Korean government official informed the United States before the death of Kim Jong Il was announced in December of its plan to launch a satellite, according to a former senior U.S. government official.
In an article for a U.S. research institute, Evans Revere, who served as acting assistant secretary of state under the administration of President George W. Bush, wrote that the decision to carry out the launch is highly likely to have been made by the late North Korean leader.
…Revere met with the North Korean official on Dec. 15 and was told about the planned launch of what some people believed to be a missile. The meeting is believed to have taken place in New York…”

This fits entirely in with standard practice by media, partly because it’s a great story, to hype the DPRK threat, (remember the original Taepodon incident of 1998 was not a shock at all, it was a trigger)  which is used by Japan’s political establishment (rightly, in my opinion) to promote further strategic investment and spending in Japan’s defense capabilities. Ultimately, and very indirectly of course, this is fed by nationalism and fear of abandonment. Those specters lurk very deep in the background. But they are there, nonetheless.

This whole prearranged dance is not what it seems at all…

….While a minor and enjoyable subroutine of my job as a researcher is to look at how politicians and the media work to manufacture opinion one of the hazards and joys is looking at the some of the dire rubbish that is fed to otherwise intelligent readers by the dregs of the media, I feel it’s important to keep some sort of sensible narrative up about important incidents such at the DPRK’s satellite launch. The whole idea about deploying PAC-3 to Okinawa to defend Japan is made-up media guff but the launch over the Yellow Sea will provide the MSDF with a valuable tracking and training opportunity, while there is no threat to Japan or its southernmost island chain at all.

For your amusement:

If you did read the CNN piece about those good ol’ Eagis ships protecting us from the commies, you would have also learned from CNN International that the North Koreans were planning “a rocket-powered satellite launch.” Or was that The Daily Telegraph?  Well hot dog!

It looks like the Taepodon Trigger #3 is fully in effect in both Japan and the ROK meanwhile.

Update 2: Taepodon Trigger #3

Update; some news has made it into some media that the Eunha-3 is going to come nowhere near Japan and it seems the press is gradually catching up to the news that the rocket’s path is due south as we see it “consistent with a satellite launch.” Of course it’s good PR to use the launch to focus attention on the need for Japan to bolster its BMD, but it seems people are slowly waking up to some basic facts about the launch.

The latest spin is “crash fears” about the “propulsion stage.” Put on your tin helmets!

The Taepodon Trigger (by which I mean magnifying external events to trigger changes in Japan’s national security stance)  is now fully in effect, with politicians and the media not wasting the opportunity drum up and repackage a good story about Japan preparing to shoot down the DPRK’s Eunha-3 (Galaxy) rocket next month to launch the Kwangmyŏngsŏng-3 if necessary.

The story, as repackaged from the Asahi in Time (Japan Threatens to Shoot Down NoKo Missile. Really) is a typical copying local reports “that Japanese Defense Minister Naoki Tanaka told Diet members Monday that “We will take the (necessary) procedures in the event of a contingency that threatens our country’s security,” and pointed out that Japan has Patriot PAC-3 and Aegis destroyers that could do the job. Japan’s Ground Self-Defense Forces began deploying Patriot batteries to Japan’s southern islands today.”

The article then goes on to copy the same old media rubric that I have to use in my media articles about the “Japanese” still being  “traumatized by a 1998 test in which nuclear-armed North Korea lobbed a ballistic missile directly over the home islands.”

“The incident prompted the Japanese to join the US in missile-defense R&D, and it remains a cornerstone of Japanese defense policy.”

This is lazy journalism, reinventing the past and not checking the facts and not knowing the basics about what is happening because:

1. The 1998 “missile test” was a space launch attempt and Japan and the U.S. were notified about it at least a month in advance and in fact an Aegis cruiser was put in the Sea of Japan to track the SLV’s flightpath

2. The original Taepodong 1 did not overfly or violate Japan’s territory.

3. Japan’s cooperation with MD did not directly result from this incident; in fact the IGS program was triggered.

Please see In Defense of Japan for more details and Taepodon Trigger #3: DPRK to attempt 3rd Satellite Shot- Third Time Lucky?

The SLV will fly over the Yellow Sea and not Japan. SM-3 is designed to intercept an IRBM in orbit. PAC-3 is not designed to shoot down IRBMs and even if the thing blew up on the way up, there is a vanishingly small chance of a hunk of metal landing on Naha. Could PAC-3 be of any use anyway? Perhaps a garbage-can chunk of debris containing a basket ball sized satellite might conceivably drop somewhere over the Yellow Sea somewhere but what has that got to do with PAC-3?

Finally all of the press (including the Yomiuri’s Govt may send PAC-3s to Okinawa / SDF readying for launch of DPRK rocket) is ignoring the fact that the movement of PAC-3 is ALREADY PLANNED.

But don’t let the facts get in the way of a good story.  Please see my Defense News article from this week below.

The point is that these and other “scares” will be used to help bolster Japan’s defense posture, which is an excellent thing overall.

Text of Review of In Defense of Japan by Foreign Affairs Magazine

It’s nice that Andrew J. Nathan Class of 1919 Professor Columbia University Political Science took the time to review In Defense of Japan for the January/February 2011 edition of Foreign Affairs and even nicer when he’s got a lot of time for the book too.

We would like to say a very big thank you to Prof. Nathan.

Here is the full review:

 

Blog Review of In Defense of Japan

Veteran satellite journalist Peter J. Brown has written a nice review of In Defense of Japan on his new blog Japanese in Space.

One of the issues with In Defense of Japan is that it is not media friendly and not designed to be media friendly as we wanted to reach decision makers and analysts. Undoing misconceptions of Japan’s space program by decades of superficial coverage can’t be done by engaging the mass media as the message just does not jive, or jars with media  shibboleths. However, we are finding that people who are seriously interested in this area find the time to read In Defense of Japan through and “get” our arguments.

Peter’s take amounts to: “…this  writer is hard pressed indeed to identify any recent book in English  that comes close to covering as much ground as this one does.”

Here is an excerpt:

Many thanks Peter and keep up the good work on Japanese in Space!

Japanese in Space: Hypersonic Flight: HYFLEX deserves a closer look

HerImage of Japan's Prototype Space Plane Hyflex (courtesy of JAXA)e I am going to put up some excellent work by fellow space journalist and Japan space watcher Peter J. Brown in his blog Japanese in Space.

Back in 2010, in In Defense of Japan, From the Market to the Military in Space Policy  Saadia and I pointed out some interesting context for Japan’s Hyflex program: You can read excerpts here on Google Books from our chapter on Launch Vehicles.

Wired Danger Room recently ran a piece on the USAF’s X-37B space plane (A Year Later, Mysterious Space Plane Is Still in Orbit), a program that is raising much attention in the military space community, for obvious reasons. But look at the picture; this is not a picture of the X-37B, though at a glance you might be forgiven for thinking it was…

As Peter points out, Japan actually had a robotic prototype space plane, Hyflex, that successfully demonstrated many of the precursor technologies of the X-37B all the way back in 1996, launched aboard the J-1 rocket. An interesting combination of technologies indeed.

If you want to find out more about the Hyflex program, please take a look at Peter’s article, which was also featured in another site I am a fan of, Japan Security Watch as USAF HTV-2 Recalls Japan’s HYFLEX Program. Please also note that Saadia and I were perhaps the first to point out the implications of the Hyflex program in In Defense of Japan, From the Market to the Military in Space Policy .

So what happened to Hyflex? Well, that’s a long story. I’ll see if I can dig out some of my old Space News articles from the 1990s!