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JSP Catchup #7: Japan Still Calculating Cost of Defense Firm’s Padded Bills

Here is the follow-up to JSP Catchup #6: Probe Uncovers 40-year Japanese Contractor Fraud and a fuller story for Defense News published the following week. I am still intrigued on who blew the whistle and why, but hopefully this will clean out a very mucky stable. Again there are so many unanswered questions, but perhaps it was felt that Melco had gotten too big for its boots.

This was certainly the message I got around Kasumigaseki in the mid-noughties when it became increasingly apparent that, at least in space, the IGS was overpriced and not very functional. But it seemed that Japan was stuck with it until better alternatives came up.

Meanwhile, Melco’s answer was, of course, to ask for more money to improve (repair) the IGS. The numbers of contracts and amounts are quite staggering, because the practice of overcharging was built into the very fabric of Melco’s system, and reading between the lines, it seems that the NEC scandal of 1998, instead of provoking a response to clean up, it did the reverse- Melco adopted increasingly sophisticated systems of cover-up and concealment. Not good.

A basic fact is that Melco produces a lot of excellent technology and systems and is a corner stone of Japan’s defense and space industries. While it really should have cleaned its stable out in 1998, as no doubt many others did, to the degree of information that is available, it seems that justice is being done. Perhaps at last, some real “Changes for the Better” ?

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by japanspace on November 19, 2012  •  Permalink
Posted in Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center (CSIC), IGS, Information Gathering Satellite, Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency, Japan Board of Audit, Japan Space Budget, Japan Space Development, Japanese BMD, JMOD, Melco, Melco scandal, Mitsubishi Electric, NEC, NEC Scandal, Tokyo Foundation
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Posted by japanspace on November 19, 2012

https://japanspace.wordpress.com/2012/11/19/jsp-catchup-7-japan-still-calculating-cost-of-defense-firms-padded-bills/

JSP Catchup #6: Probe Uncovers 40-year Japanese Contractor Fraud

This story was NOT a surprise; the fuller story is at Japan Still Calculating Cost of Defense Firm’s Padded Bills, but ever since NEC Corp. in 1998 was found with its hands in the till, I have been wondering who would be fingered next, and when, and why when, and why.

I say this because when I chatted to people back in 1998, the practice of padding contracts with surplus labor costs was widespread in the space and defense sectors and this was commonly known. At the time the questions were Why NEC? And Why Now? Below my initial October story is NEC SCANDAL SHEDS LIGHT ON JAPANESE PROCUREMENTS, a more fruity web version of a story that I originally wrote for Space News back in the day.

The timing for the original NEC story was also interesting as NEC was strongly pushing for its version of what was to become Japan’s IGS spy satellite system that was provoked by the Teapodon Trigger– an analysis that Saadia and I wrote about in In Defense of Japan (thank you Google Books!)

At the time NEC’s version of what was to become the IGS would have featured smaller satellites and cost less than Melco’s system. But with NEC suddenly out of the picture, Melco, with Ichiro Taniguchi at the helm, managed to personally lobby Japan’s Cabinet in the weeks after the Taepondon launch, and Japan’ got the IGS.

Here is a nice picture from Space Safety Magazine of Japan’s 1,200-Kilogram IGS 1B Satellite re-entered Earth’s Atmosphere on Thursday, July 26, 2012 after spending nearly 9.5 years in space.  Another more detailed article about this can be found at Spaceflight.101.com.

Eventually, NEC’s small-bus and higher resolution system has  been re-emerging in the ASNARO system, which is now being pushed as an alternative and complementary system to the expensive and relatively lower performance IGS, and also as the linchpin of a satellite-based, pan-Asian disaster monitoring network that is now a major part of Japan’s emerging regional space diplomacy and security strategy.  At least the Vietnamese have bought into it, and while customers don’t seem to be forming a line yet, there is still a lot of hope out there.

Here is the initial story for Defense News:

NEC SCANDAL SHEDS LIGHT ON

JAPANESE PROCUREMENTS.

By Paul Kallender in Tokyo

When, in September 1998, an investigation into the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) discovered that Japanese technology giant NEC Corp had systematically defrauded the taxpayer on 33 space contracts over the course of five years, it looked as though Japan’s obviously abused government procurement system was about to get a major overhaul.

The investigation began promisingly enough. On September 3, Tokyo prosecutors raided the JDA and arrested Kenichi Ueno, deputy head of the Procurement Office, and a clutch of executives from NEC subsidiary Toyo Communications.

This followed discoveries that not only had Toyo overcharged the JDA some $21m over dozens of equipment contracts, but that Ueno and others had conspired to prevent Toyo, NEC and other subsidiaries from repaying the money. NEC was raided the next day and by September 10, nine senior NEC and JDA executives were in jail.

It came to light that Ueno and others had lifted incriminating paperwork out of the Agency’s filing cabinets and put them into incinerators and even the homes of friends. NEC’s SuperTower headquarters was soon besieged by the Japanese phenomenon of ‘sound trucks,’ driven by right-wing extremists screaming abuse and demanding mass resignations.

But instead of resulting in the punishment of protagonists and the start of reforms, the scandal collapsed into a desultory cover-up. NEC’s initial response was to deny everything, with a bemused VP Masakatsu Miwa telling the media on September 10 that he did not expect top NEC executives to resign because of the scandal, going on to explain that he “wondered why” NEC officials were being implicated. Unfortunately for Miwa, on September 29, NEC’s overcharging was upscaled to $2.5bn, while, on the same day, a Parliamentary committee reported that the JDA had hired no less than 44 NEC executives in senior positions in just two years. By October 10, former NEC VP Hiroaki Shimayama and Takenori Yanase, VP of NEC’s Space Systems Division, had both been arrested.

Thieves charter

The National Space Development Agency (NASDA) launched an inquiry and on November 9, NEC admitted overcharging by at least $19m. Meanwhile on October 14, the JDA revealed that 225 of its officials had been hired by 20 suppliers in the past five years, shedding some dim light on a corner of Japan’s Amadudari (Descent from Heaven) career kickback system.

At the heart of the issue, according to NASDA’s former executive director Akira Kubozono, is the flawed government contract system which encourages corruption through a combination of legendary meanness and bureaucratic incompetence.

“There are two points about this affair,” he said. “One is that NEC is just a scapegoat. The second is that the governmental contract system is the cause of this scandal. When the defense contract revelations began, I thought it was only a matter of time before it spread into NEC’s space systems division as both defense and space procurement are conducted under similar systems.”

Under the Japanese government contract system, the co ntractor is obliged to repay any unused budget if the delivery price falls below the contract amount, and the contractor must also incur any costs if the project overshoots the agreed estimate — a thieves charter if ever there was one.

Furthermore NASDA, the Science and Technology Agency and the Ministry of Finance lack the technical expertise to evaluate bids and tend to just accept company estimates, says Kubozono. “The system needs to be reformed but I doubt this is possible as long as NASDA and the corporations are controlled by STA administrators (who also often retire to executive positions in NASDA) and not by engineers,” he says.

No mettle Kubozono, it seems, was right.

By November 12, the space scandal seemed to have been wrapped up, with NASDA saying it was satisfied that only NEC had abused the system. “The system has worked well for 30 years. We believe that a little devil whispered into NEC’s ear. We do not think it will happen again,” said Yasuyuki Fukumuro, NASDA PR deputy director. Fukumuro quickly admitted that NEC would be allowed to bid for Japan’s new spy satellite system, after a token contract moratorium.

Back at the JDA, a grand total of six senior officials will take up to 10% pay cuts for one to three months plus one official will receive a 10-day suspension, JDA chief Fukushiro Nukuga told the media at his November 20 resignation press conference.

The speech followed a report, which admitted that there had been “some incidents that could be regarded as a systematic cover-up,” perhaps referring to the 31 officials suspected of Berlin-bunker style burning of documentation that might have provided evidence.

But the worst thing about the affair, according to observers, has been the brazen arrogance of NEC. In his October 23 resignation speech, NEC Chairman Tadahiro Sekimoto, now under personal investigation for his role in the affair, denied any involvement but resigned out of “social responsibility” for the affair, astonishing Kubozono in particular.

“Sekimoto’s act was spineless. If he had honor he would have resigned to take responsibility, not quibbled. He showed no mettle and is a very poor example for younger business leaders. I fear for Japan’s future.”

An even poorer analysis comes from Youichi Teraishi, Editor of Japan’s ‘scandaru’ [scandal] daily, the Nikkan Gendai. He says that Sekimoto’s act compared unfavorably with Yakuza (the Japanese Mafia) standards of conduct. “This Oyabun [Japanese gang boss] showed a lack of chivalry. Captains of industry are supposed to be able to demonstrate this, but Sekimoto lacked the class,” he says.

Lastly, the scandal has left NEC seething that it was singled out for a brutal slap on the wrist. “Everyone is doing it, why should we be the scapegoat?” admitted one NEC official. “Our top management just stuck their heads in the sand and got shafted,” complained another.

This article first appeared in Global Technology News.

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by japanspace on November 19, 2012  •  Permalink
Posted in ASNARO, Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center (CSIC), Defense News, DPRK, DPRK Missile, DS2000, Dual Use Technology: Spy Satellite, Early Warning, F-35, IGS, In Defense of Japan, In Defense of Japan: From the Market to the Military in Space Policy, Information Gathering Satellite, Japan early warning satellite, JAXA, JMOD, JMOD White Paper, Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), Keidanren, Market to the Military, Melco, Melco scandal, MEXT, MHI, Mitsubishi Electric, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, MOD Japan, NEC, NEC Scandal, NEC Space Systems, NEXTAR, Norihiro Sakamoto, ODA Space Diplomacy, SM-3 Block IIA, Taepodon, Taepodon Shock, Taepodon Trigger
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Posted by japanspace on November 19, 2012

https://japanspace.wordpress.com/2012/11/19/jsp-catchup-6-probe-uncovers-40-year-japanese-contractor-fraud/

Space.com’s Hayabusa-2 Story

Hi still catching up with things with this blog, guess there will be another 20-odd things to post before I feel it’s reasonably up-to-date. Here is the space.com story of March 2 based on my Feb.25 Space News story.

Japan Eyes New Space Mission to Sample an Asteroid

by Leonard David, SPACE.com’s Space Insider Columnist
Date: 02 March 2012 Time: 07:00 AM E
Artist's concept of Japan's proposed Hayabusa 2 spacecraft, which would grab samples off the asteroid 1999 JU3 .
Artist’s concept of Japan’s proposed Hayabusa 2 spacecraft, which would reconnoiter asteroid 1999 JU3 in mid-2018. Hayabusa 2 would hurl an impactor into the asteroid, sample the resulting crater and send pieces back to Earth for study.
CREDIT: JAXA/Akihiro Ikeshita

Space engineers in Japan are scoping out an ambitious follow-up to the country’s Hayabusa mission, which snagged samples from the asteroid Itokawa and returned them to Earth in 2010.

The successor spacecraft, known as Hayabusa 2, would carry out an aggressive study of another asteroid. The probe would drop off two landers, blast the asteroid with an impactor and send more samples back to Earth for close-up inspection.

Earlier this year, Tokyo-based NEC Corporation announced it had started designing the new asteroid explorer for the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA). For more, please read the original article on Space.com. 

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by japanspace on March 12, 2012  •  Permalink
Posted in Hayabusa, Hayabusa-2, JAXA, MEXT, NEC, NEC Space Systems
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Posted by japanspace on March 12, 2012

https://japanspace.wordpress.com/2012/03/12/space-coms-hayabusa-2-story/

Japan, Vietnam Sign Deal for Two Radar Imaging Satellites

The Basic Law of 2008 scores its first success! This is an old story but with a deal impeding in Thailand I thought I’d put it up.

It’s hard to overestimate the impact of this deal to Japan’s space diplomacy and the ripple effects for pan-Asian security. Not only was this the first time space diplomacy was used as an ODA tool, actually a strategic diplomatic coup with a key SE Asian emerging economy, Vietnam, but also for a LEO “EO” satellite.  The Japan-Vietnam deal represents the first real fruits of the Basic Law of 2008. NEC, which has developed excellent small-bus, communications and EO technologies was squashed out by Melco (which promoted and succeeded with both its IGS and QZSS plans, to turn from the Market to the Military, the key point of In Defense of Japan), has now been able to secure its own market and strategy.

Further the ASNARO project could well turn out to be a stroke of genius. NEC, USEF, METI, and others are streaming all over the southern hemisphere to “sell” various stripes of ASNARO, including upcoming hyperspectral sensor models. USEF figure they need a constellation of six (eight would be better) for an ASNARO constellation to fulfill its purpose. So only another emerging economy (probably Thailand) needs to sign up and things are looking very useful. Remember, ASNARO is built to dump data as it flies over various ground stations, which are truck-mounted and highly mobile.

What is Japan doing selling spy satellites (GSD of better than 50cm) via a highly-advanced 73 cm silicon mirror (that beat out a tried and tested Melco optical design hands down) capable of advanced point-and-click, back scanning and data dumping? The ASNARO is a significant leap forward for Japan’s spy satellite fleet, with ASNARO optical and SAR already sharper that IGS-Optical/Radar Gen-2, on a tiny bus, with far, far better pointing and delivery times.

Outline of ASNARO key capabilities and features*:

Basic acquisition mode is Snap Shot mode (10km x 10km). However, depending on the largeness or shape of the area of interest, it is more efficient to use Strip Map mode or Skew mode. In the ground segment, based on the area of interest (AOI) requested from the end-user, optimum acquisition mode is automatically selected and most efficient acquisition plan is programmed. In the planning, satellite resources (storage and power) are considered to optimize the acquisition planning in mid to long term.
– Snap Shot mode:
10km x 10km area parallel to the satellite orbit is acquired.
-Wide View shot mode:
Several snap shot acquisitions are combined in cross track direction, providing wider area image data than single snap shot acquisition.
– Multi Angle Shot mode:
Within single pass, one identical target area is acquired several times from different incidence angle.
– Strip Map mode:
Long strip area parallel to the satellite orbit is acquired.
– Skew Shot mode:
Long strip area in any direction can be acquired in Skew shot node.
– High S/N Shot mode:
10km x 10km area parallel to the satellite orbit is acquired taking longer time than Snap shot mode to increase S/N of the image

What on earth would Vietnam want all that for? Crop monitoring? Disaster prevention?Here is the SN story:

*Data taken from SSC11-IV-4 Advanced EO system for the Japanese Small Satellite ASNARO
25th Annual AIAA/USU Conference on Small Satellites

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by japanspace on March 7, 2012  •  Permalink
Posted in ASNARO, Dual Use Technology: Spy Satellite, Early Warning, IGS, Market to the Military, METI, MEXT, Michibiki, NEC, NEC Space Systems, NEXTAR, QZSS, Space ODA, SPACE ON DEMAND, USEF, USEF: ASNARO
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Posted by japanspace on March 7, 2012

https://japanspace.wordpress.com/2012/03/07/japan-vietnam-sign-deal-for-two-radar-imaging-satellites/

[Old] Update on ASNARO

This is part II of work that I was doing last year on ASNARO/NEXTAR that I forgot to upload. It’s relevant because of the big breakthrough in space ODA to Vietnam. Soon to be repeated in Thailand, if reports are true!

2011年6月30日

USERS SEM Deorbiting Pod

I was lucky enough recently to spend a day interviewing great people at METI, USEF, Pasco and NEC a little while back and managed to nail down many more details about what is happening with the ASNARO (Advanced Satellite with New system Architecture for Observation) project. For some Space News background on ASNARO, please see my original story. This time, specifically METI asked me to write about it for them, and gave tremendous help getting NEC and Pasco on board. It was just wonderful meeting people with ideas and strategies that are obviously well thought out.

Let’s get the disclaimer out of the way first.

From where we are standing, from the point of view of national security space, at the end of the day, it doesn’t matter if NEC succeeds in its strategy to turn the ASNARO/Nextar branded modular satellite platform into a commercial success in/for ASEAN countries. Of course it matters to NEC, because they are a private company and want to make more profit.

And of course it matters to me, because for the health of NEC and Japan’s military industrial base, it’s better that they sell or get more SE Asian nations to “buy” them through ODA and I wish them every luck.

But, at the end of the day, IF ASNARO/Sasuke/ Nextar never makes a successful commercial go of it, the Japanese government is still going to make sure the platform is built. And we predict that ASNARO will play its role in Japan’s emerging national space security infrastructure.

ASNARO is crucial to a number of players in a number of ways. After years of false starts and what may have been blind alleys — MDS-1 Tsubasa or OICETS Kirari spring to mind ;-) –

-Nextar represents what NEC has been trying to build since the late 90s (1998 if my memory serves me right, see NEC unveils prototype bus, aims for Teledesic, this being the non-Space News version) and the era of Hiroaki Shimayama and Takenori Yanase. Nextar, which looks suspiciously like a reworked OICETS/ MDS bus to me, and it’s the keystone of their pan-Asian commercial turnkey systems strategy.

We’ll go into this in Part II.  In Part III, we’ll look at the military angle, but only when the official article is published in Defense News.

So what is ASNARO?

ASNARO is a USEF powerplay to develop a bus system that on one hand will give NEC a chance to compeat in the ASEAN market for EO sats, and whether or not that succeeds, gives Japan the option to build a constellation of spysatellites, all kicked of with a tiny down-payment of 6 billion yen.

Therefore ASNARO is important to METI to show that its decades-long investment in creating standardized satelite bus systems and plug and play and COTs parts at USEF is finally paying off. Those of you  who have read In Defense of Japan know that we more or less regard USEF as METI’s DARPA, or military space arm, although USEF wouldn’t be comfortable with this description. Afterall, the technologies they develop are for peaceful purposes only. Right?

(I still vividly remember the change in body language when discussing with USEF how accurate USERS’s SEM -see image above- could be made).

Leaving aside the dual-use nature of many USEF projects, ANSARO is a vital component in what METI had been calling its Space on Demand (SOD) program, which, while it doesn’t actually use military language, leves very little to the imagination. Submarine launch, air launch (and with Epsilon) mobile launch! Reprogrammable satellites…”flexible” ground systems (we’ll get to that one in Part III).


Incidentally, the other main submarine space launch vehicle I know of  is the R-29R Vysota “Stingray” SLBM rebranded Volna and its peaceful brotherhood for lobbing payloads into LEO instead of  3x 300 kiloton-yield warheads at…wherever.

Behind this, ASNARO is a platform technology that also enables NEC to supply ISAS with SPRINT-series satellites, and could become a key part of Japan’s ODA strategy to counter China’s building influence in ASEAN. Hitherto, APRSAF has been a bit of a highly amicable talking shop. More about that in Part II.

Anyway, here is the Space News article with some of the bear-bones details. More to follow in Parts II and III.

Space News article by Paul Kallender-Umezu

ASNARO Delayed but far from Doomed!

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by japanspace on March 7, 2012  •  Permalink
Posted in Advanced Solid Rocket (ADR), ASNARO, Dual Use Technology: Spy Satellite, In Defense of Japan: From the Market to the Military in Space Policy, Information Gathering Satellite, METI, NEC, NEC Space Systems, NEXTAR, ODA Space Diplomacy, Sasuke, Space News, Space ODA, USEF, USEF: ASNARO
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Posted by japanspace on March 7, 2012

https://japanspace.wordpress.com/2012/03/07/old-update-on-asnaro/

Japan’s Export Change Won’t Yield Instant Results

The partial and qualified relaxation announced this January came as no surprise. I had been talking to Keidanren and MHI about this off and on since 2004. Here is the front page of Defense News, with the full story below in text form. Also, to follow, is something remarkable from David Isenberg, adjunct scholar at the Cato Institute, which in addition to “Individual Liberty, Free Markets and Peace” also believes in ripping off my work, including my data collected from the JMOD, without any attribution :-(…

Here is the original copy:

By Paul Kallender-Umezu

Last December’s announcement by Chief Cabinet Secretary Osamu Fujimura that Japan will relax the nation’s 1960’s-era de facto ban on exporting arms will probably lead to an increased presence of high-quality Japanese components. But the caveats behind the relaxation and the effects of four decades that have left Japan’s comparatively small and suffering defense production base globally uncompetitive will probably mean the effect of the change may be mixed or marginal, at least for the short term, according to analysts.

The so-called “three principles on arms exports” first set in April 1967 prohibited Japan from selling weapons to communist states, countries subject to embargoes under UN resolutions and nations involved in armed international conflicts. Under the new rule, Japanese companies will allowed to participate in the international joint development of military technology but with significant strings: Japan will be able to export enable exports of guns and other weapons to other nations only if they are to be used for peace-building and humanitarian assistance.

Such restrictions have led to a comparatively lukewarm reaction from industry and analysts.

While Japan’s most powerful business lobby, Keidanren, which has spent decades lobbying for the relaxation quickly issued a statement praising the move, a source related to Japan’s defense industry said the devil will be in the details.

One immediate issue following last December’s news that Japan will purchase 42 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters is whether domestic makers can profit from it. While Japan has been informed that it will be able to assemble about 40% of the 5th generation stealth fighters, the message from the source amounted to a “so what?”

“Yes, it’s true to say that we are pleased about the news,” the source said.  “But it is not clear to us what equipment, what kinds of equipment and under what stipulations the equipment can be exported. It is said that the F-35 will be covered, but we don’t even know yet what Japan is supposed to be building,” the source said.

Complicating the issue is Japan’s 60-year pacifist legacy, which has lead to diplomatic caution while stunting Japan’s ability to gain leverage on the international market.

Firstly, people should not read too much into the timing as December was the first opportunity for the pro-Alliance administration of Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda, following two administrations less friendly to the United States, to fulfill his election pledge to effect the change, according to Dr Hiroyasu Akutsu Senior Fellow, Northeast Asia Division at Japan’s National Institute for Defense Studies.

“Mr. Noda already decided to relax the existing arms exports, which had long been over-due, before his planned visit to the U.S. in January 2012. Although the plan was canceled, the Prime Minister simply wanted to realize the pledge anyway as a prime minister who keeps his policy promise as early as possible.”

Local military analyst Shinichi Kiyotani said the caveats and restrictions show that Japan is not yet prepared diplomatically or industrially to enter the global arms market.

“The Japanese are maybe expecting we will export weapons to foreign countries, but this is a misunderstanding. Exporting weapons systems means diplomatic and political complications that Japan doesn’t have the resources to tackle,” he said.

On the upside, many in-demand Japanese components and products such as Sony’s CCD sensors and Panasonic’s popular range of Toughbook rugged notebook PCs will find new customers, he said. In addition, high precision and high quality products in weapons may find markets, for example, critical systems in the extremely accurate Type 99 155-mm self-propelled howitzer made by MHI and Japan Steel Works, subsystems for tanks, armor, and some older weapons discontinued in the U.S. that Japan still produces such as Hawk missiles that are still in demand. Other possibilities are advanced Japanese materials technologies, for example in CFRP.

“There are many parts and technologies, many of them not-specifically military, that could prove an easy first business,” Kiyotani said.

The rule chance could paradoxically lead to more problems than profits. Japan has too many too many domestic players fighting over small slices of pie, for example some ten major Japanese electronics companies supply defense electronics, but defense sales are small business units making up only marginal percentages of total sales of electronics conglomerates such as NEC, Toshiba, Mitsubishi Electric and Oki.

For example, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, by far and away Japan’s biggest defense with revenues of around $3 billion in 2010 and ranked only 26th in Japan Global 100, with its defense business accounting for 8.7% of it total revenues that year. Global electronics and IT communications supplier NEC Corp., ranked 63 last year, did $1 billion in defense business in 2010, but this represented only 2.8% of its revenues.

“There are far too many players in some fields, and they need to merge or cooperate to compete. Yet they are almost like state-run companies in the defense market and are not used to international competition. I foresee blood, sweat and tears,” Kiyotani said.

If inward investment is allowed, major contractors such as BAE Systems or Raytheon may step in and try to snap up business units, looking for inroads in de facto protected local markets, as much as re-exports, he said. For example if France’s Thales sets it sights on superior optics for periscopes, it might arrange to purchase a business unit of Nikon.

One British executive who asked not to be named said the Japanese were likely to be politically led and cautious in how they entered export markets. “They have some excellent technology in fields like electronics which could see them first enter the market as a tier two or three subcontractor but the threat generally is going to be long-term”, he said.

“For the medium term a key need for the Japanese will be to attract foreign partners into indigenous programs where technology transfer and industrial partnership eventually leads to exports to third party nations”, he said.

The policy change will not result in increased competition in arms sales in the near term, said Jean-Pierre Maulny, deputy director of think-tank Institut des Relations Internationales et Stratégiques, based in Paris.

“This will not lead to change quickly,” Maulny said. “Greater competition will come in 10 or 20 years’ time,” he said. Japanese industry has first to consolidate domestically. Japanese industry could, however, compete faster than India in foreign arms markets, particularly in price, he said. An ability to export will help Japanese industry gain autonomy and reduce dependence on the United States, he said.

Japan cooperates with the United States on development of the sea-based Raytheon Standard Missile-3 and has long worked on fighter aircraft, building the F-15 under license and an F-16 derivative under the FS-X program. Europe and Japan do not cooperate in military programs, and if they do not cooperate, they will end up competing, Maulny said.

It will be interesting to see how the new policy will be seen among Japan’s neighbors in the region, particularly Korea, as the process of reconciliation after the Second World War has been slower in Asia than in Europe, Maulny said.

And here is what appeared in The Asia Times:  “Little lift from end to Japanese arms ban”  By David Isenberg

Parts of this look familiar?

“But caveats attached to the decision will slow the recovery of the country’s military-industrial production base. For example, it is not clear what kinds of equipment can be exported and under what stipulations.

Another problem is that Japan has too many domestic players fighting over small slices of pie. Some 10 major Japanese electronics companies supply defense electronics, but defense sales are small business units that make up only marginal percentages of total sales of electronics conglomerates such as NEC, Toshiba, Mitsubishi Electric and Oki.

For instance, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, far and away Japan’s biggest defense company with revenues of about $3 billion in 2010, saw its defense business account for 8.7% of revenue that year.

Global electronics and IT communications supplier NEC Corp did $1 billion in defense business in 2010, just 2.8 percent of its revenue.

Such companies are not used to international competition and they may fine securing foreign sales against established competitors from other countries a hard slog.

If Japanese industry can consolidate domestically it could compete faster than, say, India in foreign arms markets, particularly in price. An ability to export will help Japanese industry gain autonomy and reduce dependence on the US.

Currently Japan cooperates with the US on development of the sea-based Raytheon Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) and has long worked on fighter aircraft, building the F-15 under license and an F-16 derivative under the FS-X program.”

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by japanspace on March 6, 2012  •  Permalink
Posted in Aliance Issues, Arms Export Ban, Keidanren, MHI, National Institute for Defense Studies, NEC, NIDS, Three Principles on Arms Exports, Yoshihiko Noda
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Posted by japanspace on March 6, 2012

https://japanspace.wordpress.com/2012/03/06/japans-export-change-wont-yield-instant-results/

ASNARO Project Upate: Part II- A New Pathway for NEC

2011年7月13日

Following on from an afternoon at NEC a while back, I was also fortunate enough to spend more or less a day at USEF catching up on METI’s space programs. What an eye-opening event that was, which will also mean that an entire chapter in an upcoming book and old friend and I are planning is now almost entirely focused on USEF. Space Environment Reliability Verification Integrated System SERVIS-2 for example yielded at least one internationally competitive technology that has become a major global success story, as well as building significant leaps forward in satellite design with the improved CFRP core and 3D heat pipes…on Melco’s COTs-testbed the SERVIS-1.

Anyway, back to the matter in hand: in promoting the ASNARO/Nextar project, USEF took a break from Melco, which has been the main beneficiary of spin on/off with USEF over the last 15 years, to switch to NEC, which had traditionally been- and still is- Japan’s master of smaller bus systems, communications and sensors. I have to qualify this statement by saying that when I mean small, I don’t mean the micro- nano- and picosatellites now being churned out by UNISEC members and others.

What I mean is NEC’s excellence in satellites such as Oicets/Kirari and work done for ISAS over the decasdes. Allied with the engineering tradition of Toshiba (in particular ETS-7 here is an old story and another here I did for Spacer and ETS-6), NEC should have by all accounts bounced back earlier from last decade’s scandal.

But they are back, big time with the small-medium ASNARO bus (see below graphic):

Back in the late 90s, as I mentioned in Part-I, NEC’s main challenge for the then-commercial constellation communications market was the Oicets bus for Teledesic.

Remember Skybridge, Celestri, Spaceway, Astrolink, and the rest of them?…how could we ever forget the time when it appeared the earth was about to be circled by hundreds of satellites dedicated to making our brick cellphones work so expensively…

That all went kaput, along with NEC’s credibility when the procurement scandal broke in 1998, all to conveniently sabotaging NEC’s bid for the IGS constellation. And it seemed for years that NEC had been cast adrift like Comets/ Kakehashi or Kiku-6 slowly frazzling in the radiation of bad publicity while sinking into a black hole of no major Engineering Test Satellite contracts for JAXA.

In many ways, with the seizure of the IGS contracts by Melco in 1998, the company surged ahead of NEC, which was left without heavy bus technology. With Melco also closely aligned to USEF, things were looking pretty grim for NEC which seemed to have been left behind from securing major contracts for NASDA/JAXA for the best part of a decade.

NEC’s position has turned the corner and improved by several developments, however.

First miniturization and continual technical improvement mean that relatively small buses such as ASNARO’s can do a lot more than they could 20 years ago. These days, a middleweight can pack the punch of a heavyweight of yesteryear in some respects.  Related to this, there is swing back to the need for smaller, more flexible satellites as payloads and technology has advanced and ASNARO’s modular, plug and play capabilities could work just fine.

Second, more and differnet satellites are needed from multiple sources to build more solutions for Japan’s emerging national security space infrastructure.  Even with Melco recently announcing it planned to redouble its output at its Kamakura Works, Japan needs NEC.

Last but most importantly in some respects is the need for different solutions to promote Japanese space diplomacy in Asia, and South East Asia through APRSAF and ODA and against the rival Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization and CGWIC . Exploring this and related issues will be a key theme for my Ph.D. research at 慶應義塾大学 政策・メディア研究科 (Keio University’s Graduate School of Media and Governance).

In the coming decade, Southeast Asia needs to take decisions about developing its space infrastructure for human security and disaster and environmental warning/monitoring/relief and it’s vital that these are done with Japanese technologies, moving on from the Sentinel, SAFE, STAR and Micro-Star and UNIFORM  programs.

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by japanspace on March 5, 2012  •  Permalink
Posted in ASNARO, Dual Use Technology: Spy Satellite, Japan Space Development, NEC, NEXTAR, USEF, USEF: ASNARO
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Posted by japanspace on March 5, 2012

https://japanspace.wordpress.com/2012/03/05/asnaro-project-upate-part-ii-a-new-pathway-for-nec/

Moving Beyond A Zero-Sum Military Space Game

2011年2月14日

I  just filed a Military Space Special for Space News last week and am giving an update here. What I have done is to copy an early version of the story below (which has a few more details than the SN version) and some comments and background.

Basically, I recently conducted a sit-down with three director-level MoD personnel who did a good job of convincing me that the MoD is very interested in military space development but feels its hands are tied  as long as it continues to face a zero-sum budget game. I stress that this was not said to me directly by the MoD who stressed that the MoD’s budget has held up despite huge pressures on the DPJ to cut due to fiscal pressures.

After talking to industry, however, there is very deep dissatisfaction with the slow pace of movement. Nobody is saying that the DPJ has reneged on the commitments made by the Basic Space Law, but it does appear that military space is drifting in neutral until budget is found. Nobody is being blamed. However, it is clear that the leadership, clear command and budget lines that were supposed to have been introduced by now, are absent.

Until the SHSP or the new Space Agency materializes and budget according to the 「ニーズに対応した５年間の衛星等の開発利用計画（１０年程度を視野（案)」as promoted by the Basic Space Law, no specific budget lines can be drawn up for the MoD, or by the MoD, and this seems to be the single biggest factor stopping more concrete progress.

1. Japan is forging ahead with IGS

In an interview with the CSIC, the one sure bet is that Japan will continue plowing money into  IGS. It’s a bit of a Melco money pit, this one, by very efficient Japanese standards, and the system has been plagued by troubles. The first generation optical satellites that have not been performing to spec- let’s hope they could at least resolve buildings, and the radar satellites have been winking off with that old bane of Melco satellites- electrical problems. (Please bear in mind, thought, that compared to spiraling procurement costs of many U.S. military procurement programs, the IGS emerges as freshly laundered as a blouse in a soap suds TV commercial!)

Anyway, hopefully these issues can be ironed out. The new generation of optical satellites should function at 60cm resolution and the new test optical satellite going up next year should be another big leap forward, given that GeoEye-2,  has a planned resolution of 25 cm  (9.8 in) it would be surprising if NEC and Goodrich couldn’t get at least half way to that. Afterall, ASNARO is looking at 50 cm or so. Given that NEC’s Daichi/ALOS satellite is the basis for the optical system for IGS, and NEC is integrating ASNARO, you can draw your own conclusions about the clarity of IGS’s future vision.

Here is the opening of the story:

Japan’s reconnaissance program continues to burgeon while military space program faces a series of difficult choices, according to a series of interviews with officials in the Prime Ministers Cabinet Office and Ministry of Defense (MOD).

Japan’s Information Gathering Satellite program, known as IGS, will see the launch launching of 10 satellites by 2018, including an extra radar satellite, an official at the Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center (CSIC) said February 7.

One optical and one radar satellite will be launched fiscal 2011 and a radar satellite and a technology test satellite for future higher-capability optical satellites in fiscal 2012; fiscal 2014 will see the launch of a further optical satellite and an “extra” radar satellite. A further optical and radar satellite will be launched in fiscal 2016, and the CSIC is now planning to request the launch of a radar satellite in 2017, “assuming we get the budget to do so,” the official said. Japan’s fiscal year runs April through March.

IGS is designed to function as a fleet of two radar and two optical satellites, but the November 2003 destruction of an H-2A rocket and IGS-2A and 2B and the early failures of two radar satellites (IGS-1B) in  March 2007  and IGS-4A in August 2010 have left fleet with only two operational satellites.

As a hedge against future service interruption, Japan decided in October to launch an extra radar satellite and boost CISC’s budget to cover the satellite’s development costs, the official said.

“Yes, we have enough budget to include the extra satellite, although at the moment the plan is continue to maintain a basic four satellite system for the foreseeable future,” the official said.

2. MoD is Pushing Out Development Budgets for Military Space Programs Until 2015 or So

Here is part 2 of the original story:

Japan’s Ministry of Defense, meanwhile, is taking a cautious approach to space acquisition, weighing its needs against what it can afford, according to officials who spoke to Space News on condition of anonymity.

The Ministry of Defense was formally barred from building space systems until 2008 when Japan’s Basic Space Law overrode a 1969 resolution committing Japan to use space exclusively for peaceful purposes.

In addition to making space programs fair game for the Ministry of Defense, the Basic Space Law called for restructuring control of Japan’s space-development budgets and programs away from competing ministries and into a single cabinet-level agency. The 2008 law also called for Japan to double its space spending between 2010 and 2020 and to pursue programs that contribute to its national security.

In response to this direction, the Ministry of Defense in 2009 released a report detailing a long list of space programs it might be interested in developing.

Commentary: According to the MoD’s Basic Guidelines for Space Development and Use of Space of January 15, 2009 by the Committee on Promotion of Space Development and Use, Ministry of Defense of Japan the MoD has an extensive shopping list of needs including- more and better spy satellites, space-based early warning for BMD, a dedicated communications satellite, a SIGINT satellite (no doubt using ETS-8), Space Situational Awareness capabilities (seat belts and rear view mirrors?), microsatellites (ahem) satellite protection (wow- defensive counterspace already!) a dedicated LV (Epsilon, or I’ll eat my hat) and QZSS. But this will remain a wish-list until at least (a) MOD conducts negotiations with the U.S. (b) the next Mid-Term Defense Plan includes substantial funds for military space development, (c) The JAXA Law is amended to allow for for defensive military space development. The technologies are there (at least in theory) but the  institutional will, budget and legal issues remain significant barriers.

Kiku-8: Listening in on the Neighbors Soon? Perhaps not!

Thus Japan’s latest National Defense Program Guidelines – a planning document produced every five years  (see this survey by The Tokyo Foundation) — are much less specific. The document, approved by the Security Council in December, focuses on the ministry’s role in developing military space programs aimed at bolstering the nation’s space-based surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities.

For now, officials said, the Ministry of Defense is researching when and if to develop a series of capabilities, including its own space-based early warning system, a signals intelligence satellite, a communications satellite, reconnaissance satellites and experimental microsatellites. But with so many decisions to be thought through, these officials said, the ministry will hold off on starting any development programs until 2016, when the next five-year Defense Program Guidelines is due.

For example, the Ministry of Defense is questioning whether it can afford and really needs a space-based infrared missile warning satellite for its fleet of Aegis cruisers and Patriot missile batteries, according to one official.

“When we consider a cost-benefit analysis [of a space-based early warning system] we should consider the U.S.-Japan relationship,” the official said Feb. 8. “We get enough data from the U.S., so we should find out exactly what new capabilities we could get from our own satellite. If we can get appreciable benefit and if we think it is affordable, then we can consider development.”

Part of the issue for the defense ministry’s conservatism is concern about future budgets, said Satoshi Tsuzukibashi, director of the Office of Defense Production at the Japan Business Federation.

Thirty months after enactment of the Basic Space Law, Japan has yet to form a new agency to coordinate national space programs and the sought after budget increased have yet to materialize. “The most difficult problem is budget. If there is a specific budget provided for the [Ministry of Defense], the [ministry] will move ahead and promote its space programs without troubling its commitments to land, air and marine forces,” Tsuzukibashi said Feb. 9.

Commentary: MoD is playing a waiting game: here are the major points I gleaned that are publishable

Even Stage I (2013-17) Epsilon will be the Best Solid Rocket in History

1. Communications: Current transponders on Superbirds, B2, D and C  are facing end-of life issues as satellites are retiring. Building a dedicated communications satellite is still under cost-benefit analysis

2. Sigint: This really got the MoD cautious. I will leave you to draw your own conclusions. However, preliminary studies are looking into the feasibility and need for this and the possibility of Japan using a satellite is under study and not ruled out.

3. ASNARO: MoD will consider it IF it works. That’s as far as they would go. ASNARO seems sure to get money for ODA for at least Vietnam and maybe Cambodia. I’m still optimistic that this dual use technology will prove alluring for MoD. At least its a hedge.

4. No surprise here: MoD likes Epsilon. And who couldn’t. It’s great! Even Stage I (2013 Phase 1) Epsilon will be the best solid rocket ever made and for only $200 million. Prof. Yasuhiro Morita is such a genius! Just wait till Phase II is out.

5. SM3 Block IIA is on target and on course, and I believe it’s Japan’s involvement that is helping this to happen. It seems to me to be no accident that the the most successful element in BMD is the part where Japanese companies are supplying the cutting edge components. Bloody hell, the version out now can knock out satellites, functioning as a direct ascent ASAT, just with a software shuffle. I can’t imagine how scared Japan’s neighbors are when they realize just how far they are behind!

6. MoD continues to study microsatellites, what kind of satellites and their potential applications, and that is all that it will say right now. On the other hand the sterling work being up and down Japan in UNISEC and related laboratories, and the plethora of dual use technologies being developed, as well as the guaranteed budget  for Japan’s micro/nano/picosatellite development programs means that the MoD is sitting on a goldmine of talent and experience here. Purely accidentally, of course.

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by japanspace on March 4, 2012  •  Permalink
Posted in ASNARO, Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center (CSIC), CSIC, ETS-8, In Defense of Japan, In Defense of Japan: From the Market to the Military in Space Policy, Japanese GPS, Melco, Ministry of Defense, Mitsubishi Electric, NEC, Peaceful Purposes Resolution (PPR), QZSS
Tagged , , , , , , , ,

Posted by japanspace on March 4, 2012

https://japanspace.wordpress.com/2012/03/04/moving-beyond-a-zero-sum-military-space-game/