Japan Rebuilding IGS Spy Satellite Network

Here is an older about the IGS spy satellite constellation for Space News which has been left “as is” by the Office of National Space Policy (ONSP) in its February 25 Mk. II Basic Plan. I have a lot to say about this for academia this year, but managed to get a story out for Aviation Week & Space Technology, which I’ll post a bit later.

Japan Rebuilding IGS Spy Satellite Network

自衛隊も宇宙利用へ: Japanese Journalism on EW

Here is an insight into how Japanese journalists (with many honorable exceptions) over the issues.  You can get an idea of piece just from the title: “New Satellite Race.” What on earth (or in orbit) that is supposed to mean, is beyond me.

The point is that the article raises legitimate concerns in its conclusion:

「政府の担当者の間では、発射のタイミングを正確にとらえるためにも、DSPなど「宇宙の目」の役割は重要と考えられている。このため、日本でも自前のDSP導入に向けた研究が始まった。
しかし課題は山積している。DSPにはミサイルの熱源をもとに瞬時に種類や能力を割り出し、弾道を緻密に解析できるソフトウエア開発が欠かせない。しかし日本にはそうしたデータの蓄積がない。しかも早期警戒システムには衛星だけでなく、集めた情報を部隊間で共有する巨大なネットワークの構築も必要になる。
03年から打ち上げが始まった政府の情報収集衛星に投じられた経費は現在、7000億円近い。開発費を含めればDSPも数千億円かかると推定されており、国民の納得が得られるかどうかという新たな問題に直面する。」

Which boils down to legitimate doubts and questions about Japan’s EW program. But the point is without context/ contextual/ relevant contextual presentation by the journalist, the Japanese public is left thinking that the Asahi’s question raising motivated by its political stance; even a few more cursory levels of analysis of facts and background would have made this more helpful…but at least it isn’t at the pizza on the moon level of rubbish that we sometimes see in the foreign press.

So I figure, anything that gets Japanese space development issues into the media by a reasonable  journalist has to be something…

日本の宇宙利用は変わるのか: An interesting interview with Norihiro Sakamoto

Here is an interesting article by my good friend and space expert Norihiro Sakamoto at The Tokyo Foundation. I have known Mr. Sakamoto ever since he worked at the Society of Japan Aerospace Companies (SJAC) and whose predictions and interpretations about Japan’s evolving space policy have proved the most accurate in the business. Here is a screenshot of the article, but you can find the full text at: http://www.tkfd.or.jp/files/doc/nikkeiplus.pdf

The MoD’s PFI for communication satellites was largely Mr. Sakamoto’s idea and he has lots more great ideas!

Mr. Sakamoto has some very interesting opinions about what exactly Japan should do with EW and marine observation and if I get a chance I will be talking about his ideas more on this blog later. Chance would be a fine thing. If I get a chance to put 10% of what I am looking at on this blog or in the media I will be lucky!

JSP Catchup #9: In Asia, C4ISR Market Is Growing

Ahem, just after writing JSP Catchup #8, I have to issue a mea culpa as colleague Wendell Minnick asked me to contribute from Japan, resulting in us looking at the UAV issue in In Asia, C4ISR Market Is Growing, which is easier to link to without copy and pasting the Defense News version in the paper. But, here is how it looks on the web!

JSP Catchup #8: Japan To Boost Missile Warning, Other Surveillance Efforts

Here is a story that Space News asked me to write for their Military Space Quarterly, so it gave me a chance to write a little bit about the militarization of Japan’s space development, which is apparently not occurring.

The intriguing thing for me as a media participant and, more recently, as an observer, is why Japan’s development of a UAV program for early warning should suddenly become news.

And news. And news.

And, ahem…news.

Well, it’s because the Yomuiri decided it was news, even though the information has been out there since August, when the request for the budget was put out.

This led to the story being printed in the English and then suddenly the WSJ even has an angle.

Perhaps the journalist has figured out that maritime observation was somehow important to the U.S.-Japan Alliance, perhaps as it has been written in as one of the fours priority areas of cooperation. in the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (2+2) (June 2011).

The funniest story of them all was an AFP hack job on the Yomiuri story which was itself re-sluiced round media  slop sites, including a website called Inquirer.net, which quoted the AFP quoting the Yomiuri as saying “The defense ministry has demanded 3 billion yen ($372 million) over the next four years to develop the aircraft, which would come into operation in 2020, the Yomiuri Shimbun reported without citing sources.”

The Yomiuri Shimbun’s source was, as I mentioned, the publicly available MOD budget request, released months before, in color:

The fact that Japan is developing UAVs is old, old news; the fact that it is developing them as an alternative to satellite- based EW was big news- back in August. I wonder why the Yomiuri decided to notice the story months later?

In any case, for space watchers, the interesting point about this why is Japan researching twin  Early Warning programs simultaneously?

If you believe in the cock-up theory of history and recognize the stovepiping inherent in any large bureaucracy, then you might call it one hand not knowing what the other is doing.

In this case however, it is  more probably the extreme anxiety that the MOD feels about buying Japanese, which is probably based on the fact that the IGS has proved so problematical for Japan. There is a strong sense in the MoD that it can buy better gear, cheaper, with guaranteed compatibility and interoperability in terms of space based EW, so why risk buying from Melco?

Also there are tricky decisions whether to mount EW sensors on the geo-based satellites of QZSS, or develop standalone satellites, or put capability on a future Himawari, among other options on the table. In the meantime, cheap and cheerful UAV-mounted sensors are an option.

I’ll talk about SSA in a later submission, perhaps at the end of the month. If EW looks complicated for Japan, wait till you see what is happening with SSA! Anyway, here is a recent article from Space News.

JSP Catchup #6: Probe Uncovers 40-year Japanese Contractor Fraud

This story was NOT a surprise; the fuller story is at Japan Still Calculating Cost of Defense Firm’s Padded Bills, but ever since NEC Corp. in 1998 was found with its hands in the till, I have been wondering who would be fingered next, and when, and why when, and why.

I say this because when I chatted to people back in 1998, the practice of padding contracts with surplus labor costs was widespread in the space and defense sectors and this was commonly known. At the time the questions were Why NEC? And Why Now? Below my initial October story is NEC SCANDAL SHEDS LIGHT ON JAPANESE PROCUREMENTS, a more fruity web version of a story that I originally wrote for Space News back in the day.

The timing for the original NEC story was also interesting as NEC was strongly pushing for its version of what was to become Japan’s IGS spy satellite system that was provoked by the Teapodon Triggeran analysis that Saadia and I wrote about in In Defense of Japan (thank you Google Books!)

At the time NEC’s version of what was to become the IGS would have featured smaller satellites and cost less than Melco’s system. But with NEC suddenly out of the picture, Melco, with Ichiro Taniguchi at the helm, managed to personally lobby Japan’s Cabinet in the weeks after the Taepondon launch, and Japan’ got the IGS.

Here is a nice picture from Space Safety Magazine of Japan’s 1,200-Kilogram IGS 1B Satellite re-entered Earth’s Atmosphere on Thursday, July 26, 2012 after spending nearly 9.5 years in space.  Another more detailed article about this can be found at Spaceflight.101.com.

Eventually, NEC’s small-bus and higher resolution system has  been re-emerging in the ASNARO system, which is now being pushed as an alternative and complementary system to the expensive and relatively lower performance IGS, and also as the linchpin of a satellite-based, pan-Asian disaster monitoring network that is now a major part of Japan’s emerging regional space diplomacy and security strategy.  At least the Vietnamese have bought into it, and while customers don’t seem to be forming a line yet, there is still a lot of hope out there.

Here is the initial story for Defense News:

NEC SCANDAL SHEDS LIGHT ON

JAPANESE PROCUREMENTS.

By Paul Kallender in Tokyo

When, in September 1998, an investigation into the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) discovered that Japanese technology giant NEC Corp had systematically defrauded the taxpayer on 33 space contracts over the course of five years, it looked as though Japan’s obviously abused government procurement system was about to get a major overhaul.

The investigation began promisingly enough. On September 3, Tokyo prosecutors raided the JDA and arrested Kenichi Ueno, deputy head of the Procurement Office, and a clutch of executives from NEC subsidiary Toyo Communications.

This followed discoveries that not only had Toyo overcharged the JDA some $21m over dozens of equipment contracts, but that Ueno and others had conspired to prevent Toyo, NEC and other subsidiaries from repaying the money. NEC was raided the next day and by September 10, nine senior NEC and JDA executives were in jail.

It came to light that Ueno and others had lifted incriminating paperwork out of the Agency’s filing cabinets and put them into incinerators and even the homes of friends. NEC’s SuperTower headquarters was soon besieged by the Japanese phenomenon of ‘sound trucks,’ driven by right-wing extremists screaming abuse and demanding mass resignations.

But instead of resulting in the punishment of protagonists and the start of reforms, the scandal collapsed into a desultory cover-up. NEC’s initial response was to deny everything, with a bemused VP Masakatsu Miwa telling the media on September 10 that he did not expect top NEC executives to resign because of the scandal, going on to explain that he “wondered why” NEC officials were being implicated. Unfortunately for Miwa, on September 29, NEC’s overcharging was upscaled to $2.5bn, while, on the same day, a Parliamentary committee reported that the JDA had hired no less than 44 NEC executives in senior positions in just two years. By October 10, former NEC VP Hiroaki Shimayama and Takenori Yanase, VP of NEC’s Space Systems Division, had both been arrested.

Thieves charter

The National Space Development Agency (NASDA) launched an inquiry and on November 9, NEC admitted overcharging by at least $19m. Meanwhile on October 14, the JDA revealed that 225 of its officials had been hired by 20 suppliers in the past five years, shedding some dim light on a corner of Japan’s Amadudari (Descent from Heaven) career kickback system.

At the heart of the issue, according to NASDA’s former executive director Akira Kubozono, is the flawed government contract system which encourages corruption through a combination of legendary meanness and bureaucratic incompetence.

“There are two points about this affair,” he said. “One is that NEC is just a scapegoat. The second is that the governmental contract system is the cause of this scandal. When the defense contract revelations began, I thought it was only a matter of time before it spread into NEC’s space systems division as both defense and space procurement are conducted under similar systems.”

Under the Japanese government contract system, the co ntractor is obliged to repay any unused budget if the delivery price falls below the contract amount, and the contractor must also incur any costs if the project overshoots the agreed estimate — a thieves charter if ever there was one.

Furthermore NASDA, the Science and Technology Agency and the Ministry of Finance lack the technical expertise to evaluate bids and tend to just accept company estimates, says Kubozono. “The system needs to be reformed but I doubt this is possible as long as NASDA and the corporations are controlled by STA administrators (who also often retire to executive positions in NASDA) and not by engineers,” he says.

No mettle Kubozono, it seems, was right.

By November 12, the space scandal seemed to have been wrapped up, with NASDA saying it was satisfied that only NEC had abused the system. “The system has worked well for 30 years. We believe that a little devil whispered into NEC’s ear. We do not think it will happen again,” said Yasuyuki Fukumuro, NASDA PR deputy director. Fukumuro quickly admitted that NEC would be allowed to bid for Japan’s new spy satellite system, after a token contract moratorium.

Back at the JDA, a grand total of six senior officials will take up to 10% pay cuts for one to three months plus one official will receive a 10-day suspension, JDA chief Fukushiro Nukuga told the media at his November 20 resignation press conference.

The speech followed a report, which admitted that there had been “some incidents that could be regarded as a systematic cover-up,” perhaps referring to the 31 officials suspected of Berlin-bunker style burning of documentation that might have provided evidence.

But the worst thing about the affair, according to observers, has been the brazen arrogance of NEC. In his October 23 resignation speech, NEC Chairman Tadahiro Sekimoto, now under personal investigation for his role in the affair, denied any involvement but resigned out of “social responsibility” for the affair, astonishing Kubozono in particular.

“Sekimoto’s act was spineless. If he had honor he would have resigned to take responsibility, not quibbled. He showed no mettle and is a very poor example for younger business leaders. I fear for Japan’s future.”

An even poorer analysis comes from Youichi Teraishi, Editor of Japan’s ‘scandaru’ [scandal] daily, the Nikkan Gendai. He says that Sekimoto’s act compared unfavorably with Yakuza (the Japanese Mafia) standards of conduct. “This Oyabun [Japanese gang boss] showed a lack of chivalry. Captains of industry are supposed to be able to demonstrate this, but Sekimoto lacked the class,” he says.

Lastly, the scandal has left NEC seething that it was singled out for a brutal slap on the wrist. “Everyone is doing it, why should we be the scapegoat?” admitted one NEC official. “Our top management just stuck their heads in the sand and got shafted,” complained another.

This article first appeared in Global Technology News.

Catchup #2 Japan’s Defense Budget Request Down 1.7 Percent

Here is a basic story on Japan’s defense budget request for next year for Defense News.  Of course the most interesting items for me are how the space and BMD budgets are working out, along with new investments in C4ISR. But this is more for a general audience.

The web story is here.

TOKYO — Japan’s Ministry of Defense on Sept. 10 requested 4.57 trillion yen ($58 billion) in budget appropriations for the next financial year, starting April 1, 2013, a figure that is 1.7 percent lower than the current budget. This represents the biggest one-year decline in half a century and the lowest total in two decades.

But the request also signals an ongoing restructuring and updating of Japan’s defense posture to counter China, and greatly upgrades command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; ballistic missile defense; and cyber defense capabilities.

Japan’s current five-year Mid-Term Defense Program of December 2010 has tasked the MoD with bolstering defense of the nation’s sea lanes and far-flung southeastern island chain, which extends from Okinawa to a few hundred kilometers from Taiwan. More recently, the MoD has begun to openly acknowledge China, which has an increasingly assertive Navy in the region, as a strategic concern.

In line with this, the ministry has been steadily reinforcing Japan’s marine, antisubmarine and surveillance capabilities. Consequently, the MoD for the next year has requested 72.3 billion yen for an advanced, 5,000-ton antisubmarine destroyer that features a new combined diesel-electric and gas propulsion system that will probably be developed in Japan.

The ministry has also asked for 10 billion yen to upgrade four E-767 airborne early warning and control aircraft, 19.2 billion yen for a 690-ton minesweeper featuring a fiber-reinforced plastic hull and 2.5 billion yen for four amphibious assault vehicles (AAVs).

The AAV request is viewed as the most important new item, said local military analyst Shinichi Kiyotani, who added the Ground Self-Defense Forces (GSDF) were looking to purchase four AAV-7 series vehicles after concluding that a vehicle developed in Japan could not meet cost and capability requirements.

“Japan has no marines or no Royal Marines for remote island protection,” Kiyotani said. “This was a significant purchase for the GSDF and a first for postwar Japan. It represents great progress in Japan’s efforts to deter threats against our islands.”

C4ISR and space systems also are more prominently featured, with the ministry requesting 100 million yen to convert its advanced FPS-5 phased array radar system so it can also conduct space situational awareness duties, in addition to funds for a research budget for a satellite-mounted ballistic missile early warning sensor, and 3 billion yen for an unmanned aerial vehicle-mounted ballistic missile early warning system.

And after several years of trying, the MoD has also requested 21.2 billion yen to set up a new cyber defense force with about 100 people, which will combine previous efforts to create a combined unit, along with 13.3 billion yen to reinforce cyber defense of the ministry’s core Defense Information Infrastructure.

Motohiro Tsuchiya, a professor at Keio University and member of the Information Security Policy Center, Japan’s top-level government cybersecurity advisory body, applauded the move to set up the unit as the MoD has previously been stymied by budgetary restraints in its attempts to set up the unit.

“The MoD has been trying for two years to set up the unit, but the attempts were refused by the Finance Ministry. It is said that the MoD will be finding about 100 staff to man the unit, but it is unclear if they will be 100 new staff, or seconded from other areas,” Tsuchiya said.

The Japanese budget year runs from April 1, with all of the nation’s government ministries putting in their requests to the powerful Ministry of Finance in late August or early September. The budget requests, already the result of haggling and negotiation, are then audited by the Finance Ministry, which generally makes small cuts, announcing the final figures at the end of December. The Japanese Diet then passes the ratified budget into law the following spring.