Here is an older about the IGS spy satellite constellation for Space News which has been left “as is” by the Office of National Space Policy (ONSP) in its February 25 Mk. II Basic Plan. I have a lot to say about this for academia this year, but managed to get a story out for Aviation Week & Space Technology, which I’ll post a bit later.
Posted by japanspace on May 9, 2013
https://japanspace.wordpress.com/2013/05/09/japan-rebuilding-igs-spy-satellite-network/
Here is a story that Space News asked me to write for their Military Space Quarterly, so it gave me a chance to write a little bit about the militarization of Japan’s space development, which is apparently not occurring.
The intriguing thing for me as a media participant and, more recently, as an observer, is why Japan’s development of a UAV program for early warning should suddenly become news.
And, ahem…news.
Well, it’s because the Yomuiri decided it was news, even though the information has been out there since August, when the request for the budget was put out.
This led to the story being printed in the English and then suddenly the WSJ even has an angle.
Perhaps the journalist has figured out that maritime observation was somehow important to the U.S.-Japan Alliance, perhaps as it has been written in as one of the fours priority areas of cooperation. in the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (2+2) (June 2011).
The funniest story of them all was an AFP hack job on the Yomiuri story which was itself re-sluiced round media slop sites, including a website called Inquirer.net, which quoted the AFP quoting the Yomiuri as saying “The defense ministry has demanded 3 billion yen ($372 million) over the next four years to develop the aircraft, which would come into operation in 2020, the Yomiuri Shimbun reported without citing sources.”
The Yomiuri Shimbun’s source was, as I mentioned, the publicly available MOD budget request, released months before, in color:
The fact that Japan is developing UAVs is old, old news; the fact that it is developing them as an alternative to satellite- based EW was big news- back in August. I wonder why the Yomiuri decided to notice the story months later?
In any case, for space watchers, the interesting point about this why is Japan researching twin Early Warning programs simultaneously?
If you believe in the cock-up theory of history and recognize the stovepiping inherent in any large bureaucracy, then you might call it one hand not knowing what the other is doing.
In this case however, it is more probably the extreme anxiety that the MOD feels about buying Japanese, which is probably based on the fact that the IGS has proved so problematical for Japan. There is a strong sense in the MoD that it can buy better gear, cheaper, with guaranteed compatibility and interoperability in terms of space based EW, so why risk buying from Melco?
Also there are tricky decisions whether to mount EW sensors on the geo-based satellites of QZSS, or develop standalone satellites, or put capability on a future Himawari, among other options on the table. In the meantime, cheap and cheerful UAV-mounted sensors are an option.
I’ll talk about SSA in a later submission, perhaps at the end of the month. If EW looks complicated for Japan, wait till you see what is happening with SSA! Anyway, here is a recent article from Space News.
Posted by japanspace on November 19, 2012
https://japanspace.wordpress.com/2012/11/19/jsp-catchup-8-japan-to-boost-missile-warning-other-surveillance-efforts-2/
Here is the follow-up to JSP Catchup #6: Probe Uncovers 40-year Japanese Contractor Fraud and a fuller story for Defense News published the following week. I am still intrigued on who blew the whistle and why, but hopefully this will clean out a very mucky stable. Again there are so many unanswered questions, but perhaps it was felt that Melco had gotten too big for its boots.
This was certainly the message I got around Kasumigaseki in the mid-noughties when it became increasingly apparent that, at least in space, the IGS was overpriced and not very functional. But it seemed that Japan was stuck with it until better alternatives came up.
Meanwhile, Melco’s answer was, of course, to ask for more money to improve (repair) the IGS. The numbers of contracts and amounts are quite staggering, because the practice of overcharging was built into the very fabric of Melco’s system, and reading between the lines, it seems that the NEC scandal of 1998, instead of provoking a response to clean up, it did the reverse- Melco adopted increasingly sophisticated systems of cover-up and concealment. Not good.
A basic fact is that Melco produces a lot of excellent technology and systems and is a corner stone of Japan’s defense and space industries. While it really should have cleaned its stable out in 1998, as no doubt many others did, to the degree of information that is available, it seems that justice is being done. Perhaps at last, some real “Changes for the Better” ?
Posted by japanspace on November 19, 2012
https://japanspace.wordpress.com/2012/11/19/jsp-catchup-7-japan-still-calculating-cost-of-defense-firms-padded-bills/
This story was NOT a surprise; the fuller story is at Japan Still Calculating Cost of Defense Firm’s Padded Bills, but ever since NEC Corp. in 1998 was found with its hands in the till, I have been wondering who would be fingered next, and when, and why when, and why.
I say this because when I chatted to people back in 1998, the practice of padding contracts with surplus labor costs was widespread in the space and defense sectors and this was commonly known. At the time the questions were Why NEC? And Why Now? Below my initial October story is NEC SCANDAL SHEDS LIGHT ON JAPANESE PROCUREMENTS, a more fruity web version of a story that I originally wrote for Space News back in the day.
The timing for the original NEC story was also interesting as NEC was strongly pushing for its version of what was to become Japan’s IGS spy satellite system that was provoked by the Teapodon Trigger– an analysis that Saadia and I wrote about in In Defense of Japan (thank you Google Books!)
At the time NEC’s version of what was to become the IGS would have featured smaller satellites and cost less than Melco’s system. But with NEC suddenly out of the picture, Melco, with Ichiro Taniguchi at the helm, managed to personally lobby Japan’s Cabinet in the weeks after the Taepondon launch, and Japan’ got the IGS.
Here is a nice picture from Space Safety Magazine of Japan’s 1,200-Kilogram IGS 1B Satellite re-entered Earth’s Atmosphere on Thursday, July 26, 2012 after spending nearly 9.5 years in space. Another more detailed article about this can be found at Spaceflight.101.com.
Eventually, NEC’s small-bus and higher resolution system has been re-emerging in the ASNARO system, which is now being pushed as an alternative and complementary system to the expensive and relatively lower performance IGS, and also as the linchpin of a satellite-based, pan-Asian disaster monitoring network that is now a major part of Japan’s emerging regional space diplomacy and security strategy. At least the Vietnamese have bought into it, and while customers don’t seem to be forming a line yet, there is still a lot of hope out there.
Here is the initial story for Defense News:
By Paul Kallender in Tokyo
When, in September 1998, an investigation into the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) discovered that Japanese technology giant NEC Corp had systematically defrauded the taxpayer on 33 space contracts over the course of five years, it looked as though Japan’s obviously abused government procurement system was about to get a major overhaul.
The investigation began promisingly enough. On September 3, Tokyo prosecutors raided the JDA and arrested Kenichi Ueno, deputy head of the Procurement Office, and a clutch of executives from NEC subsidiary Toyo Communications.
This followed discoveries that not only had Toyo overcharged the JDA some $21m over dozens of equipment contracts, but that Ueno and others had conspired to prevent Toyo, NEC and other subsidiaries from repaying the money. NEC was raided the next day and by September 10, nine senior NEC and JDA executives were in jail.
It came to light that Ueno and others had lifted incriminating paperwork out of the Agency’s filing cabinets and put them into incinerators and even the homes of friends. NEC’s SuperTower headquarters was soon besieged by the Japanese phenomenon of ‘sound trucks,’ driven by right-wing extremists screaming abuse and demanding mass resignations.
But instead of resulting in the punishment of protagonists and the start of reforms, the scandal collapsed into a desultory cover-up. NEC’s initial response was to deny everything, with a bemused VP Masakatsu Miwa telling the media on September 10 that he did not expect top NEC executives to resign because of the scandal, going on to explain that he “wondered why” NEC officials were being implicated. Unfortunately for Miwa, on September 29, NEC’s overcharging was upscaled to $2.5bn, while, on the same day, a Parliamentary committee reported that the JDA had hired no less than 44 NEC executives in senior positions in just two years. By October 10, former NEC VP Hiroaki Shimayama and Takenori Yanase, VP of NEC’s Space Systems Division, had both been arrested.
Thieves charter
The National Space Development Agency (NASDA) launched an inquiry and on November 9, NEC admitted overcharging by at least $19m. Meanwhile on October 14, the JDA revealed that 225 of its officials had been hired by 20 suppliers in the past five years, shedding some dim light on a corner of Japan’s Amadudari (Descent from Heaven) career kickback system.
At the heart of the issue, according to NASDA’s former executive director Akira Kubozono, is the flawed government contract system which encourages corruption through a combination of legendary meanness and bureaucratic incompetence.
“There are two points about this affair,” he said. “One is that NEC is just a scapegoat. The second is that the governmental contract system is the cause of this scandal. When the defense contract revelations began, I thought it was only a matter of time before it spread into NEC’s space systems division as both defense and space procurement are conducted under similar systems.”
Under the Japanese government contract system, the co ntractor is obliged to repay any unused budget if the delivery price falls below the contract amount, and the contractor must also incur any costs if the project overshoots the agreed estimate — a thieves charter if ever there was one.
Furthermore NASDA, the Science and Technology Agency and the Ministry of Finance lack the technical expertise to evaluate bids and tend to just accept company estimates, says Kubozono. “The system needs to be reformed but I doubt this is possible as long as NASDA and the corporations are controlled by STA administrators (who also often retire to executive positions in NASDA) and not by engineers,” he says.
No mettle Kubozono, it seems, was right.
By November 12, the space scandal seemed to have been wrapped up, with NASDA saying it was satisfied that only NEC had abused the system. “The system has worked well for 30 years. We believe that a little devil whispered into NEC’s ear. We do not think it will happen again,” said Yasuyuki Fukumuro, NASDA PR deputy director. Fukumuro quickly admitted that NEC would be allowed to bid for Japan’s new spy satellite system, after a token contract moratorium.
Back at the JDA, a grand total of six senior officials will take up to 10% pay cuts for one to three months plus one official will receive a 10-day suspension, JDA chief Fukushiro Nukuga told the media at his November 20 resignation press conference.
The speech followed a report, which admitted that there had been “some incidents that could be regarded as a systematic cover-up,” perhaps referring to the 31 officials suspected of Berlin-bunker style burning of documentation that might have provided evidence.
But the worst thing about the affair, according to observers, has been the brazen arrogance of NEC. In his October 23 resignation speech, NEC Chairman Tadahiro Sekimoto, now under personal investigation for his role in the affair, denied any involvement but resigned out of “social responsibility” for the affair, astonishing Kubozono in particular.
“Sekimoto’s act was spineless. If he had honor he would have resigned to take responsibility, not quibbled. He showed no mettle and is a very poor example for younger business leaders. I fear for Japan’s future.”
An even poorer analysis comes from Youichi Teraishi, Editor of Japan’s ‘scandaru’ [scandal] daily, the Nikkan Gendai. He says that Sekimoto’s act compared unfavorably with Yakuza (the Japanese Mafia) standards of conduct. “This Oyabun [Japanese gang boss] showed a lack of chivalry. Captains of industry are supposed to be able to demonstrate this, but Sekimoto lacked the class,” he says.
Lastly, the scandal has left NEC seething that it was singled out for a brutal slap on the wrist. “Everyone is doing it, why should we be the scapegoat?” admitted one NEC official. “Our top management just stuck their heads in the sand and got shafted,” complained another.
This article first appeared in Global Technology News.
Posted by japanspace on November 19, 2012
https://japanspace.wordpress.com/2012/11/19/jsp-catchup-6-probe-uncovers-40-year-japanese-contractor-fraud/
In its March 22 editorial Security, efficiency must go together in space use the Yomiuri Shimbun writes about how the Ministry of Defense is using a PFI to procure two badly needed communications satellites instead of renting transponders from what used to be Mitsubishi’s SCC Superbird satellites before SCC was absorbed by its longstanding rival J-SAT
(Actually its a bit more complex than this because of the digital satellite broadcasting wars of the 90s and the launch and demise of DirecTV and J Sky B’s PerfecTV! .You can tell who won by the name of the company that the MOD is renting transponders off: SKY Perfect JSAT Corporation.)
The Yomuiri goes on to say: “Military technology has made remarkable progress in recent years. Even in the field of space technology, more emphasis should be placed on national security aspects. The Defense Ministry will for the first time seek to obtain two communication satellites for its exclusive use.”
The Yomiuri’s point is that instead of renting X-band transponders, by having its own satellites, “communication among the three forces will become smoother” and …”the share of communication lines allotted to each defense force can be adjusted. It will be also possible to place satellites in the most ideal position for the SDF, thereby ensuring high-speed, large-capacity–and better quality–communication lines.”
The story behind this is the zero-sum budget that the MOD currently faces for military space use. Those familiar with Japan’s nascent military space development will know that as early as 2009 the MOD created a shopping list of items it felt it might need in terms of military space assets, but these have remained a wish-list because (a) budget for them will have to come from somewhere else within the MOD (b) conservative elements in the MOD are wedded to massive hardware procurements and the space constituency in the MOD is new and has to fight for relevancy against the people who want more DDS or more F-35s (c) the Joint Chiefs of Staff have only just really started a military space policy following last year’s 2+2.
However the main point is the budget situation at the moment, hence the PFI solution, which was originally recommended by my old friend Sakamoto san, who used to lead SJAC’s space and aerospace unit. PFI will probably used for MOD’s EW or own dedicated SERVIS-3 based spy satellites, if these progra
ms ever “get off the ground.”
Here is the original Space News Article:
Posted by japanspace on March 22, 2012
https://japanspace.wordpress.com/2012/03/22/japans-first-space-pfi/
You couldn’t make it up. You just couldn’t. I just asked the MOD about this very likelihood this week!
The announcement that the DPRK is attempting a third satellite launch in mid-April is just the sort of development that will help propel Japan’s basic BMD and nascent military space deployment.
The fact that so the Eunha-3 (Galaxy) rocket will fly over the Yellow Sea and not Japan doesn’t mean the news hasn’t already caused a huge stir in Japan, with the story being the top news on most TV.
Regardless of the flightpath, the launch will constitute another violation of June 2009’s UNSC Resolution 1874 that was passed the last time DPRK tried to launch a satellite (see below).
“We urge North Korea to exercise restraint and refrain from the launch,” said Chief Cabinet Secretary Osamu Fujimura, echoing statements from ROK.
What timing!
On Tuesday I was talking to Masayuki Iwaike, Director of Missile Defense and Space Policy at MOD about Japan’s approach to SSA and likely speed of moves by Japan on Early Warning, following last June’s 2+2, when Japan and the U.S. basically agreed that Japan will add some form of EW capability to its BMD systems, either through adding IR sensors on QZSS/Michibiki or through several different satellite bus plans (candidates include
SERVIS-3 by USEF and ASNARO, among others) with the CISC probably jealously guarding its independence with the IGS program, keeping it from the Space Strategy Office to be formed in April.
The key point about next week’s Defense News article, will be that Japan has more or less completed its basic two-tier BMD system, with its radar and sensor structure also on the verge of completion with the fourth and final FPS-5 S-band phased array ground based early warning radar nearly finished, joining the upgraded FPS-3 3-D phased-array radars, and JADGE up and running. Meanwhile PAC-3 is being boosted and the MSDF is adding two more SM3-Block 1A capable cruisers.
So the big question was to Iwaike, will you accelerate plans or add capability if the recent U.S.-DPRK agreement turns out to be not worth the paper its written on?
– Remember last month North Korea supposedly agreed to suspend uranium enrichment, halt nuclear and long-range missile tests, and to allow back U.N. weapons inspectors in exchange for a quarter of a million tons of “food aid.”
So what happens if they start firing off their nasty fireworks demonstrating significant new capabilities, or creditable information comes out about successful miniaturization of their Pakistani/stolen bargain-basement fission bomb technology (actually, then consequently making it a creditable threat)?
Will Japan build out BMD?
Of course, I didn’t put the it that way, but the message was an unequivocal yes. Because all the key systems are in place. But that’s for next week’s article.
Please read Defense News on Monday.
The beauty of the SM3-/PAC-3 two-tier system is that it works (with caveats, see Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress) and it’s only going to get better. And when the Chinese decided to create chaos in orbit with its 2007 ASAT test leading to what is rapidly going to become a crisis if nothing is done over the next decade, the U.S. was able to remind the Chinese just whom they are dealing with if they are serious.
And then, just on time, news comes out that North Korea is attempting its third satellite launch (Kwangmyŏngsŏng-3) around April 12-16 to celebrate the 100th anniversary of the birth Kim Il Sung, on April 15.
The Taepodon Trigger
One of the key stories in In Defense of Japan is the story of the Taepodon Trigger, which is more commonly called the Taepodon Shock.
Whatever else it doesn’t have going for it, the DPRK is a master of timing. It’s almost as if it wants Japan to further rearm to create a foreign bugbear to rail against and rally the (starving) masses. The history of DPRK missile launches is quite intriguing. In 1998, the attempted launch of Kwangmyongsong-1 
aboard a re-gigged Taepodon gave Japan the decisive inflection point it needed to launching military space development, instead of developing dual-use technology research and development programs that could be converted to military use if and when needed. This is essentially the story behind Japan’s IGS, which is a regigged Melco USERS bus with not very good radar and optical sensors (which are getting better, nearing half-meter now for Gen-2 optical at least).
At the time, I can vividly remember the shock and outrage behind the missile overfly, which was largely stage-managed by media and politicians, since (a) Japan and the U.S. knew about the launch a month in advance, having been informed by the DPRK about it, and had an Aegis missile cruiser tracking the thing (b) the satellite launch didn’t actually violate Japan’s airspace at all and (c) as was actually an attempted satellite launch, not a missile test, as made out by the Japanese media.
Now while I am a strong supporter of Japan and no fan of the DPRK, the facts are the facts. Within 10 days of the “shocking missile test,” Ichiro Taniguchi, the Lion of Melco, was briefing the Cabinet on what was to become IGS. For more on this, please read In Defense of Japan.
But it was more of the same in 2009 when the nation in April attempted the 
launch of Kwangmyŏngsŏng-2 aboard an Unha-2 rocket carrying the satellite, following this with two rounds of missile tests in July 2009 and then a probably partially successful nuclear test in October. A busy year for everyone, and provocation that has helped Japan to bolster its SM-3 fleet to six ships.
In a perverse sense, the latest launch looks right on schedule. In order to prop up the 3rd incarnation of the Kim Dynasty, the DPRK needed a quick win in its poker strategy diplomacy of threat, bluff, and (insincere) concession cycle. On what levels the events of the last two months are wins for the regime vary; if they get the food and launch the satellite, it will buy the new regime a lot of time perhaps. If the perfidious Yankie and, etc., imperialists “renegade” on the deal, and the satellite is triumphantly launched (whether it will or not, it will still triumphantly succeed in glorious honor of what not, of course, right) then it still provides glue to hang the new regime together on. Oh the poor suffering people.
All this of course is grist for the mill for Japan and is, ahem, unlikely to disincentivize Japan from pushing forward with EW and better BMD.
Update: This is from Reuters: Launch called a ‘deal-breaker
The U.S. State Department issued the following statement, March 16:
“North Korea’s announcement that it plans to conduct a missile launch in direct violation of its international obligations is highly provocative. UN Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874 clearly and unequivocally prohibit North Korea from conducting launches that use ballistic missile technology. Such a missile launch would pose a threat to regional security and would also be inconsistent with North Korea’s recent undertaking to refrain from long-range missile launches. We call on North Korea to adhere to its international obligations, including all relevant UN Security Council Resolutions. We are consulting closely with our international partners on next steps. U.S. now says it will not send food aid to North Korea if it goes ahead with the long-range rocket launch, and U.N. Security Council members said it may violate sanctions.”
The DPRK argues that satellite launches are part of a peaceful space program that is exempt from international disarmament obligations, but according to Reuters, State Department spokesman Victoria Nuland said the U.S. now had “grave concerns” about the Feb. 29 agreement under which the North agreed with the U.S. to nuclear concessions and a moratorium on long-range missile tests in return for 240,000 tons of food aid.
Nuland said a rocket launch would call into question North Korea’s good faith. She said that during the negotiations for the U.S.-North Korea agreement, “we made clear unequivocally that we considered that any satellite launch would be a deal-breaker.
Expect a third nuclear test!
Posted by japanspace on March 16, 2012
https://japanspace.wordpress.com/2012/03/16/taepodon-trigger-3-dprk-to-attempt-3rd-satellite-shot-third-time-lucky/
Again, here is anearlier story I did (back in March 2011) with esteemed colleague Wendell Minnick about the earlier stages of the F-X RFP…
TOKYO and TAIPEI – After years of vacillation, Japan’s Ministry of Defense (MoD) plans this month to formally launch a $10 billion purchase of 40 to 50 fighter jets, a program that could make or break the country’s ability to manufacture combat aircraft.
The F-X program will release a request for proposals March 28, sources in Tokyo said. Bids will be due Aug. 31, and a contract awarded at the end of this year, they said.
The competition will be closely watched by the Japanese defense industry. Unless some of the F-X planes are produced in Japan under license, the country faces its sunset as a maker of fighter jets. Production of Mitsubishi F-2s, the country’s only active fighter line, is to close in September.
A deal to make at least some of the F-Xs will prove very profitable for local industry, “but no licensed production will be tantamount to disaster,” a Japanese defense industry source said. “We have excellent engineers, and a generation of skills will be lost.”
Three competitors are expected to vie for the contract: the Boeing F/A-18 Super Hornet, Eurofighter Typhoon and the Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).
Boeing and Eurofighter are set to offer licensed production in their bids, but Lockheed may be unable to do so. Japan is not a member of the multinational JSF partnership, thanks to its self-imposed ban on making defense items for export.
Attempts by Japan’s defense industry to repeal the ban have met stiff resistance from pacifist political opposition groups.
This makes licensed production of the F-35 nearly impossible in Japan, said Satoshi Tsuzukibashi, director of the Office of Defense Production Committee at the Japan Business Federation, or Nippon Keidanren.
And that could finally scuttle the Japan Air Self-Defense Force’s (JASDF) dreams of buying a fifth-generation fighter. The F-X program was supposed to launch in 2007, but officials delayed it in hopes that the U.S. would allow Lockheed to export the F-22. When those hopes were dashed, Tokyo set its sights on the F-35, only to see the JSF effort dogged by delays and cost overruns.
“The delay of the RfP last year was somewhat because of the delay of the F-35,” Tsuzukibashi said.
Despite the doubts over licensed production, Lockheeds plans to compete for the F-X, offering some form of industrial participation, said John Giese, the company’s senior manager for international communications. He said the F-35 “meets Japan’s F-X acquisition timeline, both to support the F-X model selection decision to be made in 2011 and for delivery of aircraft and sustainment to meet JASDF’s F-X delivery requirements.”
But for the Japanese defense industry, licensed production remains the bottom line.
Industry “will happily accept the MoD’s decision for any of the options on the table, as long as the MoD secures licensed production,” said a senior Japanese defense industry source, who added that Tokyo must “do all it can to convince the U.S. to allow for technology transfer and licensed production if the MoD does opt for the F-35.”
If not, the source said, defense industry favors either the F/A-18 or the Typhoon as a matter of survival.
Boeing and Eurofighter are taking advantage of these fears.
Boeing would offer Japanese industry opportunities to develop and produce the F/A-18, including options under the new Super Hornet International Roadmap capability program, said Joe Song, Boeing’s vice president of Asia-Pacific business development.
“We believe we can offer a substantial package to Japan that enables it to sustain and advance its defense aerospace business for follow-on development,” Song said.
Kory Mathews, Boeing’s vice president for F/A-18 and EA-18 programs, noted that Boeing had brought Japan licensed production of the F-4EJ and F-15J.
But the Super Hornet faces stiff competition from the Typhoon, the first serious effort by a European fighter to unseat U.S. dominance in Japan. Tsuzukibashi said Eurofighter officials have been promoting it as a flexible, inexpensive alternative to the F/A-18 and F-35, and they believe it has a good chance of winning.
A European industry source in Japan said technical export restrictions hamper F-35 exports, while Eurofighter has “no blackbox policy,” which means wider options for Japanese industry participation.
A senior Japanese defense industry source said, “The Eurofighter people are always talking about full disclosure technology for production and technology transfer to Japanese industry and the MoD. The guys from BAE are very hard workers … very enthusiastic for promoting the Eurofighter option for the F-X.”
Eurofighter has teamed with Sumitomo, a major Japanese integrated trading and investment enterprise, to fight for the F-X contract.
Yet the Japan-U.S. military alliance and pressure to procure a U.S. fighter may keep the MoD from picking a European fighter, Tsuzukibashi said.
The F-X will replace Mitsubishi F-4EJ Kai Phantoms due to begin retiring in 2015. Tokyo is also considering buying more fighters to replace F-15Js in the next 10 years. That could increase the number of F-X fighters to 150, lowering the cost of manufacturing in Japan.
Posted by japanspace on March 6, 2012
https://japanspace.wordpress.com/2012/03/06/japan-to-launch-much-delayed-f-x-contest/
Space News, 19 December 2011. The future of the IGS looks to be that the CSIC will retain its independence within the new 宇宙戦略室 (Space Strategy Office) within the Cabinet Office, however the details are still be worked out in favor of a final January decision. If all goes well, the proposed law will put to the Diet in January. The CISC will not allow interference in this program for a while it seems; however Melco has been steadily making profits from this program ever since NEC was destabilized by scandal back in 1998 (see NEC Scandal Sheds Light on Japanese Procurements). However the satellite bus is old (probably based on USERS) and there have been many issues with both the radar and optical satellites. This saga has been covered by me exhaustively since the late 1990s and several of the IGS have failed on orbit early. We hope Melco has sorted out the issues with the IGS design moving forward!
Posted by japanspace on March 6, 2012
https://japanspace.wordpress.com/2012/03/06/japan-launches-igs-radar-reconnaissance-satellite/
After 15 years and twists and turns that made IHI/Nissan’s bid for the J-1A->J-2->GX look like a skip around the block, Michibiki will finally become an openly accepted part of Japan’s emergent space-based national security structure.
There has always been a strong element of “aw-shucks, you don’t say” about the real purpose of the QZSS system, which is to provide a highly advanced (15cm to 1m positioning accuracy) sovereign (encrypted = military signal) positioning (read targeting) local (read regional) GPS system, that’s useful for…the same uses as the original GPS and GLONASS systems.
Although the what become the present system originated out of Melco and the old CRL (Communications Research Laboratory, now NICT) in 1996/7. I can still remember the pitch, and then the huge wrangle between the STA and MOFA with the U.S. over it. I covered this for Space News what, 14 and 13 years ago now.
In a recent conversation I had with a former GSDF general who is now a consultant for a major Japanese IT firm consulting the MOD to fight Japan’s cyberwars against 30,000 state-funded Chinese hackers, making sure QZSS has targeting capability has been formally on the table in inter-ministerial meetings (well at that time the MOD was the JDA) since at least 2005. In fact, retired general “X,” as we’ll call him, brought QZSS up unilaterally. The topic we were discussing was the utility of UAVs and network-centric warfare and the limits of interoperability. The main issue for X was concern that Japan be capable of building a “rec’n’rocket” Global Hawk capability as well as a tactical capability so that battlefield, operations and strategic roles can be fulfilled. And then, as he put it, “there is the space element” of which QZSS or its successor will no doublt play a role…
2005. 2005. Well, well, well. Wasn’t that time when the now-defunct ASBC (Advanced Satellite Business Corporation), who were responsible for window-dressing QZSS as an orbital Wall-Mart communications and broadcasting and “man nabi” system, gave me a very 玉虫色 (tamamushiiro) response about if they were talking to the JDA about the QZSS’s dual-uses.
The business model for QZSS as pounded out by ASBC didn’t make sense. Why would we need man-nabi from a keitai with an expensive chip plugged into a space-based system when nabi functions were already commonplace. Why would we need broadcasting when we already had BS* by NHK, and SKY PerfecTV washing our brains out with hundreds of channels of digital junk. SkyPerfect being the consolidated rump of what had been DirecTV, PerfecTV and JSky B competing in Japan’s limited market, and JSAT competing with Mitsubishi’s SCC as a platform service providers. (SCC lost and was merged into JSAT). So there goes your business model.
As we make clear in In Defense of Japan, “..although the QZSS/Michibiki itself is a product of the 2000s, the system as a whole represents the culmination of eff orts to develop a regional GPS system dating back to the late 1980s. Like a lot of the other space- based technologies discussed in this book, this one has had a long trajectory…”
More precisely, like everyone else, Japan realized that the space-based force muliplier technology and infrastruture, with gave birth to RMA, completely outdated militaries not similarly equipped in practically anything other than low-intensity conflicts. Thus the gearing up by Europe (Galileo), China (Beidou) (not exactly friends those two with the snooty French keeping the receipe for roast canard separate while the Chinese attempt to spice the whole affair up with illiberal doses of General Tao’s Sauce) and and Japan (Michibiki) to develop its own PNT capability in case it was denied access or remained dependent on U.S. technology.
In the 1990s, the STA, METI, and the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT), looked to develop a positioning system that would cover a large swathe of Asia, from the Kurile Islands to the north, China to the east, and Guam in the south. In March 1997 the then STA asked what was then NASDA (now JAXA) to move ahead with research into the highly accurate, satellite-mounted atomic clocks needed for a high-precision GPS. This was billed at the time as a matter of “economic security.” As anyone who understands Japan’s nomenclature, “economic security” is a fine bedfellow of “security” and his old chum “national security.” The facinating story of how Michibiki got developed is summarized in In Defense of Japan. Meanwhile, as my recent story in Space News below tries to make clear, the curtains have been drawn open, and people in Japan are starting to talk about Michibiki’s national security role more openly.
*BS means Broadcasting Satellite in Japan, not “the other” meaning.
Posted by japanspace on March 5, 2012
https://japanspace.wordpress.com/2012/03/05/michibiki-finally-licence-to-guide/
I just filed a Military Space Special for Space News last week and am giving an update here. What I have done is to copy an early version of the story below (which has a few more details than the SN version) and some comments and background.
Basically, I recently conducted a sit-down with three director-level MoD personnel who did a good job of convincing me that the MoD is very interested in military space development but feels its hands are tied as long as it continues to face a zero-sum budget game. I stress that this was not said to me directly by the MoD who stressed that the MoD’s budget has held up despite huge pressures on the DPJ to cut due to fiscal pressures.
After talking to industry, however, there is very deep dissatisfaction with the slow pace of movement. Nobody is saying that the DPJ has reneged on the commitments made by the Basic Space Law, but it does appear that military space is drifting in neutral until budget is found. Nobody is being blamed. However, it is clear that the leadership, clear command and budget lines that were supposed to have been introduced by now, are absent.
Until the SHSP or the new Space Agency materializes and budget according to the 「ニーズに対応した５年間の衛星等の開発利用計画（１０年程度を視野（案)」as promoted by the Basic Space Law, no specific budget lines can be drawn up for the MoD, or by the MoD, and this seems to be the single biggest factor stopping more concrete progress.
1. Japan is forging ahead with IGS
In an interview with the CSIC, the one sure bet is that Japan will continue plowing money into IGS. It’s a bit of a Melco money pit, this one, by very efficient Japanese standards, and the system has been plagued by troubles. The first generation optical satellites that have not been performing to spec- let’s hope they could at least resolve buildings, and the radar satellites have been winking off with that old bane of Melco satellites- electrical problems. (Please bear in mind, thought, that compared to spiraling procurement costs of many U.S. military procurement programs, the IGS emerges as freshly laundered as a blouse in a soap suds TV commercial!)
Anyway, hopefully these issues can be ironed out. The new generation of optical satellites should function at 60cm resolution and the new test optical satellite going up next year should be another big leap forward, given that GeoEye-2, has a planned resolution of 25 cm (9.8 in) it would be surprising if NEC and Goodrich couldn’t get at least half way to that. Afterall, ASNARO is looking at 50 cm or so. Given that NEC’s Daichi/ALOS satellite is the basis for the optical system for IGS, and NEC is integrating ASNARO, you can draw your own conclusions about the clarity of IGS’s future vision.
Here is the opening of the story:
Japan’s reconnaissance program continues to burgeon while military space program faces a series of difficult choices, according to a series of interviews with officials in the Prime Ministers Cabinet Office and Ministry of Defense (MOD).
Japan’s Information Gathering Satellite program, known as IGS, will see the launch launching of 10 satellites by 2018, including an extra radar satellite, an official at the Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center (CSIC) said February 7.
One optical and one radar satellite will be launched fiscal 2011 and a radar satellite and a technology test satellite for future higher-capability optical satellites in fiscal 2012; fiscal 2014 will see the launch of a further optical satellite and an “extra” radar satellite. A further optical and radar satellite will be launched in fiscal 2016, and the CSIC is now planning to request the launch of a radar satellite in 2017, “assuming we get the budget to do so,” the official said. Japan’s fiscal year runs April through March.
IGS is designed to function as a fleet of two radar and two optical satellites, but the November 2003 destruction of an H-2A rocket and IGS-2A and 2B and the early failures of two radar satellites (IGS-1B) in March 2007 and IGS-4A in August 2010 have left fleet with only two operational satellites.
As a hedge against future service interruption, Japan decided in October to launch an extra radar satellite and boost CISC’s budget to cover the satellite’s development costs, the official said.
“Yes, we have enough budget to include the extra satellite, although at the moment the plan is continue to maintain a basic four satellite system for the foreseeable future,” the official said.
2. MoD is Pushing Out Development Budgets for Military Space Programs Until 2015 or So
Here is part 2 of the original story:
Japan’s Ministry of Defense, meanwhile, is taking a cautious approach to space acquisition, weighing its needs against what it can afford, according to officials who spoke to Space News on condition of anonymity.
The Ministry of Defense was formally barred from building space systems until 2008 when Japan’s Basic Space Law overrode a 1969 resolution committing Japan to use space exclusively for peaceful purposes.
In addition to making space programs fair game for the Ministry of Defense, the Basic Space Law called for restructuring control of Japan’s space-development budgets and programs away from competing ministries and into a single cabinet-level agency. The 2008 law also called for Japan to double its space spending between 2010 and 2020 and to pursue programs that contribute to its national security.
In response to this direction, the Ministry of Defense in 2009 released a report detailing a long list of space programs it might be interested in developing.
Commentary: According to the MoD’s Basic Guidelines for Space Development and Use of Space of January 15, 2009 by the Committee on Promotion of Space Development and Use, Ministry of Defense of Japan the MoD has an extensive shopping list of needs including- more and better spy satellites, space-based early warning for BMD, a dedicated communications satellite, a SIGINT satellite (no doubt using ETS-8), Space Situational Awareness capabilities (seat belts and rear view mirrors?), microsatellites (ahem) satellite protection (wow- defensive counterspace already!) a dedicated LV (Epsilon, or I’ll eat my hat) and QZSS. But this will remain a wish-list until at least (a) MOD conducts negotiations with the U.S. (b) the next Mid-Term Defense Plan includes substantial funds for military space development, (c) The JAXA Law is amended to allow for for defensive military space development. The technologies are there (at least in theory) but the institutional will, budget and legal issues remain significant barriers.
Kiku-8: Listening in on the Neighbors Soon? Perhaps not!
Thus Japan’s latest National Defense Program Guidelines – a planning document produced every five years (see this survey by The Tokyo Foundation) — are much less specific. The document, approved by the Security Council in December, focuses on the ministry’s role in developing military space programs aimed at bolstering the nation’s space-based surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities.
For now, officials said, the Ministry of Defense is researching when and if to develop a series of capabilities, including its own space-based early warning system, a signals intelligence satellite, a communications satellite, reconnaissance satellites and experimental microsatellites. But with so many decisions to be thought through, these officials said, the ministry will hold off on starting any development programs until 2016, when the next five-year Defense Program Guidelines is due.
For example, the Ministry of Defense is questioning whether it can afford and really needs a space-based infrared missile warning satellite for its fleet of Aegis cruisers and Patriot missile batteries, according to one official.
“When we consider a cost-benefit analysis [of a space-based early warning system] we should consider the U.S.-Japan relationship,” the official said Feb. 8. “We get enough data from the U.S., so we should find out exactly what new capabilities we could get from our own satellite. If we can get appreciable benefit and if we think it is affordable, then we can consider development.”
Part of the issue for the defense ministry’s conservatism is concern about future budgets, said Satoshi Tsuzukibashi, director of the Office of Defense Production at the Japan Business Federation.
Thirty months after enactment of the Basic Space Law, Japan has yet to form a new agency to coordinate national space programs and the sought after budget increased have yet to materialize. “The most difficult problem is budget. If there is a specific budget provided for the [Ministry of Defense], the [ministry] will move ahead and promote its space programs without troubling its commitments to land, air and marine forces,” Tsuzukibashi said Feb. 9.
Commentary: MoD is playing a waiting game: here are the major points I gleaned that are publishable
Even Stage I (2013-17) Epsilon will be the Best Solid Rocket in History
1. Communications: Current transponders on Superbirds, B2, D and C are facing end-of life issues as satellites are retiring. Building a dedicated communications satellite is still under cost-benefit analysis
2. Sigint: This really got the MoD cautious. I will leave you to draw your own conclusions. However, preliminary studies are looking into the feasibility and need for this and the possibility of Japan using a satellite is under study and not ruled out.
3. ASNARO: MoD will consider it IF it works. That’s as far as they would go. ASNARO seems sure to get money for ODA for at least Vietnam and maybe Cambodia. I’m still optimistic that this dual use technology will prove alluring for MoD. At least its a hedge.
4. No surprise here: MoD likes Epsilon. And who couldn’t. It’s great! Even Stage I (2013 Phase 1) Epsilon will be the best solid rocket ever made and for only $200 million. Prof. Yasuhiro Morita is such a genius! Just wait till Phase II is out.
5. SM3 Block IIA is on target and on course, and I believe it’s Japan’s involvement that is helping this to happen. It seems to me to be no accident that the the most successful element in BMD is the part where Japanese companies are supplying the cutting edge components. Bloody hell, the version out now can knock out satellites, functioning as a direct ascent ASAT, just with a software shuffle. I can’t imagine how scared Japan’s neighbors are when they realize just how far they are behind!
6. MoD continues to study microsatellites, what kind of satellites and their potential applications, and that is all that it will say right now. On the other hand the sterling work being up and down Japan in UNISEC and related laboratories, and the plethora of dual use technologies being developed, as well as the guaranteed budget for Japan’s micro/nano/picosatellite development programs means that the MoD is sitting on a goldmine of talent and experience here. Purely accidentally, of course.
Posted by japanspace on March 4, 2012
https://japanspace.wordpress.com/2012/03/04/moving-beyond-a-zero-sum-military-space-game/
Japan Space Policy 